Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix).     

Reconfiguring the Animal/Human Boundary: The Impact of Xeno Technologies

The focus of this paper is on the symbolic and cultural as well as practical implications of what I term xeno technologies. I argue that these biomedical technologies, which aim to prolong individual human lives through the sacrifice of animal bodies, generate considerable anxiety and pose many intriguing issues for health care lawyers. In part, the concerns engendered by xeno technologies are attributable to the incalculable risks they may pose. This, coupled with public distrust of scientific evaluations of risk, undermines scientific attempts to present them as benign technologies. In this paper, however, I suggest that xeno technologies provoke a deeper cultural unease by raising, in acute new forms, historical and religious concerns about bodily mixing and rejection which challenge traditional notions of (human) self identity. The various ways in which xeno technologies render human and non-human bodies vulnerable and penetrable, pose multiple challenges to the animal/human boundary. In my view, they should force a radical re-thinking of notions of kinship, which should extend beyond the ȁ8easy caseȁ9 of human kinship with other great apes. Rather than addressing this issue, however, healthcare law makes valiant attempts to shore up the animal/human boundary. Such efforts at boundary maintenance may be traced at various sites, including the regulatory regime under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. I argue that lawȁ9s efforts to grapple with the ethical challenges posed by biotechnologies are doomed to incoherence unless it confronts the unreflective speciesism underpinning law, which designates animals as property and serves to obscure our kinship with them. My suggestion is that health care ethicists and lawyers should instead seek to expose the myriad ways in which biotechnologies may prove oppressive rather than liberatory for those who are made their human and animal subjects.     

The One-System View and Dworkin’s Anti-Archimedean Eliminativism

Many of Dworkin’s interlocutors saw his ‘one-system view’, according to which law is a branch of morality, as a radical shift. I argue that it is better seen as a different way of expressing his longstanding view that legal theory is an inherently normative endeavor. Dworkin emphasizes that fact and value are separate domains, and one cannot ground claims of one sort in the other domain. On this view, legal philosophy can only answer questions from within either domain. We cannot ask metaphysical questions about which domain law ‘properly’ belongs in; these would be archimedean, and Dworkin has long argued against archimedeanism. The one-system view, then, is best understood as an invitation to join Dworkin in asking moral questions from within the domain of value. Finally, I argue that Dworkin’s view can be understood as a version of ‘eliminativism’, a growing trend in legal philosophy.

     

证明力与证据能力规则演变规律探究——我国证据规则立法方向的理性选择

证据规则立法演变呈现出如下规律:首先,在证明力问题上,法官的判断经历了从不自由到自由的过程,证据证明力日渐脱离法律的规定,而进入法官自由裁量的范围;其次,证据能力属于法律问题,应当成为各国证据立法的重心所在。我国当前证据立法与上述规律背道而驰,其中,证据能力规则不仅数量稀疏,而且质量不高;相反,证明力规则却显得相当庞杂,占据了证据规则体系的主干地位。为此,在将证据立法重心由证明力转向证据能力的同时,又要防止矫枉过正。一方面,我国尚未形成自由心证约束机制,仍然需要一定的证明力规则来制约法官的心证;另一方面,我国当前证据资源有限,证据能力排除规则又不宜规定过多,以避免对案件事实真相认定产生障碍。     

The boundaries of law and the purpose of legal philosophy

Many of the current debates in jurisprudence focus on articulating the boundaries of law. In this essay I challenge this approach on two separate grounds. I first argue that if such debates are to be about law, their purported subject, they ought to pay closer attention to the practice. When such attention is taken it turns out that most of the debates on the boundaries of law are probably indeterminate. I show this in particular with regard to the debate between inclusive and exclusive positivists: I present several ways of understanding what this debate is about and argue that none of them is defensible. My second argument focuses more on the purpose of jurisprudential inquiry. I argue there that even if some jurisprudential debates have determinate answers, it does not follow that they deserve our attention, because not all true facts are worth knowing. After discussing and rejecting the claim that jurisprudence could be justified as knowledge for its own sake, I propose one possible justification for engaging in legal philosophy and outline its implications for the kind of issues that should be pursued. Assistant Professor, University of Warwick School of Law. The Essay was presented in the Oxford Jurisprudence Discussion Group. I thank participants there for their comments.     

Karl Olivecrona's Legal Philosophy. A Critical Appraisal*

I argue in this article (i) that Karl Olivecrona's legal philosophy, especially the critique of the view that law has binding force, the analysis of the concept and function of a legal rule, and the idea that law is a matter of organized force, is a significant contribution to twentieth century legal philosophy. I also argue (ii) that Olivecrona fails to substantiate some of his most important empirical claims, and (iii) that the distinction espoused by Olivecrona between the truth and the correctness of legal statements is problematic but not needed in Olivecrona's legal philosophy.     

The International Law of Naval Blockade and Israel’s Interception of the Mavi Marmara

In this article I discuss the legality of Israel’s interception of the Mavi Marmara on 31 May 2010. Although Israel’s stopping, boarding and inspection of the Mavi whilst on the high seas would undoubtedly constitute a violation of the law of the sea during peace time, I examine whether this violation can be justified on the basis of international humanitarian law. Specifically, Israel asserts that it was enforcing a naval blockade. I examine the legality of this blockade. I suggest that the blockade was unlawful on the basis that customary international humanitarian law permits the use of naval blockades only in times of an international armed conflict. I argue that on 31 May 2010 Israel was not engaged in an international armed conflict with Hamas. Moreover, I submit that customary international law prohibits the use of blockades where they are intended to deny the civilian population objects essential for its survival or where the damage to the civilian population is excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage. Israel argues that the intention of the blockade was to prevent war material from being delivered to Hamas fighters. This notwithstanding, I argue that because this blockade was causing a severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza on 31 May 2010, it was incompatible with customary international law and therefore unlawful. Furthermore, even if the deployment of the blockade could be considered lawful, I argue that the enforcement of the blockade was unlawful because Israel’s use of force to capture the vessel went beyond what was necessary in the circumstances.

     

Criminalization,Legitimacy, and Welfare

A standard view about criminal law distinguishes between two kinds of offenses, “mala in se” and “mala prohibita.” This view also corresponds to a distinction between two bases for criminalization: certain acts should be criminalized because they are moral wrongs; other acts may be criminalized for the sake of promoting overall welfare. This paper aims to show two things: first, that allowing for criminalization for the sake of promoting welfare renders the category of wrongfulness crimes largely redundant. Second, and more importantly, accepting welfare as a legitimate ground for criminalization implies a certain view about legitimate state action, which makes criminalization for wrongfulness more difficult to justify. If I am right, the view that keeps the two categories of criminalization as largely separate is untenable. I conclude with some remarks about the advantages of welfare (and not wrongfulness) as the basis for criminalization.     

Intoxication and the Act/Control/Agency Requirement

Doug Husak has argued, persuasively I think, that there is no literal ??act requirement?? in Anglo-American law. I begin by reviewing Husak??s reasons for rejecting the act requirement, and provide additional reasons to think he is right to do so. But Husak??s alternative, the ??control condition??, I argue, is inadequate. The control requirement is falsified by the widespread practice of holding extremely intoxicated offenders liable for criminal conduct they engage in even if they lack control over their conduct at the time of the offense, and even if they are acting involuntarily. I provide examples from Canadian, US and German law to flesh out our legal practices with respect to intoxicated offenders. I then argue that, at least with respect to one class of intoxicated offenders?Cthose known as ??grand schemers??, who plan their criminal offending prior to rendering themselves incapable of voluntary control over their conduct?Cwe are morally justified in imposing liability. I then propose an alternative to both the act and control requirements: what I call the ??agency requirement??. I argue that our law does and should impose liability for conduct that is expressive of or constitutive of the defendant??s practically rational agency. Adopting an agency view allows us to expand our focus from just the moment of the offense to temporally extended instances of agency, such as is involved in planned offending by grand schemers.     

Complicity,Collectives, and Killing in War*

Recent work on the ethics of war has struggled to simultaneously justify two central tenets of international law: the Permission to kill enemy combatants, and the Prohibition on targeting enemy noncombatants. Recently, just war theorists have turned to collectivist considerations as a way out of this problem. In this paper, I reject the argument that all and only unjust combatants are liable to be killed in virtue of their complicity in the wrongful war fought by their side, and that noncombatants are not permissible targets because they are not complicit. I then argue that just combatants have some reason to direct force against unjust combatants rather than unjust noncombatants, because they should respect the reasonable self-determining decisions of other political communities, when those communities settle on the distribution of a negative surplus of cost for which they are collectively but not individually responsible. These collectivist reasons will not fully justify the Permission and the Prohibition, but they can contribute to that justification.     

Ignorance of the Criminal Law,and Duties to Avoid it

‘Ignorance of the law is no defence,’ so we are told from an early stage in our legal studies. Or, to be more accurate, ‘ignorance of the criminal law is no defence to a criminal charge.’ That appears to be the rule in this country, apart from a couple of well‐established exceptions and another possible one. I will argue that it is a preposterous doctrine, resting on insecure foundations within the criminal law and on questionable propositions about the political obligations of individuals and of the State. In developing these arguments, I will draw attention to the differing problems of ignorance of the criminal law in three broad areas – regulatory offences, serious crime, and offences of omission – with a view to suggesting that there is a great deal more that the State needs to do if the issue of ignorance of the criminal law is to be dealt with adequately and fairly. I begin by scrutinising the relevant rule of English criminal law and the justifications offered for it. I then go on to situate the ‘ignorance‐of‐law’ doctrine in the context of the principle of legality and the rule of law, those bastions of liberal criminal law theory. Part three then explores the three broad areas of the criminal law, and parts four and five carry the debate into the political obligations of individuals and of the State in these matters.     

完善我国新型劳动法律体系架构研究

我国现行劳动法律体系存在着形式上和内容上的缺陷。因此 ,应在探析其价值内核的基础上 ,建立和完善新型的劳动法律体系。该体系应包括 :劳动力市场主体法、劳动力市场秩序维护法、劳动宏观调控法、劳动监督检查法、社会保险法和劳动争议处理法。     

What Is The Wrong Of Wrongful Disability? From Chance To Choice To Harms To Persons

The issue of wrongful disability arises when parents face the choice whether to produce a child whose life will be unavoidably flawed by a serious disease or disorder (Down syndrome, for example, or Huntington’s disease) yet clearly worth living. The authors of From Chance to Choice claim, with certain restrictions, that the choice to produce such a child is morally wrong. They then argue that an intuitive moral approach––a “person-affecting” approach that pins wrongdoing to the harming of some existing or future person––cannot account for that wrong since the choice to produce such a child cannot, under the logic of the nonidentity problem, harm that child. The authors propose that we supplement the person-affecting approach with an “impersonal” principle that takes the form of their well-known principle N. In this paper, I argue that the authors are mistaken to suppose that a plausibly articulated person-affecting approach cannot account for the wrong of wrongful disability. We can retain an intuitive, comparative, “worse for” account of harm and still identify serious harms imposed by the choice of wrongful disability. In particular, I argue that harm, both to the impaired child and to others, comes not in the form of that procreative choice’s procreative effect but rather in the form of its many distributive effects. I also argue that the rare, residual case in which a person-affecting approach would approve of the choice of wrongful disability does not function as a counterexample to that approach. As a separate matter, I address legal claims for wrongful disability, which are closely akin to claims for wrongful life. The legal claim is brought by the impaired child, not against the parents, but rather against health care providers whose negligent failure to diagnose or inform parents of an increased risk of a genetic or congenital impairment results in the birth of the impaired child. The authors’ treatment of the moral wrong that is done as impersonal in nature suggests that courts are correct to dismiss any such claim. Once we identify harm, however, the person-affecting approach can identify a clear foundation in the law for the wrongful disability claim.     

Self-Defense and Giving Rise to Cost: On Innocent Bystanders,Threats, Obstructors,and Obstacles,and the Permissibility to Harm Them

Philosophers have had trouble defending the common sense view that it is permissible to impose significant cost on an innocent person who is about to harm you to prevent the harm from occurring. In this paper, I argue that such harm can be justified if one pays attention to the moral significance of imposing a cost on others. The constraint against harming people who give rise to cost by their presence or movements is weaker than the constraint against harming bystanders. Moreover, I argue that people who give rise to cost have a duty to take on some of that cost to help protect the person under threat.     

Negating and Counterbalancing: A Fundamental Distinction in the Concept of a Corrective Duty

I argue in this paper that negating and counterbalancing should be recognised as two fundamental categories of corrective action. First, I show that recognising the distinction helps to avoid confusion when asking normative questions about the justification of imposing corrective duties. Second, I argue that we have moral reasons to care about the difference between negating and counterbalancing detrimental states, and this has implications for permissible action. I then outline some ways in which the discussion helps us explain and justify specific legal remedies in private law, and I conclude by noting some exceptions to the normative priority of negating over counterbalancing.     

Law and the political stakes of global crises: Lessons from development practice for a coronavirus world

Law has translated the coronavirus crisis into politically salient forms in people's lives, from states of emergency, to border closures, to mask mandates. Yet political theory work on these forms has focused on constraining arbitrary state power. In this paper, I try to broaden this focus. Substantively, I argue that policy and its implementation also matter to how we theorize the role of law in crises, in terms of how we understand the political power of society and its relationship to the state. Methodologically, I argue that thinking about law in this way is more than a complement to or replacement for thinking about constraints on arbitrariness. Rather, different forms of thinking about law and crisis should constantly be used to critique each other in order to pursue the sorts of legal innovations required by geomobile and interconnected crises. Given that the current pandemic and its broader consequences are still unfolding, I turn to development policy and practice to demonstrate the process and consequence of such ongoing critique in action. Studying rule of law reforms—including during the West African Ebola crisis—I show how practitioners continually reimagined law in ways that facilitated ongoing legal innovation that could adapt to the politics of the crisis.     

Moral Concerns About Responsibility Denial and the Quarantine of Violent Criminals

Some contemporary philosophers maintain we lack the kind of free will that makes us morally responsible for our actions. Some of these philosophers, such as Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and Bruce Waller, also argue that such a view supports the case for significant reform of the penal system. Pereboom and Caruso explicitly endorse a quarantine model for dealing with dangerous criminals, arguing that while not responsible for their crimes such criminals should be detained in non-harsh conditions and offered the opportunity for rehabilitation. Waller does not explicitly endorse the quarantine model, but his view is similar in significant respects. I argue that such views can too easily lead to the endorsement of legal policies which would result in more frequent punishment of innocent persons for crimes they have not committed. Thus, we should have deep moral reservations about such views.