Retributivism and Legal Moralism

This article examines whether a retributivist conception of punishment implies legal moralism and asks what liberalism implies about retributivism and moralism. It makes a case for accepting the weak retributivist thesis that culpable wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for blame and punishment and the weak moralist claim that moral wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for legal regulation. This weak moralist claim is compatible with the liberal claim that the legal enforcement of morality is rarely all‐thing‐considered desirable. Though weak moralism has some plausibility, it does not follow from weak retributivism if legitimate state functions are limited in certain ways.     

Retributivism: The Right and the Good

Victor Tadros claims that punishment must be justified either instrumentally or on the grounds that deserved punishment is intrinisically good. However, if we have deontic reasons to punish wrongdoers then these reasons could justify punishment non-instrumentally. Morever, even if the punishment of wrongdoers is intrinsically good this fact cannot contribute to the justication of punishment because goodness is not a reason-giving property. It follows that retributivism is both true and important only if we have deontic reasons to punish. Tadros also claims that the constitutive aim of punishment is to inflict harm or suffering on offenders. On the contrary, the constitutive aim of retributive punishment is to inflict (justified) wrongs on offenders that are proportionate to the (unjustified) wrongs they commit. Indeed, punishment should involve the least harmful wrong that is proportionate to the wrongfulness of the offense, adequate to facilitate recognition, and (perhaps) conducive to deterrence.     

Why Retributivists Should Endorse Leniency in Punishment

This paper develops a retributivist argument for leniency in punishment. It argues that even retributivists who defend desert-based punishment have a reason, internal to their view, to prefer more lenient over more severe punishments when there are doubts concerning how much punishment an offender deserves. This is because retributivists should take an asymmetrical view to underpunishment and overpunishment, and because the likelihood of overpunishment goes up with the severity of punishment. The radicalness of the ensuing leniency depends on the strength of the asymmetry in value between underpunishment and overpunishment.     

Retributivism and Fallible Systems of Punishment

Abstract

I argue for the following, which I dub the “fallibility syllogism”: (1) All systems of criminal punishment that inflict suffering on the innocent are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. (2) All past or present human systems of criminal punishment inflict suffering on the innocent. (3) Therefore, all such human systems of criminal punishment are unjust from a desert-based, retributivist point of view. My argument for the first premise is organized in the following way. I define what a human system of punishment is. I offer a distinction between retributive and utilitarian approaches to punishment. I distinguish between weak retributivism embodied in the second premise and strong retributivism, which I argue is the basis for the weak version. I argue that on retributivist grounds, each case of punishment is just when it matches the seriousness of the wrongdoing of the offender and that systems of punishment are just from a retributivist point of view when there are no exceptions to this match-up. In making my case, I will use Kant's retributivism as the version of my choice, so I will spend some time showing that recent reinterpretations of Kant (arguing that he was not a thoroughgoing retributivist), even if they are correct, are consistent with my view. Ultimately, however, I argue that the better view is that Kant was a thoroughgoing retributivist.     

Punishment,Liberalism, and Public Reason

The article argues for a conception of the justification of punishment that is compatible with a modern, politically liberal regime. Section I deals with what some have thought are the obvious social interests society has in punishing criminals, and tries to develop those possible interests somewhat sympathetically. Section II suggests that many of those reasons are not good ones if punishment is regarded (as it should be) from the perspective of political philosophy. Social responses to bad things happening to people cannot be grounded in controversial metaphysical views about what is good for people or what people deserve, but many reasons proffered for punishment are in fact grounded in such views. This constraint, accordingly, limits what individuals can expect in terms of a societal response to crime. Section III develops the appropriate reasons for punishment in a modern, liberal regime. Here the article relies on a—largely undefended—conception of public reason as the most plausible theory of what reasons for punishment are available to liberals. Section IV offers some closing thoughts on why people might adopt a politically liberal view about punishment as their own, personal view about how they should relate to others.     

Time and Retribution

Retributivists believe that punishment can be deserved, and that deserved punishment is intrinsically good or important. They also believe that certain crimes deserve certain quantities of punishment. On the plausible assumption that the overall amount of any given punishment is a function of its severity and duration, we might think that retributivists (qua retributivists) would be indifferent as to whether a punishment were long and light or short and sharp, provided the offender gets the overall amount of punishment he deserves. In this paper I argue against this, showing that retributivists should actually prefer shorter and more severe punishments to longer, gentler options. I show this by focusing on, and developing a series of interpretations of, the retributivist claim that not punishing the guilty is bad, focusing on the relationship between that badness and time. I then show that each interpretation leads to a preference for shorter over longer punishment.     

Motives,Reasons, and Responsibility in Hate/Bias Crime Legislation

Hate/bias crimes, according to what we may call the literal interpretation, are crimes distinguished by their connection to a certain kind of motive. Hate crime laws and sentencing provisions state that such motives may result in penalty enhancements. According to the standard objection to hate crime laws, this position is problematic: first, criminal law should not be used to pass moral judgments on motives. Its concern should be with actions as modified by intentions, not with the values and reasons of perpetrators. Second, our motives are not directly responsive to the will, so we should not be held responsible for them. In reply to the second part of the objection, this article defends a version of the literal interpretation of hate crime that conceives of it as acting on a bad reason. Hate crime laws add punishment not for motives/thoughts, but for the decision to treat a patently bad reason (such as racism) as a reason to commit a criminal act. If the act itself is reason-responsive, we can be held responsible for what reasons we act on. Given that the truth or falsity of hate/bias on these grounds is not a disputed matter, we can justify using the criminal law to recognize the moral status of such motives.     

What is a Crime?

This article presents a philosophical account of the natureof crime. It argues that the criminal law contains both fault-basedcrimes and strict liability offences, and that these two representdifferent paradigms of liability. It goes on to argue that thegist of fault-based crimes lies in their being public wrongs,not (as is often thought) because they wrong the public, butbecause the public is responsible for punishing them, i.e. becausethey merit state punishment. What makes wrongs deserving ofpunishment is that they are seriously blameworthy, inasmuchas they evince a disrespect for the values violated. But theyonly merit state punishment when they violate important values,not simply due to the well-known pragmatic considerations againstthe use of the criminal law, but to the intrinsic expressiveforce of criminal conviction. Finally, the analysis of fault-basedcrimes points to a role for strict liability in regulating actionsthat are not seriously blameworthy but do increase the riskof values being damaged.     

美国对犯罪与违法的法理界定

本文阐述的是美国关于犯罪本质的哲学解释。刑罚既包括过错犯罪。也包括严格责任违法,这两者代表了两种不同的刑事责任类型。美国学界主张过错犯罪的要点在于其是侵害公众利益的不法行为,并非由于其危害公众利益,而是因为公众负责处罚此类行为,即它们应该得到国家的处罚。不法行为得到惩罚是因其性质严重,它们不敬重社会公认的价值;只有当行为人违反重要价值时才应得到处罚,不仅是出于对刑法实用主义的考虑,亦取决于罪刑法定原则的内涵。美国学者分析过错犯罪和不太严重的违法行为,认为后者同样存在着损害公众利益的危险。     

Criminalizing the State

In this article, I ask whether the state, as opposed to its individual members, can intelligibly and legitimately be criminalized, with a focus on the possibility of its domestic criminalization. I proceed by identifying what I take to be the core objections to such criminalization, and then investigate ways in which they can be challenged. First, I address the claim that the state is not a kind of entity that can intelligibly perpetrate domestic criminal wrongs. I argue against it by building upon an account of the modern state as a moral agent proper, capable of both culpable moral and legal wrongdoing. I then consider objections to the intelligibility and legitimacy of subjecting states to domestic criminal processes, which primarily find their source in the assumption that such subjection would necessarily involve the state prosecuting, judging, and punishing itself. I argue that whether this (questionable) assumption is sound or not, it does not create the kinds of unsolvable quandaries its exponents think it does. I then move on to reject the distinct, yet related, objection that, at least in aspiring liberal jurisdictions, treating the state as a criminal objectionably involves extending to it various substantive and procedural guarantees that, given its nature and raison d’être, it should not have. Finally, I discuss three central objections to punishing the state. First, that organizations like states do not have the phenomenal consciousness required to suffer punishment. Second, that the constant possibility of dispersion of state punishment amongst individual members stands in the way of its justification. Lastly, that whatever justification there may be for making things harder for the state in response to its culpable wrongdoing, such treatment need not be understood as punishment. While partially conceding the strength of these objections, I strive to loosen their grip in ways that show that justified punishment of the state, meaningfully understood as such, remains a distinct possibility. I conclude by contrasting supposed alternatives to the criminalization of states, and by contending that my analysis leaves us with enough to keep the possibility of state criminalization on the table as a justifiable response to state wrongdoing.     

Self-Defense,Punishment and Forfeiture

Abstract

According to the self-defense view, the moral justification of punishment is derived from the moral justification of an earlier threat of punishment for an offense. According to the forfeiture view, criminals can justly be punished because they have forfeited certain rights in virtue of their crimes. The paper defends three theses about these two views. (1) The self-defense view is false because the right to threaten retaliation is not independent of the right to carry out that threat. (2) A more plausible account of the right to threaten says instead that the right to retaliate is primary to the right to threaten, and that the former right in turn arises because aggressors forfeit the right not to suffer retaliation. (3) The “fair warning thesis,” according to which just punishment must be preceded by a threat, is less plausible than first appearances suggest and is therefore no serious obstacle to the view of threats described above.     

Punishing Wrongs from the Distant Past

On a Parfit-inspired account of culpability, as the psychological connections between a person’s younger self and older self weaken, the older self’s culpability for a wrong committed by the younger self diminishes. Suppose we accept this account and also accept a culpability-based upper limit on punishment severity. On this combination of views, we seem forced to conclude that perpetrators of distant past wrongs should either receive discounted punishments or be exempted from punishment entirely. This article develops a strategy for resisting this conclusion. I propose that, even if the perpetrators of distant past wrongs cannot permissibly be punished for the original wrongs, in typical cases they can permissibly be punished for their ongoing and iterated failures to rectify earlier wrongs. Having set out this proposal, I defend it against three objections, before exploring how much punishment it can justify.

     

An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment

The lex talionis of the Old Testament has been widely perceived—understandably,but mistakenly—as a barbaric law of retribution in kind.It is better understood as a seminal expression of restraintand proportionality as moral principles of punishment. Thishas been recognized from the earliest times. Over the interveningcenturies, the lex talionis has lost neither its moral significancenor its penal relevance. This is reflected in H.L.A. Hart'ssynthesis of modern retributivist and utilitarian theories ofpunishment and, again, in contemporary Canadian law throughthe recognition of proportionality as the fundamental principleof sentencing under the Criminal Code. The tension between thisfundamental principle and Canada's increasing resort to mandatoryminimum sentences of imprisonment is examined briefly in thislight.     

Rehabilitating Retributivism

This review essay of Victor Tadros’s new book, “The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law,” responds to Tadros’s energetic and sophisticated attacks on retributivist justifications for criminal punishment. I argue, in a nutshell, that those attacks fail. In defending retributivism, however, I also sketch original views on two questions that retributivism must address but that many or most retributivists have skated past. First, what do wrongdoers deserve – to suffer? to be punished? something else? Second, what does it mean for them to deserve it? That is, what is the normative force or significance of valid desert claims, either with respect to retributivist desert in particular or with respect to all forms of desert? Because the answers that this essay offers are preliminary, the essay also serves as a partial blueprint for further work by criminal law theorists with retributivist sympathies.     

A Kantian Critique of Kant's Theory of Punishment

In contrast to the traditional view of Kant as apure retributivist, the recent interpretations ofKant's theory of punishment (for instance Byrd's)propose a mixed theory of retributivism and generalprevention. Although both elements are literallyright, I try to show the shortcomings of each. I thenargue that Kant's theory of punishment is notconsistent with his own concept of law. Thus I proposeanother justification for punishment: specialdeterrence and rehabilitation. Kant's critique ofutilitarianism does not affect this alternative, whichmoreover has textual support in Kant and is fullyconsistent with his concept of law.     

Fallibility and Retribution

The fact that human fallibility virtually ensures that punishment will sometimes befall the innocent presents a theoretical puzzle to all forms of retributivism. Retributivists usually say that desert is a necessary condition for justified punishment. It remains unclear, following this view, how retributivists can support punishment in (imperfect) practice. The paper investigates a number of possible replies available to the retributivist. It concludes that one reply in particular can overcome the problem posed by fallibility, but it is not obvious that this reply is convincing.     

Could There be a Right to Own Intellectual Property?

Intellectual property typically involves claims of ownership of types, rather than particulars. In this article I argue that this difference in ontology makes an important moral difference. In particular I argue that there cannot be an intrinsic moral right to own intellectual property. I begin by establishing a necessary condition for the justification of intrinsic moral rights claims, which I call the Rights Justification Principle. Briefly, this holds that if we want to claim that there is an intrinsic moral right to φ, we must be able to show that (a) violating this right would typically result in either a wrongful harm or other significant wrong to the holder of the right, and (b) the wrongful harm or other wrong in question is independent of the existence of the intrinsic right we are trying to justify. I then argue that merely creating a new instance of a type is not the kind of action which can wrongfully harm the creator of that type. Insofar as there do seem to be wrongs involved in copying a published poem or computer program, these wrongs presuppose the existence of an intrinsic right to own intellectual property, and so cannot be used to justify it. I conclude that there cannot be an intrinsic right to own intellectual property.     

The Legitimacy of Judicial Responses to Moral Panic: Perceived vs. Normative Legitimacy

In some instances, the criminal justice system is affected by a moral panic; that is, by an exaggerated social reaction to an assumed threat to moral values. When influenced by moral panic, courts demonize defendants and aggravate punishments. Are such responses legitimate? This article argues that by contrast to legitimate condemnation of criminal conduct, demonizing defendants ought never be legitimate. The legitimacy of aggravating punishment requires distinguishing between the sociological concept of legitimacy (“perceived legitimacy”) and the moral concept (“normative legitimacy”). Aggravation of punishment in response to moral panic might be perceived as legitimate since it expresses public perceptions about the severity of the threat to a social value, even when these perceptions are exaggerated; however, punishments that are proportionate to such a perceived, exaggerated, threat to a social value are unjust and unfair, and therefore are normatively illegitimate. When the panic subsides, courts tend to return to lower levels of punishment. The subsidence of the panic enables one to realize that a gap between perceived and normative legitimacy has been created during the panic. Should and can the gap be bridged retroactively in order to gain full legitimacy? One way to bridge the gap is to grant clemency that will reduce the punishment of defendants whose sentences were exaggerated unduly during the panic. The article proposes a more radical mechanism that allows for sentence re-evaluation in cases of moral panic.     

Two Challenges for Dignity as an Expressive Norm

The concept of dignity figures prominently in legal and moral discussion on such topics as human rights, euthanasia, abortion, and criminal punishment. Yet the notion has been criticized for being indeterminate and either insufficient or redundant (or both) in justifying the kinds of legal and moral rights and views its proponents use it to vindicate. The criticisms have inspired some novel conceptions of dignity. One of them is Tarunabh Khaitan??s proposal that dignity should be understood as an expressive norm. In this article, I assess Khaitan??s suggestion. I maintain that it faces two challenges that its advocates should be able to solve for the proposal to be plausible.     

Crime, Freedom and Civic Bonds: Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy

There is no question Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is an engaging and powerful book which will inform legal philosophy, particularly Kantian theories, for years to come. The text explores with care Kant’s legal and political philosophy, distinguishing it from his better known moral theory. Nor is Ripstein’s book simply a recounting of Kant’s legal and political theory. Ripstein develops Kant’s views in his own unique vision illustrating fresh ways of viewing the entire Kantian project. But the same strength and coherence which ties the book to Kant’s important values of independence blinds the work to our shared moral ties grounded in other political values. Ripstein’s thoughts on punishment are novel in that he embeds criminal law, both in its retributivist and consequentialist facets, into Kant’s overarching political philosophy to show how criminal law can be seen as one aspect of the supremacy of public law. But a criminal law solely focused on the preservation of freedom takes little notice of the ways criminal law need expand its view to account for how a polity can restore the victim of a crime back to civic equality, reincorporate offenders after they have been punished and cannot leave past offenders isolated and likely to reoffend, resulting in the rotating door prison system and communities of innocents who remain preyed upon by career criminals. Lastly, a political theory that does not prize our civic bonds will ignore the startling balkanization of our criminal punishment practices, where policing, arresting and imprisonment become tools of racial and social oppression. In illustrating the benefits in viewing criminal law as a coherent part of Kant’s political theory of freedom, Ripstein also highlights what is absent. It then becomes clear that though Kant presents one important facet of punishment, only a republican political theory can meet the most pressing moral demands of punishment by reminding us that criminal law must be used to preserve and strengthen civic society.