Intimations of Unconstitutionality: The Supremacy of International Law and Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court

Judgment 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court reopens the debate on the extent of the immunity enjoyed by states for violations of jus cogens. The decision, which questions the authority of the ICJ's 2012 judgment in Germany v Italy, could certainly have effects on the formation of customary international law. In addition, it revives the discussion on the relationship between national and international law and on the supremacy of the latter over the former, especially if read in light of the previous Medellín and Kadi I decisions. Judgment 238/2014 is an opportunity to reappraise the role played by international law in domestic courts, particularly in cases where international law conflicts with core domestic constitutional values.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

Beyond Therapy: Problem‐Solving Courts and the Deliberative Democratic State

Problem‐solving courts (drug courts, community courts, domestic violence courts, and mental health courts), unlike traditional courts, attempt to get at the root of the individual and social problems that motivate criminal behavior. Theoretical understandings of problem‐solving courts are mostly Foucauldian; proponents argue that these new institutions employ therapeutic techniques that encourage individuals to self‐engineer in ways that subtly increase state power. The Foucauldian approach captures only some elements of problem‐solving courts and does not fully theorize the revolution in justice that these courts present. Problem‐solving courts, domestic violence courts in particular, orient not just around individual change but also around social change and cultural transformation. Combining the Foucauldian idea of a therapeutic state (as developed by James Nolan) with an understanding of the deliberative democratic mechanisms of larger‐scale structural transformation (found in Habermas and others) leads to a more balanced and empirically open orientation to the actual motivations, goals, and achievements of problem‐solving courts.     

'Solange, chapter 3': Constitutional Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European Union

Abstract: Soon after the accession of eight post‐communist states from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU, the constitutional courts of some of these countries questioned the principle of supremacy of EU law over national constitutional systems, on the basis of their being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and of democratic principles. In doing so, they entered into the well‐known pattern of behaviour favoured by a number of constitutional courts of the ‘older Europe’, which is called a ‘Solange story’ for the purposes of this article. But this resistance is ridden with paradoxes, the most important of which is a democracy paradox: while accession to the EU was supposed to be the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in post‐communist states, how can the supremacy of EU law be now resisted on these very grounds? It is argued that the sources of these constitutional courts’ adherence to the ‘Solange’ pattern are primarily domestic, and that it is a way of strengthening their position vis‐à‐vis other national political actors, especially at a time when the role and independence of those courts face serious domestic challenges.     

The dangers of constitutional identity

This article purports to expose the dangers of the concept of constitutional identity – a doctrine shaped by apex state courts to shield areas of the national legal systems from the influence of European law. First, the article overviews the use of the concept of constitutional identity in the case law of national and supranational courts, mapping the growing expansion of this doctrine. Second, the article seeks to reconstruct the genealogy of the concept of constitutional identity, tracing its legal origins. Third, the article advances a normative criticism of the concept of constitutional identity, explaining how the doctrine suffers from an incurable lack of determinacy, which inevitably results in arbitrariness in its use. Moreover, the article points out how the practical use of a defensive concept such as constitutional identity is poised to weaken, if not undermine tout court, the process of European integration.     

The Angry Pamphleteer: True Threats,Political Speech,and Applying Watts v. United States in the Age of Twitter

Since the 1969 case Watts v. United States, courts have consistently held that politically motivated speech about or directed to public figures may be punished if it qualifies as a “true threat” rather than protected political hyperbole. Criticism of public officials lies at the core of First Amendment protection, even when that criticism is caustic or crude. Such caustic speech appears on Twitter with increasing frequency, often pushing the boundaries of the constitutional guarantees of free speech. Through an analysis of the political speech-true threat cases that apply Watts, this study identifies and assesses three distinct modes of analysis that lower courts use to distinguish political speech from true threats. They are: (1) criteria-based analysis; (2) ad hoc balancing; and (3) a form of balancing referred to herein as “line-crossing analysis.” This study concludes that criteria-based analysis is the most prominent mode used by lower courts. As applied to new media and political participation, criteria-based analysis risks unduly restricting valuable political speech.     

The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty

Abstract:  One of the core constitutional questions for national constitutional courts in the EU in the past decades has been whether to accept the claim made by the Court of Justice that EU law is the supreme law of the land, taking primacy even over conflicting national constitutional provisions. With the inclusion in the recently adopted Constitutional Treaty of a clause explicitly confirming the 'primacy of EU Law' appearances suggest that the EU is about to establish a characteristic of mature, vertically integrated, federal states such as the USA. This article argues that this view is mistaken. It develops a comprehensive jurisprudential framework for addressing constitutional conflicts, 'Constitutionalism Beyond the State' (CBC). CBS detaches the discussion of supremacy and constitutional conflict from a statist framework; provides a jurisprudential account that explains and justifies the highly differentiated, context-sensitive and dynamic set of conflict rules that national courts have in the past adopted; and provides the lacking theoretical basis for the more attractive, but undertheorised sui generis accounts of European constitutional practice that have recently gained ground in the literature. CBS provides a jurisprudentially grounded reconstructive account of why the issue of constitutional conflict is as rich and complicated in Europe as it is and why it is likely to remain so even if the Constitutional Treaty is ratified. The article then goes on to make concrete proposals addressed to national constitutional courts and the Court of Juctise respectively about how, in application of the developed approach, constitutional conflicts ought to be addressed doctrinally. It includes a proposal to read the new 'constitutional identity' clause as authorising Member States as a matter of EU Law to set aside EU Law on constitutional grounds under certain circumstances.     

Falling Short of Constitutional Norms: Does “Normative (In)Congruence” Explain the Courts' Inability to Promote the Right to Water in South Africa?

In South Africa, municipal noncompliance with legislation promoting the constitutional right to sufficient water is both a failure of the rule of law and a betrayal of that right. Judicial intervention has prompted formalistic compliance with water law, but the underlying commitment to sufficient water remains unfulfilled. Does the inability of courts to achieve social justice despite enforcing social legislation confirm the thesis that commitments to the rule of law and to social justice are inconsistent, that upholding the rule of law may not advance social justice? This article offers an alternative to this “inconsistency thesis,” arguing that the rule of law can accommodate social justice if it demands normative congruence alongside congruence with formal rules. Empirical investigation reveals that structural challenges and the multifarious normative demands on officials create a condition of normative incongruence that impedes the pursuit of social justice, even as courts compel congruence with formal rules.     

MARRIAGE IN CANADA—EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION?*

On July 20, 2005, the Canadian Civil Marriage Act became law, extending equal access to civil marriage to same‐sex couples while respecting religious freedom. This article briefly traces the distinctive juridical factors that have contributed to the legislation: the constitutional comity or dialogue among Parliament, the courts and the people resulting from the constitutional entrenchment of a Charter of rights and freedoms; the growth of the substantive concept of equality in Canadian law; and the impact of the constitutional division of powers and the nature of Canadian federalism. Together, these factors contributed to a constructive debate centered on respect for diversity.     

National Constitutional Courts in supranational litigation: A contextual analysis

The article examines the role of national constitutional courts in supranational litigation. It firstly illustrates their value and situates well‐known judicial doctrines affecting their jurisdiction in the context of the normative claims, policy agenda and institutional framework promoted by the European Union. Against this background, it gauges the potential of national constitutional courts in countering the process of intergovernmental and technocratic encroachment of national constitutional democracies characterising the most recent evolutionary stages of the European integration process. It is claimed that constitutional courts are in the position of reinforcing, resisting or correcting Union measures with a detrimental impact on national constitutional principles. After having identified in correction the approach more coherent with their constitutional mandate, the article highlights a disturbing paradox: in remaining faithful to their constitutional role, constitutional courts contribute to the sustainability of a comprehensive institutional setting corroding the idea of constitutional democracy on which they are premised.     

Constitutional Directives: Morally‐Committed Political Constitutionalism

About 37 state constitutions around the world feature non‐justiciable thick moral commitments (‘constitutional directives’). These directives typically oblige the state to redistribute income and wealth, guarantee social minimums, or forge a religious or secular identity for the state. They have largely been ignored in a constitutional scholarship defined by its obsession with the legitimacy of judicial review and hostility to constitutionalising thick moral commitments other than basic rights. This article presents constitutional directives as obligatory telic norms, addressed primarily to the political state, which constitutionalise thick moral objectives. Their full realisation—through increasingly sophisticated mechanisms designed to ensure their political enforcement—is deferred to a future date. They are weakly contrajudicative in that these duties are not directly enforced by courts. Functionally, they help shape the discourse over a state's constitutional identity, and regulate its political and judicial organs. Properly understood, they are a key tool to realise a morally‐committed conception of political constitutionalism.     

Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order

The European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) jurisprudence of fundamental rights in cases such as Schmidberger and Omega extends the court's jurisdiction in ways that compete with that of Member States in matters of visceral concern. And just as the Member States require a guarantee that the ECJ respect fundamental rights rooted in national tradition, so the ECJ insists that international organisations respect rights constitutive of the EU. The demand of such guarantees reproduces between the ECJ and the international order the kinds of conflicting jurisdictional claims that have shadowed the relation between the ECJ and the courts of the Member States. This article argues that the clash of jurisdiction is being resolved by the formation of a novel order of coordinate constitutionalism in which Member States, the ECJ, the European Court of Human Rights and other international tribunals or organisations agree to defer to one another's decisions, provided those decisions respect mutually agreed essentials. This coordinate order extends constitutionalism beyond its home territory in the nation state through a jurisprudence of mutual monitoring and peer review that carefully builds on national constitutional traditions, but does not create a new, encompassing sovereign entity. The doctrinal instruments by which the plural constitutional orders are, in this way, profoundly linked without being integrated are variants of the familiar Solange principles of the German Constitutional Court, by which each legal order accepts the decisions of the others, even if another decision would have been more consistent with the national constitution tradition, ‘so long as’ those decisions do not systematically violate its own understanding of constitutional essentials. The article presents the coordinate constitutional order being created by this broad application of the Solange doctrine as an instance, and practical development, of what Rawls called an overlapping consensus: agreement on fundamental commitments of principle—those essentials which each order requires the others to respect—does not rest on mutual agreement on any single, comprehensive moral doctrine embracing ideas of human dignity, individuality or the like. It is precisely because the actors of each order acknowledge these persistent differences, and their continuing influence on the interpretation of shared commitments in particular conflicts, that they reserve the right to interpret essential principles, within broad and shared limits, and accord this right to others. The embrace of variants of the Solange principles by many coordinate courts, in obligating each to monitor the others' respect for essentials, creates an institutional mechanism for articulating and adjusting the practical meaning of the overlapping consensus.     

Religion and the Practices of Popular Constitutionalism: Sarah Gordon's The Spirit of the Law

Sarah Gordon's The Spirit of the Law: Religious Voices and the Constitution in Modern America (2010) details the advent, beginning in the 1940s, of a “new constitutional world” pertaining to the religion clauses. By focusing on case studies, Gordon's narrative history shows the emergence, maturation, and waning of a rich historical moment in which religiously motivated popular constitutionalists had a profound impact on how the Constitution was technically interpreted by the courts. Shifting perspectives from history to ethnography, the essay synthesizes Gordon's stories to yield an anatomy of “religious” popular constitutionalism as it appears in Gordon's book and conjectures at what it might look like if we left court records behind.     

Offenders' lies and truths: an evaluation of the Supreme Court of Sweden's criteria for credibility assessment

Abstract

The criteria used by Swedish courts for assessing credibility of plaintiffs' accounts were for the first time scientifically evaluated. Furthermore, unlike much previous deception detection research, we used offenders as participants instead of college students. False and truthful confessions by 30 offenders were analysed, and few significant effects were obtained. Truthful confessions were rated as having a higher degree of clarity than false confessions. Women's truthful confessions were rated as more credible than their false confessions. The offenders who were most experienced in being interviewed by the police gave a stronger impression of talking about something self-experienced in their false than in their truthful confessions; hence, it seems that offenders with more police interview experience have developed a kind of expertise in telling a convincing lie about crime. Overall, the criteria for credibility assessment used by Swedish courts had very limited usefulness in discriminating truthful and false confessions. A critique of the current status of evaluating statements in Swedish courts is provided.     

Fundamental rights in the EU after Kadi and Al Barakaat

This article takes stock of the emerging scholarship on the European Court of Justice's 2008 Kadi decision and seeks to make sense of the court's apparent evasiveness towards international law. The article argues that Kadi is best understood as an act of civil disobedience prompted by the UN Security Council's misapplication of foundational principles of the international order. In turn, the court's forceful articulation of the stakes in this case signals a prioritisation of basic rights within the supranational constitutional architectonic. In this respect, the ‘domestic’ constitutional implications of Kadi are just as far reaching as its consequences for the EU's status as an actor under international law.     

Preserving the Law’s Coherence: Citizens United v. FEC and Stare Decisis

In addition to striking down the portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that limited the amount of money corporations and unions could spend on independent expenditures, Citizens United v. FEC overturned two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, an action that stands in contrast to the principle of stare decisis. This article analyzes the discussions of stare decisis in the various Citizens United opinions and compares these discussions to existing scholarly debate on the proper role of stare decisis in constitutional law. It also examines citations and discussions of Citizens United in state supreme court and federal circuit court of appeals cases to analyze how the justices’ discussions of stare decisis in Citizens United have influenced lower courts. The article concludes that the Citizens United opinions that discussed stare decisis — particularly Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion and Chief Justice John Roberts’ concurrence — are highly problematic for a number of reasons. The applications of stare decisis in the opinions were also flawed. Citizens United has thus made it even easier for lower courts to abandon stare decisis and overturn precedent.     

The Persistent Significance of Jurisdiction*

According to Joseph Raz's sources thesis, the existence and content of authoritative directives must be identifiable by resort to the social fact of their provenance from a de facto authority, without regard to any of the normative considerations that the authority in question is supposed to rely on in its judgment. This article argues that the sources thesis fails to account for the role of jurisdictional considerations (namely, considerations about the scope of a de facto authority's power) in the identification of valid law. It examines a legal system with a legislature and courts and a practice of constitutional review of legislation by the courts for its conformity with fundamental rights and argues that the special normative status of (at least some) authoritative directives in this legal system depends on respect for jurisdiction. An assessment of whether an authority has stayed intra vires involves recourse to the normative considerations that it is the authority's job to weigh up. This criticism of the sources thesis highlights the importance of incorporating jurisdiction into our philosophical accounts of legal authority.     

Caution in the Classroom: K-12 Teacher In-Class Speech,The Federal Courts and Garcetti

The federal courts’ approach to regulating K-12 public school teacher speech in the classroom has been split during the past twenty years. Some circuit courts use Pickering v. Board of Education, in which speech is examined to see if it touches on a matter of public concern. Others prefer Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, which focuses on whether speech is school-sponsored and whether the school had a legitimate reason for restricting it. In 2007, Garcetti v. Ceballos offered a new perspective on public employee speech. In that case, speech was examined to determine whether it was related to an employee's professional duties. An examination of federal court treatment of in-class teacher speech before and after Garcetti shows the case has further complicated the issue because it is being embraced by some federal courts as an appropriate precedent when dealing with classroom speech.     

Domestic judicial defiance and the authority of international legal regimes

Tensions and occasional overt defiance of international courts suggest that compliance with international regimes is not a self-evident choice for domestic judges. I develop a formal theory of domestic judicial defiance in which domestic and supranational judges vie for jurisprudential authority in a non-hierarchical setting. The model emphasises the role of domestic non-compliance costs and power asymmetries in determining the conduct of domestic and international judges. I argue that the EU represents a special case of a particularly effective international regime. Weak domestic courts have little to gain from an escalated conflict with the European court of Justice. But even domestic judicial superpowers like the German Federal Constitutional Court have strong incentives to seek mutual accommodation with European judges. The analysis also yields new insights into concepts, such as “judicial dialogue” and “constitutional pluralism” that have featured prominently in the legal literature, and suggests new hypotheses for empirical research.