情势变更原则抑或其它——再论“韩国KIKO外汇期权交易合约案”的法律适用

不论是套期保值还是投机套利,金融衍生品交易的对象本质上就是市场上的风险,而这种作为交易对象的市场风险就是当事人赖以订约的“情势”。金融衍生品交易之所以具有射幸性,就是因为这种风险或者“情势”导致交易合同法律效果的不确定,因此,金融衍生品合约的射幸性与“情势变更”具有内在的统一性。既然法律肯定了其射幸性,也就等于认可了交易中的“情势变更”,因此,在金融衍生品交易案件中,应该严格限制情势变更原则的适用。“韩国KIKO外汇期权交易合约案”应在公平、诚信等宏观原则的指导下,多从交易商的适当性义务、信义义务以及注意义务等法律原理入手寻找解决该类案件的法律依据。     

评析指数条款及其新发展

浮动汇率制下,货币贬值是比较普遍的国际现象,涉及货币债务的国际合同特别是长期合同大多难以逃脱合同价值贬值的宿命。为了保持合同价值,合同当事方开始将合同债务与某些商品、数据或者其他标准相联系,其中最常使用的便是指数条款。指数条款虽然曾经或者正在面对一系列的争议和法律障碍,但是由于其先天的科学性和优越性,已经成为国际经贸合同中预防贬值的最佳途径。     

Old Habits Are Hard to Change: A Case Study of Israeli Real Estate Contracts

This article presents a case study on the persistent dollarization norm in the Israeli real estate market. For many years Israeli real estate contracts have been denominated in American dollars. This contracting norm has remained surprisingly stable despite tremendous changes in the structure of the Israeli foreign currency market that severed the connection between the dollar and local inflation and added significant risks to exchange rates. Using an array of theoretical tools, I explain this puzzling phenomenon and demonstrate the centrality of social norms to the design of high‐stakes contracts. Finally, I explore the interaction between social norms and the law and highlight the potential obstacles to regulating contracting norms.     

Organized futures contracting

Futures markets play an important role in shifting risk and facilitating exchange. Yet despite their growing importance economists do not yet possess a satisfactory theory of the evolution and growth of futures markets.¹ In the law-and-economics literature there is an assumption that parties will seek to specify their obligations completely or else rely on the terms implied by contract law.² The idea that institutions will develop to deal with contractual problems (including the inefficiencies of contract law) has only recently been explored.³ Futures contracts are contracts designed to separate one aspect of exchange that is particularly susceptible to enforcement problems-price volatility. It does this in a way that allows little scope for the intervention of the formal legal rules of contract law since trading in and the resolution of disputes concerning futures contracts are governed by the rules of the exchange. In fact, many futures contracts, especially the newer varieties, may well be deemed wagering contracts and hence null and void under the usual rules of contract law.⁴In this article the structure of organized futures contracting will be examined to see how it deals with the enforcement problems that arise when exchange is subject to the risk of price volatility.⁵     

公司法的合同路径与公司法规则的正当性

新古典主义经济学的公司合同理论认为,公司是一组合约的联结,多方博弈的结果将创造出内生性合理秩序,不应强行加入外生性制度安排。然而,与普通合约迥然相异的是,公司合同是长期合同和关系合同,存在着诸多漏洞,仅靠合同法并不足以保障各方预期。作为公司合同的模本机制和漏洞补充机制,公司法补充而不是代替了公司参与方的合约安排。因而,立法者只有按照合同的规则和市场的路径来进行公司立法,公司法规则才能获得正当性。     

金融衍生交易的法律解释——以合同为中心

金融衍生交易特别是场外衍生交易规则与传统民商法之间的冲突是大陆法系国家普遍存在的问题。衍生工具作为一种新的合同类型,与传统合同的显著区别在于"当前订约、未来履行",从中派生出特殊的履约风险、缔约风险等一系列新问题。对赌、显失公平等法律争议正是基于衍生合约本身的特性而产生;而通常被称为"衍生交易规则"的一整套制度实际上是市场自发创设的防范履约风险的安排。在此,场外衍生交易与场内衍生交易之间没有本质区别,英美法系与大陆法系需要应对同样的问题。通过还原衍生交易规则背后的法律逻辑,可以构筑一个以"合同"为中心的衍生交易法律问题的分析框架,容纳从合同效力、履行、缔约到信息披露、监管等一系列问题。以合同为主要处理对象的民商法应扩张自身的体系以容纳实践中产生的新合同类型,从而为整个金融衍生交易法律规则体系提供坚实的基础。     

铁路旅客运送合同研究

铁路旅客运送合同是我国旅客运送合同中最重要的一种。铁路运输行业的垄断性以及铁路运输方式的特殊性,决定了铁路旅客运送合同从订立到履行以及违约责任的承担都表现得极其复杂。本文分析了铁路旅客运送合同的成立、生效的时间及变更、解除的界限,界定了铁路旅客运送合同双方当事人的权利义务,论证了违反铁路旅客运送合同的归责原则及责任竞合时的处理方法。     

From old to new: From internet to smart contracts and from people to smart contracts

Discussing legal issues related to smart contracts on the blockchain is very topical. This article will discuss primarily smart contracts on the blockchain the conclusion and execution of which does not interact with the physical world, as well as briefly touch upon smart contracts on the blockchain which do interact with the physical world. For these smart contracts, it will be determined to what extent existing EU internet laws can help support their development and if not, what is needed to support this. In order to answer this question, the following will be discussed: the rise of e-commerce and in particular the EU internet laws supporting and regulating e-commerce, how smart contracts work and how smart contracts compare with existing technological developments and comparable legal constructs (internet, bank accounts and bank guarantees). Subsequently, it will be explained how the use of smart contracts leads to a shift of confidence, from trust in people to trust in code. On the basis of The DAO hack and the problems that arose, it will be illustrated that this shift to trust in code is not as absolute as is often thought. The article concludes that applying specific EU laws on supporting and regulating e-commerce to smart contracts is difficult for two reasons. First of all, the starting points differ: trust in people versus trust in code. Secondly, technical and practical obstacles often inhibit applying internet laws in a meaningful manner. When using smart contracts, it makes more sense to prevent problems from arising than to correct them afterwards. For this reason, it is advocated that programmers work together with lawyers to create better smart contracts and that the legislator focuses on laws dealing with auditing smart contracts code by trusted third parties and automatically equating smart contracts with written contracts with wet ink signatures. This will hopefully facilitate the rise of smart contracts on the blockchain.     

论智能合约的私法构造

智能合约是一种通过区块链才能实现的新技术,在技术上是一种可编程的代码程序,在法律上是一种特殊的身份合同。其藉由特定当事人之间形成的共识机制,实现了对当事人身份的识别,促成了智能合约难以逆转的自动执行,并在事实上排除了当事人的合同撤销权,成为跨越合同订立、合同履行两个领域的新型交易机制。智能合约对传统合同法理论带来了巨大冲击和挑战,却不足以支撑"技术自治"或"代码即法律"等学术主张,也不足以否定实定法对智能合约的正当干预。在现行合同法框架下,仍然存在对智能合约及交易作出妥当解释的空间。除此以外,在智能合约的私法构造中,应当引入团体法思想,认可社团主义的自治机能,构建以"信赖保护"为核心的救济机制,实现法律与技术的同步发展。     

Creating markets in no-trust environments: The law and economics of smart contracts

Smart contracts, self-executing agreements based on blockchain technology, have the capacity to create trust in what we term no-trust contracting environments. We argue that using them in such environments is the path to unleash the full potential of smart contracts. Compared to the contract enforcement mechanisms characterized by traditional contract law or relational contracts, smart contracts can offer a superior solution for facilitating trade.Several lawyers and economists have debated whether smart contracts might offer the prospect of cheaper, faster and better transactions. As we discuss below, contract law scholars caution that they neither replicate the relational context essential for the day-to-day practice of contracting nor offer a superior solution to problems addressed by traditional contract law, such as contract validity and legality. We clarify and systematize the current thinking on the legal nature and reliability of smart contracts, and address the concerns of contract law scholars. While doing that, we suggest a step forward in characterizing contracting environments, contract enforcement mechanisms and the trust relationship underlying contracts.     

Institutional competition of optional codes in European contract law

The Common European Sales Law (CESL) is the European Commission’s most recent policy initiative for European contract law. It aims to address the problem that differences between the national contract laws of the Member States may constitute an obstacle for the European Internal Market. This paper develops a model of the institutional competition in European contract law and uses it to addresses the question as to whether an optional European contract code and the CESL are economically desirable for European contract law. To do so I examine the transaction costs involved in the process of choosing an applicable law that European businesses face when they conduct cross-border transactions in the European Internal Market. I then describe how these transaction costs shape the competitive environment, i.e. what I refer to as the “European market for contract laws” in which the contracting parties choose a law to govern their cross-border contracts. Having identified this environment and the competitive forces operating within it, I propose a model, the “Cycle of European Contract Law”. I use this model to analyze the competitive processes that take place in the European market for contract laws. Based on my results I make recommendations for the optimal implementation of an optional European contract code and the CESL in European contract law.     

强行法在国际商事仲裁中的适用

意思自治原则允许合同当事人选择支配其合同的实体法。在国际商事仲裁领域,仲裁员能否适用当事人所没有选择的相关强行法,理论认识中还存在分歧。从国际实践来看,合同履行地国的强行法被认为是与合同的联系更为密切,从而能够在仲裁中得以适用。强行法在国际商事仲裁中的适用是个不争的事实。在适用强行法方面,仲裁员的主要作用在于界定实体法,确定合同履行地及仲裁裁决实施地,甄别、解释有关的强行性法律。而强行法的适用同样有其特定的冲突规范,强行法在国际商事仲裁领域中的适用,构成对当事人选择支配合同实体法的自由的一个限制。     

Convertibility as a step for the RMB internationalization

The paper concentrates on the issue of currency convertibility in the context of Chinese strategy of the RMB internationalization. It argues that the motive for that strategy was ignited by China’s dissatisfaction with the long lasting unstable international monetary system. Recent global financial crisis intensified China’s urge to get rid of “dollar trap” and look for a diversified international reserve currency system where the Chinese yuan could take a place. The paper investigates the step-by-step approach from the trade settlement to more comprehensive policy measures. It also emphasizes the importance of domestic financial reforms for the RMB full convertibility, including flexible exchange rate, market determined interest rate and deepened domestic financial market.     

Inequality,Just Price and Bad Bargains: Contracting Attitudes after the South Sea Crash, 1720

ABSTRACT

In 1720, following the crash in South Sea stock, some doubted the legal and ethical enforceability of contracts concluded on the secondary market for the purchase of future South Sea stock. This article examines the argument of David Dalrymple who drew upon civil law, natural law and the notion of a just price to advocate for the annulment of these so called ‘time bargains’. It demonstrates why Dalrymple's just price argument held a rhetorical relevance, as an ethical argument, even if the effectiveness of such a plea in both Scottish and English courts, during the early eighteenth century, is doubtful. Additionally, in setting out the context of his pamphlet and the wider debate, this article also draws attention to the emergence of a new ethical rhetoric of commerce and contracting, which argued against Dalrymple, and for the enforcement of these contracts. Lastly, this article contends that a wider conception of what constitutes the legal context of the South Sea crisis is needed, through which a deeper understanding can be gained of what role the law played in resolving the crisis and how political and ethical attitudes shaped the use of law, specifically contract law.     

Verifiability, Incomplete Contracts and Dispute Resolution

Recent literature on incomplete contracts attributes noncontractibility of certain contingencies to their unverifiability. This paper questions the underlying assumption of this theory and argues that the court (or arbitrator) need not observe relevant contingencies with the same degree of accuracy as the contracting parties in order to enforce a contingent contract. In a simple procurement model, it is shown that as long as the ruling of the court (arbitrator) is not arbitrary, the first-best outcome can be implemented under certain ideal conditions by a contingent contract even if contingencies are costly to verify and verification is imperfect.     

The Governance of Blockchain Financial Networks

Since the emergence of the virtual currency Bitcoin in 2009, a new, Internet‐based way of recording entitlements and enforcing rights has increasingly captured the interest of businesses and governments. The technology is commonly called ‘blockchain’ and is often associated with a closely related phenomenon, the ‘smart contract’. The market is now exploring ways of using these concepts for financial assets, such as securities, fiat money and derivative contracts. This article develops a conceptual framework for the governance of blockchain‐based networks in financial markets. It constructs a vision of how financial regulation and private law should set the boundaries of this new technology in order to protect market participants and societies at large, while at the same time allowing the necessary room for innovation.     

从应然合同的视角解读合同解释的必为性

应然合同是一个利益平衡体,它体现在两个方面:当事人之间的平衡体和当事人与社会之间的平衡体。进入司法过程中的合同是利益失衡的合同,表现为合同中的权利义务失衡和当事人内心的失衡。当事人内心的失衡是其进入司法过程中寻求司法救济的决定性因素,也是合同解释必为性的原因。本文尝试以应然合同,作为探讨和认识合同的一个新的视角,来审视司法过程中合同解释的成因。     

E-confidence: Offer and acceptance in online contracting

Online contracting, as a focal point of electronic commercial transactions, has been developing since the 1990s. Recent international legislation, namely the 2005 United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts (the UN Convention) is a significant legal achievement. However, the validity and effectiveness of electronic offer and acceptance is still an issue for debate. This paper aims to seek answers to how law makers may meet the challenge of regulating electronic contracting, and what future improvements that the UN Convention may need to make to boost confidence of contracting online. The paper will introduce the concept and formation of electronic contracts; analyse the current legislative environment of electronic contacting in the international organisations, EU, US and China; discuss the obstacles that electronic contracting has faced; and propose a solution to remove its legal uncertainty.     

Differences in contract design between successful and less successful franchises

The aim of this paper is to identify differences in contract design between successful and less successful franchise chains. Comparing contracts from both groups of companies, we observe, on the one hand, that (1) franchise contracts are unbalanced irrespective of the chain’s success: contracts cover franchisees’ obligations more than franchisors’ obligations. On the other hand, we find that (2) contracts in successful franchise chains are more complete (i.e. cover a larger number of contingencies) than the less successful ones and (3) this difference lies in the contingencies regarding franchisees’ obligations, which are more fully covered in the contracts of more successful chains. More specifically, within the contingencies regarding franchisees’ obligations, (4) successful chains restrict the franchisee decision rights more frequently on day-to-day business operations than on financial conditions or post-contractual contingencies. These findings can be explained because successful chains are more sensitive to franchisees’ opportunistic behavior, because they have learned how to manage and solve any potential conflicts, or because of differences in bargaining power. Finally (5) franchisors’ obligations are not statistically different between groups, which we interpret as evidence that relational contracting mechanisms do not substitute formalization.