Sir Eric Phipps,the British Government,and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933–1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps’ reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933–1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps’ attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

“Never a Dull Moment”: The Moscow Ambassadorship of Sir Frank Roberts in the Years of the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, 1960–1962

This analysis explores the largely unsung Moscow ambassadorship of Britain’s Frank Roberts (1960–1962). After examining his Embassy’s role in developing cultural and commercial relations, the article addresses Roberts’ involvement in the Berlin and Cuban missile crises. In the former case, he made a low-key but important contribution by influencing American policy; in the second, he provided insightful assessments of Soviet attitudes and thinking. Roberts’ ambassadorship demonstrated the continued importance of resident embassies and ambassadors, because of the lack of ministerial-level Anglo–Soviet relations and the need to interpret Soviet policy in crisis situations. The research contributes to the literature of diplomatic representation as well as of Anglo–Soviet relations during the Cold War.     

Alan Bullock, 1914–2004: “I Only Write Enormous Books” 1

Alan Bullock (1914–2004) was one of Britain’s most distinguished scholars and the author of several extremely important books on recent and modern European civilization, history and culture. His enormous contribution to British, European, and Anglo-Saxon culture and historiography is easily discernible in his many books and essays. Chief among them his biography of Hitler, parallel study of Hitler and Stalin, three volume biography of Ernest Bevin, and the Fontana dictionaries of modern thought. One of Bullock’s greatest achievements was the establishment of St. Catherine’s College in Oxford University, at which he served as the Founding Master for more than a generation (1962–1990). Prior to WW II, recent European history was not considered a respectable research field worthy of serious academic work, nor was it thought that there existed the necessary distance from recent events for historians to deal with such history in a proper fashion. However, Alan Bullock’s books turned the study of modern and recent European history into the mainstream of postgraduate studies at Oxford. Lord Bullock contributed tremendously (together with Hugh Seton-Watson, Bill Deakin, Hugh Trevor-Roper and A. J. P. Taylor) to the breakthrough which turned contemporary history into a focus for academic research and teaching.     

“A Trivial and Unimportant Ally”? Britain and the West German-Soviet Treaty Negotiations, 1970

ABSTRACT

This analysis explores British perceptions and roles regarding the negotiation of the West German-Soviet Moscow treaty of 1970. Whilst supportive of West German Ostpolitik, Britain has received a very marginal role in the historiography of the treaty. By exploring the consultation process in the so-called Bonn Group of the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany, this exegesis explains that Britain played a leading role in building consensus and forming schemes to resolve the issue of the treatment of Quadripartite Rights and Responsibilities concerning Berlin in the Moscow treaty package. As background, this essay also explains the policies of the Harold Wilson’s Labour government and Edward Heath’s Conservative government regarding European détente in Europe, including West German Ostpolitik.     

Sir Eric Phipps, the British Government, and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933-1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps' reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933-1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps' attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

Dealing with the Intractable: A Possible Negotiating Position for the New British Ambassador to Berlin,Summer 1933

Foreign Office diplomats recognised the danger to British security posed by Adolph Hitler’s accession to the chancellorship of Germany in January 1933 but differed on how to meet this challenge. This article reproduces the hitherto unpublished draft instructions prepared by Owen O’Malley, a ranking official at the Foreign Office, for the newly appointed ambassador to Germany, Sir Eric Phipps, on taking up his posting in autumn 1933. Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent under secretary, who took a sceptical but not entirely hostile view of O’Malley’s proposals, minutes O’Malley’s suggestion of a clear warning to Hitler, accompanied by the opening of negotiations with Nazi Germany recognising its enhanced position and the justice of some of its claims. Vansittart did not forward the draft memorandum to the foreign secretary, Sir John Simon, and there is, as far as I know, no copy of this in the public archives. Included is additional information on the clashes between the two men on how dictators should be treated as well as biographical information on the careers of the three men involved in this debate.     

The Spirit of Ulysses? Ideology and British Appeasement in the 1930s

The British government's appeasement of fascism in the 1930s derived not only from economic, political, and strategic constraints, but also from the personal ideologies of the policy makers. Widespread guilt about the terms of the Versailles Treaty and tensions with France created sympathy for German revisionism, but the Cabinet properly recognized that Nazi Germany represented the gravest threat to peace in the 1930s. Fear of war and the recognition that Britain would have to tolerate peaceful change underlay attempts to appease the dictators, culminating in the Munich agreement in September 1938. After Munich, continued German belligerence, the Kristallnacht, and British intelligence assessments indicating that Hitler was prepared to attack the Western powers led to a reassessment of appeasement. The British government gave security guarantees to several European countries, seeking to deter future aggression and to lay the groundwork for a successful war against Germany should it prove necessary. While most of the British elite detested communism, anti-communist views did not govern British policy; security considerations required Soviet support in Eastern Europe, and Britain and France made a determined effort to secure Soviet support for the Peace Front.     

Hard‐Core Toughie: Donald Trump’s Negotiations for the United States Presidency

This paper examines the negotiation tactics employed by Donald Trump in his 2016 presidential campaign. Drawing on data from multiple sources (interviews, debates, articles, books), our analysis begins with a brief overview of Trump’s personality and philosophy, which offers a basis for understanding his general negotiating approach. We then highlight six competitive tactics and four principles of persuasion that Trump employs, with specific examples of how he used them during the campaign with his primary negotiating counterparts – the other candidates, the Republican Party, the press corps, and the American electorate. Finally, we discuss some of the implications of his negotiating approach and preferred tactics in dealing with domestic and international issues as president of the United States.     

The Polish Blitz,More than a Mere Footnote to History: Poland and Preventive War with Germany, 1933

The January 1933 appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor of Germany marked the beginning of the end of the fragile post-war peace throughout Europe. The Polish leadership had good reason to fear his threats of revising the Treaty of Versailles. Realising that Hitler was too dangerous to remain in power, the Polish leadership led by Marshal Józef Pi?sudski prepared for a preventive war against Germany. Unfortunately, the appeasement policy among the Western Powers condemned this plan to failure and forced Poland into signing a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1934; thus dooming Poland's existence. To test his premonitions about Hitler, Pi?sudski created several international “incidents” concerning the Free City of Danzig, designed to test both Germany and whether the Western Powers would fight to uphold the Treaty of Versailles. Pi?sudski's efforts offer proof that Poland deserves more credit for its determination to deal with a rising tide of Nazi Germany.     

“Only the USSR Has… Clean Hands”: The Soviet Perspective on the Failure of Collective Security and the Collapse of Czechoslovakia, 1934–1938 (Part 2)

The second part of this two part essay focuses on the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938, based on papers from the Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii in Moscow and the recently published journals of Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan M. Maiskii. The essay is also grounded in British, French, and Romanian archives, and the standard document collections, including the American and German series. The Soviet Union did all that it could do, given Anglo-French abdication, to help the Czechoslovak goverment defend its independance against Nazi Germany. The British and French portrayed a manipulative Soviet Union, seeking to abandon treaty commitments to Czechoslovakia, while at the same time they fled from obligations to Prague and projected their own evasions onto Moscow. In spite of everything, the Czechoslovak president, Edvard Bene?, might have held the fate of his country in his own hands. Would he do “something crazy”, would Czechoslovakia fight alone at the outset, hoping that public opinion would force France and Great Britain into war? Tragically, Bene? would not bid va banque and indeed was complicit in the Anglo-French abandonment of his country. By its reckoning, the Soviet Union escaped the crisis with “clean hands”, though a clear conscience was no consolation in Moscow, where the government had to contemplate the ruin of collective security and its own isolation in Europe.     

Sir Austen Chamberlain and British Foreign Policy 1931–37

This article seeks to analyze Sir Austen Chamberlain’s critique of British foreign policy in the six years before his death in 1937. It presents Chamberlain as one of the most perceptive contemporary observers of the international scene, and in particular of Hitler’s Germany. Unusually among British politicians, Chamberlain drew a direct causal connection between the domestic policy of the Nazi regime and its likely behaviour in the international arena. However, it is suggested that the basis for his understanding was an innate anti-Germanism, which can be dated back to his experiences as a young man in the 1880s.     

Being Nuclear on a Budget: Churchill,Britain and “Atoms for Peace,” 1953–1955

This analysis critiques the impact of President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for Peace” initiative on Washington’s alliance with Britain, itself a newly crowned nuclear state. Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s taste for personal diplomacy led him to support his friend’s proposal without real consideration for how the contributions of fissionable materials and manpower demanded by the scheme would damage Britain’s overstretched domestic nuclear project. Membership of an international atomic agency allowed Britain to reaffirm its global status whilst depleting the resources needed to develop its native technology. In turn, the article discusses the commercial challenge posed by American nuclear firms and highlights how reactor exports quickly became a contest between the quality of British research and the quantity of American subsidies. In this way, it establishes how “Atoms for Peace” prejudiced both Britain’s domestic nuclear effort and export potential, in turn shedding light on Washington’s relations with an ailing Great Power.     

The making of a public in a political campaign: A participant observation study

Abstract

The author served as a press assistant in the 1978 gubernatorial campaign of Ohio Lieutenant Governor Richard F. Celeste. This article examines the evolution of campaign strategy in the 1978 Democratic primary. Faced with token opposition, Celeste used the primary to introduce policies and establish themes for his general election campaign against incumbent James E. Rhodes. This study focuses on the Celeste campaign's efforts to identify and reach a particular constituency within the Ohio electorate. The “making of a public,” influenced by demographics and the results of opinion surveys, became a tentative, reactive process. The candidate's public identity and strategy were negotiated during the course of the primary campaign. Pressed by events and criticism from the press, the candidate eventually deemphasized the specifics of issues as he sought to redefine himself for a public of voters.     

The Occupy Wall Street Movement: Reports by the U.S. Mainstream Media

Occupy Wall Street is a mass protest that began in New York on September 17, 2011. The protesters came mainly from thelower-middle classes. They were protesting against Wall Street＇s ＂greed,＂     

Shaping the race issue: A special kind of journalism

The paper examines the press coverage of the Los Angeles Times in the 1982 gubernatorial election between Mayor Tom Bradley and George Deukmejian in terms of the proclivity to highlight Bradley's race in campaign news stories. The paper focuses on the statement made by Deukmejian campaign manager, Bill Roberts, in the early days of October, with his candidate trailing badly in the polls, that “there was a hidden anti‐black vote” that would aid Deukmejian on election day. The authors detail the Los Angeles Times coverage of this statement and the tendency of the Times to focus on this story during the entire month of October rather than to report on the issues addressed by the candidates. The analysis notes that as campaign coverage zeroed in on the race issue, so did polls and voter interest. After examining the coverage and Deukmejian's narrow victory, the authors pose questions of ethics to reporters engaged in this writing and outline concerns for such practices in future elections and campaigns.     

试论塞西尔·罗得斯与南部非洲政治格局的形成

塞西尔·罗得斯是19世纪中后期在南部非洲疯狂推行殖民扩张政策的英国殖民主义代表人物之一,其殖民行径在客观上对于南部非洲政治格局和政治版图的形成具有一定影响。在南非联邦的建立问题上,他提出通过加强与布尔人的经济关系和交通联系,以及向布尔人让渡部分权力的办法,换取布尔人的支持,用和平、渐进的新路径推动了两个白人民族和解和南非联邦的建立。另外,罗得斯及其领导下的英国南非公司的殖民行为还推动了津巴布韦和赞比亚两国政治地理版图的形成,并引进比较科学的行政管理模式,从而在客观上对当地无意识地起到了一些"建设性"的作用。但这全然不能掩饰殖民主义在人类文明史上的罪恶和破坏作用的本质。     

Do Online Ads Influence Vote Choice?

Do online ads influence vote choice? We partner with a German party to evaluate the effectiveness of online ads using a cluster-randomized experiment. During the 2016 Berlin state election, 189 postal districts were randomly assigned to (a) emotional ads; (b) factual ads; or (c) no ads. Analyzing electoral results at the postal district level, we find that the overall campaign weakly increased the party’s vote share by 0.7 percentage points (p-value = 0.155). We also estimate a negative effect of the campaign on the vote share of the party’s main competitors of 1.4 percentage points (p-value = 0.094). Turning to the mechanism of persuasion, we find that the factual ads, if anything, fared slightly better than the emotional ads. Our evidence thus provides tentative support that online ads positively affect vote choice.     

High and Low Tide: Sino–American Relations and Summit Diplomacy in the Second World War

Studies of Chinese involvement in Allied relations during the Second World War tend to focus on the Cairo Conference of November 1943 and see it as the high point for China’s wartime diplomacy. This analysis argues that the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference, held just prior to Cairo in late October–early November, was more important for the achievement of China’s longer-term interests. The participation at Moscow of Cordell Hull, the American secretary of state, was unique as the State Department was absent from almost all the Allied wartime summits. President Franklin Roosevelt liked to conduct his diplomacy personally. In Moscow, however, Hull represented the United States, and his patience and persistence led to the inclusion of China in the Four Nation Declaration that resulted from the meeting. That, in turn, meant that China was eventually included as a permanent member of the eventual United Nations Security Council and seen as a post-war Great Power. It was a more significant outcome than those resulting from the Cairo Conference.     

A ‘missed opportunity’ for peace? Harold Wilson,British diplomacy,and the sun flower initiative to end the Vietnam war,February 1967

This article examines Harold Wilson's attempts to promote a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war during his first term in office as Britain's Prime Minister, with particular reference to his discussions with the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, in London in February 1967. Wilson's diplomatic efforts were influenced by his intention to improve Anglo-Soviet relations, and by his belief that the United Kingdom could help develop East-West contacts and facilitate the process of detente. In conclusion, this article argues that the failure of the Sunflower initiative in February 1967 was due not to the intervention of American ‘hawks’, as Wilson supposed, but to the convoluted clash of interests of the powers involved either directly or indirectly in the Vietnam war – the USA, USSR, China, and North Vietnam – which handicapped third-parry peace initiatives.     

The power of Trump-speak: populist crisis narratives and ontological security

Abstract

For most observers, the election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States (US) came as a shock. This has been widely recast as the culmination of the American public’s long-standing dissatisfaction with the political elite and deep-seated frustrations with broader socio-economic conditions. We argue that the Trump campaign’s success also stemmed from its effective use of an emotionally charged, anti-establishment crisis narrative. With insights from political psychology, we examine the socio-linguistic mechanisms that underlie the effectiveness of ‘Trump-speak’ through both quantitative and qualitative content analysis of Trump’s communications toolkit during the 2016?US presidential election campaign. We show that his leadership legitimation claims rest significantly upon ‘crisis talk’ that puts his audience in a loss frame with nothing to lose and explain why ‘crisis talk’ impacts on political behaviour. As we demonstrate, the crisis stories that political agents tell simultaneously instil ontological insecurity among the American public and serve to transform their anxiety into confidence that the narrator’s policy agendas are the route back to ‘normality’. Through these rhetorical mechanisms, the Trump campaign manipulated individuals’ ontological (in)security as a tool in the politics of reassurance at the broader, societal level.