Bias in OMB's economic forecasts and budget proposals

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) annually submits the President's budget for the U.S. government to the Congress. The economic forecasts and revenue and outlay proposals contained in the budget have been criticized as biased, especially during the 1980s. Tests for bias in one year ahead proposals for the 1963–89 period show no bias in economic forecasts and revenue estimates, but substantial bias in outlay proposals. Most outlay proposals are consistently less than actual outcomes, accounting for underprediction of the Federal deficit. OMB outlay proposals appear to be influenced by politics. Republican administrations show more significant proposal biases, with defense proposals higher and domestic outlay proposals lower than outcomes. The Office of Management and Budget consistently understates the deficits by resorting to the most optimistic economic assumptions it can credibly — and now sometimes even incredibly — employ. — Senator James SasserWall Street Journal, 25 January 1990     

State Revenue Forecasts and Political Acceptance: The Value of Consensus Forecasting in the Budget Process

Concerns about political biases in state revenue forecasts, as well as insufficient evidence that complex forecasts outperform naive algorithms, have resulted in a nearly universal call for depoliticization of forecasting. This article discusses revenue forecasting in the broader context of the political budget process and highlights the importance of a forecast that is politically accepted—forecast accuracy is irrelevant if the budget process does not respect the forecast as a resource constraint. The authors provide a case illustration in Indiana by showing how the politicized process contributed to forecast acceptance in the state budget over several decades. They also present a counterfactual history of forecast errors that would have been produced by naive algorithms. In addition to showing that the Indiana process would have outperformed the naive approaches, the authors demonstrate that the path of naive forecast errors during recessions would be easily ignored by political actors.     

Forecasting General Fund Revenue: An Analysis of Idaho FY 1998 to FY 2011

Forecasting state general fund revenue (GFR) though business cycles means possibly confusing a cycle with an underlying long‐run trend. Relative to the actual revenue, the mean squared error of the academic, legislative, governor's, the growth path (GP), and Holt‐Winters (HW) forecasts for Idaho GFR was not significantly different than the naïve forecast's; the Combined GP‐HW forecast has significantly smaller mean square error. The GP model (ARIMA 1, 2, 1) produced a short‐run elasticity of revenue with respect to income of 1.05 (±0.05). The best GFR forecasts combined a HW two‐step‐ahead level with a GP one‐step‐ahead trend that provided a forecast of GFR with the smallest root mean square error between FY 1998 and FY 2009. A budget stabilization fund needs to be 34–40 percent of GFR for GFR to sustain growth at the state's long‐run expansion rate during a contraction.     

Fiscal Planning, Budgeting, and Rebudgeting Using Revenue Semaphores

Revenue forecasts play an important role in the state government budget and policy process. These forecasts are generally reported to executive and legislative leaders as point estimates, with no acknowledgment of their corresponding risk and uncertainty. The revenue semaphores proposed in this article outline procedures by which revenue uncertainty directly influences the planning process. The goal is not to make forecasts more accurate, but to make discussions of budget and revenue alternatives more comprehensive. Explicitly incorporating risk and uncertainty measures into the budgeting process increases the degree of real-time budgeting and reduces some adverse effects of budget revisions after the fiscal year begins. The discussion occurs in the context of budget control, management, and policy making.     

On the political economy of national tax revenue forecasts: evidence from OECD countries

Sustainable budgets are important quality signals for the electorate. Politicians might thus have an incentive to influence tax revenue forecasts, which are widely regarded as a key element of national budget plans. Looking at the time period from 1996 to 2012, we systematically analyze whether national tax revenue forecasts in 18 OECD countries are biased due to political manipulation. Drawing on theories from the field of political economy, we test three hypotheses using panel estimation techniques. We find support for partisan politics. Left-wing governments seem to produce more optimistic, or less pessimistic, tax revenue forecasts than do right-wing ones. Contrary to the theoretical prediction based on the “common pool” problem, we find that more fragmented governments and parliaments tend to produce more pessimistic, or less optimistic, tax revenue forecasts. We find no empirical evidence that political business cycles play a role in tax revenue forecasts.     

Collective failure? Lessons from combining forecasts for the UK's referendum on EU membership

Research on election forecasting suggests there are benefits from combining different sources of information. This paper discusses the experience of a combined forecasting method that was developed for the UK’s EU referendum in 2016. The sources included opinion polls, vote expectation surveys, prediction and betting markets, expert and volunteer forecasts, and various forecasting models based on polling and other kinds of data. Averages of sources within each of these categories all, in our final forecast, suggested Remain was more likely to win but with varying degrees of certainty. Combining them produced a forecast that beat some but not others. Opinion polls and citizen forecasts came closest to the true outcome. Betting and prediction market participants and volunteer forecasters were the most overconfident that the UK would vote Remain. This may have been because they were distrustful of the polls following the 2015 general election miss and had too strong an expectation of a late swing towards the status quo similar to those in Scotland in 2014 and Quebec in 1995.     

Budgetary constraints and municipal revenue forecasting

Conclusion The objective of this research has been to determine whether key budget participants see forecasting as making significant contributions to the budgetary process. The issue is important for at least two reasons. Budgetary tools will be used to the degree budget players perceive them as providing net budgettary benefits. Moreover, the continuing trend toward technological sophistication gives governments opportunities, red herrings or not, to incorporate the technology into the budget process. The issue is also very timely; with the demise of packaged budget reforms but not the values of budget reforms, there may be new opportunities for improving budgeting on a less grandiose, more piecemeal basis, such as using forecasts to analyze budgetary options. The findings here provide some insight into two questions concerning governmental forecasting. First, why do governments use complex methods? In support of previous research, since cities most dependent on intergovernmental aid tend to use complex forecasting, such methods may indeed be seen as a way to help cope with fiscal stress. Also, reflecting the ambiguity of current research, since cities tend to use relatively simple techniques regardless of the revenue source being forecasted, the source is at best a partial determinant of complexity. The most important predictor of complexity, however, was budget format; cities that emphasize reform methods, especially planning, tend to use the most complex forecast methods. The forecasting process was not as important as expected.Second, so what? Does forecasting influence budgetary choices? The evidence from the second part of the study suggest that it can, but within definable limits. Budget directors are more likely than councils to value outyear estimates, but both actors are much less likely to value long-term estimates. The survey results also indicate that revenue forecasts are not as useful for making political decisions as for making management decisions: the forecast is usually used as an internal document, is only sometimes intended to affect council decisions, and is not usually included in the budget. In short, the forecast may be most useful for making managerial decisions since that is what most cities want out of it. It also tends to be more useful if the budget format is less traditional. Finally, the findings indicate that forecasting may be more useful to management to the degree the council finds it politically useful. This is extremely important since it suggests that as powerful as technology may be, budgetary tools that do not meet political needs will be managerially confined.Clearly, more research is needed in this area. Does forecasting actually shape long-range plans? In the long run, will the forecasting effort change the ways cities budget? Can the availability of forecasting information strengthen one actor relative to another? These are important questions that need answering to clarify the impact of forecasting and other technologies on the budget process.     

Often Wrong,Never Uncertain: Lessons from 40 Years of State Revenue Forecasting

Experience in state revenue forecasting humbles and educates the public finance scholar and can inform the public administrator. It teaches the limits of econometrics, the importance of disaggregation, the significance of tax administrators, the utility of causal models, the issue of data problems, the need to understand tax structure, the importance of consensus forecasts, the terror of recessions, and the reality of being wrong. In the Indiana consensus system, experience provides greater respect for public servants seeking to make a sustainable fiscal system function and probably contributes to making the revenue forecast binding in the budget process.     

The information content of elections and varieties of the partisan political business cycle

This event study uses economic forecasts and opinion polls to measure the response of expectations to election surprise. Use of forecast data complements older work on partisan cycles by allowing a tighter link between election and response thereby mitigating concerns of endogeneity and omitted variables. I find that forecasters respond swiftly and significantly to election surprise. I further argue that the response ought to vary across countries with different institutional foundations. In support, I find that there exist three distinct patterns in forecasters’ responses to partisan surprise corresponding to Hall and Soskice’s three varieties of capitalism.     

A User's Guide to State Revenue Forecasting

One of the most difficult tasks in preparing a state budget is forecasting available revenues. An overly optimistic forecast may subsequently require unpopular budget cuts, tax increases, or both. A pessimistic forecast may trigger a political controversy over the size of the budget surplus, or may encourage additional spending that cannot be sustained in the future. Forecasters have always informally shared their experience with each other. Only in recent years, however have scholars begun to document those experiences.
A forecast user is an elected official, program manager, reporter or private citizen involved in the budget process who uses a forecast prepared by someone else as a basis for making or influencing policy decisions about state taxes and spending levels. __ While the objectives of these forecast users may vary depending on their role in the budget process, they all share one need in common: a sound forecast which provides them with the information they need to participate in the budget process. The first part of this article briefly reviews the status of revenue forecasting in the states. The second part reviews five specific forecasting issues. The third section, discusses limits of revenue forecasting. The concluding section is a summary and checklist of good revenue forecasting practices.     

Budget Deficits in the States: Massachusetts

Massachusetts entered the current recession carrying a structural deficit counterbalanced by a healthy, $2.1 billion stabilization fund, equal to 10 percent of total tax revenue. Like most states, Massachusetts only dimly realized the depth of the current recession in October 2008 when revenue collections began to slip and welfare caseloads began to increase. By May of 2009, a total FY2009 budget gap of $4 billion had been identified, the combined effect of plummeting revenues and increased costs for welfare and medical assistance. The Commonwealth closed the FY2009 budget gap through a combination of budget cuts, stabilization fund transfers, and federal stimulus funds. The Commonwealth faced an even larger $4.8 billion budget gap in FY2010. With the stabilization fund severely depleted, the FY2010 budget gap was closed primarily by budget cuts, federal stimulus money, and a sales and use tax increase. Because of the Commonwealth's reliance on one-time money to close current budget gaps, a significant budget gap of at least $2.8 billion for FY2011 was identified soon after passage of the budget. In this paper we discuss the political and historic context in which the budget gaps occurred, outline the causes of the budget gaps, and evaluate the strategies employed to close them.     

Politics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States

Governments make policy decisions in the same areas in quite different institutions. Some assign policymaking responsibility to institutions designed to be insulated from myopic partisan and electoral pressures and others do not. In this study, we claim that differences in political context and institutional design constrain the policy choices governments make. Testable propositions based on an analysis of varying electoral incentives and time horizons created by these different contexts are empirically tested using panel data on official general fund revenue forecasts in the American states, 1987 to 2008. The empirical evidence reveals that executive branch agencies and independent commissions produce more conservative forecasts than legislatures with one important exception. Executive branch revenue forecasts in states with gubernatorial term limits are indistinguishable from legislative branch forecasts. Further, we find that legislative branch forecasts are more conservative in the presence of divided partisan legislatures than unified party government. In turn, this implies that entrusting policymaking authority to either the executive branch or an independent commission may only be consequential when the political system itself fails to check legislative excesses or executive myopia.     

The change in aggregate budget behavior in the 1990s: a cointegration-error correction model analysis

Using data from 1955 to 2005, the estimates presented imply a long-run equilibrium relation between U.S. federal government revenues and expenditures, but one that is consistent with a continuous expansion in the deficit. There is evidence of a structural break that led to deficit reduction and surpluses from 1996 to 2001, which coincides with several noteworthy economic and political outcomes including the only time when a Democratic administration and Republican Congress were in power simultaneously. The results support the view of a long-run deficit bias in federal budget decision-making. Absent behavior similar to that of the late 1990s, a change in budget rules may be needed to avoid the large deficits forecasted under current law.     

Budget Slack,Institutions, and Transparency

Economic theory suggests that it is optimal for governments to use precautionary saving as a countercyclical tool. However, the availability of surplus funds often triggers political pressure for tax cuts and spending increases. Mechanisms for alleviating that pressure include limiting the transparency of slack resources and limiting politicians’ discretion to use slack resources for purposes other than stabilization. This article investigates the extent to which these two mechanisms are substitutes. In particular, the authors examine whether the widespread adoption of budget stabilization funds (BSFs) in the U.S. states over the past several decades has been accompanied by a decline in conservative revenue forecast bias. Using panel data from 47 states over a 22‐year period, they find that the adoption of a BSF reduces revenue underestimation by approximately two‐thirds; however, the size of the effect depends in part on how much a state saves in the BSF and the rules governing BSF deposits and withdrawals. The results suggest that BSFs have the unintended effect of increasing fiscal transparency.     

The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990: The Path to No Fault Budgeting

The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, included in the controversial and comprehensive budget legislation passed by Congress in October, makes a number of significant changes in federal budgeting. It shifts the focus of the budget process from deficit reduction to spending control, provides five-year spending totals and mini-sequesters for defense, international and domestic appropriations, and puts entitlements and revenue expenditures on a pay-as-you-go basis. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit targets have been raised substantially, Social Security surpluses taken out of the deficit calculation and allowance made for further adjustments for inflation, Operation Desert Shield, and other emergency spending, minimizing the prospect for general sequestration. OMB has been given important new estimating authority and the roles of the congressional committees involved in budgeting have been altered.     

Wisconsin's Budget Deficit: Size, Causes, Remedies, and Consequences

Wisconsin's lawmakers increased spending and cut taxes during the 1990s. Then, in January of 2001, they faced an estimated $2.4 billion budget gap or deficit for the FY 2001–2003 biennium. They cut spending and generated additional revenue by borrowing against future tobacco settlement income. Still, by January of 2002, the estimated deficit had grown by an additional $1.3 billion, and more cutting and borrowing took place. Despite these actions, a $3.5 billion deficit was projected for FY 2003–2005. In this study, the causes of the deficit, the "remedies" selected, and their effects are examined. "Lessons" highlighted by Wisconsin's experience include the risks associated with nonincremental policy making, the high costs of excessive political partisanship, and the corrosive effects of "fiscal brinksmanship."     

Bias in the formulation of local government budget problems

Government budgets are premised on forecasts of revenues and expenditures. These forecasts are subject to both stochastic error and strategic manipulation. Circumstantial evidence in the budgeting literature and in the popular media suggest that government officials routinely bias the forecasts underlying budgets. The research reported here asked three primary questions: To what extent are budget forecasts systematically biased? Why? (Are fiscal and electoral variables systematically related to the magnitude and direction of the biases?) What political and ethical difference do the biases make? From the literature and an analysis of the incentives facing politicians and bureaucrats, we developed hypotheses about budget biases. These hypotheses were tested using time series data for the City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (1941–1983); the City of San Diego, California (1950–1982); and the Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania) School District (1946–1983). In these locales over the periods examined, budgets were systematically pessimistic; revenues were underestimated and expenditures were overestimated. The fiscal and electoral factors hypothesized to account for this pessimism are, however, very mixed in their ability to explain the biases.     

Political distortions in state forecasts

This study provides evidence that political incentives lead state budget officials to make biased forecasts. Specifically, the budget in the year that ends right before an election is based on overly optimistic forecasts. Similarly, the budget that starts right before an election is also based on optimistic forecasts. These biases are even larger if the incumbent party is more likely to lose the gubernatorial election. Accordingly, budget deficits are $27 per capita higher in election years and $26 per capita higher the following year.     

Budget Deficits in the States: New York

New York faces large projected budget shortfalls. Although the recession has contributed, a large part of the shortfalls are due to long standing structural imbalances. The structural imbalances result from high spending levels, particularly on Medicaid and education, a volatile revenue structure, and political forces that make it difficult to achieve recurring spending reductions. In the most recent budget session, federal stimulus money allowed legislators to avoid the tough decisions needed to move the state toward long-run fiscal balance, and the adoption of increased income tax rates for high earners is likely to increase revenue volatility moving forward.