The impact of elections on the village structure of power: the relations between the village committees and the party branches

Village committee elections are one of the major innovations of the reform era. Electoral processes have elicited much scholarly and public attention. Less attention has been devoted to studying the impact of this innovation on the relations between the elected village committee chair persons and the appointed Party secretaries. This article shows that conflicts can arise between the two because the basis of their legitimacy and authority differs. A concrete instance of conflict is control over collective economic resources and financial decisions. The field research on which much of this article is based was done in southern Guangdong, where villages tend to be quite industrialized and wealthy. In these villages, control had hitherto been vested in the secretaries. Now, town leaders had to adjudicate jurisdictional disputes between village committees and the Party branches. Often they preferred to side with the latter, since secretaries were likely to be more responsive to their superiors than elected village chiefs. A solution to these conflicts that is now being widely adopted in rural China is to require that Party secretaries run for the post of village committee chair, thereby in effect merging the two institutions.     

Economic Development and the Implementation of Village Elections in Rural China

Based on survey data from rural Fujian Province of China, this paper shows that economic development, especially village collective revenue, plays an important role in village elections. With economic development and industrialization, collective revenues will increase and differentiated interests will develop among villagers. Village elections are institutional channels for villagers to articulate their interests. The research findings show that it is the collective revenue and the relative living standard of the village compared with other townships within the same county or district that arouse villagers' interests for participation and candidates' motives for campaigning, and thus enhance the implementation of elections. The paper concludes that village-level economic development is crucial for the implementation of competitive elections. With economic development, village committees will control more collective revenues, thus increasing the stakes villagers have in elections. This will result in greater participation by villagers in elections, and in more competitive elections. Increased competitiveness of elections will facilitate changes in the institutions regarding village committee elections.     

Elections,Democratic Values,and Economic Development in Rural China

This paper assesses several assumptions underlying the promotion of democracy and good governance in rural China. We draw on a 1999 survey of 120 villages in four counties, two in Anhui and two in Heilongjiang provinces (sample of 2,997 households, including villagers, cadres and entrepreneurs). First, we look at how institutionalized ‘democratic procedures’, such as secret ballots, multi-candidate elections, public nominations, and village contracts, are in these villages. Then we analyze villager views on economic development and democracy, finding that villagers want more democracy, even if the economy is doing well. Third, we assess their views on the election process; do they see elections as efficacious, fair, and competitive, or do they feel that the local power elite manipulate outcomes? Fourth, we found that the richest people are less supportive of democracy, with the most democratic being middle-income households. Finally, elections have increased local elite turnover, cadres understand this, and therefore, democracy does lead to good governance.     

State Power and Village Cadres in Contemporary China: the case of rural land transfer in Shandong province

In the case of land transfer in rural China, why do some village cadres act as entrepreneurs, some become middlemen between agribusinesses and peasants, and others choose to be passive bystanders? Based on comparative case studies in Shandong province, it is argued that state power, rather than village elections, informal solidary groups and economic benefits, is the dominant explanatory mechanism. This article suggests that our discussion of the state–village cadre relationship should not be limited to the control perspective. To achieve policy objectives, village cadres' ability and creativity are as important as motivation to local government. Substantial support makes village cadres more capable, and some degree of leeway is necessary for creativity. Local government relies on three forms of leverage (control, support and non-intervention) to address three issues (motivation, ability and creativity) in shaping behavioral patterns of village cadres.     

Village Election and Governance: do villagers care?

Village elections at the grassroots level have been regularly conducted for more than a decade in the context of the Chinese political system. Both negative and positive views have been expressed and written on village elections. How does one evaluate Chinese village elections? Free and fair elections require conformity to international election principles, rules, and procedures. This study develops a minimum procedural criterion to assess if village elections have followed internationally-accepted rules and procedures of free and fair elections. We also measure the meaningfulness of village elections by examining the effects of elections on village governance and villagers' life. We find that elections have been conducted in a manner consistent with proscribed rules and procedures and are generally free and fair, and there is a considerable convergence of views of villagers and cadres who see that elections are meaningful in producing positive changes in village governance and life. The data also confirm that elected villagers' committees are still in the long shadow of township governments and village Party branches.     

农民增收的金钥匙:优化分工与提升人力资本

农民增收难,根本原因是农民人力资本存量不足、结构不合理,农民被排斥在较高端的分工与分配体系之外。优化分工、提升农民人力资本能带动农民收入增长,带来财富增长效应与财富配给效应。建议大力发展中小企业,促进区域内专业化分工;放开国内市场,着力发展第三产业;增加教育培训等公共品的提供,引导农民契合较高端的社会分工;鼓励农民增加人力资本投资并保障农民收益。     

民族学视野中的村落资源分析--以南盘江畔的巴结村为例

村落资源是村落生存与发展的资源体系."为我所用"的民族村落资源体系正在面临着许多前所未有的遭遇.在现代化进程中,具有数百年历史的巴结布依族村落的消失就是民族村落资源丧失的一个代表.民族村落资源如何走向共同繁荣,是民族社会生存与发展的紧迫而重要的话题.     

关于未来五年甘肃发展的思考

随着科学发展观的全面落实与和谐社会建设的不断加强,甘肃未来五年的发展将迎来许多难得的机遇:经济全球化为利用两个市场、两种资源提供了更大的空间;甘肃产业结构与全国性的新一轮消费结构升级相吻合;国家的农村政策有利于甘肃转换二元经济结构矛盾,解决“三农问题”;产业梯度转移的势头越来越强劲,聚集生产要素的能力将进一步提高;新能源建设将得到长足发展;劳务经济将最大化拓展……只有敏锐地捕捉机遇、夯实基础、创造条件、改善环境、突出重点、推进体制机制创新,处理好经济发展和社会发展的关系,处理好基础设施建设和培育特色优势产业的关系,处理好政府推动和市场机制的关系,处理好改革发展稳定的关系,把中央精神和甘肃实际结合起来,把研究现实情况和总结历史经验结合起来,深化认识,统一思想,自觉地以党的十六届五中全会精神为指导,着眼于关系经济社会发展全局重大问题的研究,努力掌握工作的主动权,才能有力地推动甘肃经济和社会事业更快更好地发展。     

农业现代化和新农村建设同步发展的“金穗模式”——广西隆安县那桐镇定江村定典屯的实践与探索

实现农业现代化与新型城镇化同步发展,进一步促进城乡发展加快融合,找到农民增收、农业增效的有效途径是中国各方一直在探索的问题。该文以广西定江村定典屯为例,提出以土地流转为核心,企业与村屯携手共建发展平台的“金穗模式”,即依托产业带动,村屯以土地流转形式帮助企业解决用地问题,企业帮助完善村屯基础设施,解决农民的就业出路,实现村屯变美、农民致富、企业发展的“三赢”局面。     

我国公共政策执行的示范方式失效分析——基于示范村建设个案的研究

示范作为政府执行公共政策的一种工作方式,在我国被普遍使用,示范村则是新农村建设中地方政府公共政策执行的重要方式。本文基于西北地区某县示范村建设实际情况的个案调研,从政府利益内在性的角度,比较分析了中西方公共政策执行与公共资源分配的方式。本文认为,公众对行政官员没有形成有效的制约,部分地方官员为了产生有显示度的政绩成果,将各种政府项目相对集中地投入到少数示范村,是导致公共政策执行的示范方式失效的主要原因,并针对我国的实际情况提出了相应的对策建议。     

Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions by Chinese Firms: value creation or value destruction?

Mixed results from studies on Chinese cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&;As) have been a puzzle for both academia and business professionals over the years. Do these M&;As create value when Chinese firms acquire foreign target firms suffering heavy losses and even on the verge of bankruptcy? This article explores the wealth effect of M&;As conducted by Chinese firms as well as the relevant factors from the asset-seeking perspective. The authors use 180 M&;A cases conducted by listed firms in China between 2002 and 2012 as samples and examine their wealth effects in a method of event study. The results show that these M&;A activities have produced significant positive wealth effects during the event window of [–10, 10]. The authors then study the key factors affecting wealth effects. The findings reveal that an acquiring firm’s strength via research and development (R&;D) and M&;A experience generates significant positive impacts on the wealth effect. The findings also reveal that an innovation orientation and development stage of host countries helps create positive wealth effects; vertical M&;As are particularly favored by the market since they can gain easier access to R&;D, marketing channels or mineral resources.     

村庄参与中的差别化接纳——江西省农村外嫁女集体回娘家活动研究

在社会转型过程中,外嫁女与娘家村庄的关系逐渐发生改变。本文运用"接纳度"和"同等性"两个维度相结合的分析框架,通过剖析江西省四个村庄集体回娘家活动,呈现外嫁女在村庄参与中的身份问题。研究发现,外嫁女通过集体回娘家活动改变了其参与村庄事务的实质性缺席和象征性参与的状态,借助亲情表达和仪式认可被重新接纳为娘家村庄的成员。不过,与男性相比,这种接纳属于差别化接纳,具有功利性、暂时性和尊卑有别的特征。同时,这种差别化接纳隐匿于亲情联结和个体平等的叙事中,并未被活动参与主体明确意识到。     

建设广西民族特色村寨的思考

广西是一个多民族聚居的自治区,建设美丽广西,民族特色村寨大有作为。广西民族特色村寨资源丰富,但少数民族村寨大多数位于边远山区,其保护与发展面临着许多困难和问题。民族特色村寨既是保护对象,又是发展资源,其开发建设必须坚持一些重要原则。建设民族特色村寨重在突出特色,应当围绕"特色"探索开发途径并制定相应的措施。     

Representation without Taxation: political changes in Chinese authoritarian regimes

The question of why some authoritarian regimes choose to incorporate institutions of democracy such as village elections into their governing systems remains largely unanswered. As a typical case of a resilient authoritarian state that implements democracy in its villages, China has provided an invaluable case for researchers to study. Current theories focus on the influence of political elites and rural forces separately. Insightful as they are, these theories are invalid as an explanation of the variation of local governance in China across time and thus are incomplete. It should be recognized that central fiscal strategies have great effects on local governance. Specifically, if the central government largely relies upon fiscal revenue from rural areas, it has to expand its bureaucracy to the countryside to extract revenue. In contrast, if it does not rely on the rural areas for revenue, the central government will establish local democracy in the countryside. This hypothesis is historically reflected in the authoritarian regimes led by the Nationalist Party (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China. As opposed to the familiar story about representation through taxation, the logic of representation without taxation seems to be the case in China.     

对甘肃东部赵村择偶问题的人类学调查--甘肃山区择偶过程中的女性

赵村是甘肃省东部地区一个典型的山区村庄。因社区闭塞,交通不便,生活条件艰苦(2000年赵村年人均纯收入780元),赵村青年男子的择偶面临很多困难。外村女子不愿嫁到赵村来,包括赵村在内的山区女孩希望嫁到地理条件相对较好的村落去,这样,地理条件和经济条件等作为负面资源一方面影响了赵村男子在婚姻市场上的配偶供给,另一方面提高了妇女在婚姻市场上的价值。但是,赵村的情况说明,妇女在婚姻市场上的高价值并不等同于其在社会生活中的高地位。     

关于村委会选举的问题与分析

文章针对我国一些地方村民委员会选举中存在的问题进行研究与分析，从体制改革、加快立法、经济发展、国民教育和法制建设五个方面提出了推进中国民主政治建设的途径与方法。     

Getting Rich and Staying Connected: the organizational medium of Chinese capitalists

This article answers the following question: ‘What is the organizational medium that has allowed a few Chinese businesspeople in East and Southeast Asia to accumulate considerable wealth and economic power?’ In the course of giving an answer, we show the organizational differences between traditional business networks in the late Qing and early Republican periods and the Chinese business networks in modern capitalist Asia. We argue that, throughout the twentieth century, Chinese business people outside of China proper began to adapt Western corporate structures for their own purposes and that this organizational innovation allowed Chinese to develop and sustain personal networks through which wealth and power could be concentrated.     

Economic performance and political mobility: Chinese provincial leaders

Chinese provincial leaders, unlike their counterparts in a democratic system, are not elected but selected. Hence the criteria by which the center uses to select and retain provincial leaders would be critical for the political mobility of provincial leaders. As China has been a developmental state since 1949, it is not unreasonable to expect that the center would retain or promote or demote provincial leaders according to the economic performance of their provinces. To test the hypothesis, I conducted multinomial regressions with a data set of Chinese provincial leaders between 1949 and 1994 in thirty provincial units. As the results show, the political mobility of provincial leaders is determined not only by the political movements of the PRC but also by the economic performance of the provincial leaders. The worse the economic performance record the more likely the provincial leader will be demoted. Moreover, the revenue contributions of the province during the provincial leader's tenure are also a determinant of the political mobility of the provincial leader.     

‘Rich brothers’ and ‘poor cousins’: the political economy of post‐reform rural disparity in a Chinese township

Rural reforms have resulted in great uneven development in rural China. The gap between the rich and the poor has been widened due to the diversity in the conditions for production and social life in the countryside. This paper probes into an interesting yet complex question: what causes the great economic divergences among villages that are geographically so close sharing similar physical settings and natural endowment? Answering this question is beyond the scope of a sole economic analysis. Using the case of Dayingjie Township, Yunnan Province, the paper develops an answer based on the political economy approach. It argues that human capital and social networking play important roles in the economic take off of a rich village in the Dayingjie context. As the gap between rich and poor communities widens, localism and weak distribution power at the township level become apparent, indicating a combination of both economic and political dimensions in deepening the gap. Finally, extreme concentration of resources leads to the rise of a group of a new rural elite who holds both political and economic leverage. They influence local politics toward profit hunting in favour of the wealthy clan in a rich village. This further leads to an ever‐widening gap between the rich and poor. The Dayingjie case presents important insights in understanding inter‐village disparity in rural China. Whether this story is generalizable in China is still too early to tell, but, by investigating one particular geographic area, this article attempts to direct attention to the political economy of inter‐village disparity in China and to stimulate more discussion in the future.     

农村留守妇女的婚姻稳定性探析——豫东HC村的个案研究

本文运用社会交换理论分析了豫东HC村留守妇女的婚姻稳定状况。研究认为,丈夫外出务工,妻子留守在家,造成了夫妻间内在吸引力弱化,婚姻替代吸引力有所增加,但由于农村婚姻解体的社会成本过大,使得留守妇女的婚姻仍处于高稳定状态。但前两种力量对留守妇女婚姻稳定性的冲击不容忽视。