Terrorist countermeasures

At the end of 1997 the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), and their proxies the South Lebanon Army (SLA), remained hopelessly bogged down in a military quagmire which is played out daily in the hills and valleys of Southern Lebanon. As each new week passed more and more Israeli and SLA soldiers fell victim to the Islamic Resistance's (IR) most effective weapon, the roadside bomb, no amount of “preventive patrolling” could manage to reduce the frequency with which these indiscriminate attacks took place, nor did it confine the planting of these devices to the perimeter of the Security Zone. Having recently completed an assignment with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Brendan O'Shea, of the History Department at University College, Cork, Ireland, investigates the claims of Nabih Berri, Leader of the Shi'ite Amal Movement and Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, that the blood‐spattered hills of South Lebanon have now become “Israel's Vietnam.“¹     

Know thy enemy: Hizbullah, ‘terrorism’ and the politics of perception

The labelling career of the Lebanese armed group and political party Hizbullah is an interesting case with which to investigate the epistemological consequences of the politics of naming. Having found itself since its inception in the mid-1980s on the receiving end of mainly US and Israeli policy makers' and analysts' scorn for being an archetypical terrorist organisation, Hizbullah has been surprisingly successful in achieving its stated aims and in enduring the verbal and military onslaught against it. Although it is not the intention here to reduce explanations for Hizbullah's durability to discursive politics, this article suggests that both the labelling of Hizbullah as terrorist and, conversely, its identification as a ‘lebanonised’ political force that is about to make its conversion into an unarmed political party are misleading and incapable of grasping this organisation's complexities. In fact, both ‘terrorist’ and ‘lebanonised’ labels produce a quality of knowledge inferior to that produced by Hizbullah's own conceptualisation of its enemies. But most importantly, the debate on Hizbullah's alleged terrorist nature has obscured several of its traits that many should register before passing judgement on it. Our analysis shows that the variety of institutions Hizbullah has been carefully elaborating and readapting over the past two decades in Lebanon operate today as a holistic and integrated network which produce sets of values and meanings embedded in an interrelated religious and political framework—that of the wilayat al-faqih. These meanings are disseminated on a daily basis among Shi'a constituencies through the party's institutionalised networks and serve to mobilise them into ‘the society of the Resistance’ (mujtamaa’ al-muqawama), which is the foundation of the hala al-islamiyya (Islamic sphere) in Lebanon. Accordingly, any prospect of Hizbullah's transformation away from armed ‘resistance’ should be firmly placed in an analysis of its hegemony among the Shi'a of Lebanon and of the tools it uses to acquire and sustain this status.     

Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case

This article examines the degree of efficacy of Israel's antiterror policies and ability to cope with terrorism using seven parameters that fall into seven parameters: reduction in civilian casualties among Israelis and Palestinians, Israel's ability to cope economically, Israeli social cohesion, the status of international and domestic support for the Israeli government and the extent of weakening of international and domestic support for the Palestinian leadership. The article concludes that based on most of these parameters, Israel has been successful in coping with terrorism, although greater security must be attained through a change in Palestinian policies.     

Israeli State Violence during the Second Intifada: Combining New Institutionalist and Rational Choice Approaches

In attempting to explain Israel's retaliatory policies toward Palestinian violence, new institutionalist and rational choice theories vie for dominance. This article argues that both approaches can contribute to understanding the severity of Israel's response if they are viewed as nested explanations appropriate to different threat levels. The article makes its case using data from 74 interviews with senior Israeli counterterrorist experts (2006–07), counts of Israeli and Palestinian fatalities due to state and collective violence (1987–2007), and a database of collective violence events during the Second Intifada (2000–05). Institutional effects are evident at low threat levels, as new institutionalists predict, but these effects are overwhelmed at high threat levels, as rational choice theorists assert.     

Taking Hand-Outs or Going It Alone: Nationalization versus Privatization in the Funding of Islamist Terrorist Groups

This article explores the consequences for the funding of Islamist terrorist groups of nationalization, in the form of state sponsorship, versus privatization, in the form of autonomous financing. The article begins by examining the evolution in terrorist groups’ sources of funding from state sponsorship to autonomous activity, then turns to the benefits and costs to terrorist groups of relying on state sponsors. The article then analyzes the benefits and costs of procuring funding autonomously. Finally, the article weighs those benefits and costs in relation to a terrorist group's emphasis on enhancing its constituency versus pursuing its agenda. The article's central conclusion is that nationalization tends to boost a terrorist group's constituency while privatization tends to bolster a group's agenda. Determining which advantage takes priority depends on the relative importance to a given terrorist group at a particular time of enhancing its constituency versus advancing its agenda.     

Torn Between God,Family, and Money: The Changing Profile of Lebanon's Religious Terrorists

Based upon this researcher's prior work and the conceptual denouement from geocultural immobility to religious terrorism, the author speculates that the reverse may be achieved and a zealot's motivation for religious terrorism might be purged once his or her basic Moslovian needs are fulfilled. Thus, this article attempts to empirically assess in some elements of Hizbullah, the effect of newly found wealth, money, and family exigencies on the Lebanese Shi'a's religious zealotry, his or her perceived religious commitments, and their acts of terrorism. This research concluded that Hizbullah in Lebanon, an organization originally established as a religious network with narrowly defined politico-socioeconomic goals, has eroded. Many of its individual cells now serve primarily their own self-interest instead of their perception of God's will. These cells are defying Hizbullah's main leadership wishes and committing criminal actions designed to serve cell or family interests. Its sophisticated network is already being used to transport and harbor criminals across the Mid-East and Europe. This research stress that the well-established Hizbullah cell organizations that protect each and every element and coordinate with other terrorist organizations are ripe to be exploited for international criminal activities. More importantly, this research attempts to explain and delineate the process by which nations may manage, control, reform, or even eliminate such international affliction.     

THE THIRD SECTOR AND IMMIGRANT ABSORPTION: LESSONS FROM THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE

This paper deals with the role of two third sector organizations in immigrant absorption in Israel during the mid-1980s through 1993. The Jewish Agency, a non-governmental, voluntary, non-profit “public institution” funded by Diaspora Jewry had responsibility for immigrants during their first year in the country. It represented world Jewry and Israeli political parties. A second third sector institution, the quasi-public party controlled state religious school system played a significant role in the education of Ethiopian immigrant children.

The paper evaluates their impact on the absorption of immigrants. To what extent did these third sector agencies pursue their own agendas and or serve the immigrants? The paper also examines the influence of Israel's political-administrative systems on the third sector. How unique is the Israeli experience? Hopefully the findings will shed new light on the politics of collaboration with the third sector in contemporary Israel.

Evidence presented here suggests that third sector absorbing agencies often pursued their own interests at the expense of the immigrants. The paper also reveals the complexity of the political and administrative character of Israel's third sector. Finally, the analysis shows the importance of political-administrative systems for understanding third sector collaboration in Israel.     

A Reply to Professor Kushner

Based on field research in Lebanon and Sri Lanka, this article discusses the ways in which Hizballah and the LTTE use nonprofit service provision as a tool for increasing community support. The article compares the organizations’ goals for service provision and specific structures of service provision. The difference in resources and capacity between the two organizations has shaped the structure of service provision used by each organization. Whereas Hizballah autonomously operates a sophisticated group of nongovernmental organization (NGO) service providers, the LTTE has developed an elaborate system for controlling and channeling the resources of existing local and international NGO service providers.     

Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations

Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups offer the analyst a highly complex challenge. The current literature classifies Islamic terrorist organizations as either networked or hierarchical. Yet, this classification fails to account for the appearance on the international stage of a new type of global terrorism. Most notably, it does not capture the structure and mode of operation of Al Qaeda as it emerged after the 2001 U.S.-led assault on Afghanistan. This article therefore introduces a new conceptthe Dune organizationthat is distinct from other organizational modes of thinking. This conceptualization leads to a new typology of Islamic terrorist organizations. This typology concentrates on organizational behavior patterns and provides a framework for a comparative analysis of terrorist movements, which is applied to a study of Al Qaeda, Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.     

Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party

Despite the classification of Hezbollah as a terrorist group by several states, Hezbollah is recognized as a legitimate political party within Lebanon. The purpose of this article is to probe at the reasons why Hezbollah was able to achieve its current status in the Lebanese government while it still maintains a powerful, well armed military branch that has used force recently to influence Lebanese politics. An examination of Hezbollah's life cycle suggests that two major factors were decisive: 1) Hezbollah's political leverage over the majority government, and 2) choices by Hezbollah's leaders to moderate their objectives to achieve domestic political goals.     

Quantifying and Qualifying Charisma: A Theoretical Framework for Measuring the Presence of Charismatic Authority in Terrorist Groups

In the past four decades, there has been increased multidisciplinary scholarly interest in the study of charismatic authority. However, there has yet to be any systematic examination of charismatic authority in the context of terrorism, despite widespread acknowledgment of the importance of charismatic leaders in the recruitment, radicalization, and operation of terrorist groups. This article seeks to contribute to future empirical research by presenting a theoretical framework for measuring the presence of charismatic authority in terrorist groups that is based on Max Weber's seminal work on legitimate domination (herrschaft) and on theoretical insights drawn from the study of charismatic authority in new religious movements. The framework is then applied to an illustrative case study of the relationship between charismatic authority and the radicalization process within the far-right terrorist group “the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord.” The article concludes with a discussion of findings and suggestions for future research.     

Counterterrorism research and development

An effective de-radicalization process in prisons is intended to facilitate the renouncement of violence and terrorism by those that have carried out such offenses. A key lesson that can be drawn from Israel's de-radicalization efforts is that it is possible, indeed recommended, to treat inmates—regardless of their level of radicalization—in a dignified and humane manner. However, Israel's ability to significantly de-radicalize security prisoners is limited if it is at all existent in its current form. Security prisoners with the potential for positive change should be placed in a different, perhaps foreign setting. This article provides an overview of Israel's prison system, the challenges it faces, its efforts to de-radicalize security inmates and suggests additional courses of action.     

Terrorism: Review of 1988 and prospects for 1989

This article is the first to explore the Israel Defense Forces's official statistical data on Palestinian terrorism toward Israeli targets during the al-Aqsa intifada 2000–2004. Focusing the analysis on the logic of terrorist target choice, the article identifies two separate results: First, an unambiguous difference in the form of the attacks contingent on whether they are carried out in the state of Israel or in the Occupied Territories. Second, based on the same distinction, the analysis points out how the attacks are targeted toward distinctively different categories of the Israeli populace. Causes of the results are discussed.     

Target Malacca Straits: Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia

The strategic and economic importance of the Straits of Malacca makes it one of the world's major sea routes most vulnerable to a terrorist attack. The piracy problem that continues to frustrate maritime authorities in the Straits bears proof to this and, given the heightened security concerns post–9/11, has alarmed the waterway's major users. Although international pressure has forced the littoral states—Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia—to up their efforts on improving Straits security, national interests and a reluctance to address the problem as a potential terror threat continues to hinder cooperation. This article attempts to look at how three neighbors in the same Straits came to have such divergent policies on combating maritime terrorism.     

Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption

Because of the importance of technology to the operations of modern terrorist groups, the factors that affect the technological sophistication of extreme organizations are of great interest. In this article, the process through which terrorist groups seek out and deploy new technology is examined by bringing to bear the deep literature that exists on technology adoption by commercial organizations. A framework is described that delineates not only the factors that influence a group's decision-making processes surrounding new technology but also the obstacles that stand in the way of the successful absorption and use of unfamiliar technologies by a terrorist organization. This framework, by taking a holistic view of the entire technology adoption process, sets out a methodology to both more reasonably predict the outcome of a group's technology-seeking efforts and to speculate about its future innovation efforts. Such a technology focused viewpoint provides a route to more fully inform risk assessment, especially with regard to the low probabilityhigh consequence technologies that have served as the focus of much recent counterterrorist deliberation. The lessons provided by the framework with respect to weapons of mass destruction terrorism and to novel counterterrorist routes are discussed.     

The geopolitics of ‘Enclavisation’and the demise of a two-stateSolution to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict

This paper argues that Israel's military strategy since the outbreak of the second Intifada, in September 2000, has been one not merely of ‘security’ or ‘counter-terror’ but part of a longer-term strategy of spatial demolition and strangulation. This strategy seems predicated on two aims: unilateral separation from the Palestinian population, and its concomitant territorial dismemberment. Withdrawal from a totally controlled and isolated Gaza, in effect the latter's enclavisation, is part of this strategy. Such an enclave will in effect be functionally and spatially sundered from another chain of Palestinian enclaves in the West Bank. From an Israeli perspective, driven by its own distinctive territorial imperative, such separation will ensure Israeli control of and sovereignty over the best land and water resources, and control of all borders and border areas. It is further argued that the policy of unilateral separation and strangulation, the destruction and planned enclavisation of Gaza, and covert and overt settlement expansion in the West Bank—its dismemberment through exclavization, has in effect shattered the spatial basis of a two-state solution.     

Stable instability: the Syrian conflict and the postponement of the 2013 Lebanese parliamentary elections

Given the morass of the Syrian civil war and Lebanon’s exposure to the consequences, this article seeks to explore how the intersecting dynamics of Lebanese domestic conflicts and the multiple implications of the bloodbath in Syria have influenced the behaviour of Lebanese political parties in their ongoing struggle over the formulation of a new electoral law, leading to a broad consensus among the country’s parties to postpone the 2013 parliamentary elections. The article argues that, while the usual attempts to profit at the expense of other groups in society are still present and external patrons still wield great influence, the decision to postpone the elections also demonstrates a degree of pragmatism and political development since, despite dire predictions to the contrary, Lebanon has not succumbed to the return of its own civil war. Instead a complex mixture of pragmatism, elision of interests and external influence, combined with local agency, has led Lebanon into a situation of stable instability.     

Reference Group Perspective on State Behaviour: A Case Study of Estonia's Counterterrorism Policies

For over a decade Estonia has been untouched by terrorist violence. However, notwithstanding the lack of a viable terrorist threat, the Estonian government adopted extensive counterterrorism measures. What explains the scope of Estonia's counterterrorism measures? The main proposition of this article is that the content of states' counterterrorism policies is shaped by the types of responses adopted by their reference groups. The evidence examined in the study demonstrates that Estonia's primary reference groups, NATO and the EU, have influenced the republic's counterterrorism programme. An unattractive target to terrorists, Estonia adopted broad counterterrorism responses to defend indivisible Euro–Atlantic security and to protect democratic values that terrorists attempt to destroy.     

Failure and Disengagement in the Red Army Faction

This article examines the factors that have contributed to the end of the Red Army Faction (RAF), and places particular emphasis on the causes and characteristics of individual disengagement of RAF members from the armed struggle. It discusses the evolution, ideology, and decline of each of the three generations of the RAF. The article's contribution is twofold. First, by assessing both contextual- and individual-level factors that led to the group's demise, the article bridges two approaches to analyzing the demise of terrorist organizations—the literature on how terrorism ends and why individuals disengage from terrorism. Second, the article helps build a growing empirical body of work on the demise of terrorist groups that can be used to confirm, challenge, or refine existing hypotheses on how terrorism ends, while formulating new ones. The article concludes that different factors contributed to the decline of each subsequent generation of the RAF. Successful German police efforts played a critical role in thwarting the RAF's first generation. Lack of public support and recruits, due in large part to an escalation of terrorist violence, hastened the decline of the second generation of the group. The third generation suffered from serious interorganizational strife, exacerbated by a government initiative that offered to release those RAF members from prison who renounced terrorism.     

Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering

Hizbullah, which has been designated a terrorist entity in several international jurisdictions, depends upon a substantial mobilization of financial resources to support its complex, multi-faceted organizational apparatus, its domestic activities in Lebanon, and its far-reaching transnational operations. This study surveys Hizbullah's resourcing requirements, and examines the role of military assistance from Iran and Syria along with Hizbullah's own reliance on front organizations, clandestine networks, business enterprises, propaganda media, and local exactions to generate funding for operational activities. Particular attention is directed at the diversion of charitable contributions, the exploitation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), involvement in criminal activities and contraband trade, and the money laundering mechanisms utilized to transfer funds to where they are required. It also reviews efforts by international authorities to staunch the flow of financial resources to terror groups, activities and operations, including their effect on Hizbullah terrorism finance.