双层次博弈理论:内在逻辑及其评价

在国际关系研究中 ,美国学者罗伯特·普特南提出的双层次博弈理论旨在分析国际谈判过程中国际政治和国内政治何时和如何发生互动。它假定首要的谈判者在国际和国内两个棋盘上进行互相关联的博弈 ,并且把国际谈判区分为谈判和批准两个阶段 ,认为后者是两个层面之间关键的理论联系。双层次博弈理论还强调政府首脑能够通过采取一定的策略来扩大或者缩小获胜集合。双层次博弈理论具有重要的理论和方法意义 ,但是这个理论也有一定的局限性。     

中俄天然气合作博弈与发展趋势研究

本文以能源地缘政治学为理论基础,分析了中国与俄罗斯天然气合作博弈。从合作意愿看,双方有诸多的共同利益点,但由于多种原因,双方难以在共同利益上达到完全的一致。中俄天然气合作经历了三个阶段的博弈,即中方消极俄方积极阶段、中方积极俄方消极阶段、中俄双方的积极合作。在每一阶段,中俄双方各自的需求意愿差异和国际因素的影响,造成双方屡经反复博弈,当然,地缘政治因素在双方合作的每一阶段中的影响也不同。展望中俄天然气合作前景,对中国谈判的有利因素在增加,而俄罗斯是否对双方利益诉求和世界天然气市场变化有深入而理性的分析,是决定未来两国天然气能否实现实质性合作的关键。     

中美贸易谈判的权力结构与中国的策略选择

在中美贸易谈判诸多研究领域中,有关谈判分析框架和谈判权力的研究存在着明显空白。更为严重的是,目前谈判理论的片面和狭隘易使中方陷入被动、不利的境地。针对中美贸易谈判的复杂多变性和互动性,本文提出谈判权力结构是影响美国贸易政策转变的重要因素,并依据三层博弈分析框架来解读中美贸易谈判的全貌,进而指出中美贸易谈判是涉及"国际—国内—决策者"三层博弈之间互动的过程,谈判结果是国际权力结构、国内获胜集合与决策者认知交互作用的产物。通过构建中美贸易谈判模型,归纳出整体权力并非谈判方的权力来源,特定议题权力才是影响谈判结果的关键因素,并且国内获胜集合和决策者认知的变化都会引起权力结构的改变,信任更可能主导谈判进程和结果。鉴于谈判权力对谈判行为和结果的影响尤为显著,本文建议可以通过坚持策略、议题关联、改变对方的获胜集合等方法增强中国谈判权力。     

发展中国家在气候变化问题上的立场及其影响

发展中国家在国际气候谈判中的立场举足轻重。在“发展压倒一切”作为国家主要任务的相似前提下,发展中国家在国际气候治理上的原则立场基本一致,它们共同进行了以气候治理谈判为契机改变现有国际经济秩序的尝试,对东西方气候谈判博弈产生较大影响。但是,由于当前气候变化对国家造成的影响程度不同,各国对国家利益的认知和考量有别,加上发达国家不失时机地推出“分而治之”政策,近年来发展中国家对国际气候治理谈判中的具体问题出现分歧,协调统一立场难度增大,国际谈判主要力量出现重新排列组合。未来的国际气候谈判必将朝着谈判主体更加多元、相互矛盾更加突出、彼此斗争更加激烈的趋势前行,谈判阵营碎片化已是大势所趋。     

国际合作中的分配问题'

分配问题产生于帕累托边界上博弈均衡点的选择。帕累托边界的存在表明行为体 对于合作并无异议,但对于具体合作方案却存在不同偏好。这种分配问题上的讨价还价可能会成 为合作的巨大障碍。新现实主义合作理论希望通过权力解决帕累托边界上的分配问题, 但这种权 力在信息不对称的博弈中很难产生预期效用。相反, 融合型谈判方式却有助于帕累托边界向好的 方向移动, 从而扩大可能协议空间,并有助于行为体寻求均衡获益标准, 从而解决分配问题。对分 配问题的这种研究和结论,有助于消除人们对国际合作困境的一些误解,为国际合作理论和实践提 供科学根据。     

美洲自由贸易协定谈判中主要谈判方的博弈

由于美国和一些拉美国家(南共市成员国)对建立美洲自由贸易区的预期有着根本的不同,因此在农业、环境、知识产权、劳工标准、服务贸易等关键性问题的谈判中相持不下。自2004年以来,美洲自由贸易协定的谈判一直陷于停滞状态。本文从主要谈判方的立场和方式的变化来分析美洲自由贸易协定谈判的博弈过程,并着重分析主要谈判方在农业和环境领域的谈判中为何陷入僵局以及打破僵局的可能性。     

逆全球化背景下东亚经济合作的机遇

亚洲金融危机推动了东亚合作的机制化建设,经过了20年的发展,本地区逐渐形成了以东盟为主导、"10+3"为核心、东亚峰会为主要平台的多层次合作框架。本文基于中日两国对掌握东亚合作主导权博弈的视角,回顾了在域外因素影响下的中日韩东亚政策演变。本文认为当前东亚地区的合作困境源于本地区仍然存在的冷战对抗思维与零和博弈认知,而逆全球化给各国带来冲击的同时也提供了合作契机。中日韩应积极重启领导人对话机制,以互惠的经济关系和共同的和平诉求为合作基点,加快区域经济合作安排的谈判,利用边境自贸试验区的建设等途径,尽快在经济合作领域取得阶段性成果。     

中国与G77在国际气候谈判中的分歧

"G77+中国"是国际气候谈判的重要谈判方,多年来为推进国际气候谈判,尤其是维护广大发展中国家的权益做出了重大贡献.但随着气候谈判的日渐深入和复杂,中国与G77之问立场出现了分化,利益协调面临困难.尽管如此,双方合作的基础仍然存在.在后续国际气候谈判中,中国与G77继续维持这一战略联盟意义重大.     

中俄区域贸易博弈分析

在中国东北和俄罗斯贸易合作的进程中,客观地分析和评价贸易的规模、性质和发展规律,准确地制定符合双方利益的发展方向和目标,已成为中俄贸易发展中亟待解决的问题,也成了学界研究中俄贸易的难点问题.本文试图从博弈论的角度来解释和阐述中国东北地区和俄罗斯作为贸易主体而形成了博弈双方,用博弈的方法分析双方在贸易中发生的各种行为是否符合国际贸易发展的客观规律,认识中国东北与俄罗斯贸易合作博弈过程的均衡程度,说明在双方贸易中因不同博弈过程而产生不同结果的逻辑联系,用博弈论的理论演绎出能够促进中国东北与俄罗斯贸易发展达到新高度的均衡解.     

日美贸易摩擦中三大谈判机制的对比研究

"市场导向的个别领域谈判"、"日美结构性障碍协议"、"日美经济框架对话"是战后日美双方缓解贸易摩擦的三大谈判机制。对三大谈判机制及其各自内部子议题的对比研究发现,贸易谈判中外压强度和谈判有效性之间并不存在对称关系。在这些谈判机制中,美国对日外压与日本国内的内压之间形成了动态的双层博弈。内压的结构与价值诉求、利益指向是分析贸易谈判的重要变量。     

The impact of international conflict and detente on bargaining in arms control negotiations: An experimental analysis

This paper reports on a laboratory experiment which investigated the impact of conflict and cooperation in a hypothetical international environment on the bargaining processes and outcomes of a simulated arms control negotiation. A method called Bargaining Process Analysis was employed for measuring the content of bargaining behaviors in this experiment where free verbal interactions were permitted.

The results suggested that a heightening of international tensions tended to increase the perceptions of mutual hostility among negotiators, to increase the employment of “hard‐line” bargaining strategies such as threats and retractions, to increase the proportion of negative relative to positive affect and disagreements relative to agreements. These changes in bargaining behavior, in turn, detracted from the ability of negotiators to identify a solution to the bargaining problem and from the level of agreement attained. Conversely, increased cooperation in the international environment had no consistent, strong effects on either the bargaining process or outcomes of negotiations.     

Asymmetric Power Among Agents and the Generation and Maintenance of Cooperation in International Relations

The question addressed in this analysis is whether endowing agents with various forms of asymmetric power makes cooperation more likely across a variety of structural settings of conflict and cooperation present in international relations. To address this question, an agent-based model incorporating asymmetric power among agents in a set of (2×2) games that represent different forms of conflict and cooperation prevalent in international relations (Chicken, Stag, Assurance, Deadlock, and Prisoner's Dilemma) is developed and analyzed via simulation. Simulation results indicate that the introduction of asymmetric power substantially increases the chances that both cooperative agents survive and cooperative worlds evolve. This is particularly the case when agents are endowed with the ability to selectively interact with other agents. Also, anticipated variations in outcomes across the game structures regarding the likelihood of cooperation are supported.     

Time Horizons and Multilateral Enforcement in International Cooperation

This article examines the effects on international cooperation of the rivalness and excludability of international goods. Rivalness affects bargaining power when the negotiating states have different discount rates; with rival goods states with higher discount rates will be empowered, while with nonrival goods states with lower discount rates will be empowered. Excludability affects the enforceability of agreements once reached; multilateral agreements about nonexcludable goods cannot be enforced through retaliation-in-kind. As such, agreements concerning international toll goods are likely to reflect the interests of the state(s) with the lower discount rate(s), and be multilaterally enforceable. Agreements concerning international public goods should similarly reflect the interests of those with the lower discount rates, but be more weakly enforced. Finally, agreements concerning international common pool resources should both reflect the interests of those with higher discount rates, and be weakly enforced. The article concludes with some strategies to mitigate the negative effects on cooperation discussed.     

The domestic politics of international negotiations: The effects of state structures and policy making processes

Putnam's metaphor of a two‐level game that state representatives play when they face the dual constraints of international bargaining and domestic pressures has been applied across different political systems. This paper argues that it is important to take into account differences in state structures and political processes in the study of international negotiations. That state structures and processes are important has become a common theme in current research on foreign policy, decision making, and international conflict. Building on this literature, this study involves a meta‐analysis of existing case studies of two‐level games. The previously completed cases provide evidence of variation in the characteristics of two‐level games. Independent measures of the institutional structures of the states involved in the set of case studies are collected from the POLITY III dataset. Hypotheses on how differences in state structures might influence the characteristics of two‐level bargaining are then examined. The study finds that differences in state structures do influence the dynamics of two‐level games. Some of the results support the conventional wisdom on this relationship, while other results suggest counter‐intuitive insights. A framework conceptualizing state characteristics at three levels is proposed for future research.     

Threats at Home,Threats Abroad: Bargaining and War in the Shadow of Coups and Revolutions

I analyze a two-level game in which a leader bargains over the spoils of international bargaining with a domestic opposition that can threaten her with a coup or revolution. While fighting an international war shrinks the domestic pie, it also alters the distribution of domestic power. This has three main implications. First, if war will undermine the opposition, fighting may be so attractive that leaders demand more for peace than foreign states are willing to give, leading to war. Second, if war will bolster the opposition, leaders accept harsh terms to avoid fighting—strategic selection that has implications for the observed relationship between war and political survival. Finally, prospective shifts in the distribution of domestic power caused by war can reduce the effects of international asymmetric information, though the result may be to increase or decrease the chances of war.     

“双循环”背景下陆海新通道与澜湄合作对接

陆海新通道与澜湄合作对接是推动形成"双循环"新发展格局的一个可能突破口。作为国际机制的陆海新通道与澜湄合作匹配基础好、对接难度小。但在对接过程中,仍面临着区域互联互通不畅、合作机制重叠低效,大国博弈日趋激烈、机制成员国和东盟对中国影响力扩大有疑虑等挑战。由此,可通过加强互联互通建设、增加与其它国际机制的合作、开展在第三方市场合作等路径,推动陆海新通道与澜湄合作实现高效对接,进而推动"双循环"新发展格局在中国西南方向实现突破,使中国与中南半岛乃至东盟国家实现联动发展。     

Bargaining Between Rebel Groups and the Outside Option of Violence

Although military cooperation among rebel groups in multi-party civil wars could help rebels defeat or extract concessions from an incumbent government, violent conflict among rebel groups is empirically prevalent. Why do rebel groups in multi-party civil wars choose to fight one another? This article models the strategic dilemma facing rebel groups in multi-party civil wars as an alternating-offer bargaining game of incomplete information with an outside option. The game-theoretic model explores the relationship between the status quo distribution of power among rebel groups, the costs of fighting, and the likelihood that one rebel group will opt to unilaterally end bargaining over a set of goods, such as access to supply routes, natural resources, and control over civilian populations. We show that the likelihood of violent conflict between rebel groups is lowest when the status quo distribution of benefits reflects the existing distribution of power.     

Sequencing Negotiating Partners: Implications for the Two‐Level Game?

In the late 1990s, Japan and South Korea concluded their first bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in completely opposite sequences despite similar domestic pressures. Japan concluded an "easier" FTA with Singapore first and then concluded a more "difficult" FTA with Mexico. South Korea concluded a more difficult FTA first with Chile and then moved on to negotiate with Singapore. In this article, I analyze these cases and review the literature on bargaining and two-level games to develop a model of how these differences in sequence account in part for the relative differences in each country's bargaining strength in their more difficult negotiations. The preexistence of the Singapore FTA eased domestic pressures to reap the benefits of entry into the bilateral FTA game. Thus, Japan could approach the more difficult FTA negotiation knowing that a "no-agreement" outcome would not fundamentally increase domestic pressure to get into the free trade "game." This alternative to no agreement put the Japanese in a stronger international bargaining position. South Korea negotiated its harder case knowing that the relative domestic pressure to get in the FTA game would increase without an agreement. This relatively worse bargaining position created a context in which South Korea conceded more internationally at the expense of higher side payments domestically.     

Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in Military Basing Negotiations

Why might public acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations generate bargaining constraints that provoke stalemate? Previous scholarship points to aroused public opinion. Yet in many cases where hard-line bargaining stances develop and talks collapse following public acknowledgment, it is not domestic political pressures that tie leaders’ hands. This article examines instead an international constraint attendant to publicity: opposition by third-party states. I argue that international power position shapes the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. The act of official acknowledgment can constrain the more vulnerable partner by enabling third-party states to credibly scrutinize its intentions. By threatening strained relations, such scrutiny can create a security dilemma that reduces the weaker partner's bargaining range to a choice between cooperation on its terms and noncooperation. I evaluate this argument by studying foreign military basing negotiations. Statistical analyses and a comparative case study produce strong support for my argument.     

海洋命运共同体视域下东亚海域污染合作治理策略优化研究

海洋污染合作治理作为公共政策本质上是要解决不同国家或地区之间的利益冲突问题。东亚海域污染情况复杂,合作治理难度大,尽管目前已有东亚海洋协作体、东亚海环境管理伙伴关系计划等合作机制,但成效甚微。"海洋命运共同体"理念的提出,回应了多极化时代背景下全球海洋污染治理格局变化,聚合了海洋污染治理的全球共识,为解析和指导东亚海域污染合作治理问题提供了方法论。深描东亚海域污染各治理主体在合作过程中所采取的策略,揭示其行动逻辑及作用机制,深刻分析存在的问题,阐释东亚海域污染合作治理博弈产生的动因,通过经典博弈模型描述中日、日韩、不同发展程度国家间及不同利益集团间的博弈过程,能够解释东亚海域污染合作治理效果欠佳的症结所在,进而需要在"海洋命运共同体"理念指引下全面优化各治理主体行动策略,面对百年未有之大变局,为完善东亚海域污染合作治理机制提供中国方案。