Change and continuity across the 9/11 fault line: rethinking twenty-first-century responses to terrorism

This article asks the following questions. Which terrorism threats, challenges and responses did key players consider to have been decisively changed by 9/11? On close inspection now, nearly two decades after those attacks, how are we to assess such claims? What did 9/11 really change regarding terrorism and counterterrorism? And what remained unaltered? The article’s central argument is this: some western states exaggerated the extent to which terrorist threats and challenges had been changed by 9/11 and, as a consequence, they did significantly alter some of their responses to terrorism; but at the heart of this ironic process was the tragic reality that, had there been a more serious-minded and historically sensitive recognition of how little had necessarily been changed by 9/11 in terms of terrorist threats and challenges, then the twenty-first-century experience of non-state terrorism would have been much less painful than has been the case in practice.     

‘A good investment?’ State sponsorship of terrorism as an instrument of Iraqi foreign policy (1979–1991)

Governmental support for nonstate actors designated as terrorist organizations is not only a policy that carries significant international and domestic costs; it further poses a theoretical challenge to structural realist thinking about alliance politics in international relations. By debating, firstly, the utility of terrorism as a means to influence systemic power distribution, and, secondly, the functional equality of nonstate actors, this article considers under what conditions state sponsored terrorism occurs despite the expected security loss. Drawing on the example of Iraq between 1979 and 1991, the assumption that the interplay of external security challenges—as well as domestic dissent as an intervening, unit-level factor—affects governmental alignments with terrorist groups will be reviewed in the cases of the Iranian Mujahedin al-Khalq Organization, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and armed Palestinian factions. The article concludes by addressing whether state sponsorship of terrorism is inevitably linked to policy failure or whether it could be seen as a good investment to balance external and internal security challenges successfully.     

Terror of the talk: a new framework for countering terrorism within the institutionalisation of the terrorism industry

The “terrorism industry” that has been constructed by the war on terror has become institutionalised in the past decade, contributing in part to a significant increase in the overall public perception of terrorism and a dilution in meaning of the term “terrorist.” A linear regression analysis of the relationship of poll data collected from American citizens and frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks shows that this increased awareness has occurred despite the fact that terrorist attacks on American soil have decreased over the past decade. Considering the often-stated purpose of terrorists is to inspire fear, a central goal of the industry and the government should be to diminish these effects. However, the frequent and offhand use of the term “terrorist” fails to contextualise and counter the varied dispositions and motivations of terrorists and other non-state actors. To reduce public worry while working within the boundaries of the institutionalised terrorism industry, the study of terrorism should be conducted, and counterterrorist policies designed, using a new interdisciplinary framework that would allow the terrorism industry and the government to move beyond the binary designation of “terrorist” and “non-terrorist” to a greater spectrum of classification, from terrorists and violent non-state actors, to guerrillas, insurgents or criminals. A more nuanced framework could reduce public fear of terrorism and increase the effectiveness of counterterrorist policies.     

Contested multilateralism

“Contested multilateralism” describes the situation that results from the pursuit of strategies by states, multilateral organizations, and non-state actors to use multilateral institutions, existing or newly created, to challenge the rules, practices, or missions of existing multilateral institutions. It occurs when coalitions dissatisfied with existing institutions combine threats of exit, voice, and the creation of alternative institutions to pursue policies and practices different from those of existing institutions. Contested multilateralism takes two principal forms: regime shifting and competitive regime creation. It can be observed across issue areas. It shapes patterns of international cooperation and discord on key security concerns such as combating terrorist financing, halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and banning certain conventional weapons. It is also evident on economic issues involving intellectual property, on environmental and energy issues, and in the realm of global public health. The sources of dissatisfaction are primarily exogenous, and the institutions used to challenge the status quo range from traditional treaties or intergovernmental organizations to informal networks, some of which include non-state actors. Some institutions are winners from the process of contested multilateralism; others may lose authority or status. Although we do not propose an explanatory theory of contested multilateralism, we do suggest that this concept provides a useful framework for understanding changes in regime complexes and the strategies that generate such changes.     

Damned If You Do,Damned If You Don't: Performative Power and the Strategy of Conventional and Nuclear Defusing

This article seeks to initiate a new round of strategic intellectual innovation in an era when threats posed by non-state terrorist organizations and their state supporters do not resemble Cold War threats. Based on an interpretative sociological reading of the concepts of power, security, and rationality, it argues that a “damned if you do, damned if you don't” dilemma is to the post-Cold War era what the danger of surprise attack or unintended nuclear war was to the Cold War: the defining structural threat of international politics. The dilemma leaves states confronting asymmetrical warfare with the choice of reacting with force to a terrorist act or practicing appeasement. Neither approach, however, can achieve the goal of putting an end to terrorism. Deterrence sustains the dilemma by providing a rationale for why force should be used and why self-restraint is irrational. This article proposes a third option, defusing, which may be accomplished by denial (preventing provocateurs from dragging states into the use of force) and restructuration (transforming the structure and rules of the situation). Defusing relies on “performative power”—the capacity to project a dramatic and credible performance on the world stage and to decouple social actors, their audiences, and their most deeply held strategic beliefs. The force of the argument is illustrated by examples from the global “war on terror,” the 2006 Lebanon War, the 2008–09 operation “Cast Lead” in Gaza, and the Iranian nuclear crisis.     

A Critical Perspective on Terrorism: Case Study of Jundallah and Jeish ul-Adl in Iran

ABSTRACT

An extensive body of traditional terrorism research exists where the focus is on Iran as a terrorist state and a terrorism sponsor. This article explores an alternative terrorism narrative by examining the non-state actors, Jundallah and Jeish ul-Adl. The deficiency of information in the literature is addressed by applying the first and second-order critique approach of Richard Jackson’s knowledge, power and politics theoretical framework in contrast with the traditional terrorism studies approach. A first-order critique seeks to destabilise the accepted knowledge that Iran is both a terrorist state and a terrorism sponsor. This provides the grounds to study other aspects of “knowing” in relation to the second-order critique, where a critical ground outside the discourse suggests that Iranian officials have declared that the non-state terrorist actors of Jundallah and Jeish ul-Adl constitute a threat to Iran’s political stability. The outcome of the analyses here bridges the gap between the new aspect of terrorism, the non-state actors, and critical terrorism studies in order to contest the traditional discussion of terrorism in Iran. The rationale behind new terrorism varies and necessitates that new meanings and strategies be adopted in relation to Iran.     

Deadlier in the U.S.? On Lone Wolves,Terrorist Groups,and Attack Lethality

Scholars, politicians, and pundits increasingly suggest lone wolf terrorists are substantial threats, but we know little about how dangerous these actors are—especially relative to other terrorist actors. How deadly are lone actor terrorists? A growing body of empirical research focuses on terrorist organizations, but similar work on lone actors is sparse. Furthermore, attempts to explicitly compare these or other types of terrorist actors are almost non-existent. This article considers theoretical arguments for why lone wolves ought to be especially lethal. However, it presents an argument for why terrorist groups should generally be more lethal. This argument is conditional upon the environment in which actors operate. Lone wolves should only be more deadly in states with especially strong counterterrorism capacity. The article uses data on terrorist attacks in fifteen developed countries, 1970–2010, to compare the lethality of terrorist acts. Around the world, attacks by organizations tend to be far more lethal than attacks by other actors. In the United States, however, lone wolves are generally the more lethal terrorist actors. This is argued to be because the robust counterterrorism capacity makes organized terrorism more difficult to accomplish.     

Bermuda triangle: comparing official definitions of terrorist activity

Terror has been officially defined by many states and international actors. Although these definitions differ from each other to a certain extent, the basic divergence appears in the definition of the terrorist, since it reveals who is considered an ‘enemy’ by those actors. The difference between the definitions and lists elaborated by the United States and by the European Union on ‘terrorism, terrorist, and terror organization’ indicates their respective perceptions of the enemy as well as their differing global policies on terrorism. In Turkey, a country marked by a 20 year long struggle against terrorism, the definition of these concepts is mostly limited to domestic politics. The objective of this paper is to compare and contrast the official definitions of terror, terrorist, and terrorist organization by these three actors, including their respective international positions on terrorism.     

Representative Democracy and Fighting Domestic Terrorism

Does more representative government improve states' ability to fight domestic terrorism? In prior work, democracies are seen as more susceptible to terrorism because their respect for human rights prevents them from fully eliminating terrorist groups. However, such extrajudicial aggression could also alienate large portions of the population and create the ideal conditions for an insurgency. I argue that since terrorism is the lowest-capacity form of political violence, it is natural that states that do best at deterring political violence experience the most terrorism. While representative democracies should see terrorist groups initiate spells of attacks at a greater frequency, full political representation should also galvanize major political actors to unite and eliminate terrorist threats. I test this assertion through statistical models that treat the process of terrorist group initiation and its duration and intensity separately. Results not only show that less consolidated democracies and autocracies experience longer and more intense terrorist campaigns, but that, in support of the theory's mechanisms, groups are more likely to shift to terrorism from insurgency when their political base gains more political representation. The results call the division among research programs of various political violence types into question.     

评上海合作组织与独联体集体安全条约组织之间的关系

上合组织与集安组织都是以维护地区安全为主要目的的地区性国际组织,两者的成员和功能有很高的重合度。这两个组织进行合作可以更好地维护地区安全,但同时也会对上合以及上合成员国的对外关系提出挑战。目前集安组织与上合已经有了初步的合作,今后双方会有更多的合作机会。     

Competing to Kill: Terrorist Organizations Versus Lone Wolf Terrorists

Are organizationally linked suicide attacks deadlier than those launched by lone wolf terrorists? This article elaborates a perpetrator-based distinction among suicide terrorist attacks between organizations and lone wolf terrorists, who operate in the absence of a financially or physically supportive terrorist organization. The expectation is that terrorist organizations would serve as commitment tools that increase the loyalty of suicide bombers to their missions through material and non-material incentives. Findings demonstrate that when terrorist organizations are involved in the planning and execution of suicide terrorist attacks, not only do they increase the lethality of these attacks but they also accentuate the tactical advantages of suicide terrorism. These findings suggest that despite the recent upsurge and concern about lone wolf terrorism, the lethality and security impacts of suicide terrorism continue to be driven by terrorist organizations.     

EU counter‐terrorism,the Maastricht third pillar and liberal democratic acceptability

The article examines the effectiveness of the Maastricht Third Pillar's internal security provisions with respect to the fight against terrorism. An assessment of EU internal security cooperation is made from a perspective that takes into account questions of both operational anti‐terrorist proficiency and democratic acceptability. Police and security forces throughout the European Union (EU) have strongly endorsed the Third Pillar as providing an efficient response to serious criminality. However, from a liberal democratic point of view the Maastricht provisions raise extremely serious questions concerning the lack of critical public debate and systems of accountability within the EU. Close coordination between member states is definitely necessary if terrorism is to be effectively countered in the region. However, it is vital that in the headlong rush to provide for an enhanced international operational capacity critical considerations of democratic control are not lost. One cannot expect to gain the type of public consent that is crucial for democratic acceptability if fundamental fears exist over the legitimacy and desirability of ever closer law enforcement and judicial cooperation.     

Reshaping Cultural Heritage Protection Policies at a Time of Securitisation: France,Italy, and the United Kingdom

In the context of the increasing securitisation of cultural heritage, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have reacted differently to the recent wave of iconoclasm perpetrated by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and similar radical groups and terrorist organisations. With cultural heritage now discursively identified as a security concern, the three states enacted security practices to deal with the newly emerged security threats. All three cases show a tight association between the protection of cultural heritage, development and security policies. State-driven cultural heritage protection policies continue to be designed around the notion of multilateral cooperation, although innovative forms of public-private multilateralism and civil-military cooperation are increasingly being introduced.     

Security Governance and Networks: New Theoretical Perspectives in Transatlantic Security

The end of the Cold War has not only witnessed the rise of new transnational threats such as terrorism, crime, proliferation and civil war; it has also seen the growing role of non-state actors in the provision of security in Europe and North America. Two concepts in particular have been used to describe these transformations: security governance and networks. However, the differences and potential theoretical utility of these two concepts for the study of contemporary security have so far been under-examined. This article seeks to address this gap. It proposes that security governance can help to explain the transformation of Cold War security structures, whereas network analysis is particularly useful for understanding the relations and interactions between public and private actors in the making and implementation of national and international security policies.     

Managing Soft Security Threats: Current Progress and Future Prospects

This concluding essay explores the development of the concept of security since the end of the Cold War, in a world characterized by failing states, and the rise of non-state actors. It revisits the competing paradigms of ‘The End of History’ and ‘The Clash of Civilisations’ within globalization trends as a whole, and security in particular. Post September 11, 2001, the boundaries between hard and soft security have been blurred as the relationship between terrorism and illegal trade have become apparent.

The paper highlights three challenging processes of particular relevance for soft security: the still growing gap between rich and poor; the technological revolution; and the changing role of and attitudes to military force. Environmental, economic and population pressures elsewhere fuel the soft security threats in Europe, and the problems cannot be solved by improved policing or border mechanisms alone. Rather, the solution lies in treating them at a global level.     

The politics of preventing violent extremism: the case of Uganda*

Multilateral development actors have recently embraced the ‘PVE’ (preventing violent extremism) agenda. This includes consideration of PVE measures in countries like Uganda, where interpretations of non-state violence are contested and where the government has a history of strategic rent-seeking behaviour regarding counter-terrorism assistance. This article assesses the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in Uganda. We argue against a strategic reorientation towards PVE among development actors. Current and emerging threats do not justify a departure from existing development priorities. Importantly, consideration of the political context pertaining to PVE in Uganda commends a cautious approach.     

Mark S. Hamm. Terrorism as Crime: From Oklahoma City to Al-Qaeda and Beyond

Few issues are more important to scholars of security studies than understanding the impact of state sponsorship on the capabilities of non-state armed actors. The subject of our study—Lebanon's Hezbollah—was selected based on its reputation amongst scholars and policymakers alike as an exceptionally capable organization. In our inquiry, we seek to answer the following questions about Hezbollah's rapid emergence during the 1980s as one of the world's premier armed non-state actors: (a) how did Iranian sponsorship contribute to Hezbollah's effectiveness?; and (b) to what extent did Hezbollah's success depend on characteristics endogenous to the organization itself? To preview our conclusions, state sponsorship can contribute markedly to non-state actors' capabilities by providing resources and sanctuary. However, the ultimate effectiveness of non-state armed groups depends heavily on such internal characteristics as their decision-making processes and members' backgrounds. Thus, while state support may be necessary for non-state actors to achieve their goals, it is insufficient as a guarantee of their effectiveness.     

EU cooperation on terrorism prevention and violent radicalization: frustrated ambitions or new forms of EU security governance?

This article questions the effectiveness of EU efforts to prevent terrorism and violent radicalization as well as the future prospects of such efforts. Driven by the pressure of attacks, member states have agreed on a comprehensive strategy to prevent radicalization and recruitment into terrorism, but simultaneously the strategy traces the limits of EU authority in member states in this regard. Meanwhile, the European Commission has focused on indirect measures, such as research support, for counter radicalization. However, over time, both flexible cooperation among a subset of member states and new EU initiatives have generated only few or biased policy outputs. The Stockholm Programme renewed the ambition to prevent terrorism at an early stage and underlined the EU's role in evaluation and knowledge exchange. This article questions the resulting proposal to create a network of local or subnational actors for best practice exchange. The article argues that preventive counterterrorism relies on contentious scientific evidence and that authoritative evaluations remain tied to national policy-making. Finally, the EU Commission cannot mobilize sufficient resources to ensure that ‘frontline’ organizations, such as police services, implement new practices. Taken together, this limits the potential for depoliticizing multilevel governance approaches to terrorism prevention. The conclusions of this article raise further research questions on the use of knowledge and complex governance patterns in EU internal security.     

自杀性恐怖主义的行动模式 及其根源

作为恐怖组织常用的一种行动模式,自杀性恐怖主义在历史上就长期存在,尤其是九一一事件的发生,更使得自杀性恐怖主义成为恐怖组织在恐怖袭击中惯用的一种手段。相比其他形式的恐怖袭击,自杀性恐怖主义具有简单、廉价、机动性强、引起的社会恐慌大以及造成的人员伤亡严重等特征。自杀性恐怖主义在世界多地都已经发生过,被各种类型的恐怖组织广泛使用,针对的对象多样化,并且具有相对固定的行动流程。目前学术界从个体、组织、社会、文化和环境等方面对于自杀性恐怖主义的产生原因进行了分析。从个体的角度来看,一个人是否愿意进行自杀性恐怖袭击,最为重要的是当事人的理性计算,即个人通过自杀性恐怖袭击获得的好处是否能为自己带来更大的个人收益、是否可以增进家庭的福利、是否可以增加所在共同体的利益。在未来的反恐与应对中,国际社会可以通过增强重要设备的科技含量、增加双方对话与谈判的可能性、加强公共外交的力度、增进各国间的相互合作等方式以应对自杀性恐怖主义威胁。