Preventing protectionism: International institutions and trade policy

This paper examines the role of international institutions in preventing the rise of protectionism. We analyze states?? choices in trade policy during the current global economic crisis, a situation likely to exacerbate uncertainty in the conduct of commercial relations and to push countries toward ??beggar-thy-neighbor?? trade policies. The main argument of the paper is that the numerous international institutions present in the international system during the current economic crisis serve as conveyors of information and mechanisms of commitment and socialization. They mitigate the uncertainty problem that prevails in prisoner??s dilemma settings such as trade. Economic international organizations increase the flow of information about the preferences and behaviors of its members. Non-economic organizations also have a role to play as social environments that encourage cooperation. Specialized international institutions devoted to trade, such as the WTO and preferential trade agreements (PTAs), not only provide monitoring and enforcement functions but also lock in commitments to liberal trade through legal obligations that make defections costly. We test our argument using a dataset of trade policies during the current economic crisis and of membership in international organizations. The paper finds strong support for the role of international institutions as commitment and socialization mechanisms in preventing the rise of protectionism.     

The Economic Leverage of International Organizations in Interstate Disputes

Addressing a long-standing debate in international relations scholarship, this study shows that international governmental organizations (IGOs) with high economic leverage over their member states, such as some development banks, substantially lower the risk that political disputes experience the use of military force. Empirical tests covering cases of disputatious claims and international crises since 1946 make use of a new classification of IGOs that have economic leverage and use it toward increasing states’ cost of using force in disputes. When pairs of states are subject to the economic leverage of IGOs, they are substantially less likely to use force. For the understanding and practice of interstate dispute resolution and international conflict more generally, the study suggests a specific linkage between institutionalized economic interdependence and conflict escalation.     

Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992

Previous studies provide strong evidence for the Kantian theory of peace, but a satisfactory evaluation requires establishing the causal influence of the variables. Here we focus on the reciprocal relations between economic interdependence and interstate conflict, 1885–1992. Using distributed-lags analyses, we find that economically important trade does have a substantively important effect in reducing dyadic militarized disputes, even with extensive controls for the influence of past conflict. The benefit of interdependence is particularly great in the case of conflict involving military fatalities. Militarized disputes also cause a reduction in trade, as liberal theory predicts. Democracy and joint membership in intergovernmental organizations, too, have im-portant pacific benefits; but we find only limited support for the role of costly signals in establishing the liberal peace. We find no evidence that democratization increases the incidence of interstate disputes; and contrary to realists' expectations, allies are not less conflict prone than states that are not allied. Democracies and states that share membership in many international organizations have higher levels of trade, but allies do not when these influences are held constant.     

Dyadic Effects,Relevance, and the Empirical Assessment of the Kantian Peace

Dyadic effects to a large extent account for the difficulty of explaining and predicting international conflict. In this study, I derive a statistical model to estimate unobserved dyadic effects in the dyadic analysis of conflict. The proposed model employs a hierarchical modeling approach to estimate dyadic effects, thereby avoiding the problems caused by the use of fixed effects models. Furthermore, it simultaneously addresses the important sample selection issue of identifying relevant dyads. I show that the estimation of dyadic effects significantly improves the model fit and generates several interesting findings. Substantively, this study makes an important contribution to the empirical evaluation of the Kantian peace. It argues that international organizations increase the likelihood of conflict of interest between member states but reduce the probability of militarized conflict. I demonstrate that the positive coefficient of international organizations in Oneal and Russett (1999) is biased in the positive direction. When the proposed statistical model is used, international organizations, together with trade and democracy, reduce the probability of conflict.     

Nationalist Sources of International Economic Integration

Most scholars of international relations and nationalism presume that nationalist ideology acts uniformly to hinder international economic integration, globalization, and free trade. This article challenges the conventional wisdom by developing an analytical framework of the incentives majority and minority nationalists face in the realm of foreign economic relations. Defining nationalism as the promotion of the autonomy, unity, and identity of the nation, it argues that nationalists have strong possible motivations both for and against close economic ties with foreign nations and states. As a result, oftentimes nationalists must make trade-offs among their goals of autonomy, unity, and identity when developing foreign economic policy preferences. Case studies of nationalist organizations in Quebec, India, and Ukraine that favor a high degree of international economic integration are presented to show the usefulness of the analytical framework.     

Promoting trade through private law: Explaining international legal harmonization

A large body of research examines states’ efforts to increase international trade through public law, that is, by forming preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that lower governmental barriers to trade. Scholars, however, have overlooked another mechanism through which states seek to facilitate trade: international harmonization of private law. Underlying legal harmonization is the assumption that cross-national variation of commercial law impedes trade; by contrast, similarity of laws across countries encourages trade by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs. I argue that the harmonization of private law acts as a substitute for the public-law channel of stimulating trade: countries with limited PTA partnerships make up for this deficiency by joining initiatives for private-law harmonization. This argument is tested by analyzing the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods-one of the primary instruments of legal harmonization. Indeed, countries that are party to shallow PTAs or have few PTA partners are more likely to ratify this private-law convention. Overall, this article urges scholars of trade and international law to broaden their research agenda to include private law.     

Not letting ‘bad apples’ spoil the bunch: Democratization and strict international organization accession rules

To solve their domestic and international problems, democratizing states often form new international organizations. In doing so, they face the question of institutional design: what types of rules and provisions should be included in the charter of the new international organization? We analyze this question through the lens of accession rules, with an emphasis on voting rules. We argue that democratizing states have strong incentives to design organizations with strict accession rules. Organizations with strict accession rules allow the founding members to regulate entry. This is particularly useful for transitional democracies, as democratizing states are initially unable to gain entry into the lucrative existing international organizations operated by the established democracies. Using original data on accession voting rules in 324 international organizations, we find strong evidence in support of our claims.     

Transnationalizing democracy promotion: The role of Western political foundations and think‐tanks

Promoting democracy has developed into a common activity performed by a variety of actors in the post‐cold war world. While it is states and international institutions that receive most of the attention devoted to this increasingly important issue‐area, other non‐state actors also engage in democracy promotion. This article examines the activities of two such actors: political foundations ‐ quasi‐governmental organizations established in a number of advanced states ‐ and think‐tanks ‐ private institutions traditionally engaged in research and policy advocacy. It argues that the role and impact of these actors deepen the transnationalization of democracy promotion, which has important consequences for the international politics of democratization and international relations more generally.     

"丝绸之路"复兴计划与中国外交

"丝绸之路"贸易通道的复兴,对于中国经济发展和社会进步具有重大的现实意义。中国已经开展了大量关于"新丝路"的外交活动,但中国更需要将"丝路外交"提升到战略的高度,原因在于"丝路外交"的开展不仅有利于中国突破当前的贸易和能源困境,而且也可以极大地加强中国与周边国家的文化交流,实质性地改善中国的安全处境。中国在"新丝路外交"中应该注意防范非传统安全威胁,利用好包括联合国在内的各种国际协调机制,并避免恶性的大国竞争。     

International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives?

Do international organizations affect government killing? Extant work has studied international organizations' effects on a set of human rights, but has not examined the abilities of specific actors to protect specific rights. I analyze naming and shaming by three types of international organizations (human rights nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], the news media, and the United Nations), focusing on their impacts on a single type of abuse: one-sided government killing. I present a principal-agent theory in which the government develops a preference for killing, and then delegates the murderous task to a set of individual perpetrators. The theory reveals new ways for international organizations to make killing costly, and statistical analyses support my expectations: By calling attention to abusive states, human rights NGOs and the United Nations can reduce both the likelihood and severity of state-sponsored murder. I also find that international organizations are better equipped to prevent killing from the beginning than to limit mounting body counts once it has begun.     

How effective are preferential trade agreements? Ask the experts

Limited data on regional and preferential trade agreements prevent social scientists from testing some of the international cooperation literature??s most important claims. Expert surveys??a technique that is widely used in the field of comparative politics but thus far underutilized in international relations??allow us to capture many aspects of trade agreements for which data would otherwise be unavailable. They also provide us with a means of comparing agreements across regions and issue areas. We present a new dataset of expert opinion on the world??s regional trade organizations. Our survey covers 24 dimensions of 40 different regional agreements??including the perceived effectiveness of trade liberalization, the degree to which dispute settlement mechanisms are easy to use, and the political and international influence of the agreement. Bayesian factor analysis allows us to extract a principal dimension of effectiveness.     

Strengthening the citizens' role in international organizations

Today's international organizations are characterized by a fundamental deficit in democracy. We therefore propose institutional measures to increase the direct participation possibilities of the citizens in international organizations. In order to reduce the number of citizens involved in decision-making to a manageable size, a representative sample of trustees is selected using a random mechanism. The trustees are given the right to launch initiatives and to vote in referendums on issues related to an international organization's constitution. They can also recall executives when they are dissatisfied with their behavior. No specific changes to the organization of these entities, especially their executive function, are proposed. Rather, the executives of international organizations must obey the constitutional changes adopted by the trustees. The proposal gives international organizations democratic legitimacy. Moreover, the executives are subjected to the control of the citizens of the member states, which induces better responsiveness to the preferences of the people, as well as higher organizational efficiency. JEL codes D72 · 019     

Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia

International security cooperation usually takes one of two forms. A classical collective security organization is designed to promote international security through regulating the behavior of its member states. A defensive security organization is designed to protect a group of states from threats emanating from a challenging state or group of states. Both forms of security cooperation bind states to act in concert with respect to threats presented by other states. The emergence of non-state actors such as terrorist or extremist organizations challenges traditional forms of collective security. Threats from political extremism, terrorism, and outlaw organizations have grown in visibility during the past decade in the countries of Eurasia. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the ensuing global war on terrorism have given added impetus to the Eurasian inter-state cooperation in confronting non-traditional threats and challenges from non-state actors. Bearing in mind the theory of collective security, this article analyzes threats posed by non-state actors with respect to Eurasian collective security organizations including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, and the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that the effectiveness of these organizations at achieving stated objectives depends upon their capacity to adopt new criteria of effectiveness.     

The (Ir)Relevance of Militarized Interstate Disputes for International Trade

Do military disputes between two states suppress trade between their firms? Both liberals and realists suggest that conflict occurrence reduces bilateral trade. However, using a rational expectation argument, Morrow (1999) proposes that conflict occurrence and trade should be uncorrelated statistically. Empirical evidence to date both supports expectations and appears contradictory and inconclusive. We offer a theory that reconciles, encompasses, and extends the competing arguments, explaining the empirical inconsistency. By incorporating rational expectations and uncertainty into the profit calculus of trading firms, the theory identifies the conditions under which various properties of a conflict (onset, duration, and severity) should and should not reduce bilateral trade ex ante and ex post . We test the ex post effects in two datasets that cover either a wider range of countries or a longer time period than previous quantitative studies. Both an unexpected MID onset and the unexpectedness of a MID onset reduce bilateral trade substantially ex post . Preliminary tests suggest that MID duration and severity also affect bilateral trade ex post . We conclude by discussing the implications of our research.     

Smuggler’s Blues: Examining Why Countries Become Narcotics Transit States Using the New International Narcotics Production and Transit (INAPT) Data Set

We examine the global determinants of the illicit international narcotics trade and the specific roles that states play in it, a topic understudied by international relations scholars. We develop the first comprehensive global data set of state involvement in international narcotics trafficking and then use the data set to empirically test hypotheses concerning the likelihood of countries to serve as transit states for the transshipment of illicit drugs. We find that more-globalized countries are more likely to act as transit states and that the size of the economy, as well as state corruption and a weak rule of law, are positively related to the probability of acting as a transit state. States with a more stable political environment are also more likely to be transit states.     

The crisis of governance: Present and future challenges

One of the principal challenges facing individual states and the international community is the threat of ungovernability, of the declining ability of governments to govern. This comes in two forms, the rise of a range of internal economic, social, and political problems beyond the ability of governments to cope with; and actions of governments that increasingly alienate their citizens. Ethnic, religious, and political upheavals that leave millions dead or homeless and require increasing international intervention to deal with have become features of the international political landscape. Among the most serious challenges to the stability of governments and to the possibility of sustainable democratic institutions is the rise of various international criminal organizations able to defy local governments and to operate with great freedom across international community does not respond. There must be an effort to strengthen institutions and capabilities to deal with the growing problem of organized crime and ungovernability.     

Looking beyond States: Openings for international bureaucrats to enter the institutional design process

Surprisingly little research investigates a stark reality: the vast majority of today’s international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) were crafted not by states alone, but with participation by international bureaucrats working in pre-existing IGOs. What explains this phenomenon? Drawing on international relations scholarship, this article develops predictions involving the capabilities of states, or a matter’s salience to states. The predictions are tested with a new and original dataset that captures, for the first time, variation in the roles that international bureaucrats play in the institutional design arena. Statistical analyses find that states’ need for expertise, as well as the design negotiations’ distance from high-politics, leave openings for international bureaucrats to enter institutional design processes. The findings enhance our understanding of institutional design, principal-agent relationships, non-state actors, and divisions of labor in contemporary global governance.     

Dwarfs in international negotiations: how small states make their voices heard

Students of international relations interested in cooperation through international regimes and organizations very often devote their attention to the role of a few big states rather than the numerous small ones. Small states tend to possess fewer administrative and financial resources back home as well as smaller and less well-equipped delegations at the international negotiation table than big states. This can easily translate into difficulties in preparing positions for all items on the negotiation agenda and in developing negotiation strategies in great detail, which might inhibit small states from successfully influencing negotiation outcomes. Yet, since international negotiation often rest on a one-state, one-vote principle and since small states can adjust priorities and redirect their limited capacities, there is a window of opportunity for small states to turn into important international actors and achieve significant outcomes in international affairs. In order to systematically shed light on the role of small states in international negotiations, this article outlines the conceptual framework to answer the following question: How, and under which conditions, can small states successfully punch above their weight in international negotiations?     

Consensus Decisions and Similarity Measures in International Organizations

Voting behavior in international organizations, most notably in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), is often used to infer the similarity of foreign policy preferences of member states. Most of these measures ignore, however, that particular covoting patterns may appear simply by chance (Häge 2011) and that these patterns of agreement (or the absence thereof) are only observable if decisions are reached through roll-call votes. As the relative frequency of roll-call votes changes considerably over time in most international organizations, currently used similarity and affinity measures offer a misleading picture. Based on a complete data set of UNGA resolution decisions, we demonstrate how taking different forms of chance agreement and the relative prevalence of consensus decisions into account affects conclusions about the effect of the similarity of member states’ foreign policy positions on foreign aid allocation.