从印尼社会特点看伊斯兰教与政治的关系

印度尼西亚是世界上穆斯林人口最多的国家,但伊斯兰教在政治中的影响较小.这是由印尼社会的特点决定的.印尼是多元种族社会,主张融和的爪哇文化占主导地位,印尼穆斯林大都属名义穆斯林,加之威权政治下的弱政党制度,使得印尼人更拥护潘查希拉而不是伊斯兰教为立国基础.     

印尼伊斯兰教主流派与极端派初探

印尼是世界第四大人口大国,又是世界穆斯林人数最多的国家。苏哈托政权垮台后,伊斯兰势力已重返政治舞台,伊斯兰化倾向日益明显。印尼伊斯兰教主流派比较温和与包容,反对在印尼建立伊斯兰教国家。极端派主张在印尼实行伊斯兰教派规,人数虽小,但组织严密,能量也大。美国“9·11”事件后,在当前反对国际恐怖主义斗争中,印尼极端组织的动向引起国际社会的关注。     

印尼廉政建设中的文化因素

从文化角度考察印尼腐败问题长期存在和反腐失效的原因,是全面研究印尼腐败问题的必要之举。爪哇传统文化中的尊敬与重视社会和谐的价值观,以及在此基础上形成的以等级制为特征的政治文化,是庇护制和主公制度形成的文化基础,也是腐败问题在印尼长期存在的重要原因。在建立健全的反腐法律机制的同时,弘扬传统文化中的积极因素,构建本国特色的廉政文化,对于印尼长期的反腐工作具有重要意义。     

论爪哇文化的兼容性

论爪哇文化的兼容性蔡金城爪哇文化，作为印度尼西亚文化中的一个分支，因其人口众多，文明程度高且颇具特色，是印尼文化中最重要的组成部分。爪哇族作为印尼的主体民族，占印尼人口的４７％，而爪哇人在印尼国家政治中更是扮演着重要的角色，如两位印尼总统均是爪哇人，...     

郑和与印尼的伊斯兰教

明朝郑和(1371—1433)是中国一位杰出的航海家。他率领巨舰百艘,七下西洋,远航亚非30余国,涉沧溟10万余里,历28年之久。郑和为增进我国与亚非各国间的贸易往来与友好关系,为推进世界文明的发展,作出了重大贡献。在七下西洋期间,郑和几乎每次都访问印尼的爪哇和苏门答腊等岛屿。下面介绍郑和在印尼(尤其在爪哇岛)传播伊斯兰教的情况。     

印尼华人逐渐融入当地主流社会

１９９７年１２月，应印尼万隆西爪哇伊斯兰兄弟联谊会（下简称西伊联谊会）和努山打拉伊斯兰大学的邀请，笔者和北京大学梁立基教授，厦门大学吴文华教授，暨南大学黄昆章教授赴印尼雅加达和万隆访问，进行学术交流和考查华人社会。交流在两个方面进行；第一方面是和印尼...     

印尼伊斯兰教与基督教冲突的根源

冷战结束后 ,伊斯兰教复兴运动再次席卷穆斯林世界 ,伊斯兰势力在国际政治舞台上的作用 ,成为 2 0世纪末最重要的政治现象之一。伊斯兰复兴运动的东渐影响着东南亚局势的发展。印尼作为世界最大穆斯林国家 ,在世纪末遭受亚洲金融危机的重创 ,政治、经济和社会危机总爆发。民族宗教冲突是社会危机的突出表现之一 ,而伊斯兰教与基督教冲突又是宗教冲突的焦点。探讨印尼宗教冲突的根源 ,有助于了解印尼局势的发展 ;解决印尼宗教冲突 ,有利于东南亚地区的稳定 ,这是各国政府和学者共同关心的问题。     

伊斯兰教复兴浪潮冲击印尼

伊斯兰教复兴浪潮冲击印尼孔远志七十年代以来，伊斯三教复兴主义思潮以中乐为中心，向亚菲、特别是穆斯林人口多的国家迅速蔓延。印尼也不例外。印尼全国人口约１．８亿，穆斯林占８８％，即１．６亿左右。她是世界上穆斯林最多的国家。目前伊斯兰教复兴主义思潮对印尼社...     

浅析新秩序时期后的印尼伊斯兰教

印尼是伊斯兰教徒最多的国家 ,伊斯兰问题在印尼向来是比较敏感的。新秩序之后 ,伊斯兰问题尤为突出 :内部派别矛盾加剧 ,各政党四分五裂 ;在外则与基督教之间的冲突和骚乱此起彼伏。印尼国家及民族的统一和团结正经受严峻的考验 ,印尼的伊斯兰面临艰难的抉择。     

印度教在印度尼西亚

印度教是印尼官方承认的五大宗教之一。据估计,1980年印尼的印度教徒约360万,占东南亚国家印度教徒450万至500万人中的70—80％。①他们主要集中在巴厘岛。在印尼历史上,印度教在爪哇等岛曾有相当大的影响。     

Ahmadis or Indonesians? The polarization of post-reform public debates on Islam and orthodoxy

Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesian public discourse about “mainstream” Muslim identity and practice has polarized sharply into various factions. This article offers a detailed analysis of a subset of this discourse that focuses on the Ahmadiyya in order to grasp how the new normative contours of Islam are being shaped in Indonesia. I make three arguments: First, the discourse is homogenizing what was once a wide spectrum of identitarian positions, and that consequently, Islamic diversity in Indonesia is shrinking. Second, the various internally homogenized sets of arguments for and against the Ahmadiyya mis-engage with each other in a way that produces social fragmentation and further polarization. Third, these arguments produce exclusionary mechanisms that reinforce each other. Both the opponents of the Ahmadiyya and their defenders exclude Ahmadis from conceptions of an Indonesian “majority.” This dynamic in Indonesian public discourse has resulted in the acceleration of the marginalization of the Ahmadiyya within an increasingly fragmented Indonesian society.     

Indonesia and the “conflictual consensus”: a discursive perspective on Indonesian democracy

In this essay we propose an alternative approach to assessing the state of democracy in Indonesia. We focus not on institutional indicators (as is usually the case) but on manifestations of political discourses in the public sphere. In applying post-Marxist political theory through the work of Slavoj ?i?ek and Chantal Mouffe, we argue that democracy’s main defining feature is that it allows antagonistic discourses about alternative policies to coexist, yet still manages to coalesce around a minimal consensus on how these discursive conflicts are to be dealt with in a fair way. Applying this approach to democracy analysis to Indonesia, we suggest that the major obstacles to democratic practice do not emerge from institutional problems, but from an overbearing political discourse that imposes broad consensus and harmony on most political issues. Political discourse in Indonesia is generally structured around “Islam” and “the people.” These themes provide a basis for a political consensus that conceals economic and social contradictions and reveals considerable depoliticization in Indonesian democratic practice.     

The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance

Abstract

Indonesian democracy has been challenged by rising religious intolerance and discriminatory attitudes in civil society since the mid-2000s, despite expanded freedom in many areas including the media. Why has Indonesian civil society been put on the defensive by radical and conservative Islamic elements in the context of democratic consolidation? What role has expanded freedoms and a flourishing of new media and information technologies played? This article argues that two factors have contributed to the rising influence of religious hardliners/radicals and increasing religious intolerance. The first is hardliner access not only to new media but, more importantly, to traditional means and institutions for religious and political mobilisation, including state apparatus, to cultivate antagonistic sentiments and attitudes against what they consider the enemies of Islam within the Muslim communities while disseminating narrow and dogmatic interpretations of Islam. The other is the rise of conservative Muslim politicians within the state who are ready and eager to embrace new media and communication technologies while using the state office and prerogatives to advance conservative religious visions and agendas. In order to assess how those conservative politicians exploit their ministerial prerogatives and state patronage to curtail civil society, particularly the freedom of expression and religion, this article examines two prominent and controversial Muslim politicians: Tifatul Sembiring from the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party and Suryadharma Ali from the United Development Party.     

Imagine All the People? Mobilising Islamic Populism for Right-Wing Politics in Indonesia

ABSTRACT

Right-wing politics in Indonesia is frequently associated with Islamic populist ideas. In part this is because Islamic organisations played a major role in the army-led destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party in the 1960s. Since then Islamic populism has evolved greatly and in post-authoritarian Indonesia it includes manifestations that see no fundamental contradiction between Islam and neo-liberal market economies as well as those that do. Significantly, like their counterparts in other countries, Indonesian Islamic populists maintain vigilance against the purveyors of class-based politics who may exert a divisive influence on the ummah. Thus, Indonesian Islamic populism shares with many of its counterparts a disdain for Leftist challenges to private property and capital accumulation besides political liberalism’s affinity to the secular national state. Yet strands of Islamic populism have relegated the project of establishing a state based on sharia to the background and embraced the democratic process. But this has not translated necessarily into social pluralist positions on a range of issues because the reinforcement of cultural idioms associated with Islam is required for the mobilisation of public support in contests over power and resources based on an ummah-based political identity.     

Islam in Indonesia: Its History,Development and Future Challenges

In Indonesian history, Islamic groups have always played an important political role. Jusuf Wanandi, co-founder of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, states that most of these groups are moderate, tolerant and democratic. In the past few years, however, radical and extreme groups of Muslims have emerged and to some degree have set the agenda in the country with their extreme political interpretation of Islam. The depth of political and economic crises, and the weakness of the national government to resolve the crises have complicated the positive development of Islam in Indonesia. This is the biggest challenge facing young Muslim leaders. If they should succeed, which is quite likely, Indonesia's Islam could become the model for political Islam around the world. Wanandi concludes that this will be Indonesia's biggest contribution against global terrorism.     

在华的印尼新娘:商品化婚姻、人口贩卖与骗婚

印尼在华的合约新娘问题引起了中国、印尼政府与社会的广泛关注。中印尼经济发展的差距、非法中介谋求暴利和印尼新娘对富裕生活的向往,成为在华印尼新娘群体日益扩大的动因。在华的印尼新娘问题并不是单一的社会问题,其中杂糅了商品化婚姻、人口贩卖和婚姻诈骗等问题,处理起来千头万绪,十分棘手。稍有不慎,极有可能成为第二个"印尼的中国劳工问题"。因此,在解决在华的印尼新娘问题时,中国应完善涉外婚姻法,加强与印尼的合作,严厉打击从事非法涉外婚姻介绍的个人或组织,严厉惩治人口贩卖,及时解救被贩人员,建立健全跨国婚姻纠纷应对机制,尽快形成两国婚姻信息的互通机制及查询制度,共同扩建自由婚姻领域,促进跨国婚姻的和谐稳定。     

印尼华人的同化及其前景

印度尼西亚华人同化于主体社会的历史告诉我们 :民族通婚、一个民族的经济和文化素质、国际环境以及国家的民族政策是影响民族同化进程的四个主要因素。比较而言 ,国家民族政策是具有决定意义的因素。只要印度尼西亚政府能够制定明智而现实的国家政策 ,实现真正的民族平等 ,印度尼西亚各民族所期盼的民族统一、和睦相处的崇高目标就一定会达到。     

The Indonesian killings of 1965–1966: the case of Central Java

The mass killings of 1965–1966 in Indonesia marked a watershed in its history. The consensus estimate of lives lost is 500,000. In this paper, demographic and geographic methods are used to characterize the violence in Central Java, one of the worst-affected provinces. The findings provide a portrait of the violence and its dynamics. This portrait highlights the likely complicity of a diverse array of political opponents of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The findings also provide evidence supporting Clifford Geertz's three-aliran (cultural “stream”) model of Javanese society, with the complex interplay of the three aliran and the Indonesian Army in the political realm producing the violent outcomes of 1965–1966. In this manner, this study builds on prior work by Hefner, Jay, Lyon, Mortimer, and Ricklefs on the cultural and social underpinnings of the violence. It also builds on more recent work on the neighboring province of East Java in which the role of two of the three alirans was found to be a significant factor, underlining the importance of the intersection of culture, geography, and politics in understanding this violent episode in Indonesian history.     

Islam in post-Soviet Georgia1

This paper explores Islam in Georgia and analyses empirical results from preliminary field research in Tbilisi, more particularly in Kvemo-Kartli, whose inhabitants are predominantly Shi'ites and ethnic Azeris, as well as in Adjaria, where Sunni Adjars are resisting attempts at (re)-Christianization. Moreover, field inquiries were carried out in the Pankisi Valley, where approximately 6000 Kists live. Most publications dealing with Georgia's history neglect the role of Islam in the process of nation and state building and tend to forget that it was at some point in time one of the constituent components of the country's consolidation as a state. Most scholars insist on recalling that, right after Armenia, Georgia was one of the first nations to adopt Christianity as state religion. Therefore, when referring to Islam, the latter is often presented as an alien, extraneous and aggressive element. After 70 years of Soviet atheism, the newly independent state ideologically and strategically promotes Orthodox Christianity as central element of Georgian identity. All Islamic communities and institutions in Georgia, be they Sunni or Shi'ite, are theoretically under the central authority of the imam of Tbilisi's central mosque, Akhund Hadji Ali, himself dependant on the Baku-based Administration of the Muslims of the Caucasus. The reality shows, however, that there are two major separate Muslim communities living in Georgia: the Shi'ite Azeris and the Sunni Adjars, who scarcely co-operate. The place of Christianity in the national ideology and the promotion of Christian values tendentiously lead to the marginalization or exclusion of Muslims from the national community. However, in their day-to-day life, Muslims are not discriminated against, and most of the time all religious communities live together in good harmony. In general, Islam is considered as a ‘traditional’ religion, and as such is tolerated by the Georgian authorities, which differs very much from the way they reject ‘non-traditional’ religions.