Are innovative, participatory and deliberative procedures in policy making democratic and effective?

Abstract.  The overall project aims to establish a dialogue between normative democratic theory and research on policy formulation and implementation. This introductory article first notes the growth of various participatory and deliberative procedures in policy making, portrays the context of this growth and justifies the cases selected. It then presents the conceptual framework used for the study of these procedures, which mainly draws on participatory and deliberative democratic theory and the literature on the shift from 'government' to 'governance'. Based on this conceptual framework, the article focuses on four research questions the authors consider particularly important for the assessment of the contribution of the devices under scrutiny to democratic and effective decision making: questions of openness and access (input-legitimacy); questions regarding the quality of deliberation (throughput); questions of efficiency and effectiveness (output-legitimacy); and the issue of their insertion into the public space (questions of transparency and accountability).     

CLASSIFICATIONS OF PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES

Abstract: Scrutiny committees of the Thirty-Third Parliament (1983-84) are classified as undertaking work in one or more of the following categories: legislation; nonlegislative policy; administrative oversight; and information systems for increased accountability. Only Senate committees scrutinise legislation. The majority of scrutiny committees examine non-legislative policy. In contrast, administrative oversight work (compliance and efficiency) is undertaken by a relatively small number of committees. Information systems for increased accountability are a special category and represent the work of several committees particularly in respect of statutory authorities. Reports on non-legislative policy and administrative oversight are classified against the functional classifications of expenditure used in Budget Statement No. 3. In seeking to explain limited policy scrutiny in areas such as taxation and social security and welfare, one cannot ignore the effects that the strategic priorities of adversary politics have on bi-partisan committee inquiry. From classification and related comment one can question whether there is insufficient scrutiny of legislation, insufficient oversight of the administration and too much policy scrutiny. This in turn opens up the broader question of the overall direction and scope of scrutiny committee activity.     

Feminising British Politics: Six Lessons from Devolution in Scotland and Wales

Modest levels of female representation at the House of Commons are in sharp contrast to the Nordic‐levels of representation achieved in the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales since devolution in 1999. One apparent advantage of devolution is the opportunity that it provides for lesson‐learning across jurisdictions. This article offers six lessons on women's political representation—three positive and three negative—drawn from the experience of devolution in Scotland and Wales. We draw conclusions from these lessons, including the need to keep parties under scrutiny to ensure they deliver on their rhetorical commitments. We also postulate that gender equality might prove too important to be left to political parties and consider whether there is a need to consider stronger measures such as mandatory quotas.     

Political pressure and regulatory control

Conclusions of previous regulatory studies addressing the impact of fines on firm's behavior are contradictory. A simple game theoretic model is developed which uses continuous payoff functions to reconcile these contradictory conclusions. The game suggests changing the fine shifts the reaction functions of both the regulatory agency and the firm. The nature of such shifts are partially caused by political pressure different interest groups place on regulatory agencies. Competing goals within the agency also help explain why such shifts occur.     

Small-scale irrigation in sub-Saharan Africa: Sparse lessons,big problems,any solutions?

This paper identifies from studies made of specific schemes the major social and administrative problems confronting the improvement and extension of small-scale irrigation in Africa. The first section reviews the studies and notes the conclusions to be drawn from each separate one. Underlying these separate conclusions six general problems are identified and in the second section of the article each of these six is elaborated and discussed: the relation between the direct producer'S benefit and wider social benefits: problems of control, commitment to hierarchy, the working of production units, and how to learn from farmers in respect of water use; and finally the general problem of how to plan for the further change that follows after irrigation is introduced.     

Executive Privilege Reaffirmed? Parliamentary Scrutiny of the CFSP and CSDP

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) occupy a unique space in EU governance. Both policies have supranational elements, yet their formally intergovernmental status shields them from the increased scrutiny powers granted to national parliaments after Lisbon. National parliamentary scrutiny of these policy areas has thus received relatively little attention. Using an analytical framework of ‘authority, ability and attitude’, this paper argues that attitude, meaning MPs’ willingness to scrutinise CFSP, is the most important factor in explaining the empirical variation in the quantity and quality of national parliamentary scrutiny of CFSP. Drawing on qualitative research and interviews conducted as part of the OPAL project, the paper demonstrates that formal powers do not, in practice, equate to ‘strong’ scrutiny, arguing that the strongest parliaments are those that make CFSP scrutiny a systematic, normalised and culturally accepted part of parliamentarians’ everyday work.     

Scrutiny in English Local Government and the Role of Councillors

Overview and Scrutiny Committees were introduced in England and Wales in the Local Government Act 2000 that ended the role the full council and its committees as the locus of decision‐making for most local authorities. Overview and scrutiny committees composed of councillors not on small decision‐making executives were tasked with holding these to account. The performance of scrutiny committees is variable. Generally they work best where they concentrate on reviews of policy and practice, with recommendations following from well‐researched reports. The paper reviews the difficulties which arise when scrutiny committees endeavour to hold powerful executives to account, and suggests that to strengthen this new legislation is required, in particular to institutionalise scrutiny committees as agencies of the full council, the representative body for the area, comparable to the way in which the select committees at Westminster are the agencies of the Parliament.     

Money for our people? Decentralisation and corruption in Romania: the cases of the equalisation,infrastructure and pre‐university education funds

In spite of the attempts, in the most recent years, to introduce simple, accountable and rule‐based mechanisms governing the flows of funds for Romanian local governments (LGs) there is evidence showing that deviations from the norms are still widespread and undermine the stated goals of many policies. This article aims to explore to what extent the political factor (party affiliation, i.e. local informal power networks) interferes with the allocation of public funds as far as three main areas of decentralised policy are concerned: (i) the general purpose equalisation transfers; (ii) the Roads Fund grants and (iii) the transfers for financing the pre‐university education. These components represent a relatively large share of the local budgets and are illustrative for two important attributions Romanian LGs perform today: maintaining the local infrastructure and providing essential social services. Through a set of variables—measuring, on the one hand, the real pattern of resource allocation and on the other hand, the intensity of politicisation in the three areas—we tested the hypothesis that intergovernmental financial flows in Romania are to a large extent captured by rent‐seeking groups. It turns out that this is indeed the case with the funds for infrastructure, and much less so with the transfers financing pre‐university education. Some conclusions from these contrasting situations are drawn which reflect on the broader discussion, the link between decentralisation and corruption. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The House of Lords: A Deliberative Democratic Defence

This article defends the idea of an appointed House of Lords using deliberative democratic theory. The analysis suggests that while one might well think that current appointment procedures leave much to be desired, a reformed but still appointed House of Lords would be better at maximising the deliberative democratic qualities of inclusiveness and the scrutiny of arguments than a fully elected one; indeed, that election might do actual damage. It suggests that the debate thus far has been focused too narrowly on an outdated account of democracy, and too narrowly on the peculiarities of the House of Lords in isolation from its institutional context.     

Clawing Back Lost Powers? Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Transposition of EU Social Policy Directives in the Netherlands

For quite some time parliaments were seen as the losers of European integration. As a reaction, several parliaments have sought to exert more control over the executive branch in EU decision-making. An alternative venue for ‘clawing back’ these lost powers is by influencing the domestic transposition of EU policies. Surprisingly, this opportunity for greater parliamentary involvement has not received much scholarly attention. Under what conditions do the parties in parliament engage in ex post scrutiny over transposition? To shed light on this question, this article provides a detailed study of scrutiny by the Dutch parliament over the transposition of two social policy directives, investigating four hypotheses regarding vote-seeking, policy-seeking and office-seeking incentives for parliamentary oversight. The analysis shows that the ex post scrutiny that takes place can mostly be summarised as low-profile scrutiny aimed at information-gathering and position-taking, especially by opposition parties.     

Voter Ideology, the Economy, and the International Environment in Western Democracies, 1952–1989

Although it is commonly assumed that voters shift on an ideological spectrum over time, there has been relatively little scientific inquiry into the reasons for shifts in voter ideology. In this article, we attempt to explain why voter ideological shifts occur utilizing an interval measure of voter ideology recently developed by Kim and Fording. A pooled time-series analysis of 13 Western democracies for the period of 1952–1989 identifies several internal and external factors causing shifts in voter ideology. With respect to domestic influences, the state of the country's national economy, primarily inflation, seems to drive movement in voter ideology in a most significant way, but we find that the direction of this relationship is dependent on the ideological disposition of the incumbent government. With respect to international influences, we find significant ideological diffusion across neighboring countries of Western democracies. The effects of ideological diffusion are strongest within countries that are small relative to their neighbors. We also find that ideology is influenced by the international political environment, especially the level of East-West tension during the Cold War.     

Europeanization and the “Needle's Eye”: The Transformation of Employment Policy in Germany1

What have been the impacts of Europeanization in European Union (EU) member states in the domain of employment policy from a gender perspective? The essay explores this question for one of the traditional “male breadwinner–female caretaker” gender policy regimes in the EU—the case of Germany. Since German women's employment status is behind the status of women in many other EU countries, it has been expected that the impact of European (EC) equal opportunity and equal treatment norms on domestic policy change has remained minimal (Ostner & Lewis, 1995). This, however, is not the case any more. On the contrary, it is argued that Europeanization, although against considerable domestic resistances and with delays, helps to “gender” German public employment policy, namely in three respects: with respect to underlying gender norms, regarding the distinction of gender specific target groups and scope, and the introduction of innovative gender‐sensitive policy instruments. This claim is illustrated by three examples. An explanation for these shifts is developed that accounts for member state change despite misfits with EU norms, not as a consequence of legal compliance mechanisms, but as an outcome of a combination of three mechanisms—the politicization of controversial issues, shifts in dominant discourses, and political advocacy building—conducive to the “gendering” of Europeanization.     

Domestic scrutiny of European Union politics: Between whistle blowing and opposition control

Some European law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinises European Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non‐transparent fast‐track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issue's salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.     

Is Co-decision Good for the Environment? An Analysis of the European Parliament's Green Credentials

The European Parliament (EP) has long been regarded as a positive force for environmental change in the EU, but there has been little detailed empirical scrutiny to determine whether its reputation as a green champion is deserved. Nor has there been any evaluation of the environmental impact of the increase in EP powers under co-decision. These oversights are rectified by an evaluation of the EP's amendments to environmental legislation using typologies that rank them in terms of their level of ecological commitment and importance. EP amendments proposed under three procedures of decision making are compared in order to determine whether recent increases in the EP's powers under the co-decision procedure have affected its ability and willingness to adopt 'green' amendments. It is clear that the EP has consistently tried to strengthen environmental legislation but there is some ambiguity as to whether co-decision has been good for the environment.     

Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy

Abstract

This paper analyses under what conditions parties engage in parliamentary scrutiny of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. With insights from comparative literature on parliamentary oversight, two main incentives are identified. On the one hand, opposition parties initiate scrutiny to reduce their information asymmetry vis-à-vis the government; on the other hand, coalition parties use parliamentary scrutiny to control their partners. Empirically, the article uses information on scrutiny activities in six EU member states (Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, United Kingdom) covering 13 years and 21 governments. The findings suggest that opposition parties scrutinise the government if they have access to strong oversight instruments. In contrast, the strength of oversight instruments is not important for coalition partners. They resort to means of scrutiny if the leading minister is weak. Coalitions with a greater number of parties engage in scrutiny less often. Moreover, scrutiny is especially observed in questions with more direct distributional consequences (‘intermestic’ issues).     

Does Public Broadcasting Make a Difference? Political Knowledge and Electoral Campaigns on Television

The political role of the modern media and the impact on public opinion has come under intense scrutiny. The arguments in the scientific dispute have been structured under the optimistic ‘cognitive mobilisation’ and pessimistic ‘media malaise’ banners. For obvious reasons the role of television has been most intensely discussed. TV has the widest reach and is believed to have to the strongest impact. So far, much of the exchange of arguments has been based on data from the United States. In many European countries, public broadcasting is far more prominent than in the United States, and one can argue that the ideals underlying public broadcasting have put their mark on the TV industry in many European countries. Norway is such a case. The interesting question is, of course, whether this matters. Does public broadcasting foster a ‘virtuous circle’ of increased political competence, whereas commercial TV creates ‘media malaise’? Data from the Norwegian 1997–2001 election survey panel is used in this study to overcome the main methodological problem in the many studies based on cross‐sectional data: the question of causality. Too often researchers have based their inferences about the link between media exposure and political knowledge on cross‐sectional correlations. The empirical results do little to support the optimistic view of TV as the great political educator. On the contrary, neither exposure to the state‐owned public broadcasting NRK nor the commercial TV2 help to increase the general level of political knowledge. However, NRK seems to be the preferred channel among the politically well‐informed.     

The views of an advocatus dei: political marketing and its critics

This paper addresses 11 statements of criticism of political marketing. These statements represent the most commonly voiced issues and were collected from marketers and political scientists. While marketing theorists are more concerned with the state of political marketing theory, political scientists concentrate much of their criticism on aspects of political marketing management as it is experienced in practice. Each statement is discussed and general conclusions are identified. While presenting the personal opinion of the author (advocatus dei), these conclusions and statements concerning political marketing should foster critical discourse on issues such as political marketing management, concepts and ethics. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Why Are they Silent?

A frustrating feature in the Chinese higher educational landscape is the ubiquitous and appalling lack of student responsiveness in the classroom. Most of the explanations that have been provided for the causes of the unilateralism in the classroom discourse of Chinese higher education have placed under scrutiny various factors, from personal traits of students, such as shyness, to Confucianism. All these explanations attribute this unilateralism to, if not blame it on, the same external factor: the cultural specificity of Chinese college student. Whereas it is right to narrow the search for the causes down to the domain of culture, it does not really make much sense to simply single out parts of the Chinese culture for explanations. Instead of dwelling on specific components of the Chinese culture, the present article proposes drawing the attention to a certain functional mechanism within the culture: self-construal, which is also manifested in other cultures. It argues that the students’ minimum discourse performance in Chinese university classrooms can be understood as a result of their semi-conscious act of internal modeling, which entails confirming and reinforcing their identities based on evaluations of the situation and conforming to certain social norms that are prevalent in school. The self-construal in Chinese university classrooms perfectly reflects a kind of power imbalance between the teacher and students, which has a profound shaping force upon the students in their modeling of self-identity in regard to that of the teacher and is not conducive to students’ overall development, as it inhibits critical thinking and real academic innovation.     

How does the economy shape policy preferences?

How do changes in the economy translate into shifts in aggregate preferences for a more or less activist government in the U.S.—a construct referred to as “policy mood”? Existing theories pose alternative explanations based on either a Maslow Hierarchy of Needs model, where citizens prefer an activist federal government to expand the social safety net when the economic future looks bright (Durr, 1993), or a Phillips Curve model (Erikson et al., 2002), in which the objective economic maladies of inflation and unemployment drive policy mood. We show that neither of these explanations withstands empirical scrutiny when analysis is extended beyond the time period of the original authors' work, suggest the existing wisdom tying the economy to policy mood is wrong, and offer some alternative avenues to pursue in search of an answer to the question: What moves policy mood?     

Why Denmark and Belgium Have Different Implementation Records: On Transposition Laggards and Leaders in the EU

Statistics of the European Commission show different performances among member states regarding the implementation of European policies. In particular, this article explains why Denmark and Belgium have different records with respect to the legal or administrative transposition of European Union environmental directives. The article starts with a short overview of the implementation problematique and a presentation of the latest available statistics. Then European-level factors are ruled out as possible explanations for the differences in performance. The author argues, on the contrary, that the differences between Belgium and Denmark must be explained by national institutional contexts. To this end, an institutional approach is presented, which draws attention to 'hard' and 'soft' institutions as explanatory variables. In total seven categories of variables are discussed: four 'hard' categories – the constitutional and administrative context (division of competencies and coordination mechanisms), institutional capacity, administrative and legal adaptation pressure, communication and continuity – and three 'soft' categories – institutional jealousy, Europeanisation and political adaptation pressure. It was found that both member states under study have different scores on almost all variables, pointing to rather unfavourable implementation conditions for Belgium and much more favourable conditions for Denmark.