Rivalry, Reaction, and Weapons Proliferation: A Time-Series Analysis of Global Arms Transfers

This article analyzes the competitive dynamics in global arms transfers from 1951 to 1995. I discuss the enduring forces behind the proliferation of military capability during the Cold War and other historical periods, and then consider the competitive dynamics characteristic of the superpower rivalry itself. The process of military-technological advance, along with the dynamics of enduring interstate rivalry, lead us to expect certain patterns in quantitative data representing arms-transfer levels over time. Concepts in time-series analysis—cointegration and error correction—are helpful for understanding competitive arms-transfer policies during the Cold War, and I apply the relevant analytical tools to test for the hypothesized patterns in the empirical data. American and Russian, as well as NATO and Warsaw Pact, arms transfers are examined at three levels of regional aggregation: the Third World as a whole, the Middle East security complex, and the Persian Gulf subcomplex. The evidence shows that arms transfers by the Cold War rivals moved together in patterns consistent with competitive policy making in an environment of military-technological change, and that one or both sides adjusted their supply policies to correct for deviations from a moving equilibrium. This describes an action-reaction process, but a loosely coupled one deriving from military-technological uncertainties, the complexities of regional security dynamics, and the multidimensional character of the Cold War competition.     

The Pivot in Perspective: American Naval Power,Then and Now

The article examines the reorientation of the defense policy of the United States, initiated during the Bush and Obama Administrations, toward giving increased priority to the Asia Pacific region. It begins with the historical perspective of the development of American naval power in the twentieth century. The world wars, in which Europe represented the primary theater of conflict, had the effect of shifting a greater share of American military assets toward the Euro-Atlantic theatre, while the onset of the Cold War after 1945 required the United States to develop a navy of truly global strategic reach in which Atlantic and Pacific commitments were kept in balance. With the diminished concern for European security since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a strategic competitor in the Asia Pacific region, the United States is required in an age of defense austerity to refocus attention again to the Pacific.     

Point of Departure: A Reassessment of Charles de Gaulle and the Paris Summit of May 1960

This article argues that the Franco–American antagonism of the 1960s, which culminated with France's partial withdrawal from NATO in 1966, stems from French president Charles de Gaulle's decision in the aftermath of the failed May 1960 Paris Summit to radically redirect French foreign policy away from its post-World War Two Atlantic orientation to a more European one. By linking the failed summit to de Gaulle's new perception of the Cold War, this article moves de Gaulle scholarship away from interpretations of his foreign policy as the product of anti-Americanism or an anachronistic vision of French power to an understanding rooted in his recognition that the changing dynamics of the Cold War required the Western Europeans to reduce their military dependence on the United States. Since American leaders would never willingly relinquish their dominant position in European security affairs, de Gaulle's new design almost ensured a rising Franco–American tension.     

Sunset over the swamp – the independence and dependence of Belarus

The Federal Republic of Germany has since the end of the Cold War been at a crossroad in defining its role in European security. On the one hand, its contribution to democratic reform and economic stabilization in North Central Europe has enhanced enormously the prospects of representative government there; on the other, Germany remains wed to an outdated concept of military security and is reluctant to commit either the fiscal resources or the political capital to assume a role commensurate with Germany's importance in the development of a European Security and Defense Identity. Moreover, Bonn's precipitous diplomacy in the recognition of the breakaway Yugoslav states of Croatia and Slovenia betrays a willingness to permit Germany's allies to assume the less profitable burdens of hard security.     

局部等级视角下的东亚安全秩序与中美战略竞争

东亚秩序转型是冷战后国际关系学界争论的重要问题。在回顾既有争论的基础上,本文尝试从局部等级视角切入,分析东亚安全秩序的性质及其转型动力。局部等级体系由体系唯一超级大国领导的地区安全等级与区域内自助国家共同构成。冷战结束以来,东亚地区呈现出典型的局部等级体系特征,并在中国持续崛起的过程中逐步形成了以战略对冲为主要行为模式的安全秩序。尽管当前美国对华政策的对抗性不断增强,但是在局部等级体系下中国坚持战略对冲不但可以有效缓解自身面临的崛起困境,而且有助于防止中美陷入美苏冷战式的集团对抗,以战略对冲为核心特征的东亚安全秩序也将因此得以延续。这些发现一定程度上深化了地区安全秩序和大国竞争的理论研究,同时也有助于中美两国更为有效地管控其在东亚地区的战略竞争。     

“Exporting Democracy”? Neoconservatism and the Limits of Military Intervention, 1989–2008

This article challenges the almost universal consensus that post–Cold War neoconservative foreign policy has been characterised by the objective of “exporting democracy” abroad for strategic or moral reasons or both. Instead, the article contends that the touchstone of neoconservatism was the attempt to preserve America's so-called “unipolar moment”—its apparent position as the single pole of power in every region of the world. Moving beyond the abstract and grandiose rhetoric employed by many neocons, the article points out that neocons made a distinction between the respective uses of military and non-military power, arguing that the former should be reserved only for situations where strategic interests were at stake rather than for the sake of ideals. The article goes on to argue that this focus on strategic interests facilitated a close alliance with other conservative nationalists who were also dedicated to maintaining America's position as the single pole of world power. Thus neoconservatism should be analysed and evaluated—by both conservatives and liberal interventionists alike—on the basis that it was a strategy dedicated primarily to preserving American unipolarity, not to the promotion of ideals.     

New EU Members in Europe's Security Policy

What impact will the 2004 round of enlargement have on the European Union's common foreign and security policy? This article argues that the new members' arrival in theory strengthens the Euroatlantic camp within the EU. This impact has, however, been limited by the accession states' difficulty in exercising effective influence in Brussels so far, and their foreign policy is also coming under pressure at home because of the unpopularity of the Iraq War. The newcomers hold distinct views on the EU's policy toward Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. On this point, their efforts have begun to slowly but demonstrably transform the European Union's own involvement in countries on the EU's eastern frontier. In addition, the first signs are becoming apparent of the new members' effective imprint on the EU's common foreign and security policy.     

Damned If You Do,Damned If You Don't: Performative Power and the Strategy of Conventional and Nuclear Defusing

This article seeks to initiate a new round of strategic intellectual innovation in an era when threats posed by non-state terrorist organizations and their state supporters do not resemble Cold War threats. Based on an interpretative sociological reading of the concepts of power, security, and rationality, it argues that a “damned if you do, damned if you don't” dilemma is to the post-Cold War era what the danger of surprise attack or unintended nuclear war was to the Cold War: the defining structural threat of international politics. The dilemma leaves states confronting asymmetrical warfare with the choice of reacting with force to a terrorist act or practicing appeasement. Neither approach, however, can achieve the goal of putting an end to terrorism. Deterrence sustains the dilemma by providing a rationale for why force should be used and why self-restraint is irrational. This article proposes a third option, defusing, which may be accomplished by denial (preventing provocateurs from dragging states into the use of force) and restructuration (transforming the structure and rules of the situation). Defusing relies on “performative power”—the capacity to project a dramatic and credible performance on the world stage and to decouple social actors, their audiences, and their most deeply held strategic beliefs. The force of the argument is illustrated by examples from the global “war on terror,” the 2006 Lebanon War, the 2008–09 operation “Cast Lead” in Gaza, and the Iranian nuclear crisis.     

Balancing against threats or bandwagoning with power? Europe and the transatlantic relationship after the Cold War

The United States has played an important role in European security since the early 20^th century. From the time of the end of the Cold War, this role has changed as a consequence of the lack of a common territorial threat and the overwhelming power of the United States relative to Europe. How have European states responded to the challenges of the American world order? Are they adapting their security policies to match the challenges of US security policy and the American world order? What are the implications of the European response for the transatlantic relationship? This article seeks to describe and explain European security behaviour in the American world through the prism of two realist theories: balance of power realism and balance of threat realism. Despite sharing a common starting point in realist assumptions, each theory allows us to tell a different story about Europe's position in the American world order as well as the opportunities and challenges it faces.     

Differing member state approaches to the development of the EU Battlegroup Concept: implications for CSDP

Abstract

This article will analyse the challenges facing the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) through an evaluation of the impact that differing member state strategic cultures have on the EU Battlegroup Concept, highlighted through the examples of Germany and Poland. The concept was initiated to give the EU an increased rapid reaction capacity. However, as emphasised through the cases of Germany and Poland, divergences in EU member states' strategic cultures remain, including when, where and how force is used. When this is combined with the cost of plugging military capabilities' gaps, the political willingness to deploy a Battlegroup can be affected. Whilst the article highlights that the role that member states want to play within CSDP as well as international expectations can override constraining factors, the Battlegroups rely on a rotation system. As some member states are more willing to deploy the Battlegroups than others, the concept risks becoming a declaratory policy thus undermining CSDP.     

Germany and European security governance: how well does the Birmingham model perform?

Abstract

The expansion of the security agenda after the end of the Cold War, propelled by the blowback of 11 September 2001, raises questions about the German ability and willingness to contribute to the regional and global security governance tasks facing Europe and Germany's continuing fidelity to its post-war European avocation. It also calls for a reconsideration of the Birmingham model of foreign policy analysis, particularly its emphasis on (and interpretation of) the ideational and institutional factors defining the German foreign policy agenda and shaping German foreign policy behaviour, at least with respect to the implementation (rather than formulation) of European Union security policies. Towards assessing the continuing utility of the Birmingham model, this article proceeds in three steps: the presentation of the Birmingham model and its restatement as six conjectures; a discussion of the security governance functions undertaken by the EU and the collective action problem facing Europe (and Germany) in executing them; and an empirical investigation of Germany's contribution to the EU as a security actor since 1990.     

Influence Without Power: Middle Powers and Arms Control Diplomacy During the Cold War

This article examines the evolution of middle power diplomacy on arms control during the Cold War. It argues that despite several attempts to influence major arms control negotiations, the structural constraints imposed by strict bipolarity—particularly during the early stages of the Cold War—limited the room for diplomatic manoeuvre by the small and medium-sized states. Factors such as the geographical voting groups within the United Nations system and the self-imposed discipline within traditional alliance structures typically restricted middle power initiatives on the important questions of international security such as arms control. Nonetheless, a number of efforts were made by leading middle powers such as Australia and Canada to progress the cause of arms control and significant policy ideas were at least canvassed during this time. The historical evidence shows that the middle powers were not innocent bystanders in the Cold War arms control debates, but whatever influence they had was ultimately subordinate to the overwhelming structural power of Washington and Moscow.     

Making sense of EU comprehensive security towards conceptual and analytical clarity

Abstract

European leaders frequently vaunt the European Union's distinctiveness in adopting and pursuing a comprehensive approach to security. The EU's profile as an international actor is designed to span across all dimensions of security. As a result, its security policy portfolio involves a large number of institutional actors and policies that need to be coordinated. The ambition of the EU to provide security in a comprehensive manner raises challenges at the politico–strategic level, at the level of operational and policy planning and in day-to-day implementation. So far, the field is lacking an inclusive analytical framework for the analysis of providing security through a distinctively comprehensive civil–military, economic and political organisation. This article seeks to close this gap by providing suggestions for how the wide range of issues related to comprehensive security could be structured, and by framing the matter theoretically and with reference to existing conceptual work and empirical research.     

Normative power and organized hypocrisy: European Union member states' arms export to Libya

The 2011 Libyan civil war prompted a reassessment of the normative foundation of the EU's conventional arms export control regime as armaments manufactured in Europe were used by Gaddafi's forces during the war. The EU's foreign policy identity is based, partly, upon a common approach to arms export involving respect for common criteria for export licences. Yet, prior to the civil war, considerable amounts of military equipment had been exported by member states to Libya, notwithstanding grounds for restraint on the basis of several of the criteria. This article traces member states' arms export to Libya during 2005–2010 to explore whether member states favoured restraint or export promotion. It concludes that although aware of the risks of exporting, in a competitive market for military goods, member states sought commercial advantage over restraint, and comprehensively violated export control principles. This casts doubts on assertions of the EU acting as a “normative power”.     

Protracted refugee situations and state and regional insecurity

This article examines the long‐stating importance of refugee issues in international politics and underlines the changing emphasis given to these issues by policy makers and academic researchers, both in the immediate post‐Cold War and post‐9/11 periods. The authors then address the manner in which the relationship between forced migration and state security has been addressed in the past decade. The article highlights how this area of research continues to over‐emphasize the migration‐related security of Western states and the presence of armed elements in refugee movements in the Third World. In contrast, the literature largely neglects the security concerns of states hosting protracted refugee populations. Ironically, chronic refugee situations in regions of refugee origin constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's refugee population.     

The Military and SocietyBeyond the Postmodern Era

The degree to which the international security environment had changed after the Cold War became evident with the attacks on September 11. As a result, military forces in the United States (and perhaps in the West generally) are evolving from their Cold War and immediate post-Cold War perspectives to confront transnational and subnational non-state dangers. These changes have significant implications for military professionalism and the relations between the military and society. They are explored through a modified “Postmodern Military” model, called here the “Hybrid” model.     

The Balkans and the enlargement of NATO: A sceptical view

Throughout the Cold War, NATO and the USA worked hard to consolidate their strategic presence in Europe, while at the same time containing the Soviet threat. But the road taken by NATO in its effort to reform itself after the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, has not been a royal path, smooth and free of risk. NATO's geopolitical and selective way of eastward expansion encourages the creation of new ‘enemy blocs’ with Russia at their epicentre. The clash between NATO and the European Union over defence and security issues becomes all the more obvious. The humanitarian war over Kosovo was a risky affair whose spillover effects are badly felt today with the uprising of Albanian Macedonians; The Kosovo war, moreover, created a unique precedent in the conduct of foreign policy and clearly bordered on ‘double standard’ politics. Last but not least, the wider implications of Turkey's entry into the European Union may not be, in the long run, as positive for NATO as initially thought they would be.

This article offers a critical overview of NATO's reform process in the 1990s and argues that its transformation from a military defence pact into a political organisation upholding and selectively implementing liberal‐democratic principles may lead the alliance into serious political deadlocks in the years to come.     

The European Union in the G20: what role for small states?

The G20 has emerged as the premier forum for international economic policy coordination. For small EU states, the EU's participation in the G20 represents a particular challenge as they may be faced with decisions in which they had no say. This article looks at the possibilities for small state involvement in the G20 process and analyses the extent to which they can influence the EU's participation in the G20. The article suggests two sets of variables to explain the possibilities for influence of small states in the EU's external relations. Looking into four financial and economic policy dossiers, the article explores the conditions of success of small states' strategies. The article does not contradict that the big member states dominate the EU presence in the G20, but it does argue that small states may successfully use the EU as a foreign policy platform to pursue national objectives. Their influence varies strongly and is bound to a number of conditions.     

American security policy and NATO's future

NATO remains the United States’ principal instrument for shaping the security environment in Europe. It acts as a long‐run hedge against a possible resurrected Russian threat to the continent and to dampen the prospects for the renationalization of military and security policies in Europe. The United States faces formidable challenges to ensure the viability of NATO after the Cold War. Washington must be prepared to engage in a grand balancing act on several fronts to perpetuate the Alliance. It must support NATO enlargement to move the Alliance's geopolitical center eastward, but not to territory that would practically indefensible in the event of a resurgent Russia. Out‐of‐area operations will preoccupy Alliance attention in the near‐future, but too great an appetite for undertaking peacekeeping missions might over time substantially erode the Alliance's ability to deter or withstand the political and military pressure from a resurgent Russia or major power or coalition on the outlying areas of the Eurasian landmass.     

When Humanitarianism Matters: Liberalism and the Termination of Strategic Commitments

For all of the recent advances in the study of humanitarian norms in international relations, the prevailing sentiment remains that human rights are subordinate to other interests, especially strategic, in great power foreign policy making. This article seeks to lay the foundation to qualify this extant pessimism. It does so through a study of strategic commitments. Focusing specifically on security assistance in Latin America during the Cold War, this study assesses when and how humanitarian norms are most likely to lead democratic states to terminate these types of pledges. In so doing, it contributes to the growing literature on democratic commitments, furthers our understanding of non-governmental organization influence on international politics, and, most importantly, lays the theoretical basis for better assessing the extent to which humanitarian norms frame relationships between democracies and strategic partners.