Visualizing Estonia

The concept of "Estonia" is constituted in different sign systems. Each such sign system models and communicates various aspects of "Estonia", adding simultaneously its medium specific signs to the concept. The dominating visual representations circulating internationally about Estonia are photo albums, postcards, films, web pages and other iconic items. Photo albums in particular are constituted by the orthoscopic parameters of painting and the innocent notion of ‘picturesque’. In Estonia these albums present hardly anything else than architecture and weirdly empty environment. The reason for this might be a long-term impact of ideology of the past that still tends to constitute an idealist kaleidoscopic overview of the country with no social dimension and its problems as a part of it. The modest level of visual literacy is obviously another reason of the endencies of representation that we observe in this research. The scenes offered in the visual façade menu mostly come from the past that refersto the vitality of the "national" model of culture in Estonia. Hence we haveCorrection Form file:///C:/Workdir/PROG/recfolder/111113/STY39736/Correction for So... 1 of 2 11/11/2013 3:39 PM the concept of a city/state as first of all an open-air museum. The status of "visual Estonia" would be more interesting with inclusion of first: heterotopic environment in the visual representations; second: shifing the "orthoscopic parametres" of representations; and third: diversifying scopic positions.     

"Bru-u-u-uce": The simple economics of mob goods

This paper provides a pure economic rationale for chronic excess demand for tickets to events like rock concerts. The model focuses on "mob goods", which are consumed jointly with crowd reaction, or "noise". Whereas the primary commodity is provided by the seller, the joint product is provided collectively by buyers. If propensities to make noise are inversely correlated with reservation prices and a capacity constraint applies, excess demand (queuing) is a necessary condition for profit maximization. One important implication is that anti-scalping laws may be welfare-increasing. The paper explores other applications in professional sports, restaurants, and on-stage theatre.     

Alternative forms of the Shapley value and the Shapley-Shubik index

We prove the validity of an alternative representation of the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index of voting power, based on the following model. Voting in an assembly consisting of n voters is conducted by roll-call. Every voter is assumed to vote "yea" or "nay" with equal probability, and all n! possible orders in which the voters may be called are also assumed to be equiprobable. Thus there are altogether 2 ⁿ n! distinct roll-call patterns. Given a simple voting game (a decision rule), the pivotal voter in a roll-call is the one whose vote finally decides the outcome, so that the votes of all those called subsequently no longer make any difference. The main result, stated without proof by Mann and Shapley (1964), is that the Shapley-Shubik index of voter a in a simple voting game is equal to the probability of a being pivotal. We believe this representation of the index is much less artificial than the original one, which considers only the n! roll-calls in which all voters say "yea" (or all say "nay"). The proof of this result proceeds by generalizing the representation so that one obtains a value for each player in any coalitional game, which is easily seen to satisfy Shapley's (1953) three axioms. Thus the generalization turns out to be an alternative representation of the Shapley value. This result implies a non-trivial combinatorial theorem.     

Random errors, dirty information, and politics

Rational voters' assessments of candidates and policy proposals are unbiased, but affected by random errors. "Clean" information decreases these errors, while "dirty" information increases them. In politics, most voting procedures weigh random individual errors asymmetrically. Thus, such errors do not counterbalance one another in the aggregate. They systematically affect politics. This illuminates the roles of political propaganda and interest groups. It helps to explain various puzzles in Public Choice, e.g., the frequent use of inefficient policy instruments. Institutional conditions are identified that shape the aggregate impact of individual errors and the politicians' incentives to produce dirty information.     

On the Edge of Solidarity: The Burqa and Public Life

Dislike among European publics for the Islamic full veil and the desire to ban it are often ascribed to nativist "Islamophobia." This article questions that assumption. It argues that, in political terms, the wearing of the burqa and niqab is inconsistent with Western norms of equality, the backbone of the citizenship ideal; and that, in social terms, the full veil erects a partition to interpersonal understanding and reciprocity. While the constitutional duty to protect religious freedom is a good argument in favor of tolerating the full veil, the practice of wearing it is at the edge of solidarity and injurious to the democratic public sphere.     

Social order through constitutional choice: A contractarian proposal

The present paper consists of two closely related parts: one which outlines a normative criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of constitutional change and one which specifies a particular proposal of a constitution. The criterion used stems directly from the "pragmatic" brand of contractarianism developed by Buchanan, where an approximate rule of unanimity is utilized. The proposal aims at the highest possible freedom of choice for individuals when it comes to defining the political system of their liking: a core (dealing with public goods and rights) is common for all, but everything else can vary between different sub-constitutions between which individuals choose.     

A comment on the limitations of the logical framework method,in reply to Gasper,and to Bell

The note examines three inherent weaknesses of the logical framework (LF) approach. (i) It is based on binary logic, which biasses its output towards designs which are too complex and wide in scope, because that logic excludes the sort of approximate reasoning which would support practical compromises in design. (ii) Fuzzy logic is identified as a partial solution to this problem, but this introduces the issue of the naïve realism implicit in LF, which normally assumes that there is only one way of interpreting individual development problems. (iii) The paradigm underpinning LF is examined, and its implications for managing unexpected effects during implementation are drawn out. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are you sitting comfortably? Estimating incumbency advantage in the UK: 1983–2010 – A research note

This note adapts two models commonly used to estimate the incumbency advantage that US members of Congress enjoy – the ‘slurge’ and the Gelman-King Index – to provide comparable estimates for UK MPs. The results show that Liberal Democrats enjoy extremely large such advantages on a par with those of US Congressmen of between 5% and 15% of the vote. Labour and the Conservatives have incumbency advantages at around 2% and 1% respectively. The note estimates that effects could have changed the outcome in as many as 25 seats in some elections, and that they cost the Conservatives the chance to govern alone after the 2010 election.     

Returns to effort in rent-seeking games

In the traditional formulation of rent-seeking games, increasing returns to effort are characterized by an exponent r>1. However, when the value of the rent is normalized to 1, the players’ effort levels A and B will typically be less than 1. Thus, when A<1 and r>1, the value of A ^r decreases as r increases, contradicting the interpretation of r>1 as representing increasing returns to effort. This apparent defect in the mathematization of the problem seems to suggest that a different interpretation of r is required whenever A<1, upsetting the uniformity and elegance of the model. In this short note, we demonstrate that the perceived problem is illusory, and that the usual interpretation of r is satisfactory for all values of A.     

Equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market

We study an organized market for votes, in which trade is directed by a market "specialist". This market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome, and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is Pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade. We then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one-dimensional policy space, and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough, then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying (the median ideal point). This difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side-payments.     

Loyal political cartels and committee assignments in Congress: Evidence from the Congressional Black Caucus

This study presents a political model whichsuggests that monopoly legislators form cartel-likeorganizations (referred to as ``memberships'') in aneffort to extract greater benefits in the politicalprocess. Based on a model by Coker and Crain (1994)that provides theoretical and statistical argumentsfor congressional committees as loyalty-generatinginstitutions, the instant research examines committeeplacement of ``members'' of the Congressional BlackCaucus (CBC) in the U.S. House by Democrat leaders.Voting records indicate that the CBC is uniform in itsvoting patterns, indicating cartel-like behavior.Because of this, the Democratic leadership in theHouse chooses to place CBC members on importantcommittees in order to support their policy agenda.The general finding of this study is that ``blackrepresentation'' may be greater than simply theproportion of seats held by black Representatives."Legislators differ substantially by virtue of their committeeassignments. Committees in Congress, and particularly in theHouse of Representatives, possess disproportionate power over thepolicy areas in their respective jurisdictions, have the rightto hold hearings, and recommend budget allocations for ...bureaus ..." (Grier and Munger, 1991: 25)     

(Non)equivalence in a federalism: Dual tax shares, flypaper effects and Leviathan

Among the best-known theorems of fiscal federalism is the presumed allocative and distributive equivalence between a lump-sum grant to a collectivity and a set of lump sum grants to the members of a collectivity. Interestingly, the simple elegance of the theorem is at odds with observed behavior. Grants to governments produce greater public spending than does tax reduction. Explanations of this "flypaper effect" range from misspecified econometric modeling to presumed behavior based on fiscal illusion. In this paper we show that theoretical equivalence exists in a model that recognizes only one tax share, the citizen voter's local tax share. When the model is expanded to include voters' federal tax shares as well as local taxes, non-equivalence and the flypaper effect become the rule, not the exception.     

The 1999 Knesset and prime ministerial elections in Israel

This election note delineates the outcome of the 1999 elections in Israel, in which the Prime Minister was directly elected — for only the second time — concurrently with the parliamentary election. It then analyzes the election results produced by Israel's unique electoral system, and assesses their immediate ramifications.     

Banzhaf voting power, random elections, and the Electoral College winner’s advantage

In a recent article, Riggs et al. (2009) aim to measure the ‘Electoral College winner's advantage’—in particular, the extent to which the winner’s electoral vote margin of victory is magnified as a result of (i) the ‘two electoral vote add-on’ given to each state and (ii) the ‘winner-take-all’ mode of casting state electoral votes. Their results are based on two sets of one million simulated two-candidate elections. This note has two purposes. The first is to demonstrate that RHR’s simulation estimates can be calculated precisely using the theory of voting power measurement. The second is to correct several flaws in RHR’s analysis, the most substantial of which pertains to the effect of the two electoral vote add-on, which actually has a negative effect on the winner’s advantage.     

Fast cars,fast food,and fast fixes: industry responses to current ethical dilemmas for Australian advertisers

• This paper reviews three ethical dilemmas currently facing advertisers for cars, fast food and pharmaceuticals in the U.S., U.K. and Australia, and discusses Australian industry responses to these dilemmas. In Australia, as in the U.S. and U.K., the main response mechanism for advertisers has been the introduction of self‐regulatory codes of practice. It is important to note that in a number of cases there is no conclusive evidence of the argued harm from advertising that is subsequently banned or regulated. A review of the general and trade press, and the records of the Australian Advertising Standards Board, finds that industry responses tend to be based on industry rather than community concerns, with the primary motive being to avoid deleterious outcomes for the industry rather than for society as a whole.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How do voters form positive economic beliefs? Evidence from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy

Beliefs about normative economics appear to be primarily determined by sociotropic rather than egocentric variables. (Sears & Funk, 1990; Citrin & Green, 1990) Using the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy, the current paper finds that the same holds for positiveeconomic beliefs in most – but not all – cases. This hinges on whether a question is “causal” or “non-causal”: Causal beliefs depend on sociotropic variables, especially education and ideology; non-causal beliefs, in contrast, depend on egocentric variables, with income growth playing the leading role. This is consistent with a cognitive model where actors answer easier questions using personal experience, and harder ones with ``off-the-shelf" theories.     

Whistleblower protection: is Africa ready?

The article critically examines propositions driving the exportation of western whistleblower concepts into the developing world. 1

1 The full definition used in the article is that whistleblowing is an act of ethical reporting by concerned citizen, totally or predominantly motivated by the public interest, who initiate of their own free will an open disclosure about significant wrongdoing to a person or agency capable of investigating the disclosure, and who suffers accordingly. This definition was developed in the course of the Queensland Whistleblower Study, Australia's largest inquiry into whistleblowers. Whistleblowing is a different reporting mode to that used by informants, hot line users, witnesses, public interest denunciators, and disclosures in confidence (De Maria, 1994; De Maria & Jan, 1994; De Maria, 1999, pp. 24–35). Africa, throughout the article means sub‐Saharan Africa. Abridged versions of this paper were presented to the 4th National Business Ethics Conference, Zanzibar, 1 September 2004 and a staff seminar in the School of Sociology, University of Johannesburg, 25 August 2004.

Specifically it attacks the prevailing view that public interest disclosure is somehow a culture‐free, or at least a culture‐muted phenomenon, governed by a set of rules and conventions detached from local histories and practices. The article concludes that this exportation is in the spirit of neo‐colonialism and issues a note of warning about the dangers of dispersing western conceived forms of corruption reporting to Africa. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Estimation of Models with Beta-Distributed Dependent Variables: A Replication and Extension of Paolino's Study

This note replicates and extends Paolino's discussion (2001,Political Analysis 9:325–346) on the estimation of modelswith beta-distributed dependent variables in two ways. First,it introduces an easy-to-use program for estimating the modelusing Stata. Second, it presents a Bayesian estimator for betavariables based on Paolino's model. Results are compared tothose in the original article.     

From myth to reality: Globalisation and public spending in OECD countries revisited

The prevailing but not unchallenged 'conventional wisdom' in the literature dealing with the impact of globalisation on public spending is that the effects of increased openness can be compensated through the welfare state. Repeatedly, studies have found little evidence for a 'race to the bottom' in taxation or spending. This research note shows that it is premature to conclude that globalisation has no negative impact on public spending. By extending the period of observation into the 2000s, by looking at changes in openness and spending instead of their levels, and by disentangling the effects of openness in the cross-sectional and over-time dimensions of variation, this article shows that the association between increased openness and spending is clearly negative. Although the contribution of this research note is mainly empirical, some theoretical arguments are presented, emphasising the long-term nature and complexity of policy making in the politics of globalisation.     

A correction to Potters and van Winden (1992)

This note amends the model of informational lobbying presented in Potters and van Winden (Public Choice 74:269–292, 1992). In the original article, the authors find that only separating and pooling equilibria exist when the cost of lobbying is intermediate and the policymaker’s prior favors the interest group’s preferred policy. However, we prove that a semi-separating equilibrium also exists under these conditions. Implications for lobbying behavior are discussed.