论规范性文件不予一并审查:判断要素及其认定规则——基于1799份裁判文书的分析

规范性文件“能否一并审查”是对规范性文件合法性进行实质审查的先决问题。根据现有的制度规定,可将司法实践中规范性文件不予一并审查的类型划分为基础性要件缺失、附带性要件缺失和例外情形等三类,每种类型都包含多种情形和不同判断要素。法院应当采取更加积极宽容的态度,尽可能地将更多的规范性文件纳入一并审查的范围。对于不予一并审查的规范性文件的认定,应当在区分规范性文件与非规范性文件的基础上,综合运用多种认定标准明确界定规范性文件排除审查的范围。应当赋予第三人一并审查的请求主体资格,并明确当事人延迟提出一并审查请求“正当理由”的判断标准。对于不予一并审查例外情形的认定,应审慎对待,严格约束法院司法裁量权的行使。     

The Meanings of the Logical Constants in Deontic Logic

If deontic logic is to cast light on any of the normative sciences, such as legal reasoning, then certain problems regarding its logical constants must be faced. Recent studies in the area of deontic logic have tended to assume that it is our responses to the "paradoxes" of deontic implication which are fundamental to resolving problems with the use of deontic logic to investigate various branches of normative reasoning. In this paper I wish to show that the paradoxes are of secondary importance; that they are merely by-products of the central issue, namely the ability of certain syntactic forms to embody natural language structures used in reasoning about norms. An investigation of modal syntax is proffered as the best starting-point from which to tackle the questions that still dog the legitimacy of deontic logic. Part I provides some philosophical background to the discussion of deontic logical constants. Part II addresses in greater detail issues concerning the representation of normative concepts; and Part III offers a few remarks on the general issue of deontic logic's fruitfulness as an analytical tool.     

Some Remarks on the Concept of Toleration

The paper contains a conceptual analysis of "act of toleration" and the property of "being tolerant". Being tolerant is understood as a dispositional property of persons manifested in what the author calls the "circumstances of toleration". The main circumstances distinguished are: a tendency to prohibit a certain behaviour and the competence to determine the deontic status of the behaviour in question. An act of toleration, then, consists in not prohibiting (or cancelling the prohibition of) that behaviour. It is argued that this requires the existence of two different normative systems, the "basic system", and the "justifying system". Acts of toleration must be based on reasons coming from the latter. This insight enables one to establish a difference between reasonable and unreasonable toleration, as well as between toleration and related concepts like indifference, acquiescence, etc. The analysis also introduces the distinction between "vertical" and "horizontal" toleration. Acceptance of this last category implies that toleration does not necessarily require hierarchical relationships between those who tolerate and those whose actions are tolerated.     

From Boundary Drawing to Transitions: the Creation of Normativity under the EU Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control

This article aims to make a contribution to debates about how to conceptualise normativity. It argues that normativity can not be just understood through defining it and in particular through identifying conceptual boundaries around the normative and the non-normative. Instead the article suggests that it is important to explore how transitions between the non-normative and the normative occur in practice. This argument is developed through a critical examination of literature on legal pluralism and an analysis of qualitative empirical data on the drafting of technical guidance documents under the European Union Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (96/61/EC).     

Correctness and Cognitivism. Remarks on Robert Alexy's Argument from the Claim to Correctness*

The argument from the claim to correctness has been put forward by Robert Alexy to defend the view that normative utterances admit of objective answers. My purpose in this paper is to preserve this initial aspiration even at the cost of diverting from some of the original ideas in support of the argument. I begin by spelling out a full‐blooded version of normative cognitivism, against which I propose to reconstruct the argument from the claim to correctness. I argue that the context of uttering normative propositions points to the possibility of normative cognition, but does not constitute it. What constitutes the possibility of cognition is, as of necessity, the propositional structure of norms. I conclude that the argument from the claim to correctness ought to safeguard a distinction between the context of uttering a normative sentence and the proposition that individuates the content of the utterance.     

Detachment and Deontic Language in Law

Some legal philosophers regard the use of deontic language to describe the law as philosophically significant. Joseph Raz argues that it gives rise to ‘the problem of normativity of law’. He develops an account of what he calls ‘detached’ legal statements to resolve the problem. Unfortunately, Raz’s account is difficult to reconcile with the orthodox semantics of deontic language. The article offers a revised account of the distinction between committed and detached legal statements. It argues that deontic statements carry a Gricean generalized conversational implicature to the effect that the rules in question reflect the speaker’s own commitments. Detached legal statements are made when this implicature is either explicitly cancelled or when the conversational context is sufficient to defeat the implicature. I conclude by offering some tentative reflections on the theoretical significance of deontic language in the law.     

The Fundamental Features of Legal Rationality

Abstract. The aim of this paper is to clarify the logical structure of a code connecting together some distinctions already introduced by different authors: a distinction between primary norms and secondary norms, the latter being implied by the provisions describing institutions in the indicative; a distinction between norms the content of which concerns a state and those the content of which concerns a behaviour which is itself function of several states; a distinction, among the primary norms, of the norms of competence by which a normative power can be delegated to an individual; lastly a distinction between regulative rules and constitutive rules.     

“Truly free consent”? Clarifying the nature of police legitimacy using causal mediation analysis

Journal of Experimental Criminology - To test whether normative and non-normative forms of obligation to obey the police are empirically distinct and to assess whether they exhibit different...     

英汉道义情态跨文化研究

从英汉两种语言的句法分布、不同的文化价值取向和情态主观性的体现特点出发,可以对英汉道义情态进行跨文化对比研究。英汉道义情态的语言表达受到各自语言特点和超语言因素的影响。汉语因句子结构和词性变化的局限,多用情态助动词表达道义情态,在表达方式上要比英语单一,并因此而凸显其主观性。英汉民族文化心理特征和文化价值观的不同对英汉道义情态的表达也有影响。     

Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law

This article seeks to address the current state of theoretical debate within feminist legal studies in the United Kingdom and beyond. It is part map, part critique of dominant theoretical trends – an attempt to identify and explore a range of questions about feminist scholarly engagement in law, including the relationship between academic feminism and political activism, the distinction (if any) between 'feminist' analyses and broader engagements with law and gender, and the normative underpinnings of feminist legal scholarship. The author makes no pretence to neutrality on these issues, questioning the perceived 'drift' between political and academic feminism, and arguing strongly for the recognition and realization of feminism's normative and transformative aspirations. Similarly, she challenges the emergence of an 'anti-essentialist' norm in feminist discourse, and reaffirms the value of 'women-centred' feminist approaches. Finally, this article is also a personal venture, a 'stock-taking' exercise which seeks to interrogate the author's own understanding of what feminist legal work entails.     

Some Remarks on the Notions of Legal Order and Legal System

Abstract
In this paper, the authors discuss some problems related to the existence and identity of legal norms and legal systems. Firstly, two criteria for identification of legal norms are analyzed: linguistic criteria and non-linguistic criteria. Secondly, the dynamics of legal systems and the distinction between legal system and legal order are examined (close to Raz's distinction between momentary legal system and legal system). Based on the logical relations of membership and inclusion, two ways of analysing the change of legal systems are suggested. Thirdly, a criterion for identification of legal orders (from Bulygin) is discussed and it is shown that this criterion does not explain adequately, on the one hand, the existence of some norms, i.e., customary norms; and, on the other, the existence of invalid norms; i.e., unconstitutional norms. The main conclusions of this paper are: (a) the concepts of legal system and legal order could not explain the existence of law in a given society; (b) the concepts of legal system and legal order could be considered models of rational normative systems.     

Normative and rational choice accounts of human social behavior

Two approaches to the problem of explaining social order are compared: the rational choice approach (as represented in Coleman'sFoundations of Social Theory) and the normative or social control approach, in which rules and rule-following play the central role. Considered in terms of Coleman's own criteria for social theory, only the social control approach seems plausible. In particular, the rational choice approach is circular in that it necessarily presupposes the existence of rules and rule-following, while its pretense is to be able to explain social order in non-normative terms. The social control approach accounts for social order in terms of the existence of social rules and the innate capacity of human beings to learn to follow such rules.     

Deontic Logic and Legal Knowledge Representation*

Abstract. The current literature in the Artificial Intelligence and Law field reveals uncertainty concerning the potential role of deontic logic in legal knowledge representation. For instance, the Logic Programming Group at Imperial College has shown that a good deal can be achieved in this area in the absence of explicit representation of the deontic notions. This paper argues that some rather ordinary parts of the law contain structures which, if they are to be represented in logic, will call for use of a reasonably sophisticated deontic logic.     

Nonviolent offenders' and college students' attachment and social support behaviors: implications for counseling

This study examines the relationships between adult attachment orientations and the ability to seek social support as factors in mediating behavior. Data were collected on non violent offenders (n = 57) and college students (n = 89). The results indicated the non-normative group of nonviolent offenders reported being more securely attached and having more satisfaction with their social supports than the normative group of college students. Fewer college students reported being securely attached than the nonviolent offenders but had a larger number of social supports. In the insecure categories, nonviolent offenders reported being more dismissively attached whereas college students reported being preoccupied in their attachment orientation. The study suggests that attachment and social-support-seeking behaviors across different populations may be potential factors in designing counseling services that are used for risk classification and needs assessment.     

Negating and Counterbalancing: A Fundamental Distinction in the Concept of a Corrective Duty

I argue in this paper that negating and counterbalancing should be recognised as two fundamental categories of corrective action. First, I show that recognising the distinction helps to avoid confusion when asking normative questions about the justification of imposing corrective duties. Second, I argue that we have moral reasons to care about the difference between negating and counterbalancing detrimental states, and this has implications for permissible action. I then outline some ways in which the discussion helps us explain and justify specific legal remedies in private law, and I conclude by noting some exceptions to the normative priority of negating over counterbalancing.     

Normative Systems,Permission and Deontic Logic*

Abstract. The authors concentrate on the analysis of the concept of permission. After a general account of differing concepts of permission both with regard to different legal theories and to different legal ideologies, they argue in favour of a “radical” imperativism which leaves no place for permissive norms. Thus, in contrast with the logic of normative language (LNL) purported by Alchourrón and Bulygin, the authors figure out a system of deontic logic - supplemented by devices of the possible world semantics - according to which a normative system (N) is conceived as a set of logical consequences of a certain finite set of basic obligations and no room is left either for the concept of weak permission or for the concept of strong permission. Finally the authors raise some criticisms concerning the view maintained by Alchourron and Bulygin on strong permission.*