Managing Military Transformations: Agency,Culture, and the U.S. Carrier Revolution

The marketplace of ideas within a mature democracy such as the United States is supposed to fairly reliably vet foreign policies through open, wide-ranging debate. It is widely recognized that the U.S. marketplace of ideas failed during the 2002-03 debate over going to war in Iraq. Examinations of this market failure have emphasized executive powers and public fear after 9/11 as the main reasons threat inflation succeeded; I show neither explains this case. The majority opposition was silenced throughout early 2002 and ultimately defeated in a struggle over the Iraq War Resolution by pressures to be patriotic. I contend that this silencing patriotism should not be considered ordinary patriotism for a democracy as it is anti-democratic. I discuss how two critical norms of behavior which silence debate of national security policies and cause deference to the executive branch on war powers became established as part of the militarized political culture that took root in the United States during the Cold War. Thus these norms, enforced by what I term to be militarized patriotism left over from the Cold War, silenced debate over Iraq and led to the failure of the marketplace of ideas.     

冷战后东盟的大国平衡战略

冷战结束后,东盟作为亚太地区唯一的由中小国家组成的国家集团,一直在寻找一种能够保证东南亚地区安全与稳定的地区战略.在东盟各国看来,单纯依靠东盟自身的力量是无法保障本地区安全的,而大国出于利益的驱动和对权力的追求,一定会在东南亚地区进行扩张和竞争.     

Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports

During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the strategic goal to contain Communism. Human rights and democracy were of secondary importance. In the post-Cold War period, the promotion of human rights and democracy as foreign policy concerns rose in prominence. In the spirit of Andrew Pierre, who once characterized arms transfers as "foreign policy writ large ," this study questions whether the transfer of U.S. arms mirrors America's foreign policy goals. To what extent do U.S. arms transfers reflect a concern for human rights and democracy? As a foreign policy instrument, do U.S. arms transfer patterns mark a transition between Cold War and post-Cold War worlds? To address these questions, I examine the empirical linkage between U.S. foreign policy goals and arms export agreements with developing countries for the years 1981–2002. I use a two-stage model to evaluate the decision-making process. The first-stage addresses whether a country is eligible to receive U.S. arms. If a country successfully passes through the selection stage, it progresses to the second stage where a decision is made about the amount of arms transferred. I use a Heckman model to estimate empirically the determinants of arms at both the initial selection stage and the subsequent amount stage. The findings indicate that during the Cold War years, human rights were not a significant determinant of arms transfers—although democracy was positively linked to U.S. arms in the selection stage. In the post-Cold War period, both human rights and democracy had a meaningful impact in determining the eligibility of a country to receive arms.     

Rivalry, Reaction, and Weapons Proliferation: A Time-Series Analysis of Global Arms Transfers

This article analyzes the competitive dynamics in global arms transfers from 1951 to 1995. I discuss the enduring forces behind the proliferation of military capability during the Cold War and other historical periods, and then consider the competitive dynamics characteristic of the superpower rivalry itself. The process of military-technological advance, along with the dynamics of enduring interstate rivalry, lead us to expect certain patterns in quantitative data representing arms-transfer levels over time. Concepts in time-series analysis—cointegration and error correction—are helpful for understanding competitive arms-transfer policies during the Cold War, and I apply the relevant analytical tools to test for the hypothesized patterns in the empirical data. American and Russian, as well as NATO and Warsaw Pact, arms transfers are examined at three levels of regional aggregation: the Third World as a whole, the Middle East security complex, and the Persian Gulf subcomplex. The evidence shows that arms transfers by the Cold War rivals moved together in patterns consistent with competitive policy making in an environment of military-technological change, and that one or both sides adjusted their supply policies to correct for deviations from a moving equilibrium. This describes an action-reaction process, but a loosely coupled one deriving from military-technological uncertainties, the complexities of regional security dynamics, and the multidimensional character of the Cold War competition.     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967-1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966-1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

Theoretical foundations for the collection of major power‐minor power war data

Two basic theoretical considerations underlie the collection of data on major power‐minor power conflicts. Both perspectives have major power‐minor power relations at their core, and are developed more fully in The Onset of World War (Midlarsky, 1988). First, an hierarchical equilibrium structure consists of two components: (1) two or more alliances (or other loose hierarchies such as loosely‐knit empires) of varying size and composition but clearly including a great power and a number of small powers within each, and (2) a relatively large number of small powers not formally associated with any of the great powers. Time periods during which the hierarchical equilibrium was obeyed did not experience systemic war, while those in which it was violated experienced this type of warfare. The second major theoretical basis is the overlap between great power conflicts exclusively, on the one hand, and great power‐small power conflicts on the other. This combination was a major contributor to the onset of World War I as well as other systemic wars such at the Thirty Years’ War and the Peloponnesian War.     

East Asia in a unipolar international order and Europe’s role in the region

This article attempts to explore the post-Cold War international system in which regional orders intermingle their influence. It pays special attention to regional conflicts in East Asia in the new era and what roles global powers could play to maintain regional stability. I will first examine the characteristics of the new global order after the end of the bipolarity. I will then focus on American foreign policy in the new international system in the context of its dealing with major global events that have strategic implications for its relations with other major global powers. As to discussions of regional orders, this article focuses on East Asia, where conflicts between states have not evaporated despite the relaxation of the global Cold War confrontation. What makes this area special is the involvements of many great powers and less-powerful nations that could somehow easily manipulate the seniors into the conflicts to their favour. While the regional order in East Asia is being shaped by the post- Cold War international order, the regions peace and conflicts will in turn significantly influence global order. Finally, I will argue that dealing with problems in East Asia should acquire involvements of powers that would give necessary momentum to the existing participants to solve conflicts by the means of multilateralism. The European Union (EU) is often forgotten for its role in contributing to world order, and the EU should be taken seriously by the powers in East Asia as a possible player in maintaining the regional peace. I conclude that both global and regional security depend on continuing US unipolarity, strengthened by the co-operation of the EU in the form of multilateralism. By the same token, US unilateralism without a EU counter-balancing it, only invites potential challengers, such as China, to threaten the USs preponderant position, thereby destabilising world peace.This article was supported by a research project (NSC-P3-2414-H-004-018) of the National Science Council, Taiwan, which is gratefully acknowledged.     

冷战后印韩关系的迅速发展及其影响

与冷战时期的相互淡漠相比,冷战后印韩关系迅速发展,21世纪以来急剧升温。促成两国关系迅速发展的因素包括两国的相互认知、两国的亚洲战略、美国的亚太战略部署以及亚太局势的变化。印韩关系的迅速发展已经并将继续影响亚洲的政治安全局势和亚洲经济共同体的构建前景。有鉴于此,中国应该将全球战略的重点转向亚洲,重新思考亚洲国际秩序的建构。     

构建中国与土耳其新型战略合作关系

中国和土耳其两国在1971年建立外交关系,但在20世纪七八十年代冷战的背景下,中土关系处于一种低水平状态。冷战结束后,两国关系的发展出现了前所未有的势头。2010年10月,中国和土耳其宣布正式建立和发展战略合作关系。这种战略合作关系并非空洞的外交辞令,而是具有丰富的实质性内容。作为两个发展中的地区大国,中国和土耳其双方均着眼于未来,希望在国际舞台上发挥与各自政治、经济和军事力量相称的作用。在埃及、利比亚、叙利亚等阿拉伯国家发生剧烈动荡后,土耳其在中东地区的重要性更进一步凸显。随着中东和中亚在中国对外战略中地位的上升,土耳其在中国外交中的地位会更加重要。     

The Cold War “Special Relationship” Revisited

This article focuses on one of the most potent ideas in world politics: the idea of an Anglo-American “special relationship.” It examines the use and abuse of this relationship, as cultural referent, rhetorical construct, and political imperative, during the long Cold War. It inspects the roots of specialness—the core conditions—in terms of belief and experience as well as need and opportunity. It warns of the hubris inherent in the presumption of specialness on the Churchillian model, a frame of reference (and a set of strategic contingencies) time-expired even before the expiration of the Cold War itself.     

Russian military strategies in the Arctic: change or continuity?

This paper examines the nature of Moscow’s military strategies in the Arctic. It is argued that the roles of military power have radically changed since the Cold War era. According to Russian strategic thinking, instead of being a coercive instrument in a global confrontation between two superpowers and capitalist and socialist systems, now military power has new functions, such as to ascertain Russia's sovereignty over its (not their) exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the region, protect Moscow’s economic interests in the North, prevent illegal migration and potential terrorist attacks against critical industrial and infrastructural objects, fulfil some dual-use functions (such as search and rescue operations, monitoring air and maritime spaces, providing navigation safety, mitigating natural and man-made catastrophes), help academic community in developing Arctic research, and carry some symbolic functions. These new roles, however, do not preclude military power from fulfilling its traditional functions, such as territorial defence, power projection, deterrence, and containment. Russia’s military modernisation programmes are described. The authors arrive at a conclusion that these programmes do not provoke an arms race or undermine the regional cooperation. To prevent negative security trends, a system of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures should be developed in the region.     

How Could China Bargain for a Peaceful Accommodation?

China's rise is a bargaining process between China and the outside world—especially with the United States. This article suggests two strategies, “socialization” and “legitimation,” which a rising power can use to seek “accommodation for identity” with the hegemon. Using China's peaceful rise after the Cold War as a case study, the essay then examines how China employed these two strategies to reach bargaining deals on the arms control regimes and anti-separatist movements in Xinjiang with the outside world. It concludes that the United States needs to take China's bargaining efforts seriously and consider possible peaceful accommodation with China.     

United States Responses to the Soviet Suppression of Rebellions in the German Democratic Republic,Hungary, and Czechoslovakia

Under Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson, the United States refrained from intervening during the three major Cold War crises in the Soviet bloc in 1953, 1956, and 1968. The uprisings in the German Democratic Republic and Hungary came at a contentious stage of the Cold War. In 1968 East–West relations were again groping towards détente and, the Czechoslovak Communist Party unleashed an ambitious reform agenda under Alexander Dub?ek. On 20 August, a massive military invasion by Warsaw Pact forces squashed the reform spirit. All three challenges to Soviet control on the periphery of its Cold War empire followed power struggles in the Kremlin and intimations of a slackening of the reigns of control in Moscow. Eastern Europe was terra incognita for most Americans, and the United States had never pursued an active policy in Eastern Europe. All three crisis scenarios were overshadowed by crises in other parts of the world—part of larger arcs of crises the superpowers were confronting simultaneously. The three crises also coincided, domestically, with intense presidential election politics. Washington ultimately respected the Yalta arrangements and tolerated the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Next to grudging respect for the Yalta outcomes, the ultimate spectre of mutual destruction in a nuclear war “compelled” the superpowers towards co-existence and, ultimately, in 1989, the satellite states had to liberate themselves.     

New light on the Cold War?

The Cold War has traditionally been interpreted in moral terms, but it turns out that statesmen were less ideological and far more sensitive to the logic of power than we had been led to believe. It thus makes sense to interpret that conflict in a new way — or really in much the same way as international politics has traditionally been interpreted: as a political conflict, in which power factors loomed large, and about which moral judgements are problematic. This basic claim is supported by some key examples relating to the Potsdam Conference, the Berlin Crisis and the Kennedy period.     

印度对南海争端的介入及其影响评估

冷战后,随着国际格局的调整,印度在对外战略上实行了＂东进＂政策,试图通过发展与东南亚国家的经济、军事安全等方面的合作,为其大国理想的实现奠定基础。在＂东进＂政策下,印度逐渐以联合军演、出售武器等方式介入到南海争端中,给本来就复杂的南海争端增添了变数。本文对印度介入南海争端的原因、手段做探索研究,并对其影响做出评估,以期为我国的南海争端对策提供参考。     

后金融危机时代的全球地缘政治变局与中国的机遇

源于美国次贷危机的全球金融危机对世界格局产生了深远影响,国际体系正经历着冷战结束以来最大的地缘政治变动。后危机时代,国际体系将发生一系列深刻变化:新兴大国群体崛起,传统大国趋向衰落,国际战略力量分化重组,多极化发展到一个新的阶段;中美力量对比发生此消彼长的重大变化,中美关系将成为今后一个时期全球最重要的双边关系;大国关系趋向缓和,全球和地区地缘对抗色彩淡化;国际秩序酝酿结构性调整,中国面临历史性机遇。     

An ocean for the Global South: Brazil and the zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic

In this article, we analyse an instance of revitalisation of a dormant interregional organisation dating back to the Cold War: the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS), initially launched by South American and African states in 1986 through the UN General Assembly. Drawing on the concepts of “consensual hegemony” we argue that the current phase of ZOPACAS’ existence is characterised by Brazil's efforts to rekindle it, thus reflecting its aspiration to create a new space of influence. Rather than pursuing more traditional forms of regional leadership, Brazil uses ZOPACAS as part of a persuasion-based strategy based on regional multilateralism that is designed in antagonism to other international organisations and Western powers. However, this strategy also faces important limitations resulting from resource constraints, lack of institutionalisation and an excessive exclusionary focus on minimising the role of global powers with interests in the region.     

On the BRICs Cooperation Mechanism

The BRICs cooperation mechanism,consisting of Brazil,Russia,India and China,has emerged against a backdrop of profound changes in the international pattern since the end of the Cold War.Although still ...     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967–1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966–1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

Evaluating Polysemy: An Analysis of The New York Times' Coverage of the End of the Cold War

This study examines The New York Times' definition of the end of the Cold War and its portrayal of the social movements that successfully challenged Communist authority in Eastern Europe. The analysis is located within and draws its significance from two research traditions. The first examines the degree to which media texts have a polysemic character, while the second tradition has explored the influence of Cold War ideology on the American news media's definition of international affairs. The Times' definition of the Cold War, its portrayal of the emerging post-Cold War world, and its depiction of collective action produced a text characterized by limited polysemy. This restricted polysemy was a product of the newspaper employing frames that resonated with American political values, excluding or minimizing frames divorced from mainstream American political beliefs, constructing a selective tradition in its definition of the past, and limiting the polysemic implications of particular frames.