Terrorism,Conflicts and the Responsibility to Protect Cultural Heritage

Abstract

Intentional destruction of cultural heritage is a well-known phenomenon which has been particularly exacerbated in recent times. Its common denominator is represented by the intent to persecute the communities for which that heritage represents an essential element of their cultural identity and distinctiveness. In legal terms, it produces different implications, to the point that – depending on the circumstances in which it is perpetrated – it may be qualified as a war crime, crime against humanity, violation of internationally recognised human rights, or evidence of the existence of the intent to commit genocide. Since the whole international community is seriously affected by the destruction of cultural heritage, it is indispensable that the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P) be put into practice seriously and effectively with the purpose of protecting humanity against the irreplaceable loss of its heritage.     

The Responsibility to Protect at Ten: Glass Half Empty or Half Full?

Abstract

Far from having faded away, ten years after its formal adoption, the responsibility to protect (R2P), is arguably more relevant than ever. In the current overall context of protection crises, heightened in severity by the emergence of violent extremists, R2P has changed the way in which the international community characterises situations that involve protection failures, and has raised expectations about what should occur when atrocity crimes have been committed or are imminent. UN member states now agree that prevention is at the core of R2P, that international action should employ the full range of diplomatic, political and humanitarian measures, and that military force should only be considered as a measure of last resort. While there is continued contestation about particular aspects of R2P – as there is over much older normative advancements, such as human rights – R2P has helped to forge political consensus and build new institutional capacity to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes.     

R2P: “State of Play”

Abstract

Is R2P the most effective tool the international community has to prevent genocide, or the newest neo-imperial norm perpetuated by the most powerful states? In a dramatic performance of the key debates within R2P, each of these views is presented before Aristotlean and Tocquevillean insights are drawn upon to find a middle ground rooted in citizen resistance against mass atrocity crimes. R2P can both become a more effective tool of prevention and gain needed political legitimacy by drawing on the rich historical tradition of citizen resistance to empower local actors defying regimes engaged in mass atrocity crimes.     

Civil Society and the Responsibility to Protect

While a vast and growing literature on various aspects of responsibility to protect (R2P) exists, little attention has yet been given to the role played by civil society in the development and implementation of this doctrine. This paper aims to fill this gap. After providing a typology of civil society organisations—categorising this amorphous sphere into advocacy, operational and indigenous groups—this paper examines the contribution of civil society to the discussion surrounding the development of R2P. In particular, civil society has debated three main issues: the pros and cons of building an international coalition to promote R2P, the possibility that great powers could hijack the doctrine and the opportunity of using force during R2P implementation. As a whole, this paper argues that not only advocacy, operational and indigenous civil society organisations hold different ideas about R2P and have different strategies for its implementation but, more importantly, their approaches, strategies and actions may end up undercutting one another. This argument is explored in the case of Darfur—the first crisis many analysts have described as an R2P situation.     

Responsibility to Protect: Russia’s Approaches

Abstract

Russia’s predominantly suspicious and even negative attitudes toward R2P are closely related to its traditional attachment to the notion of sovereignty, but its reluctance to ‘bless’ the use of force with R2P also serves as a pretext to cover various instrumental goals. Russia’s more assertive foreign policy has exacerbated this trend. Disagreements stem from differences between Russia and the West both in their conceptual approaches to security and in their assessments of specific cases. In particular, Russia has an existential concern over possible application of R2P by extra-regional actors in its immediate post-Soviet vicinity. However, in the conflicts around South Ossetia (2008) and Crimea / Southeastern Ukraine (2014-), there was a noticeable trend to refocus R2P-related arguments in support of Russia’s own actions. By and large, R2P continues to be perceived as a Western attempt to establish certain rules of behaviour which require caution and prudence. Nevertheless, more positive attitudes do not seem impossible. To play a prominent role in the evolving international system, Russia will have to make the R2P segment of its foreign policy more salient and overcome the lag in promoting this concept as a working tool indispensable for cooperative and responsible leadership.     

First Things First: R2P Starts with Direct Negotiations

Abstract

Public debates on R2P one-sidedly focus on its forcible aspects. They should, however, also focus on R2P’s non-coercive aspects, which include the legal obligations to cooperate and to pursue peaceful conflict resolution, notably the obligation to undertake meaningful attempts at negotiation before coercive means are taken into consideration. After the Arab Spring erupted in Libya and Syria, other countries did not exhaust reasonable efforts to deal and negotiate with the incumbent powers, and to assist and encourage them to meet their obligations under R2P, even though negotiations are part and parcel of the R2P framework and constitute the very first step to be taken whenever a state seems to ignore its obligations under that framework.     

对俄罗斯国际私法立法的评介及借鉴

前苏联解体后,俄罗斯根据对外民事交往的形势和需求,构建了新的国际私法体系。与前苏联相比,俄罗斯国际私法在立法形式上并没有重大突破,但在立法内容上,调整范围大为拓宽、意思自治原则应用的领域也更为广阔、最密切联系原则成为准据法确定的基本原则、诸多冲突规范均有实质性的改变。俄罗斯新的国际私法立法,对与其立法背景大体相同或相似的当前中国国际私法立法具有重要的借鉴意义。     

On our terms! How domestic elites localised the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala

Abstract

In summer 2004, an UN-sponsored international rule of law commission based on an initiative of the Guatemalan human rights community was rejected by Guatemalan political elites. In 2007, a new version, the International Commission against Impunity (CICIG), was approved by the Guatemalan Congress and has since been active in the country, supporting the modernisation of the Guatemalan judicial system and the investigation and prosecution of criminal networks. The CICIG has been hailed as part of a new generation of rule of law promotion that addresses the problems of post-conflict states. How did this change in elite support come about? Neither increased pressure from the international community nor changes in the elite groups in power can fully explain this shift. Rather, Guatemalan elites actively reshaped the commission; in addition, the human rights community reframed it to better fit the risk perceptions of the general public.     

Creating norms around the Eastern Mediterranean energy resources as a necessary means of security

ABSTRACT

The energy discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean since the 2000s have placed the long-standing rivalry between Turkey and Cyprus (and by extension Greece) in a new context, bringing also Egypt and Israel into the geopolitical equation. Turkey, on the one hand, has adopted an assertive profile, whereas, on the other hand, two axes of cooperation have been formed, Greece-Cyprus-Egypt and Greece-Cyprus-Israel, convening trilateral summits and signing agreements. In view of that, it is currently upheld that the confluence of energy interests among the actors of the trilateral summits has facilitated a legalisation throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, propelling states towards the development of the energy resources according to the UNCLOS, and the implementation of the international law in the Cyprus problem, as a necessary means of guaranteeing the actors’ sovereignty, creating norms, and enhancing security, without targeting any third country. The argument shows how legalisation, as a special form of institutionalisation, and soft law, in particular, nurture regional cooperation and place it under the “protective wings” of international institutions.     

Russia as a ‘virtual great power’: Implications for its declining role in European and Eurasian security

Instead of analyzing just some recent developments of Russia's domestic, foreign and security policies, this article focuses in particular on mid‐ and long‐term strategic trends and the consequences of Russia's decline for European and Eurasian Security. It argues that Russia is still in a long‐term socio‐economic decline and it is unrealistic to expect that Moscow will regain its former status as a Great Power or even Superpower in the mid‐term future even of its economy and military power improve rapidly and substantially. Against this background, two other powers of the Eurasian landmass, the EU and China will surpass Russia in international standing and secure great power status in the coming decades with far‐reaching consequences for the international system and Russia's security as well as for its role in Europe and Central as well a East Asia. In this light, the article analyzes strategic trends in domestic, foreign and security policies, including the impact of often overlooked factors such as demographic trends and the health crisis, of decentralization, regionalization and fragmentation within the Russian Federation, the future of Russia's military reform policies (including Russia's draft military doctrine of October 1999 and its nuclear illusions) and their implications for Russia's future foreign and security policies.     

Neutrality Regimes

Abstract

I analyze a model of war expansion in the shadow of international law, where neutrality regimes emerge as equilibria in which only aggressive states are expected to violate the law. By sorting belligerents according to their ambitions (restrained or aggressive), neutrality regimes can help resolve third-party uncertainty over the desirability of balancing. Punishment for violations of the law emerges in equilibrium from self-interested power calculations absent any principled legal commitment. The model shows that (a) neutrality regimes can be effective not despite but because of inconsistent compliance; (b) strong third parties are uniquely prone to failures to balance under neutrality regimes; and (c) ratification of neutrality regimes can be facilitated by mutual and severe mistrust. Neutrality regimes need not be epiphenomenal to power politics; rather, they can support balance-of-power systems.     

Derogating from International Human Rights Obligations in the ‘War Against Terrorism'? — A British–Australian Perspective

ABSTRACT

This article examines the United Kingdom's Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) from an international human rights law perspective. It argues that both pieces of legislation raise serious concerns in relation to international legal obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Both international treaties allow for ‘derogation’ from certain provisions in times of ‘public emergency’. While the United Kingdom has officially derogated from some of its treaty obligations, Australia has yet to submit a similar notification. This article argues, however, that the United Kingdom's derogation is unlawful. Likewise, current circumstances in Australia would not permit lawful derogation from the ICCPR.     

The Israeli defense forces and unconventional warfare: The Palestinian factor and Israeli national security doctrine

The basic premises of the Israeli national security doctrine were laid down by the first Prime Minister, David Ben‐Gurion, who emphasized the decisive role of the neighboring sovereign states as the crucial enemy. This view continues to guide the architects of Israeli strategic thought despite the growing importance of a non‐state actor, that is, the Palestinian national liberation movement.     

The Russian case for military intervention in Georgia: international law,norms and political calculation

Abstract

The Russian military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 has raised significant questions about Russian thinking and practice on the legitimate use of military force abroad, especially in relation to neighbour states. The arguments advanced by Russia to justify this campaign show how Russian interpretations of customary international law as well as norms related to the use of force have served as an instrument of state policy, rather than being rooted in any broader international consensus. The Russian discourse in this context about sovereignty, self-determination and the legitimacy of recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia as states appears similarly to be strongly influenced by political self-interest and Russian views about its entitlement within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. Among Russian claims, Moscow's commitment to support its ‘citizens’ abroad has been particularly controversial. This article examines these issues and also the possibility that, through its justifications for waging war against Georgia, Russia is more broadly contesting the interpretation of certain international norms, that it regards as essentially constructed by Western states. Some potential implications of these legal and normative arguments for future Russian policy in the CIS region, including Ukraine, are also examined.     

Responsibility to Protect: Emerging Rules on Humanitarian Intervention?

This article discusses different forms of military force under or linked to the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P) in relation to international law, with particular emphasis on humanitarian intervention. It contributes to the ongoing debate by analysing and separating the lawful forms of military force falling under Pillars II and III of the R2P from unlawful claims and extensive interpretations of R2P. Apart from the already existing legal right of the Security Council to authorise humanitarian interventions, it is argued that there are no ongoing legal customary developments of similar rights or obligations for other actors to intervene in another state (without consent) to protect populations by military force against grave crimes under the principle of R2P. The argumentation is based on a series of case studies of humanitarian interventions by the Security Council, regional organisations and “coalitions of willing states”. The article also includes legal analysis on the Uniting for Peace Procedure and the prior treaty-based consented rights to intervention under the African Union Act and the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention.     

我国东北国际河流与东北亚安全

我国东北国际河流主要以界河为主,鸭绿江、图们江、黑龙江等几条界河构成了中朝、朝俄、中俄的共同边界,界河是相互依存的重要物质因素,它与边界安全息息相关,上述重要国际河流的存在也使得俄罗斯远东地区、朝鲜以及我国东北地区水资源非常丰富,但是由于人类活动的频繁,对水资源没有很好地开展国际合作等原因,使该流域的水资源已经存在一定的安全问题。我国目前应借鉴建构主义理论,更新观念、以国际法为指导、以河流自然地理为基础建构友善的睦邻关系,维护东北亚地区安全。     

After One Hundred Years of Service: Hegemony,Pan-Americanism,and the Monroe Doctrine Centennial Anniversary, 1923

ABSTRACT

In 1923, the United States celebrated the centennial anniversary of the Monroe Doctrine. Overlooked by historians, the centennial served as more than an isolated moment of memorialisation; this analysis investigates the ways in which it shaped and reflected domestic perceptions of the place of the United States in the world during the early 1920s. The various celebratory events that took place across the nation re-enforced the discordant nature of United States national security by emphasising and exacerbating the doctrine’s disputed meaning. By providing a forum in which it could be scrutinised, the centennial emphasised the policy’s fractured meaning and demonstrated that both regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and Pan-Americanism were perceived as core values of United States national security that emanated from the doctrine’s enunciation in 1823.     

Toward an effective international legal order: from coexistence to concert?

In forbidding the use of force except in self‐defence against armed attack or when authorised by the Security Council, the UN Charter appears to be the culminating development of a system of international order based on the doctrine of state sovereignty. The cumulative result of international‐law‐related acts, omissions and declarations of the Bush administration since its inception can be construed as a fundamental challenge to the sovereign state system. The administration's stated security strategy is one possible response to undoubtedly grave challenges to national and human security. In fact, only an institutionalised partnership between the US and regional powers such as China, India, Brazil and Germany can hope to address those challenges successfully, in part because only it would have the requisite legitimacy. That partnership or concert could be organised within the UN framework, albeit intensifying its hierarchical elements.     

The interplay of international institutions in Kosovo between convergence,confusion and niche capabilities

Abstract

This article examines the interplay of international institutions in Kosovo and aims at disentangling and explaining the emergence and persistence of this international ‘interim’ regime. In 1999, the UN mission to Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were the leading institutions in the civilian area following NATO's deployment of Kosovo Force (KFOR). Following the failed status talks on Kosovo, the EU's rule of law mission (EULEX) and the establishment of an International Civilian Office (ICO) have been set up in addition for increasing institutional complexity. The article analyses how institutional complexity is emerging and what strategies international institutions are applying when confronted with policy overlap. The paper finds that the emergence of institutional complexity in Kosovo is largely a result of historical lock-in effects. International institutions have developed two dominant strategies to cope with dense institutional spaces. First, they show signs of a functional convergence and a coordinated pooling of resources. Second, institutions have developed niche competences to avoid competition.     

Egypt’s Foreign and Security Policy in Post-R2P Libya

Abstract

The post-intervention situation in Libya poses foreign and security policy challenges for Egypt. Egypt’s definition of the Libyan problem centres on two fundamental aspects: it is depicted as the consequence of an unfinished R2P military intervention, and perceived as part of a regional war against Islamist terrorism. All practical steps being taken by the authorities in Cairo are based on this dual framing. The implications of its positioning are, firstly, a securitised approach to foreign policy, including limited military interference and proxy support and, secondly, the emergence of a partisan position. To date, the impact of Egypt’s foreign policy line in the Libyan theatre has been limited and hence its viability risks being thrown into question.