Nomenklatura democratization: Electoral clientelism in post‐soviet Ukraine

Electoral clientelism could represent a significant threat to democratic consolidation in post‐communist states. Recent elections in Ukraine provide a prime example of the way in which communist‐era elites have been able to use electoral mechanisms to launder their political resources. Evidence suggests that economic disarray has created a situation in which large sectors of the electorate are willing to have their votes bought by political machines, rather than having them won through competition between parties offering different policy packages. Clientelism of this type appears to be engaged in by two types of political actor in Ukraine: left wing parties and individual members of the economic and political elite.     

Ethnos,demos and democratization: A comparison of the Czech Republic,Hungary and Poland

With the collapse of European communism, Western observers and leaders fostered new expectations about the relative likelihood for post‐communist nations to ‘join the West’. The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were seen as least problematic candidates, sponsored especially by the German leadership. A troubling issue however is the emerging pattern of ethnos‐politics, identity politics based on blood ties, as opposed to demos‐politics, civic politics based on universal territorial citizenship. In the Czech Republic this ethnos‐politics appears most clearly as anti‐Romany racism and governmental discrimination. In Poland and Hungary, centre‐right parties have developed a politics of ethnic patriotism which labels opponents as traitors and foreign elements. In these nations, political liberalism has been too weak and often too opportunist to offer a viable demos‐politics as a counterweight. Instead, the ex‐communist successor parties in Poland and Hungary have re‐emerged as the mass base for a non‐nationalist demos‐politics. The West has yet to take seriously the new ethnos‐politics, prefering to give priority to economic and foreign‐policy compatibility. The admission of these nations into the European Union or North Atlantic Treaty Organization would give new legitimacy to ethnos within the West, and reinforce the ethnos‐politics of Austria's Haider and France's LePen.     

Democratization and European standards of National minority protection: Polish issues

This article considers how a nationally homogeneous state in East‐Central Europe, Poland, which in this respect is comparable to Hungary and the Czech Republic, has responded to a major post‐1989 challenge – that of meeting European standards of national minority protection within a civic‐territorial model of democracy. The forced assimilation and repression of such minorities as the Ukrainians and the Belarusans in prewar and communist Poland is now being handled within a common pan‐European perspective; this offers a model for the resolution of ethnic‐communal conflicts in the remainder of the highly differentiated post‐communist space. Although Poland's national minorities are now very small, historical memories of bad integral nationalist practice has induced post‐1989 governments to allay external criticism of alleged ethno‐nationalism by meeting European standards in this area as a key step towards eventual EU membership. The dual identity, linguistic, cultural and autonomy‐seeking characteristics of its currently non‐state‐destroying (that is, non‐secessionist) minorities points to comparisons with such groups as the Welsh or the Bretons. It argues for the redefinition of ‘normal’ as against more publicized aggressive forms of East European nationalism.     

The quality of democracy: Mass‐elite linkages in the Czech republic

This article argues for the importance of more focused scholarly attention on the development of mass‐elite linkages ‐ and in particular those linkages that transcend the electoral connection ‐ for understanding democratic consolidation, drawing on the post‐communist experience of the Czech Republic as a case study. Starting with the government's loss of its majority in the 1996 Czech elections amidst favourable economic conditions, we argue that this electoral result goes beyond the response to policy priorities to point to larger deficits in the development of channels of access and communication in the policy‐making process. Such deficits, characteristic of the post‐communist experience regionally, are not merely legacies of the stunted civil societies of the communist period, but also reflect a post‐communist style of governance that may itself discourage regularized citizen and associational input. As the episodic electoral connection alone cannot bear the weight of democratic consolidation, the risk is a pattern of mass‐elite linkages that creates a punctuated politics of elections and street demonstrations.     

Democratic change in Russia and Ukraine

The transitions in Russia and Ukraine since 1991 offer contrasting patterns of political and social reconstitution. Facing similar problems, Russia forced the pace and embarked on rapid economic and political reform whereas Ukraine sought a more gradual strategy. Neither country, however, has been able to avoid disintegratory pressures on the state and society disrupting the state and nation building endeavours. The challenge of creating new political orders of stable government came into conflict with the democratization project. The outlines of a ‘post’ post‐communist polity in which the goals of stability and democracy can be reconciled are barely visible.     

Aleksandr Dugin and the ideology of national revival: Geopolitics,Eurasianism and the conservative revolution

This article examines the emergence of Aleksandr Dugin as the leader of the Eurasian Movement and later Party in Russia. For much of the 1990s Dugin was a prominent intellectual among the Russian nationalist‐communist opposition, moving from the position of ideologue of a fringe political party ‐ Edvard Limonov's National Bolsheviks — to advisor to the communist speaker of the State Duma, Gennadiy Seleznev. Dugin's ideology combined an anti‐Western interpretation of geopolitics with mysticism, Aryanism, conspirology, authoritarian statism and Eurasianism. Dugin's expanding set of Internet sites became an ideological empire of a virtual society. In 1999, in the aftermath of the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, Dugin saw an opportunity to move from the marginal opposition to the ideologue of the post‐Yeltsin president. In this capacity, Dugin and his Eurasian Movement emerged as prominent supporters of Vladimir Putin, whom Dugin identified as the embodiment of the ‘Eurasian capitalist’ model of statist development. Dugin developed a close working relationship with Gleb Pavlovsky, a spin doctor for Putin's Kremlin. In the aftermath of 11 September and Putin's move towards supporting the United States in the war on terrorism, Dugin has continued his nominal support for the president, even as he has criticized his pro‐Western policies as anti‐Eurasian and a threat to Russian interests.     

Exporting democracy: German political foundations in Central‐East Europe

In the liberal political tradition, representative government, civil society and some form of market are widely regarded as indispensable ingredients of democracy. The first two are essentially ‘home grown’, embedded in the enduring, albeit not immutable, political culture of a given society if they are to have substance as well as form. None the less, western democracies have been actively engaged in transplanting organizations to bolster civil society, along with political institutions, constitutions, and legal codes to Central‐East Europe (CEE) since 1989 as part of their democratization assistance.

This article examines if, and how, external assistance can intervene constructively to promote the development of democracy. A brief discussion of western assumptions about post‐communist society in CEE is followed by a review of the roles assigned to culture and institutions in the transition literature which undergird these assumptions. The comparative cultural advantages of the United States and Germany ‐ the two primary western actors in the region ‐ are outlined, coupled with a more detailed examination of German political foundation engagement in CEE.

The German political foundations were selected to anchor the study empirically because in terms of method and strategy, resources and level of engagement, they do everything right according to studies critical of western democratization assistance. In addition, their home political culture is very similar to that of the host societies in CEE. In short, their operational conditions present a best case scenario.

None the less, the study shows that in some of their highest priority, politically motivated projects, the foundations have not made much of an impression on the CEE landscape. New parties and labour unions they supported have failed or are terminally ill. Many new non‐governmental organizations have been set up but their sustainability is open to question. Projecting donor preferences onto CEE is integral to the problem. The greatest risk is to fabricate the appearance of deep‐rooted democracy by focusing on form at the expense of content. The proliferation of parties and nongovernmental organizations per se tells us little about their ability to integrate the public actively and constructively into the new systems.     

中国共产党与拉美共产党关系的曲折发展

1949年中华人民共和国成立,拉美各国人民特别是这些国家的进步力量和共产党受到极大鼓舞。20世纪50年代和60年代初,中共与拉美各国共产党的关系比较密切。到1960年,拉美22个共产党和工人党中,有18个党与中共建立和发展了友好关系。60年代初期,拉美共产党虽然与中共有分歧和争论,但仍与中共维持着正常往来。1965年至70年代后期,由于拉美大多数共产党在国际共运大论战中支持苏共立场,中共与拉美多数共产党的关系恶化和中断。与此同时,从拉美老共产党分裂出来的新党陆续与中共建立起党际关系。中国“文化大革命”结束和改革开放开始之后,大多数拉美共产党与中共恢复和发展关系,中共也调整了与拉美新党的关系。无论是与拉美老党还是与拉美新党的关系,中共都遵循中共十二大确立的“独立自主,完全平等,相互尊重,互不干涉内部事务”党际关系四项原则。此后,中共在党际关系方面,又突破了主要与共产党交往的传统,开始尝试与拉美民族民主等各类政党开展交往并取得重大突破,党际交往逐步由外延向内涵转变。     

Democratization in the Balkans: Challenges and prospects

The post‐communist states of the Balkans face daunting challenges as they experiment with pluralism. The absence of a strong democratic tradition, national rivalries within and between states, weak civil society, and the impact of communism on political culture, complicate the emergence of open politics. There is a lack of agreement about the management of political competition and an absence of political institutions able to integrate conflicting forces. Compared with democratizing southern Europe, the Balkans faces numerous handicaps, and support from heartland democracies has been meagre. The fate of democracy may well be determined by events outside local control, namely the economic situation and the outcome of the war in former Yugoslavia.     

Political parties and democratization in South Korea: The mass public and the democractic consolidation of political parties

This study examines the growth of popular support for a competitive multi‐party system as an indicator of democratic consolidation in South Korea. Using a national sample survey conducted in November 1993, it demonstrates that the South Korean mass public has been very slow to develop affective, behavioural, cognitive and evaluative links to political parties which, however, constitute an integral channel for representing its preferences in the policy‐making process. Contrary to the tenets of the neo‐corporatist and other theoretical models, this study finds that the failure of political parties to democratize their performance has been, and remains, a major factor inhibiting the development of popular support for a democratic party system. Based on this and other findings, we would predict much continuing difficulty and uncertainty in the process of consolidating South Korean political parties into a fully democratic party system.     

The Greek state response to terrorism

Since 1975 Greece has been suffering a persistent assault of terrorism mainly at the hands of the 17 November, revolutionary communist group. The Greek state after two decades of bitter and bloody experience, has been unable to resolve the problem. The purpose of this article is to identify and examine the attitudes of Greek political elites towards the problem and the tactics and responses which they have utilized to combat it. Focusing on the major political parties, the study explores opinions and reactions to different manifestations of the problem of political violence. It also attempts to demonstrate that, although each party stands in principle against terrorism, the overall response of the Greek state has been uniquely lethargic, dilatory and unbalanced. Four conclusions emerge from this study: the inefficacy of legislation that treats terrorism like organized crime; the need for a thoroughgoing reform of the security services; the lack of a national strategy to combat all terrorist activity; and the necessity for Greek governments to put party politics aside, when dealing with terrorism.     

Violence and terror and the extreme right

The author begins by examining Sprinzak's theory of ‘split delegitimization’ and finds that although it provides a persuasive account of why some extreme right groups become so radicalized that they perpetrate acts of terrorism and political violence, its major weakness is that it fails to explain the emergence and long‐term survival of mass parties of the extreme right. The article briefly surveys some of these mass parties and finds that there is no clear correlation between the electoral success of extreme‐right mass parties and the level of terrorism and political violence from small extreme‐right groups. However, the evident ambivalence of mass parties of the far right towards violence, and intensification of the propaganda of violence, racisim and xenophobia are clearly conducive to violence and Terrorism and Political Violence.     

In the wake of revolution: Eastern Europe in the 1990s

Summary

A ‘new world order’ and a ‘Europe whole and free’ are phrases that epitomize the hopeful rhetoric born of East European revolutions in 1989. In the three years since we were awed by the courage of citizens disgusted with communist party rule, and surprised by the rapidity of such regimes’ demise, socio‐economic and political realities have dimmed hopes and constrained expectations. The work of building free governments and free markets after decades of neglect and abuse faces East Europeans in the 1990s and beyond.

The dangers suggested above are not hyperbole, and represent real and present threats to the hopes of Poles, Romanians, and the other people, for better futures. Comparisons across the region are much less valid than at any time in the last half century. Nevertheless, the goals of post‐communist leaders ‐ security, democracy and market ‐ face similar extraordinary challenges that can easily derail these processes. Americans and our longstanding allies cannot ensure the survival and further development of East European democracy, but we must certainly be more engaged in helping them help themselves.     

Party systems in post-communist Central Europe: Patterns of stability and consolidation

When eight former communist countries joined the European Union in 2004 it was accepted that they all had reasonably well-established democratic systems. The extent to which this also meant that they had a range of political parties that cohered into anything like a stable party system was less clear, however. Different views have been expressed on this question, and it may also be queried how well current views of what the concept of party system implies fit with Central European (CE) developments. Investigation into the nature of the party systems that have developed after four free elections is first conducted in terms of their shape and size. From this perspective only Hungary and the Czech Republic have developed anything like a two-party system. The question of stable party representation in CE legislatures is then raised, and in this context Slovenia and Estonia show signs of party system development on a more plural basis. Stronger evidence of institutionalization is derived from calculation of an Index of Party Stabilization, which confirms the higher level of development in the countries identified above. There are some signs, as yet inconclusive, that weak party systems are also associated with more negative democratization outcomes.     

Greece: Twenty years of political terrorism

From the mid‐1970s to the present, Greece has been suffering a systematic terrorist assault on her political and socieo‐economic institutions‐mainly at the hands of the 17 November and ELA, intransigent communist organizations. During these two decades, the Greek state has failed to make a correct diagnosis of the problem. This article traces the long history of terrorism during this period and enables the reader to understand how the phenomenon was allowed to grow so uncontrollably that it has now become a permenant feature of contemporary Greek political culture. The author concludes that the Greek terrorists will continue their violent campaign attacking the people and institutions they despise for several years to come‐at least until Greece's established political clas takes a clear‐cut stand and effective measures to oppose and resolve this seemingly intractable problem     

Motivation and Intervention in the Northern Ireland Peace Process: An Interview with President Bill Clinton

The role of former U.S. President William Jefferson Clinton in the Northern Ireland peace process has been acknowledged as an example of political risk‐taking and leadership driven by political interests and strategic post–Cold War aims. The tendency to examine Clinton's role from the perspective of international and global policy objectives, however, has obscured consideration of his motivational role in the Northern Ireland peace process and of how he moved between encouragement and intervention to help the political parties reach a settlement. This article, which is drawn from an extended interview conducted with Clinton in 2017, seeks to paint a more comprehensive picture of Clinton's participation in the peace process, showing how his combination of motivational and interventional skills enabled him to help convince others of the need to take risks for peace and gave him greater influence and leverage over the peace process as a result.     

South African election posters: Reflecting the maturing of a democracy?

Abstract

The South African democracy has survived three national and provincial elections and three local elections, since 1994. In comparison to other young democracies in Africa, South Africa has experienced a relatively stable transition to democracy. However, the ruling ANC has not been under pressure from opposition parties. Although this has helped pave the way, a dominant governing party does not necessarily encourage the growth of a mature, democratic political culture. The assumption of this article is that political parties in developing societies have a normative obligation to do more than canvas votes during election campaigns. Political parties should also be instrumental in fostering a democratic political culture by communicating democratic values, encouraging participation in the democracy and enabling voters to make an informed electoral choice. Although political posters contribute mainly to image building, the reinforcement of party support, and the visibility of the party, posters are the agenda setters or headlines of a party's campaign – it is therefore argued that political parties in developing societies also need to design political posters responsively, in order to sustain the democracy. In general it seems that the poster campaigns of parties have matured since 1999, in the sense that there was less emphasis on democratisation issues in the past, and the campaigns conformed more to the norm of Western political campaigning.     

The party's over ‐ market liberalization and the challenges for one‐party and one‐party dominant regimes: The cases of Taiwan and Mexico,Italy and Japan

This article examines the recent political misfortunes of two ruling parties (the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico and the Kuomintang in Taiwan) and of two dominant political parties (the Christian Democrats in Italy, and the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan). It compares the causes of their misfortune, and emphasises the impact of the need to open their economies to take advantage of international trade and to make their macro‐economic policies conform more to international standards. In particular this has reduced such parties’ ability to reserve economic rewards for political supporters. It argues that these difficulties are symptomatic of broader problems which many parties will find in attracting long‐term political support and members in an era where ideology plays a lesser role in political life, and where economic pressures for the opening of markets to international competition will increase.     

Pathways of Islamist adaptation: the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’ lessons for inclusion moderation theory

The Muslim Brothers’ transition from religious movement to majority-seeking party in Egypt’s post 2011 democratic experiment offered a key test of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. While the MB’s increasing religious and organizational conservatism at new electoral thresholds appears to challenge the hypothesis, I argue that it was the result of strategic adaptation based on functional alternative interpretations of political opportunity that did not require a trade-off between power-seeking and expressive goals, constrained by prior pathways of electoral adaptation, and shaped by the ambiguous political incentives of democratic transition. This article shows that the MB, like other religious parties, has alternated between strategies for electoral adaptation, challenging expectations of linear evolution; that majority-seeking sometimes encourages intra-movement dynamics that are radicalizing as well as moderating; and shows that expressive goals and identity remain important to religious parties even in office, and make some paths of adaptation more attractive while precluding others. While the case affirms the relevance of political learning mechanisms predicted by inclusion-moderation theory, the divergent outcomes of this learning suggest the need to focus on the contexts and motivations that set movements along one of multiple possible adaptive pathways.     

Political parties and the formation of terrorist groups

Where do modern terrorist group come from? How do they begin? This article establishes that most often they emerge from political parties. An effort is made to identify the relevant types of parties and the internal party dynamics which may have led to terrorist activity. Also, it is asserted that party‐terrorist group links are most likely to occur in nations whose political systems are going through episodes of regime transformation.