国际体系深入调整 多边互动明显增强

2005年，多边外交舞台异彩纷呈，各种多边外交活动异常活跃，围绕联合国改革、国际秩序建设、多边贸易谈判、非传统安全等全球性问题，以及朝鲜与伊朗核问题、欧盟东扩、中东安全等地区热点问题，各种行为体积极发挥作用，继续展开竞争与合作。单边与多边、单极与多极的斗争仍激烈异常，美国单边主义受到了更大的牵制。发展中国家运用多边外交增强自身实力，加大与发达国家的合作，中国多边外交也卓有成效。     

参与和培育国际关系的制度建设

在当今美国一国独大的现存国际秩序下, 不做挑战者也不做追随者应是中国大国外 交的原则。它的着力点是努力培育和营造国际关系的制度建设。这既包括在现有多边国际机制中 维护国际法和国际关系准则的正当性, 在大国间健全联系机制, 也包括努力培育新的安全机制及相 互协助。中国周边外交是中国全方位外交的相切点。中国外交应在培育区域安全机制和加强区域 经济合作中与周边国家实现经济依存和安全信任。     

国际机制理论与东北亚能源外交

在东北亚地区,由于中国、日本、韩国等能源消费大国能源消费的日益增长、俄罗斯作为能源大国的异军突起以及东北亚内部因能源而起的各种争端,能源外交成为东北亚外交中的重点和热点。开展东北亚能源外交的目的是通过政策协调构建一个多边能源合作机制,在东北亚地区不存在霸权国家提供合作机制的背景下,可以考虑运用国际机制理论,通过能源外交特别是多边能源外交构建本地区多边能源合作机制,并充分发挥能源外交的"外溢"功能,借机推进东北亚整体合作的发展。     

中国国际战略中的金砖国家合作

金砖国家合作是全球化发展的产物,也是新世纪中国战略调整的产物。在全球化浪潮推动下,新兴经济体国家群体性崛起,成为国际政治经济体系转型的重要推动力量。尽管某些战略界人士鼓噪"金砖褪色论",事实上,金砖国家非但不会褪色,反而战略影响力将日益提升,成为新兴经济体国家战略协调的载体和"抓手"。中国是推动金砖国家合作的重要战略力量,金砖合作既属于新时期中国对发展中国家外交的实现形式,也是多边外交的重要实现形式。随着中国成为世界第二经济大国,金砖国家合作在中国奋发有为的国际战略中居于更加重要的地位,金砖国际合作在中国外交中的地位将进一步凸显。为适应此种变化,中国将坚持正确义利观,积极推进金砖国家合作,通过体制机制创新,不断增强金砖国家的战略影响力。     

浅析中印参与“金砖国家”合作机制的动因

在中印多边外交的发展和实践过程中,两国逐渐在金砖国家合作机制内找到了利益交汇点。因此,中印两国都在积极参与金砖国家合作机制。中国希望通过金砖国家合作机制加强与其他发展中国家之间的联系、推动人民币国际化进程以及提升与其他金砖国家之间的双边关系;印度希望通过金砖国家合作机制促进本国经济发展、为印度争取成为安理会常任理事国创造新的条件,并推动世界多极化进程。     

浅谈中印多边外交合作机制建设

本文着重强调中国和印度开展多边外交合作的必要性;回顾了中印双边协调机制和"金砖国家"等多边机制建设进展;提出经由中印战略对话发起合作倡议,通过"金砖国家"机制凝聚共识,在二十国集团和联合国框架下构建中印多边外交合作机制的构想。     

塑造与被塑造——中美在国际多边机制下的互动

在全球化的大背景下,中美相互依赖加深,利益交汇点增多。而中美两国的战略抉择为双方在国际多边机制下的互动提供了必要的空间。双方利益交融和结构性矛盾并存,必然导致中美多边互动是既合作又竞争,甚至是斗争。中美在国际多边机制下的互动,既塑造了对方,也塑造了未来,推动国际多边机制的变革。不过,这将是一个从量变到质变的漫长过程。     

如何推进中国对非多边外交

相较在国际多边舞台上的活动以及同亚太和欧洲等地区的多边交往而言,中国对非多边外交的发展仍处于滞后状态。为及时拟订对非多边外交的基本框架,首先而且最为重要的是在理念层面建构起应有的战略思维,即进一步明确非洲在中国外交战略中的定位,深化对非多边外交重要性的认识,适时更新和拓展中国对非多边外交的战略基础与关注内容。在具体的实施方略上,中国应当进一步完善和深化中非合作论坛机制,重视开展与非盟及非洲各次区域组织的交往,继续加强与非洲国家在国际多边场合的协调与互助。     

拜登政府气候外交战略：动因、进展与制约因素

拜登政府上任以来，将应对气候危机作为内政外交的优先议题，对内推行气候新政，对外实施积极的气候外交战略，以此促进美国经济社会整体绿色转型发展、维护美国国家气候安全、恢复美国的国际信誉和全球领导力。在全球层面，美国重返《巴黎协定》，发起“领导人气候峰会”，在联合国及七国集团等多边平台推动气候合作；在区域层面，美国将“印太”地区作为推进区域气候外交的重点，充分利用四方安全合作机制、“印太经济框架”、美国—东盟合作机制等小多边平台，提升“印太”地区应对气候变化的能力；在双边层面，美国以欧盟为重点加强同盟友之间的气候能源合作，同中国、印度、南非、印度尼西亚等新兴市场国家开展气候外交。拜登政府的气候外交战略对国际社会应对气候变化、促进绿色经济发展带来积极作用，但也在一定程度上加剧了全球气候治理领导权之争，可能引发新一轮全球贸易保护主义，并使大国“绿色竞争”更为激烈。需要注意的是，拜登政府气候外交战略面临国内外诸多挑战，国内党派分歧、地方政府反对等因素或阻碍美国履行气候变化国际承诺，美国同中国、欧盟等大型经济体之间的关系复杂演变也可能会制约其开展气候外交行动。     

浅析中国和巴西多边框架内的合作——从联合国到金砖国家机制

中国和巴西两个重要的新兴发展中国家,从联合国到金砖国家机制框架内开展了广泛的合作。中巴两国在多边框架内的合作虽然面临不少挑战,但未来合作会进一步加强。双方的多边合作顺应了国际形势的发展,符合全球治理发展的需求,有利于两国实现大国目标,同时对国际体系的变革、全球治理的发展、联合国的改革、金砖国家机制的发展都将产生积极的影响。     

Sovereignty,Bargaining, and the International Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment

While developing countries have undergone a remarkable transformation in their attitudes toward foreign direct investment (FDI) during the past decade, they still resist the establishment of a multilateral regime governing FDI. This is puzzling, first, because these states are liberalising their policies anyway, and second, because a multilateral regime offers several advantages over the patchwork of unilateral and bilateral arrangements that currently exist (for instance, by contributing to increasing FDI flows). What explains this paradoxical attitude? This paper critically examines a number of potential explanations. Concerns about losing sovereignty, lack of knowledge about the costs of FDI restrictions, or lingering suspicions of multinational corporations may play some role, but cannot account for unilateral and bilateral liberalisation. Another approach highlights the role of domestic groups in supporting or opposing a multilateral agreement. Yet the pattern of variation among the attitudes of developing countries casts doubt on this explanation as well. Finally, the paper puts forth an argument that focuses on how bargaining power affects the trade-off between economic gains and the loss of sovereignty. The host state's perceived attractiveness to multinational investors conditions whether or not the government resolves this trade-off in favour of supporting a multilateral regime.     

Soldiers,Civilians, and Multilateral Humanitarian Intervention

Approval from the United Nations or NATO appears to have become a necessary condition for US humanitarian military intervention. Conventional explanations emphasizing the pull of legitimacy cannot fully account for this given that US policymakers vary considerably in their attachment to multilateralism. This article argues that America's military leaders, who are consistently skeptical about humanitarian intervention and tend to emphasize its costs, play a central role in making multilateral approval necessary. As long as top-ranking generals express strong reservations about intervention and no clear threat to US national security exists, they can veto the use of force. In such circumstances, even heavyweight “humanitarian hawks” among the civilian leadership, who initially may have wanted to bypass multilateral bodies to maximize US freedom of action, can be expected to recognize the need for UN or NATO approval—if only as a means of mollifying the generals by reassuring them about the prospect of sustained multilateral burden sharing. Two case studies drawing on interviews with senior civilian and military officials illustrate and probe the plausibility of the argument.     

Multilateral determinants of regionalism revisited

The idea that some features of the multilateral trading system create incentives for countries to join preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is among the first and most influential explanations for the wave of regionalism in the last decades. Until recently, only a few empirical studies have explored this hypothesis and their results have been accepted by many researchers and policy-makers to be a fact. In this study we revisit the question of whether multilateral events are important determinants of regionalism. We use an extended dataset and implement several empirical specifications in the analysis. Unlike previous work, our results provide little support for the relevance of variables such as the number of GATT/WTO members, ongoing trade negotiation rounds, and trade disputes as predictors of PTA formation.     

The choice among aid donors: The effects of multilateral vs. bilateral aid on recipient behavioral support

Scholars studying foreign assistance differ over whether multilateral aid is preferable to bilateral aid for promoting development, but nearly all build their cases primarily on highly aggregated cross-national time-series data. We investigate this topic experimentally from the perspective of those whom the foreign aid directly affects: recipient citizens and elites. We thus report results of a survey experiment with behavioral outcomes on more than 3000 Ugandan citizens and over 300 members of Uganda’s Parliament. In spite of a large literature suggesting differences, the findings generally reveal few substantive differences in citizens’ and elites’ preferences and behavior toward the two types of aid. While no strong pattern of differences emerges, limited evidence suggests that the public evinces greater trust in multilateral institutions, and both masses and elites feel that multilateral aid is more transparent. Overall, these null results inform an ever-expanding literature, which is increasingly articulating distinctions between multilateral and bilateral aid. At least in the minds of the recipients, however, multilateral and bilateral aid may not in fact be all that different. This accords with the literature noting the strong overlap in aid organizations and bemoaning the fact that they do not specialize more. Our results raise the question about why have both multilateral and bilateral aid donors if they in effect do the same thing.     

Multilateral donors and the security-development nexus: discourse and practice in conflict-affected states

This article assesses how the ‘security-development nexus’ has impacted multilateral aid to conflict-affected states; an area until now understudied. Using a mixed methods approach, we examine both the policy discourse and aid commitments of the major multilateral donors: the European Commission, the World Bank and the UNDP. We investigate the extent to which these donors fund the sectors identified within the policy discourse as crucial to ensuring peace and stability – democratisation and peace, conflict, and security activities – and examine the impact of ‘Western’ security concerns on multilateral aid in conflict-affected states. Our new data indicate that in contrast to policy discourse, post-conflict states receive no more multilateral funding for democracy–building than states which have not suffered from conflict and furthermore, that in the context of the security-development nexus, multilateral aid to conflict-affected states is influenced by the key transnational security concerns of Western states. These results point to a potentially dangerous gap between policy and actual aid commitments, ignore the long-term nature of development and weaken the impartiality of multilateral aid.     

From a Rhetoric of Nostalgia to a Health-Based Policy: Tobacco,Obesity and the WTO

The globalisation of health demands a multilateral response. Instead of the developed world pursuing agricultural policies oriented towards propping up declining sectors of their economies, a better approach would put health concerns as a top priority. The new Framework Convention on Tobacco Control is a good example of a useful global agreement to promote health. This approach could be replicated in a multilateral framework to control obesity.     

Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective

Multilateral economic sanctions can be expected to impose greaterterms-of-trade effects on a target nation than unilateral sanctions. Yet despite their potential for greater economic damage, multilateral sanctions often are less effective in bringing about desired political results in the target. An interest-group model of endogenous policy suggests that multilateral sanctions can undermine the political effectiveness of opposition groups in the targetcountry, or strengthen those groups supporting the objectionable policy of the ruling regime. Such perverse effects are due in part to the inability of multilateral coalitions to enforce cooperation among members, and to the appropriation of sanctions rents in the target country. Unilateral sanctions, however, imposed by a country with close ties to the target, are ofteneffective in achieving their intended political objectives.     

EU enlargement and the rise of Asian FTAs: Implications for Asia-Europe relations

  Over the past few years, there has been resurgence in regionalism and preferential trade across the global economic system. The European Union has taken steps at enlargement of their economic community to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Bilateral trade arrangements are proliferating in Asia involving the region's largest economies Japan and China. These arrangements mirror similar initiatives in the Americas. These developments have profound implications on the world trading system, in general, and to Asia-Europe relations in particular. The rise of preferentialism runs the risk of heightened discrimination, trade diversion and the fragmentation of the multilateral trade order. This prospect will have a direct impact on the future relations between Asia and Europe. Both Europe and Asia should remain outward oriented, open to reciprocal arrangements with non-member economies, and supportive of the multilateral trading system.     

From the Outside Looking In: The Effect of Trading Blocs on Trade Disputes in the GATT/WTO

The increasing number and expansion of trading blocs is an important dimension of the contemporary international economy. This study examines the effects of such trading blocs on third parties and on the multilateral trading system. It is argued that trading blocs have negative economic effects on economic sectors in non-members' states. These sectors urge their governments to take political action vis-à-vis the trading bloc. Governments have several policy choices on their menu, and the attractiveness of these policies is determined by domestic and international incentives and constraints. I argue that filing a complaint in the GATT/WTO is an attractive and effective policy tool in the hands of third parties' governments. Thus, I hypothesize that the existence, deepening, and widening of trading blocs result in an increase in the number of complaints filed against their members in the multilateral trading system. I examine these propositions in the context of three important trading blocs—namely, the EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur—in the period 1948–2000. To test these hypotheses a time-series cross-section count model is performed. Controlling for conventional alternative explanations, the empirical analysis supports the theoretical framework.