The Champion of Human Rights Meets the King of Kings: Jimmy Carter,the Shah,and Iranian Illusions and Rage

Building on the recent re-discovery of the Iranian Revolution, this analysis examines the policies of the Carter Administration and their effects on Iran and the Iranian opposition. Starting with Jimmy Carter's election and hopes for a new era in American–Iranian relations, there occurred the progressive creation and expansion of a rift between the Carter Administration and the Iranian opposition. This rift was exacerbated by stubborn American support for an increasingly weak Shah, and by the complete unwillingness, both in Washington and at the American Embassy in Tehran, to meet with opposition members, let alone with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In this sense, the horizon of the analysis of the origins of the Iran hostage crisis is expanded with a longer-term perspective. The taking of the hostages represented the final act of a troubled relationship that had probably begun before Carter took office.     

Iran and nuclear ambiguity

A comparison between Iran's current nuclear efforts and those of the pro-Western regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi shows that Iranian ambitions for a full-fledged civilian nuclear programme have remained relatively constant for nearly half a century. Today, fuel cycle technology provides Iran with a latent nuclear weapon's potential. However, US concerns about an Iranian bomb, which began in the early 1970s and aggravated after the Iranian Revolution, long predate Teheran's uranium enrichment programme. Thus, Iran is a specific case of the general problem presented by the inherent potential of nuclear technology to both civilian and military ends. Approaches to dealing with a long-term, ambiguous, latent nuclear weapon threat, whether Iranian or other, are suggested.     

试析伊朗核问题的困境与走势

2011年11月8日,国际原子能机构公布报告认为,伊朗核计划可能具有军事用途,使伊朗核问题再次成为国际社会关注的焦点。伊朗核问题实质上是美国与伊朗围绕各自的国家战略目标进行的战略博弈,双方从战略互信的缺失发展到战略疑虑的加剧。新一轮伊朗核问题与当前复杂的中东局势交织在一起,加剧了地区的紧张局势。尽管目前的伊核问题形势复杂,但对相关各方来说,通过和平手段解决矛盾与冲突仍是最可行、也是最现实的方式。     

Looking Beyond a Nuclear-Armed Iran: Is Regional Proliferation Inevitable?

The past year has seen a steady rise in tensions with regard to Iran's nuclear programme. Iran's economy is being crippled by far-ranging sanctions and the threat of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities looms large on the horizon. Yet the country's nuclear programme marches on, stoking fears that Iran may indeed be seeking to cross the nuclear weapons threshold. In this context, it is timely to consider how key regional players would respond to a nuclear-armed Iran. Many argue that an Iranian bomb would prompt a proliferation cascade in the Middle East. However, a closer examination of the drivers for key regional players shows that this is not necessarily the case. There is a range of non-proliferation tools that could be applied by the West and others to offset this risk.     

Why has the United States not bombed Iran? The domestic politics of America's response to Iran's nuclear programme

Why has the United States (US), under both the Bush and Obama administrations, refrained from attacking Iran even though US officials have depicted the Iranian threat in all but apocalyptic terms and even though a loud chorus in Washington has been persistently calling for a preventive strike against Iran? I present an analysis—informed by Graham Allison's famous bureaucratic politics model—of the main political and bureaucratic forces in Washington acting to promote or impede a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear sites. I argue that America's abstention from attacking Iran should be understood not as a coherent national response to Iran's nuclear programme but rather as (in Allison's terms) an ‘intra-national political outcome’ resulting from the ‘pulling’ of ‘Iran Threat’ interests—primarily Vice President Cheney's camp in the Bush White House, members of Congress, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—and the countervailing ‘hauling’ of the Pentagon, the military's top brass, the intelligence community and the Department of State. The main reason why neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has opted for a military strike is that the ‘haulers’, who were led by a formidable bureaucratic-political player, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have had the upper hand over the hawkish ‘pullers’.     

The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003

The relationship between the United States and Iran has had an important influence on world affairs during the past two decades. Accordingly, the U.S. news media have an instrumental role in portraying U.S.‐Iran relations to the public. The Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979–1981, the TWA hijacking of 1985, the Irangate controversy of 1986–1987, and the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 are examples of important media events that have impacted public opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Iran. This research analyzes government and print media portrayals of the Reagan administration's U.S.‐Iran policy during Irangate. Results supported the prediction that the print media would fulfill their “watchdog” function by providing more critical portrayals of the United States' policy toward Iran than the Tower Commission Report, an investigative document published by President Reagan's Special Review Board. Among the three leading newspapers analyzed, there was significant diversity in the reporting of U.S.‐Iran relations. Results indicate the Reagan administration's attempt to “spin” its version of Irangate did not successfully pressure the media to neglect their watchdog role. Although the Tower Commission Report was less critical of U.S. policy toward Iran than the print media, all four print media sources portrayed the Reagan administration's policy as a flawed approach that degenerated into trading arms for hostages. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

Iranian student activism between authoritarianism and democratization: patterns of conflict and cooperation between the Office for the Strengthening of Unity and the regime

This article examines the role of student activism in enhancing or weakening democratization in authoritarian contexts, focusing on the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It contends that while numerous studies indicate that student activism has been crucial in processes of regime change, insufficient attention has been paid to the circumstances under which it contributes to strengthening authoritarian rule. The case of Iran demonstrates that there are two different ways in which this occurs. First, much like many other civil society actors, student activism can be co-opted and at times willingly so because of a coincidence of material and/or ideological interests. Second, even when student activism genuinely pushes for democratization and becomes independent and autonomous from political power, the authoritarian constraints in place can contribute to marginalize it and defeat it. The Iranian case highlights the problems student activism faces when it attempts to disengage from the dominant structures of authoritarian politics, and in line with Jamal's findings, demonstrates how authoritarian structural constraints can undermine the democratic aspirations of well-organised groups.     

Hizbollah's command leadership: Its structure,decision‐making and relationship with Iranian clergy and institution

Any analysis of the behaviour of the pro‐Iranian Hizbollah organisation in Lebanon requires both an understanding of the movement itself, in terms of its decision‐making apparatus and internal clerical factionalism, and the mechanisms of its institutionalised relationship with Iran and, to a lesser extent, Syria through military and civilian channels at work within Lebanon. This article argues that Hizbollah's behaviour is principally governed by the depth and allegiance of closely forged relationships between individual Hizbollah leaders and Iranian clergy as well as the adaptability of a particular Hizbollah leader to suit the movement's activity to specific requirements within Lebanon and in the region. As such, clerical factionalism within Hizbollah can be monitored by the ascendancy or demotion of clergymen over the leadership and is also a guide to the direction of the movement in Lebanon as well as to the affiliation and loyalty of Hizbollah's leadership with clerical factions and institutions in Iran.     

Response to Clea Bunch's Review of Engaging Iran

President Ronald Reagan's White House leaned toward Baghdad during the Iran–Iraq War because it sought to prevent an Iraqi defeat. Though the White House deemed Iraqi chemical weapons use abhorrent, it found the implications of an Iranian victory or expanded Soviet influence in the Middle East far more alarming. Newly released documents from the Iraqi state archives now allow an exploration of the chemical weapons controversy from both Iraqi and American perspectives. This evidence, along with sources from American archives, demonstrates that Washington and Baghdad had radically different assessments of the Iran–Iraq War. American officials hoped to mould Iraq into a useful ally, but Saddam interpreted American support as subterfuge. Saddam's hostile view of American intentions indicates that Washington had less influence over Iraqi behaviour during the 1980s than both contemporary American officials and many scholars writing since have realised. To insist that Washington could have deterred Iraqi chemical weapons use overstates American clout.     

Notes on Italian foreign politics

The relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran both shapes and is shaped by a new Middle Eastern “Cold War”. The United States and the Islamic Republic should transcend the prospects for hegemonial conflict or strategic standoff and seek a fundamental realignment of their relations, along the lines of the realignment in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China that took place during President Richard Nixon's tenure in the White House. The article examines the imperatives for a comprehensive and strategic realignment of US–Iranian relations from the standpoint of Iranian interests and foreign policy concepts as well as from an American perspective. It also evaluates the actual prospects for US–Iranian rapprochement.     

Struggling on the World Scene: An Over-ambitious EU versus a Committed Iran

Abstract

In 2003, the EU was hopeful to convince Iran to give up its nuclear programme. Five years later, most signals point to an accelerated nuclear programme in Iran. This article first aims to sketch an overview of the EU efforts, and secondly to make an interim assessment of the effectiveness of the EU's approach vis-à-vis Iran. While the final assessment may be different, the current evaluation is disappointing from the point of view of the EU. The Iranian case does not enhance the EU's strategic reputation in the world.     

To Prevent a Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Promotion of Democracy in Iran

John F. Kennedy came to power in 1961 with Iran on the verge of revolution against the Shah's unpopular policies. To stabilise the situation, his Administration attempted to promote democracy through a development plan based on the precepts of modernisation theory. Backed by academic theorists who argued that promoting democracy was the best way to secure victory in the Cold War, Kennedy developed an ambitious plan to transform Iran. This policy was seen as essential to replace the inevitable uncontrollable revolution and subsequent loss of Iran, with one controlled and directed by Washington. This analysis provides the first comprehensive examination of this plan and its foundations that has heretofore been overlooked. Kennedy's policy towards Iran illuminates the role that external powers can have in manufacturing, supporting, and encouraging a country's transition to democracy. Its failure, and the absence of any replacement plan to ensure political reform, made inevitable the uncontrollable revolution which eventually came in 1978.     

伊朗核问题走向与中国安全

伊朗研发核技术的决心(包括能力)与美欧阻遏伊朗拥核的立场严重对立。美国不能容忍伊朗拥核坐大,但能够采取的手段有限,而伊朗问题又涉及诸多大国利益。伊朗核问题将使中东局势乃至大国关系更加复杂,包括对中国的国家安全产生影响。     

The Iran Coup That Never Dies

The 1953 coup in Iran that toppled the nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq stands as one of the most controversial episodes of the Cold War. It is often referred to as the original sin where U.S. meddling poisoned relations between the two sides and even made the Islamist revolution of 1979 possible. But recent evidence suggests that America's role in the coup was a minor one and the key actors determining the course of events were the Iranians themselves. It was Iranian generals, clerics and everyday citizens who put an end to Mossadeq's premiership. All the Western lamentations aside, this was very much an Iranian affair.     

Revolutionary Power and Socialization: Explaining the Persistence of Revolutionary Zeal in Iran's Foreign Policy

Why do states stay revolutionary for so long? The question of why and how some political players of a country successfully pursue a revisionist strife against the status quo has neither theoretically nor empirically received systematic attention. I use a current policy issue, the crisis regarding Iran, as a single-case study to examine the issue. This article argues that answers are found in the interconnected realms of domestic politics and revolutionary ideas. In Iranian politics specifically, it is both the ideological conservative faction's occupation of key constitutional positions and pursuit of revolutionary ideas, which have caused the recurring and large degree of revolutionary zeal. In turn, this has had a significant effect on the extent of the Islamic Republic's socialization to regional and international politics.     

Confrontations on the Issue of Terrorism Between Iran and the U.S. after 1979

The issue of terrorism has been a significant source of influence on the relationship between Iran and the U.S. since the Islamic Revolution. Iran's friendship with extremist groups that are designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. State Department is seriously challenging America's foreign policy. This article attempts to explore the prospect of confrontations on the issue of terrorism between Iran and the U.S. through a detailed analysis of their different interpretations and mutual recognitions of terrorism and through an in-depth analysis of the measures each party has taken regarding this confrontation. This article argues that the confrontation between Iran and the U.S. regarding the issue of terrorism is not strictly about terrorism. Rather, it is also about the conflicts of policies that result from different security interests and political values. Resolving the issue of terrorism depends on the reconciliation of the relationship between Iran and the U.S. Without mutual trust between the two nations, Iran will continue to support extremist groups in order to increase its influence against the external and internal pressures it is currently under, and the U.S. will continue to contain Iran's regional ambitions and seek changes in its behavior.     

Why Does the United States Keep Helping Iran?

Since the Jimmy Carter administration, Iran has been America’s most consistent enemy. Strangely, however, the United States repeatedly helps its opponent. Following the 9/11 attacks, Washington aided Iran’s interests in six episodes: toppling the Taliban; overthrowing Saddam Hussein; suppressing the ISIS caliphate; backing the Saudi intervention in Yemen; withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, and assassinating the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani. Of course, Washington does not deliberately assist its opponent. Rather, the United States unintentionally helps Iran by creating power vacuums, into which Tehran steps, and triggering power surges, or coercive campaigns against Iran, which also tend to backfire and bond Iran more closely with third parties.     

Russia’s Policy towards the Middle East: The Case of Yemen

ABSTRACT

Yemen occupies a peripheral place in Russian foreign policy for three reasons: lack of serious economic interest, the illusory potential of strengthening the military presence there and recognition of Saudi Arabia’s role in the Yemeni conflict. However, a deepening of the split within the Arab coalition in Yemen, primarily between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, has not only forced the Russian authorities to seek a balance between Yemeni actors, but also made Russia part of the so-called ‘Yemeni triangle’ alongside the two GCC countries. Russian involvement in the Yemeni crisis is constrained by its economic weakness and prioritisation of Russia-Gulf relations more broadly.     

Indonesia's democratic stagnation: anti-reformist elites and resilient civil society

As Egypt and Tunisia begin difficult democratic transitions, comparative political scientists have pointed to the world's largest Muslim nation, Indonesia, as a role model. Seen as a stand-out exception from the global recession of democracy in the pre-2011 period, Indonesia has been praised as an example of a stable post-authoritarian polity. But a closer look at Indonesia's record in recent years reveals that its democratization is stagnating. As this article demonstrates, there have been several attempts to roll back reforms introduced in the late 1990s and early 2000s. While not all of these attempts have been successful, Indonesia's democratic consolidation is now frozen at 2005–2006 levels. However, the reason for this democratic stasis, the article argues, is not related to Diamond's notion of societal dissatisfaction with bad post-authoritarian governance. Opinion polls clearly show continued support for democracy despite citizen disgruntlement over the effectiveness of governance. Instead, I contend that anti-reformist elites are the main forces behind the attempted roll back, with civil society emerging as democracy's most important defender. This insight, in turn, questions the wisdom of the decision by foreign development agencies – in Indonesia, but other countries as well – to reduce their support for non-governmental organizations and instead intensify their cooperation with government.     

Iran's Hezbollah Model in Iraq and Syria: Fait Accompli?

This essay argues the wars in Iraq and Syria are not over. Iran has used the war against the Islamic State, and, more generally, the instability in Iraq and Syria, to successfully spread and legitimize its influence. If the U.S. intends to challenge Iran's influence in Syria and Iraq, it needs to demonstrate its long-term commitment to its local partners, and it needs to work with its partners to secure and stabilize eastern Syria and western Iraq. Countering Iran's influence in Iraq and Syria is a long-term project, and creating viable alternatives to Iranian influence in Damascus and Baghdad is the best way to prevent them from becoming long-term Iranian dependencies.This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/.