Victimisation and Attitudes Towards Former Political Prisoners in Northern Ireland

The release of ex-combatants and the mechanisms for their re-integration within society has become an increasingly controversial issue in peace settlements. Yet to date, the view of victims concerning such arrangements in post-conflict societies remains unexplored. Mindful of this omission and using Northern Ireland as a case study, this article investigates the relationship between victimisation and attitudes towards the treatment of former political prisoners. Based on the 2011 Northern Ireland Social and Political Attitudes Survey, the results suggest that individual victims—those who directly and/or indirectly experienced violent incidents—are notably less supportive of a punitive approach towards the treatment of former political prisoners than non-victims. Moreover, this is particularly the case when victims from within the Catholic community are considered. The Northern Ireland evidence suggests that victims can act as a positive and inclusive force in terms of the rehabilitation and re-integration of former combatants in societies emerging from conflict.     

Monitoring the Peace?: Northern Ireland's 1975 Ceasefire Incident Centres and the Politicisation of Sinn Féin

During the Provisional IRA's (PIRA) 1975 ceasefire, two different sets of incident centres were established across Northern Ireland in order to monitor and avert escalation of violence between Republicans and Security Forces. While one group of offices was run by the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and administered by clerks in the Northern Ireland Civil Service, very quickly Sinn Féin (taking advantage of their decriminalisation in 1974) established their own incident centres to coordinate their communication with the government. This article argues that the establishment of the Sinn Féin incident centres set a precedent for the future political activity of the Provisional Republican Movement; that their activity during the 1975 ceasefire played an important formative role in the evolution of the group's political strategy; and that this experience, acquired from the work done during the 1975 truce, was of far greater influence than is appreciated in current accounts.     

Was There a Clinton Doctrine? President Clinton's Foreign Policy Reconsidered

This article discusses the concept of 'doctrine' within American foreign policy and seeks to locate a possible Clinton Doctrine. It argues, against some interpretations of the Clinton presidency, that Clinton's foreign policy did have a degree of coherence necessary to sustain a 'doctrine'. The broad development of Clinton's foreign policy between 1993 and 2001 is summarized and assessed. Five possible Clinton doctrines are investigated. The article concludes that the best case for being regarded as the Clinton Doctrine relates to the doctrine of 'rogue states'.     

Internal Report Submitted to the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies

Dissident Irish Republicans have increased their violent activities in recent years. These “spoilers” reject the 1998 Good Friday Agreement power-sharing deal between Unionist and Nationalist traditions in Northern Ireland. Instead dissident IRAs vow to maintain an armed campaign against Britain's sovereign claim to Northern Ireland and have killed British soldiers, police officers, and civilians in recent years. These groups have small political organisations with which they are associated. The assumption across the political spectrum is that, whereas Sinn Fein enjoyed significant electoral backing when linked to the now vanished Provisional IRA, contemporary violent Republican ultras and their political associates are utterly bereft of sympathy. Drawing upon new data from the Economic and Social Research Council 2010 Northern Ireland election survey, the first academic study to ask the electorate its views of dissident Republicans, this article examines whether there are any clusters of sympathy for these irreconcilables and their modus operandi. The piece assesses whether there are any demographic, structural, ideological, religious, or party trends indicating Republican dissident sympathies. It also assesses the extent to which dissidents are seen as a threat and examines whether this perception is shared evenly across Northern Ireland's two main communities.     

Mainstream Revolutionaries: Sinn Féin as a “Normal” Political Party?

Despite the seismic shift of Sinn Féin from being the “mouthpiece” of the Provisional Irish Republican Army to the largest nationalist force in Northern Ireland, the party continues to project its objectives within the revolutionary politics and tradition of 1916. Whilst various groups across the island of Ireland stress their loyalty to Irish independence and allegiance to their republican forefathers, 2016 also plays host to devolved assembly elections in Northern Ireland. The centenary of the Easter Rising is therefore a poignant moment to reassess republican politics, more specifically, the relationship between the armed revolutionary tradition and constitutionalism. Within the post-peace process era Sinn Féin have been accused of maintaining an autocratic culture and an intra-party framework that is more representative of a clandestine revolutionary organisation than a political party. Yet, simultaneously, Sinn Féin have not been immune to the pressures experienced by other modern political parties, bound by the laws of electoral competition and driven by office-seeking priorities. In order to explore Sinn Féin within the modern political arena, this article firstly examines the broader debate surrounding how armed groups make the transition into constitutional politics. Secondly, public opinion survey data is used to judge the basis of Sinn Féin's electoral appeal. Finally, internal party documents are used to examine party structure, intra-party democracy, and professionalisation in order to judge the extent to which Sinn Féin have completed the transition from being a “mouthpiece” to their armed counterpart, towards being a “normal” political party.     

“The Movement Moves Against you”: Coercive Spoiler Management in the Northern Ireland Peace Process

More than a decade on, the Northern Ireland peace process can largely be considered a success. Despite the failure of the Provisional Republican Movement to achieve a united Ireland free of British control, the large-scale violence of “The Troubles” has been relegated to the past. Applying the logic of coercive diplomacy, this study examines the role of threats and the use of selective and limited violence by the Provisional Movement to manage real and potential opponents and challengers that have emerged within its own ideological ranks to maintain its position of dominance and prevent a spoiling of the peace process. This study shows that the Provisional Movement retained the capability to employ violence and demonstrated the credibility of coercive threat through a willingness to use force against its opponents on the Republican spectrum, and was able to do so with a high degree of impunity.     

Great effort,little help? Peace and conflict resolution organisations in Northern Ireland and Turkey

This article offers a comparative analysis of the role played by peace and conflict resolution organisations (P/CROs) in Northern Ireland and Turkey in negotiating solutions to ethno-nationalist conflicts in these countries. It argues that P/CROs have been instrumental in de-escalating violence and encouraging conflicting parties to resolve conflict peacefully. Examining both the elite and grass-roots levels, the article assesses P/CROs that have advanced middle-range approaches and track-two dialogue towards peace. Drawing on data from multiple sources, including semi-structured interviews, archival material and official documents, the analysis indicates that P/CROs have a range of tools at their disposal to influence political decision-makers. These include public (and closed) conferences, forums and events attended by current or former politicians, representatives of the conflicting parties and prominent figures and intellectuals in the conflict-affected society, as well as other grass-roots initiatives. The article finds that P/CROs provided help shaping and promoting non-violent processes of conflict resolution between the British Government and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Turkish Government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).     

“Us” and “Them”: Ulster Loyalist Perspectives on the IRA and Irish Republicanism

This article draws on data from one-to-one interviews with members and former members of the Ulster Volunteer Force, Ulster Defence Association, Red Hand Commando, Ulster Political Research Group, and the Progressive Unionist Party to explore the dynamic and fluid perceptions of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Sinn Féin among Ulster loyalists. The article will explore how attitudes and perceptions are influenced by the shifting political landscape in Northern Ireland as Ulster loyalists come to terms with the new realities created by the peace process, security normalization, decommissioning, and the rise in the threat of dissident republican violence. The article will also demonstrate that these perceptions are not purely antagonistic and based on the creation of negative, stereotypical “enemy images” fuelled by decades of conflict, but pragmatic, bound to societal and local events, and influenced by intragroup attitudes and divisions, in addition to the expected conflictual ingroup vs. outgroup relationships. Finally, the article will explore how loyalists employ republicanism and the transformation of the Provisional IRA in particular, as a mirror or benchmark to reflect on their own progress since 1994.     

Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts: The IRA,Sinn Fein,the Peace Process and Democracy

By characterizing the relationship between political fronts and their terrorist organizations this article sets out to explain the underlying reason for the impasse that has come about in the Northern Ireland peace process over decommissioning. It argues that political fronts are subordinate to their terrorist groups and that dual membership between the two is a common feature. Sinn Fein, at least until the autumn of 2001, has been subordinate to the IRA Army Council and so was unable to deliver IRA disarmament. It is then suggested that this misunderstanding, or willingness to overlook the fact, in 1998 has led to the legitimization of Sinn Fein by three democratic states and this has been fundamental in bringing about the party's electoral advance. Loyalist disenchantment, with both this advance and what it has perceived to be the flood of concessions to republicans because of the implied threat of violence, could ultimately have led to violence on a worse scale than the 30 years of the 'Troubles'. The international strategic environment that the republican movement was confronted with changed this. The departure of President Bill Clinton from office and the election of George W. Bush, the Colombian episode, and the declared 'war on terrorism' following the 11 September attacks, were all significant factors behind the IRA's first act of putting weapons beyond use. The possibility, however, that the move was a tactical one-off merely to stave off American pressure and cement Sinn Fein's position in the new political dispensation (and thereby confirm Sinn Fein's status as a political front subordinate to the IRA) should not be discounted. It could also be argued, however, that, because of the apparent shift in control that took place within the Army Council after the events of August and September 2001 towards the 'Sinn Fein element' that supported putting weapons beyond use, the act represents the beginning of an incremental process that will, events permitting, lead to further such moves and the ultimate disbandment of the IRA. If this is the case then the autumn of 2001 is the time that Sinn Fein ceased to be a political 'front', and was henceforth the senior partner in the Republican movement. Nevertheless, the party would still have a long way to go before becoming a democratic party.     

Economics of peace making: the case of The International Fund for Ireland

The civil unrest in Northern Ireland, which began in 1969/1970, formally came to an end on May the 8th 2007, when devolved government began in earnest in Northern Ireland, with Unionist (Protestant) and Republican and Nationalist (Catholic) political parties joining together in government. One of the reasons for this historical peace is related to the work of The International Fund for Ireland. This article will discuss the mechanisms this Fund used to transform structures of conflict, and to create economic foundations for peace in Northern Ireland. The author was Director (1989–1993) and Chairman (1993–2005) of the International Fund for Ireland.     

Bosnia on the Border? Republican Violence in Northern Ireland During the 1920s and 1970s

Unionist politicians have argued that Republican political violence on the Irish border, during both the partition of Ireland and more recent Northern Ireland conflict, constituted ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Protestant/Unionist community in those areas. These views have been bolstered by an increasingly ambivalent scholarly literature that has failed to adequately question the accuracy of these claims. This article interrogates the ethnic cleansing/genocide narrative by analysing Republican violence during the 1920s and the 1970s. Drawing from a wide range of theoretical literature and archival sources, it demonstrates that Republican violence fell far short of either ethnic cleansing or genocide, (in part) as a result of the perpetrators’ self-imposed ideological constraints. It also defines a new interpretive concept for the study of violence: functional sectarianism. This concept is designed to move scholarly discussion of political and sectarian violence beyond the highly politicised and moral cul-de-sacs that have heretofore characterised the debate, and has implications for our understanding of political violence beyond Ireland.     

A Review of: “Stefan Aust. Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the R.A.F. Uwe Steinhoff. On the Ethics of War and Terrorism. Seth G. Jones. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Ekaterina Stepanova. Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects. Laura K. Donohue. The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power,Politics and Liberty.”

Approaches to terrorism and peacebuilding have a complex relationship with each other, which may be explained according to four categories outlined in this article. These range from blocking each others’ aims, nullifying terrorism, supporting a very limited, or a broader peace process. Each of these categories has implications for the inclusion and reconciliation of a wide range of actors and the hybrid nature of the emerging peace. This relates to the critical approach of using theory to create emancipatory forms of peace, which is used as a basis for the examination of the production of hybridity via the interaction of approaches to terrorism and peacebuilding in five cases in this article. These include Sri Lanka, Kashmir, the Middle East, Nepal, and Northern Ireland. We argue that “post-liberal” possibilities for a hybrid form of peace (which are inherent in such conflicts) offer a “post-terrorist” potential for peace processes.     

In the shadows of war and peace: making sense of violence after peace accords

This article addresses an urgent but largely sidelined issue in the study of peace processes: that high levels of violence—usually framed as ‘crime’—are often ubiquitous in societies experiencing peace processes, even after the signing of peace accords. From South Africa to El Salvador, Guatemala to Northern Ireland, rising interpersonal violence has come to characterise the ‘peace’. This violence often takes place in the context of ambitious post-conflict development efforts. The article argues that even the seemingly non-political violence after peace accords is intimately linked to war, as well as the peace process—in both the causes of violence and in the types of violence that perpetrators use. In order to conceptualise post-peace accord violence, the article presents a framework of violence based on the perpetrators of violence and the types of violence (social, economic or political) that occur. This unpacking of post-peace accord violence emphasises the interconnectedness of political and non-political violence, and stresses the importance of security for development.     

DEVOLUTION,GOVERNANCE AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Devolution and the associated mechanisms of governance—a power-sharing Executive, elected assembly, cross-border bodies, a reformed system of public administration and civic engagement —are a part of the wider mosaic of peace-building. Their implementation is an attempt to institutionalize stability and copper-fasten a political settlement. This article outlines the changing governmental arrangements existing within Northern Ireland, as it has shifted tentatively away from direct rule. It maps the wider public sector in Northern Ireland, including civil administration (chiefly the Northern Ireland Civil Service), an extended mosaic of nondepartmental public bodies (NDPBs) and other public agencies that, together with local government, form a complex, multi-layered, subregional governance. Our contention is that the manner in which the administration of Northern Ireland has been conducted yields fruitful insights into issues of territorial management in other areas afflicted by intractable constitutional wrangles and attendant violence. In short, an agreed system of governance is integral to the transition from conflict to peace (or at least stability) and, in the case of Northern Ireland, was central to the substance of the Belfast Agreement, characterized by a power-sharing Executive.     

Transitional justice in settled democracies: Northern Ireland and the Basque Country in comparative perspective

This article explores the concept of transitional justice in democratic states dealing with political violence. Although transitional justice was designed for paradigmatic transitions (from war to peace and from dictatorship to democracy), conflicted democracies such as Northern Ireland and the Basque Country could also benefit from this framework which brings a comprehensive human rights approach to the past and promotes the principles of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition. The article compares the transition from conflict in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. It explores some of the specific features which characterise processes of transitional justice within settled democracies, such as the blurred break with the past, the fragmentation of initiatives aimed at dealing with violence and the mixture of ordinary and transitional justice. As well as contributing to the conceptualisation of the field of transitional justice, the study proposes that the conflict vs. terrorism divide and the clash of narratives associated with it are the key to understanding these types of transitions.     

The Middle East: Learning from the Past

The effort to bring peace to the Middle East has been an almost century long process. Legions of soldiers, politicians, and diplomats have attempted the political equivalent of transmuting dross into gold. They have failed; none more comprehensively than President Bill Clinton and his Middle East interlocutors. Despite personal energy, intelligence, and creativity, U.S. efforts failed. After a stretch of benign/malign neglect, Washington again is venturing into the swamp by sponsoring renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. There are learnable lessons from what has been (mis)managed in the past. The question remains whether the United States will take counsel from them.     

Conflict regulation or conflict resolution: Third‐party intervention in the Northern Ireland conflict – prospects for peace

This article evaluates previous third‐party efforts to broker a consociational power‐sharing solution on the peoples of Northern Ireland. Instead, an original and dynamic community‐based problem‐solving linkage system proposes co‐operation between Northern Ireland's grassroots constituents, paramilitary groups and political elites. The process would be facilitated by a quasi‐mediator comprising the three Northern Irish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and four MEPs – two each from the Netherlands and Belgium. This is a vision of how to create a mutually beneficial process linking psychocultural and structural dimensions by promoting dialogue, understanding, tolerance and the sharing of commonalities in beliefs, identity, and behaviors among groups involved in intercommunal conflict situations.     

Bush: The Sequel

This article examines the likely foreign policy initiatives of the U.S. under the leadership of George W. Bush. The new president has outlined a fairly thorough critique of America's international behavior in the 1990s. Because a leader's public statements arguably serve to persuade various audiences and to build support for policy change, the article takes Bush's words quite seriously—along with those spoken or written by his closest foreign affairs advisors. Bush intends to abandon the so-called Clinton Doctrine and deploy national missile defenses. He is critical of American policies toward China and Russia, but has not presented bold new initiatives toward those powers. Under the rubric of "compassionate conservatism," Bush may alter U.S. relations toward the Global South in some interesting ways. The president and his advisors often purport to be realists, but the article demonstrates that their own words belie this claim as they often justify policies based on ideals rather than the pursuit of power.     

‘THEY HAVEN'T GONE AWAY,YOU KNOW’. IRISH REPUBLICAN ‘DISSIDENTS’ AND ‘ARMED STRUGGLE’

The shift by the provisional Republican movement towards constitutional politics in Northern Ireland has caused splits among Republicans. The formation of the Continuity and Real Irish Republican Armies, pledged to continue ‘armed struggle’ against British rule in Northern Ireland, was predictable, given the historical propensity of Republicans to divide amid claims of ‘betrayal’ by the leadership. The odds against militarist Republican ‘dissidents’ appear overwhelming, as they lack weapons, members and support. Sinn Féin has carried most of the Nationalist constituency on its transition towards constitutionalism and the Irish Republic has abandoned its claim to Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, continued political uncertainty over the province's political future has contributed to the maintenance of a long-standing militaristic tradition within Irish republicanism.     

‘JUST FIGHTING TO SURVIVE’: LOYALIST PARAMILITARY POLITICS AND THE PROGRESSIVE UNIONIST PARTY

Throughout the contemporary period, Unionists and Loyalists in Northern Ireland have reacted in contradictory ways to the peace process. This article highlights some of the key political and social dynamics within loyalism. In particular, it considers the positioning of the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and their linked political representatives in the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP). The response of the PUP to the peace process has revealed several important tensions within unionism. These include the notions that Loyalists can no longer be assured that the UK government will maintain the Union; expressions of class and gendered identities; a lack of trust of mainstream unionism; and, sectarianism, which although it remains a key element within Loyalist identity, is by no means its only dimension. Finally, the article outlines the broader construction of Loyalist and Unionist ideologies, and positions the PUP within broader politics of contemporary unionism.