The Social and Political Implications of China's WTO Membership

China will join the WTO soon. This article does not question the rationale of China's decision to join the WTO; nor does it challenge the premise that, all in all, the potential benefits from WTO membership outweigh the potential costs, at least in the long term. Rather, it focuses on the social and political implications of China's WTO membership. It is assumed that even if WTO membership is potentially a productivity-enhancing move for China, the benefits and costs of such a change will not be evenly distributed. Unless there is a mechanism that can induce or force the winners to compensate the losers, distributive conflicts between the two groups will be inevitable. Such conflicts may weaken or even erode political support for globalization. Thus, to remain committed to globalization, the government of an open economy must play a role in redistributing gains and costs. The first section elaborates this analytical framework. The second section argues that Chinese reforms have changed from a win‐win game to a zero-sum game. As a result, China has turned itself from a relatively egalitarian society into one with huge and growing inequalities. The third section analyzes who will stand to win and lose when China joins the WTO. It predicts that precisely those social groups who have borne the costs of recent reforms will be hit hardest. More significantly, those losers happen to be the social groups that have long served as the political bases of the communist regime. WTO membership thus poses a challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese government. The final section discusses the political implications of China's WTO membership.     

Acquiring Political Information in Contemporary China: various media channels and their respective correlates

Using complementary information from two national surveys conducted in 2008, i.e. the China Survey and the ABS II Mainland China Survey, this paper presents a comprehensive picture of the media channels that Chinese citizens use for political information, as well as their relative importance as assessed by the Chinese people. Moreover, assisted by multiple regressions, this paper also identifies which groups of Chinese are more likely to use each of these channels for political information. This paper contributes to our understanding on (1) the relative significance of various media channels in contemporary China's political communication; and (2) how Chinese citizens select themselves into specific channels for political information, given their increasing autonomy in acquiring such information from China's changing media.     

Making sense of war games in the Taiwan Strait

China's missile tests in March 1996 reflected a changing leadership consensus on the Taiwan issue. Although the goal to achieve reunification through peaceful means remains the basis for the consensus, there has emerged a new mainstream opinion that peaceful overture alone has become inadequate to reach the goal. This is especially true when Taiwan is believed to have acquired military technological edge over the PLA. The new policy direction is mainly a response to the evolving political situation in Taiwan. Yet it has also been driven by the dynamics of China's domestic politics which has entered the last stage of power transfer. Under the circumstances different party leaders and political institutions may have different stakes in such a risk endeavor but at the end of the day they have accorded their support to the policy change. As a result, their judgment on the missile tests in March has been one of success. This paper shows the reasons why they believe so.     

Ideological and political tendencies of factions in the red guard movement

This paper observes the most important ideological and political tendencies of the Red Guard Movement during the first three years of China's Cultural Revolution. This paper focuses on the differences between them—the Old Red Guards, conservative Red Guards, rebel Red Guards and ultraleft Red Guards. The Old Red Guards were the initiators of the Red Guard movement. They mainly attacked the intellectuals, overthrown ‘class enemies’ and some leaders in the educational and cultural fields. The core members of the Old Red Guards were children of leaders. They stressed their red family background and strove for political and social superiority and privilege. The conservative Red Guards followed the example of the Old Red Guards but depended on and defended the local Party's leadership. The rebel Red Guards mainly attacked the power holders and the organs of the Party and government. They came from the social groups that had been out of power. In politics, they relied on the support of Mao and the left wing of the Party. The ultraleft Red Guards negated and criticized the political leadership and the existing system as a whole. They were in small groups and suppressed by Mao and his headquarters but they left independent thinking on Chinese politics and society.     

China after Deng: Some perspectives∗

Deng Xiaoping's succession arrangement is different from the typical practice of the supreme leader of a dictatorship. Instead of occupying the highest leadership position himself until his death, Deng has let his “successor” assume office as the supreme leader while he is still alive and influential. Such an arrangement will help avoid a succession crisis and political upheavals upon Deng's death. In addition, the current market‐oriented economic reforms are very unlikely to be reversed in post‐Deng's China because of four factors: (1) public support of the reforms; (2) the vested interest of the “prince party” in the reforms; (3) the new leadership's commitment to the reforms; and (4) the constitutionalization of the reforms. However, there are three major sources of social unrest, which may lead to some political turbulence in the post‐Deng period. These sources are the “June 4th Incident” of 1989, public demand for an end of corruption and for political liberalization, and some socio‐economic problems brought about by the on‐going economic reforms. Although there will be periodical events of socio‐political turbulence, they are unlikely to drag China into a long period of instability or lead to a split of the nation.     

Discussion of 'Four Contradictions Constraining China's Foreign Policy Behavior'

Chinese foreign policy behavior is constrained by different sets of contradictions, but at the same time these contradictions serve to inspire and focus Chinese foreign policy, both in negative and positive ways. As China transitions to a developed country that is fully integrated into regional and global economic, political and security regimes, these contradictions may become less salient, however. With the growth of China's comprehensive national power, the Chinese will come to view their country less as a poor nation and more as a great power and thus this dual-identity syndrome should diminish in importance as a factor constraining China's foreign policy behavior over time. The contradictory impetus behind Chinese foreign policy that derives from the desire to benefit from pursuit of 'open-door' policies and the compulsion to protect state sovereignty will similarly likely become less important as China's power grows, but only if there is mutually acceptable settlement to the Taiwan problem and Beijing's confidence in its ability to secure its territorial integrity is enhanced. A stronger, more confident China will also likely become more actively involved in regional and global issues on a pragmatic, rather than principled basis. Finally, while bilateral ties will remain important to Beijing, its participation in multilateral fora will no doubt increase, including in the security sphere, as it becomes more experienced and self-assured in multilateral interaction. Ultimately, bilateral and multilateralism may take on the role of parallel tracks in Chinese diplomacy with little tension between them.     

Discussion of 'China: A responsible great power'

Professor Xia seeks to answer the question of whether or not China will become a 'responsible great power' in the twenty-first century by examining the domestic and foreign factors which will influence that outcome in the decades ahead. Some of the most interesting and useful insights of his work come as much from what the paper does not say as from what it does say. While it does not expressly say so, this paper amply demonstrates two important points about what appears to be an idealistic Chinese worldview. First, we see how the Chinese worldview is 'conflicted' and uncertain. Second, we see how China's current and future situation are said to be determined by what others do to China. Four important policy-related ramifications result from the worldview described in Xia Liping's paper. First, the more Chinese foreign policy promotes a worldview packaged largely in ideals, the more outsiders will suspect that Chinese leaders are trying to hide their actual intentions. Second, it should be recognized that in many ways the views espoused in the paper fundamentally call into question certain principles which others view as critical to their national security (the stabilizing nature of alliances, for example). Third, the worldviews described by Xia Liping portray a largely inward-looking, self-absorbed, vulnerable and aggrieved power that may be prone to 'irresponsibility'. The paper implies that under such circumstances, it is up to the outside world to prevent China from acting on its sense of injured vulnerability. Finally, such an approach to the world may leave the impression that Chinese views are out of touch or unable to operate effectively within the current global structure. Such an impression might lead others to dismiss or discount Chinese points of view as simplistic at best or consciously obstructionist at worst. Either way limits Chinese aspirations to become a 'responsible great power'. In the end, a nuanced and realistic set of understandings about the world, which articulates not only the country's ideals, but acknowledges its contradictions, interests, contributions, and its regional and international impact, would more pragmatically support China's ascendance to responsible great power status.     

External Contradictions of the Chinese Development Model: export-led growth and the dangers of global economic contraction

China's development model faces an external constraint that could cause an economic hard landing. China has become a global manufacturing powerhouse, and its size now renders its export-led growth strategy unsustainable. China relies on the US market, but the scale of its exports is contributing to the massive US trade deficit, creating financial fragility and undermining the US manufacturing sector. These developments could stall the US economy's expansion, in turn triggering a global recession that will embrace China. This is the external constraint. These considerations suggest that China should transition from export-led growth to domestic demand-led growth. This requires growing the economy's demand side as well as its supply-side. To avoid stalling the US economic expansion, which is critical to China's growth, China should significantly revalue its currency as part of a generalized East Asian upward currency revaluation. Longer term, China should raise wages and improve income distribution. Under export-led growth, higher wages undermine employment. Under domestic demand-led growth, they support it. The challenge is to raise wages in an efficient decentralized manner. History shows that this requires independent democratic trade unions. However, such unions are currently unacceptable to the Chinese political leadership. Creating a domestic demand-led growth regime therefore requires solving this political roadblock.     

Hong Kong redux

There are surprises ahead for both Hong Kong and the China of which it will become a part. This article focuses on how the reversion of Hong Kong will affect the future of politics in both societies. Even though rule by Beijing will change Hong Kong's commercial and political life, China will also be changed by having to deal with the emerging elite of Hong Kong and those persons from the mainland who have been educated in the West. This will not produce democracy in either Hong Kong or China but it will reduce the likelihood that China will become a hegemonic power in East Asia.     

社会结构变化与我国政党制度的发展

以利益群体多样化为基本特征的社会结构深刻变化,必然引发利益要求的冲突和社会矛盾的积累,利益整合、人心凝聚成为我国改革、发展、稳定中必须解决的重大课题.这种社会结构变化为我国的多党合作政党制度提供了优越性发挥的契机和自身发展完善的空间.应充分利用中国特色的政党制度资源,协调多种利益群体的政治诉求,促进政治文明发展,提高民族凝聚力.     

Transnational Environmental Movement: impacts on the green civil society in China

China has become part of the global trend of solidarity and networking among grassroots non-governmental organisations across national borders. This paper examines the social and political implications for Chinese green civil society from the activities in the country by international environmental NGOs. Following a historical, statistical and geographical profile of transnational civil society's penetration in China, it investigates closely the material and ideational benefits received by Chinese activist organisations from transnational collaboration, against the complex and often nebulous interactions between Chinese NGOs, their global partners and the government authorities. The paper argues that transnational civil society's presence and achievements in China have helped legitimise and strengthen the burgeoning civil society in the country, and this is meaningful beyond the environmental field.     

Viewing a Changing World from the PRC Embassy Window in Washington DC

This is the first chapter from the author's book (in Chinese), The Inside Stories of China-US Diplomacy after Tiananmen . With the benefit of an insider's knowledge, Chen explains the Chinese government's perceptions, motivations and policy-making during this tumultuous period. The book reveals many stories about Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders' thoughts, and policy decisions, as well as the role of the PRC embassy in Washington, in dealing with the United States and the changing world situation; much of these processes remain unknown to the outside world today. A highly renowned political commentator, Chen also makes profound analyses in the book based on his own observations and judgment. It is a path-breaking and unique book on China's foreign policy-making in that critical historical moment, written by an experienced former PRC diplomat. It will be of practical interest to anyone in the US policy community seeking to understand how personalities, perceptions, and institutions interact to produce Chinese foreign policy behavior.     

Nationalism and Democratization in Contemporary China

The crippled economic and political reform in China has come with two schools of thought: the new-left and nationalism. The new-left focuses on domestic issues, while nationalism tackles more international relationships. This paper explores the effects of radical nationalism on China's democratization process. It argues that if nationalism takes the dominant position in China's political process, Chinese reform will go astray.     

Women's Political Participation in China: in whose interests elections?

This article takes up the issue of women's political participation in village committees in China. Of interest is the decline in and continuing low level of women's political participation in village governance structures in the reform period, and particularly following the widespread introduction of competitive village elections since 1988. The dominant explanation given for women's numerical under-representation in village committees, and in politics more generally, focuses on women's lack of self-confidence, which inhibits them from standing as candidates, and on the enduring drag of ‘feudal’ attitudes, which construct women as inferior to men, and therefore not capable of leadership. These two factors combined have in turn a material effect, as son-preference advantages boys in access to basic schooling, who thus, particularly in poorer rural areas, end up with higher levels of education, and greater opportunities in waged employment. The common solution adopted by the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF), China's largest women's organisation, lies in a two-pronged attack: first in the ideological realm, targeting men and women's sexist attitudes and concomitantly promoting a discourse of equality, and second, in the material realm by raising women's skills. It is argued here that this dominant text on women's under-representation in village committees masks a more complex conjuncture of variables that shape women's position in local politics. Social practices, economic structures, institutional norms and procedures, and political culture all prey on, revitalise and reproduce gendered notions of the appropriate place of women and men in political life.     

From Fortress Hong Kong to Hong Kong–Shenzhen Metropolis: the emergence of government-led strategy for regional integration in Hong Kong

The Hong Kong government was less active in regional integration before 2003. This study explores what conditions have contributed to the shifting of the Hong Kong government's stance on Hong Kong–Shenzhen integration from protectionism to cooperation since 2003. In addition to secondary data, a questionnaire survey and interviews were conducted in this study. Various external and internal economic, political and social factors that have contributed to the emergence of government-led strategy for regional integration in Hong Kong are analyzed. It is found that regional integration is facilitated by consensus building among the government, political parties, other interest groups and residents within Hong Kong.     

China's Approaches toward Regional Cooperation in East Asia: motivations and calculations

This paper explores how China's strategic motivations and calculations have both motivated and constrained its participation in East Asian regional cooperation. It argues that China's participation in regional economic and security cooperation is motivated first of all by the calculation of China's domestic interests to create a peaceful peripheral environment for its economic growth and political stability, particularly its frontier security and prosperity. The realist interests to enhance China's position in power competition with other major players in the region, particularly Japan and US, also play an important part in China's strategic calculation. These interest calculations, however, also set limits on China's participation in regional cooperation. These interest calculations have also shaped China's preference for an informal approach, emphasizing voluntarism and consensus building rather than legally binding resolutions, toward regional cooperation. This soft approach is a major barrier for many regional institutions to move beyond the stage of talking shops to effectively resolve conflicts in the region.     

Returnees and their Political Impact: evidence from returned students and trainees from the Soviet Union in China, 1950–1966

This paper will study one of the unique population movements in modern history: the circular movement of students and trainees between China and the Soviet Union from 1950 to 1966. This population movement includes more than 38,000 Chinese who were trained by the leading Soviet Union industrial enterprises, research centers and institutions of higher learning. These returned students and trainees from the Soviet Union captured a considerable number of prominent positions in the Chinese leadership from the 1980s to the 1990s. The explanation of their political impact relies on the domestic country's politics and international context.     

Reform ideology,political commitment and resource transfor: An alternative model for the explanation of China's economic reform∗

One of the most intriguing ironies of our era is the result of recent changes in the former communist world. Whereas the “democratizing” Russia and Eastern European countries are caught in repeated political as well as economic crises, the “unrepentant” authoritarian China and Vietnam are seeing their economies booming and more market‐oriented. Such an irony poses many important questions. One of the questions is how China has managed to get where it is. This paper represents an attempt to address this question. Firstly, it will briefly outline where economic reforms have brought China so far. Secondly, it will discuss two popular models used to explain China's economic performance. And finally, it will develop an alternative model that combines politics and economy in accounting for China's reform experience.     

China's brain drain problem: Causes,consequences and policy options

The brain drain has become a growing problem for China's overseas education, especially after the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989. Brain drain is a symptom of a home country's social, economic, or political problems. In China, political alienation, low income, poor living conditions, insufficient research facilities, and mismanagement of high‐level manpower are the major factors pushing intellectuals to seek development opportunities abroad.

Beijing has found it difficult to bring students back home. Restrictions often anger students abroad. Family members also discourage students from returning. Many students find it difficult to adjust to the home environment after years living abroad; some are afraid that they will be punished at home for their outspoken political opinions abroad. However, Beijing has limited control over students overseas. Also, after the 1989 June crackdown, most host governments have decided to allow Chinese students to stay.

Concerned with the brain drain problem, Beijing is adjusting its policy of study abroad. There are various policy scenarios. Each has its merits and limitations, and each will lead to different consequences. Some technical solutions are also worth considering. Although a brain drain will still occur in the future, the tendency can be reduced if appropriate measures are adopted. China's future policy on overseas education depends on the future domestic situation and foreign relations. Apparently, a continued open policy of overseas education is in the interest of the students and the country. For an effective and long‐term policy, some strategic adjustments are necessary. Beijing needs to shift its attention away from the symptoms and concentrate on to the causes of the brain drain. Also, Beijing needs to redesign its future strategy to balance the benefits and costs of overseas education, instead of attempting to eliminate the brain drain.

The brain drain is not permanent. More professionals will return home as the economic and political situation significantly improves. The experience of Taiwan and South Korea in coping with their brain drain problem is a valuable reference for Beijing.     

China's good neighbor policy and its implications for Taiwan

Chinese leaders in recent years have been following a coherent policy toward Asia that emphasizes moderation and accommodation while preserving core PRC interests. China's prevailing ‘good neighbor’ policy approach—backed by improvement in US–China relations—provides important opportunities and challenges for Taiwan. It clearly inclines the PRC leaders to avoid more aggressive or harder‐line tactics in the mix of carrots and sticks that makes up China's recent approach toward Taiwan. To follow a more disruptive course would undermine the influence and advantage Beijing has been seeking with its ongoing moderate approach toward the United States and other Asian powers. The main challenge for Taiwan is how to deal with the current balance of carrots and sticks in China's policy. Much depends on the ability of Taiwan's leaders and populace to turn the prevailing balance in PRC policy to Taiwan's advantage. This presumably will involve reviving their economy, promoting effective governance and prudent defense, while consolidating relations with the United States and managing tensions in cross‐Strait relations to the advantage of Taiwan's future security and development. Unfortunately, there is no political consensus on Taiwan to mobilize domestic resources and opinion in a concerted effort to protect Taiwan's future as an entity independent of PRC control. Those outsiders who have followed with positive interest Taiwan's remarkable development over the past decades hope that Taiwan makes good use of the opportunities posed by China's good neighbor policy to adopt prudent and concrete measures beneficial to Taiwan's long range prospects.