The Strategic Use of Formal Argumentation in Legal Decisions

In legal decisions standpoints can be supported by formal and also by substantive interpretative arguments. Formal arguments consist of reasons the weight or force of which is essentially dependent on the authoritativeness that the reasons may also have: In this connection one may think of linguistic and systemic arguments. On the other hand, substantive arguments are not backed up by authority, but consist of a direct invocation of moral, political, economic, or other social considerations. Formal arguments can be analyzed as exclusionary reasons: The authoritative character excludes—in principle—substantial counterarguments. Formal arguments are sometimes used to conceal value judgements based on substantial arguments. This paper deals with reconstructing problems regarding this strategic use of formal arguments in legal decisions, with a focus on linguistic argumentation.     

A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation

Abstract . The paper gives a formal reconstruction of some fundamental patterns of legal reasoning, intended to reconcile symbolic logic and argumentation theory. Legal norms are represented as unidirectional inference rules which can be combined into arguments. The value of each argument (its qualification as justified, defensible, or defeated) is determined by the importance of the rules it contains. Applicability arguments, intended to contest or support the applicability of norms, preference arguments, purporting to establish preference relations among norms, and interpretative arguments are also formalised. All those argument types are connected in a unitary model, which relates legal reasoning to the indeterminacy of legal systems, intended as the possibility to develop incompatible defensible arguments. The model is applied to permissive norms and normative hierarchies, and is implemented in a Prolog program.     

法律论证中的权威与正确性——兼论我国指导性案例的效力

法律论证既需要运用权威理由,也需要运用实质理由来证立法律命题。法律渊源是最重要的权威理由,它通过说明法律命题之来源的方式来证明后者的初步有效性。制定法与先例构成了法律论证之权威性框架的主要部分,制定法属于规范权威,而先例属于事实权威,它们在司法裁判中一般只需被指明。同时,法律论证的正确性宣称决定了法律论证也必须运用有效的实质理由,即对法律命题内容的正确性进行证立。这种论证既可以是法律体系内的论证,也可以是超越体系的论证。法律论证旨在于平衡权威与正确性,其中权威论证具有初步的优先性但并非不可推翻,权威性的强度与相关正确性论证的负担成正比。以此来分析,我国的指导性案例介于规范权威与事实权威之间,它的效力是一种"准制度拘束力"。     

Critical Remarks on Robert Alexy's "Special-Case Thesis"*

Abstract
In this paper the author criticizes the way Robert Alexy reconstructs the relationship between legal and practical reasoning. The core of Alexy's argumentation (Alexy 1978) is considered the claim that legal argumentation is a "special case" of general practical discourse. In order to question this claim, the author analyzes three different types of argument: (1) that legal reasoning is needed by general practical discourse itself, (2) that there are similarities between legal argumentation and general practical discourse, (3) that there is a correspondence between certain types of argument in general practical discourse and in legal argumentation.**     

法律论证中的逻辑理性

法律论证中的逻辑理性,是指追问以及追求法律的逻辑性或法律在逻辑上的合理性。逻辑理性在法律论证中有重要的作用,它既可以为法律思维提供基本的思维框架和模式,具有建构性功能;也可以为法律论证提供公正的平台。但是,逻辑理性在法律论证中也有一些局限性,这说明在法律论证中,只有逻辑理性是不够的：还需要实践理性和价值理性的补充。它们三者既有联系又有区别,它们的关系体现了合理与合法的关系,其有机统一对构建以法治为基础的和谐社会有积极的意义。     

浅析法律论证理论视域中的民事诉讼理论——以阿列克西理论为切入点的分析

籍由阿列克西"实践正确性的程序理论",程序理念的进化和程序性的技术客观上有助于个案评价的理性辨别、判断和选择,并能够对判决的形成过程施加理性的控制。因此在法律论证理论的视域中,通过对我国民事诉讼理论、程序架构、以及具体程序运作的分析,尝试为程序取向的判决正当化机制提供新的解释路径。     

基于经验法则的法律论证

我国法官的裁判文书说理欲实现规范化,必须重视法律论证,为每个主张与判断提供充分的理由。最高人民法院的指导意见表明经验法则是法官进行法律论证的重要理由。经验法则作为一种实践描述能够推动法律论证填补规范缝隙。在事实认定的论证环节,经验法则既是证明规则与证据规则的形成背景,更是事实推定的直接依据。只有妥善把握经验法则的盖然性,才能规避逆谬误与后见偏差等认知陷阱,合理借助经验法则论证三段论中的小前提。在法律适用的论证环节,经验法则是类比过程中相似点与规范效果之间相关性的判断依据。法官可以借助经验法则论证立法理由与事物本质,进而根据法律目的判断相似点的相关性。基于经验法则的法律论证既能回应当下释法说理的需求,也是法律论证理论扎根中国司法土壤的尝试。     

The Special Case Thesis

The author outlines his thesis that legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse ( Sonderfallthese ) and develops it as an attempt to cover both the authoritative, institutional, or real and free, discursive, or ideal dimension of legal reasoning. On this basis, he examines the objections raised by Habermas (1996) to the special case thesis. First, he discusses the reduction of general practical discourse to moral discourses ( genus proximum problem) holding that the former is a combination of moral, ethical, and pragmatic arguments within the priority of just; second, he examines the objection that general practical arguments change their character or nature when employed in legal contexts (subset and specification problem) and the related problems concerning legal validity and unjust law. He concludes proposing a procedural (opposite to a coherential) integration of general practical arguments in the legal context.     

Interpretation,Argumentation, and the Determinacy of Law

This article models legal interpretation through argumentation and provides a logical analysis of interpretive arguments, their conflicts, and the resulting indeterminacies. Interpretive arguments are modelled as defeasible inferences, which can be challenged and defeated by counterarguments and be reinstated through further arguments. It is shown what claims are possibly (defensibly) or necessarily (justifiably) supported by the arguments constructible from a given interpretive basis, i.e., a set of interpretive canons coupled with reasons for their application. It is finally established under what conditions such arguments provide single outcomes or rather support alternative interpretive conclusions, thus leading to propositions of law whose truth-value is undetermined.     

Rights, Performatives, and Promises in Karl Olivecrona's Legal Theory

Abstract.  Karl Olivecrona (1971 ) maintains that "right" is a "hollow word," and so also for some other legal terms. "Right," he says, "has no conceptual background." He arrives at this position after an examination of metaphysical and naturalistic accounts, including American legal realism. Some of Olivecrona's arguments will be evaluated here. His position is influenced by Hägerström's theory of legal language, but he argues that Hägerström fails to account for how such terms as "right,""duty," etc. function in legal discourse and why they are useful. A parallel approach is also found in Olivecrona's book The Problem of the Monetary Unit (1957 ). Olivecrona is left with the problem of how such "hollow" terms function. His explanation is largely psychological. Going beyond J. L. Austin's notion of performatory language, he introduces the idea of performatory imperatives. I propose to submit Olivecrona's approach to a critical examination. It is suggested that had he started from everyday, nonlegal promises and commitments he might well have ended up with a different theory of legal language.     

Exclusionary Reasons and the Explanation of Behaviour

Abstract .
Legal philosophy must consider the way in which laws function as reasons for action. "Simple positivism" considers laws as merely reasons in the balance of reasons. Joseph Raz, as a representative of "sophisticated positivism," argues that laws are exclusionary reasons for action, not merely reasons in the balance of reasons. This paper discusses Raz's arguments for his view. The Functional Argument provides no more reason for positivism than against it. The Phenomenological Argument is best supported by an account of how character traits function in explaining behaviour. But then the distinction between exclusionary reasons and expressive reasons is obliterated. Legal positivism cannot absorb laws as expressive reasons for action. Raz's positivism implies the correctness of an anti-positivistic legal theory.     

An Automated System for Argument Invention in Law Using Argumentation and Heuristic Search Procedures*

Abstract. A heuristic search procedure for inventing legal arguments is built on two tools already widely in use in argumentation. Argumentation schemes are forms of argument representing premise‐conclusion and inference structures of common types of arguments. Schemes especially useful in law represent defeasible arguments, like argument from expert opinion. Argument diagramming is a visualization tool used to display a chain of connected arguments linked together. One such tool, Araucaria, available free at http://araucaria.computing.dundee.ac.uk/ , helps a user display an argument on the computer screen as an inverted tree structure with an ultimate conclusion as the root of the tree. These argumentation tools are applicable to analyzing a mass of evidence in a case at trial, in a manner already known in law using heuristic methods ( Schum 1994 ) and Wigmore diagrams ( Wigmore 1931 ). In this paper it is shown how they can be automated and applied to the task of inventing legal arguments. One important application is to proof construction in trial preparation ( Palmer 2003 ).     

Taking Language Seriously: An Analysis of Linguistic Reasoning and Its Implications in EU Law

This article discusses legal reasoning at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The following questions are addressed. First, the authors look at the way linguistic arguments are used in ECJ case‐law. Second, they consider whether the requirements of legal certainty, and more specifically that of predictability, may be fulfilled by reference to linguistic arguments in a multilingual legal system. The theoretical starting‐point is that of open‐endedness of language: no means exists to definitely pin down the meaning of words. Defining the meaning of words in a legal context is necessarily a matter of choice involving evaluative considerations. Consequently, when the ECJ uses linguistic arguments to justify a decision, it is an active agent choosing the meaning of words in a specific case. Essentially, the authors argue that legal reasoning based on linguistic arguments is particularly problematic from the viewpoint of legal certainty and predictability. In this respect, the key importance of systemic and teleological argumentation is emphasised in assuring convincing, acceptable and transparent legal reasoning especially in the context of multilingual EU law.     

司法判决与其他案例中的法律推理方法研究──说理的艺术

法律推理是一种说理的艺术。法律推理的难题是在不可能讲理的情况 下讲理、与“不讲理的人”讲理;既要法官能动地审理案件,又要防止法官专横审理。法律 推理的目的是寻求以法律为根据的正当理由。演绎推理、归纳推理、辩证推理是法律推 理的基本方法;它们按照不同的思维路径与规则寻求推理结论,但都面临其自身无法解 决的问题。法律价值在解决这些问题中具有主导性、基础性的作用。法官的法律价值判 断行为非常重要,从人类学的角度看这是一种四维框架中的判断行为。规范说理的艺术 可以防止法官在法律推理中的任意、专断,其方法包括培养法律感觉、进行法律价值判断 的合理化作业,养成法律惯例和法律信念,完善法律推理的制度与规则保证等,最终,法 律推理应当以人为本。     

Pragmatic Maxims and Presumptions in Legal Interpretation

The fields of linguistic pragmatics and legal interpretation are deeply interrelated. The purpose of this paper is to show how pragmatics and the developments in argumentation theory can contribute to the debate on legal interpretation. The relation between the pragmatic maxims and the presumptions underlying the legal canons are brought to light, unveiling the principles that underlie the types of argument usually used to justify a construction. The Gricean maxims and the arguments of legal interpretation are regarded as presumptions subject to default used to justify an interpretation. This approach can allow one to trace the different legal interpretive arguments back to their basic underlying presumptions, so that they can be compared, ordered, and assessed according to their defeasibility conditions. This approach allows one to understand the difference between various types of interpretive canons, and their strength in justifying an interpretation.     

当代法哲学视域下的墨家法律观

当代法哲学视域下,墨家法律观首先在事实性的有效性向度上,认定和证成了法律的文本性、符号性、行动性、规则性、规范性、普遍性以及强制性等事实性的张力;其次,在法律有效性的规范性向度上,墨家以法为天,认定法源自于天,法是天的根本意志的体现,而天的意志的实质乃是--具有正义、平等、实践三个显著特点的--兼爱利民;其三,在交往理性的向度上,墨家把法的产生和生成、法的有效性及其实现,置于"从事"、"说书"尤其是"谈辩"的世界里,提出了语用谈辩的交往法律观:把法的有效性标准及其检验看作是,透过"古者圣王"、"百姓耳目"、"百姓人民"中的谈辩--即经过多主体的交往理性,而达成的"中效"或"共识"。墨家的交往法律观主张通过多主体之间的平等"谈辩",来化解"事实性"与"规范性"之间的紧张关系,从而实现"兴天下之利"的良性互动。     

Law as Convention

Abstract. The widely recognized impasse in legal theory, which requires an account of law as "both a social fact and a framework of reasons for action" has been most interestingly addressed in recent years by writers characterizing law as convention in the sense of a solution to a game theoretical "coordination problem." As critics have neutralized most of these proposals, the author advances an account of conventionalism, drawing on economic and sociological theory, which he claims makes the bridge between positivist and naturalist theories of law without compromising the basic insights of either. The result is a unified theory of law, politics and society.     

Does Legal Semiotics Cannibalize Jurisprudence?

Does Duncan Kennedy successfully cannibalize jurisprudence? He attempts to do it by demonstrating the inexistence of rightness in legal argumentation. If there is no right legal argument, then there is no right answer in adjudication, adjudication is not a rational enterprise and legal doctrine cannot be said to be a science. It can be shown that skepticism is self-defeating. Duncan Kennedy can avoid self defeat only because he actually believes in a lot of legal arguments. His thesis that judges decide questions of policy without any methodology that distinguishes them from legislators does not hold. Judicial reasoning is subject to constraints that do not affect legislators. It must be based on the sources of law and is limited by rules of procedure. Even when the judges have ‘interstitial’ legislative powers they are, unlike the legislator, bound to fit the system and their decisions are considered in procedure from the perspective of the right answer doctrine. The only work that can convincingly refute the skeptic argument against legal science is the reconstruction of jurisprudence as a scientific enterprise. Such work is beyond the scope of any single paper. The article aims to give some inspirations for such a task.