体制与能力:试析美国气候外交的二元影响因素

在推动全球气候变化治理的进程中,美国政府遭遇了体制与能力的二元困境:既要平衡体制内部的矛盾,融合地方和党派的分歧,达成政治妥协;又要提高谈判能力,以主导气候变化谈判机制建设,垄断话语权和发展空间分配权。因此,在全球气候变化治理中出现了一种矛盾现象:一方面,美国在全球治理谈判进程中拥有强大的谈判能力;另一方面,由美国的体制衍生而来的分化消极态度极大约束了其在气候外交和全球谈判的手脚。本文试图从美国的体制和能力两个维度来分析这一现象,认为美国强大的谈判能力和日趋分化的决策体制之间的失衡将不可避免地促使其在全球气候环境治理中的领导地位不断下降。美国气候外交在不同的时期表现有所差异,不能将其简单归因于政党政治和利益集团或者执政党领袖等因素,而是美国体制问题和谈判能力二元互动的产物。     

地缘政治与地缘经济双重视角下的美国“印太战略”

从地缘政治角度而言,美国的"印太战略"是将其"亚太再平衡"战略和亚太"轴辐"安全同盟体系扩大到印度洋区域,实行两洋联结,形成大月牙形同盟与伙伴国网络。此举试图以合作与制约双管齐下,将中印崛起规制在美国主导的国际机制和国际规则框架内。从地缘经济角度而言,世界经济重心从大西洋两岸向印太地区转移是促使美国推出"印太战略"的主要原因之一。亚太经济重心从美国向东亚及西太平洋地区和印度洋地区东部转移也促使美国提升这些次区域的战略地位。印太地区战略格局正在从一超多强向多极格局演变,形成多个三角关系。构建中美新型大国关系的进程不仅取决于两国国内因素,也受到印太地缘政治中其他行为者的影响。印太地区正在成为全球地缘经济和地缘政治的下一个中心地带。美"印太战略"使印太地区战略态势更为复杂,使中国和平发展面临更加复杂的外部环境。     

试论基础四国在后哥本哈根气候谈判中的立场和作用

基础四国是由中国、印度、巴西和南非四个主要发展中国家组成的气候谈判集团,鉴于其成员在发展中国家和世界上的影响力,该集团在国际气候谈判中备受关注。在构建2012年后国际气候机制的谈判中,基础四国的立场表现出了很高的协调性,但也存在一定的差异。总体而言,基础四国的出现和协调行动推动了国际气候谈判在公约框架下展开,有利于后京都气候安排的达成,但也可能促使国际气候谈判集团,特别是G77加中国的分化和重新组合。基础四国气候谈判集团出现时间尚短,其最终能够在构建后京都气候机制中发挥何种作用将取决于基础四国在应对气候变化中如何对待联合国渠道与其他渠道的关系、敦促发达国家减排的决心和能力以及是否能够保持G77加中国内部的团结性等。     

编者的话

当下,新型冠状病毒肺炎在全球的蔓延以及各国在应对疫情中各自的表现,给人们对于大国合作应对国际重大突发事件、通过现有合作机制形成有效治理的预期带来了巨大的挑战。与中国始终坚持对外合作不同,以美国为代表的部分西方国家因此次疫情所折射出的民族主义、保护主义高涨,与之前美国对中国的战略遏制强化相结合,引发人们对于疫情后中美关系走向以及未来国际政治、经济格局转变的广泛关注。     

现实制度主义与中美自贸区竞争

全球贸易体系中的权力转移引发了关于国际贸易制度的竞争,作为世界上两个最大的贸易体,中国和美国成为其中的核心角色。由于WTO多哈回合谈判已经陷入了深度困境,中美两国在国际贸易领域的制度竞争主要表现为区域和双边层次的自贸区谈判竞争,两国都致力于通过领导自贸区谈判来获得新一轮国际贸易制度建设的主导权,其核心内容是对贸易伙伴的争夺和贸易规则的制定。作为守成的贸易大国,面对自身在既有国际贸易制度中的优势不断丧失,美国主动发起了新制度攻势,通过"3T"(TPP、TTIP和TiSA)谈判,来缔造对自身有利的新一代的国际贸易制度体系。作为崛起的贸易大国,中国是既有贸易体系的受益者,同时也积极通过搭建自身的自贸区网络,来回应美国施加的巨大制度压力。如果中美自贸区竞争能够保持制度的开放性和包容性,将有利于贸易领域的制度升级,从而带来全球贸易体系的新一轮整合;反之,如果这种制度竞争保持封闭性和排他性,则将导致贸易领域中的制度对抗,从而加剧全球贸易体系的分裂。中美自贸区竞争检验了作为折中主义理论成果的现实制度主义的基本论点,并展现了其逻辑魅力。     

欧盟应对气候变化的全球治理:对外决策模式与行动动因

气候变化是当今最为重要的全球公共问题。欧盟在全球应对行动中是最具影响力的行为体之一。欧盟的气候决策模式决定了其气候外交行动的方式,并对全球气候行动进程具有重大影响。探讨欧盟气候行动的深层动因,有助于理解欧盟气候政策的机理和对外行动的逻辑。本文将从外交政策的视角研究欧盟的气候决策模式,从动机和外部因素两个方面解读促使欧盟致力于领导国际气候谈判的深层原因。     

美国与新大国协调机制的构建:以七国集团为视角

新大国协调继承了传统大国协调通过外交会议、协商来决策的方式,治理领域由传统的军事安全扩展到经济、政治、社会和环境等多个领域。从新大国协调的起源看,美国作为西方世界最强大的国家开始起领导作用。本文通过考察"七国集团"的治理结构,发现美国领导下的多国合作是新大国协调最有意义的制度创新。这种一国领导、多国合作的特点不同于历史上的传统大国协调的治理体制,是一种新型的国际多边安全治理机制。由于这种领导的存在,新大国协调产生了明显的治理效果,主要包括:形成美国意志主导下的大国共同立场、应对国际危机的大国集体反应、其他大国对美国身份的认可以及美国对其他大国分配治理任务。     

构建新型国际关系视角下的中美关系

中共十九大报告提出推动建设新型国际关系和构建人类命运共同体,这为新时代中国特色的大国外交指明了方向。构建中美新型大国关系是建设新型国际关系的重要组成部分。推进包括中美关系在内的大国协调和合作,构建总体稳定、均衡发展的大国关系框架,也是建设新型国际关系的重要组成部分。推进中美两国间的协调和合作既有有利因素,也面临严峻挑战。两国现处于战略竞争的相持阶段,既竞争又合作的竞合关系将持续很长一段时间;如果处理得当,这也将是中美合作的长期融合阶段。中美两国应该共同努力,避免恶性竞争,保持良性竞争,推进中美两个大国间的协调与合作,增进共同利益,有效管控分歧,建立总体稳定的中美关系,积极发展全球伙伴关系,扩大与各大国的利益交汇点,构建均衡发展的大国关系框架。     

编者的话

刘胜湘和陈飞羽认为,当前学界对大国竞争关系生成与传导机制的研究尚显匮乏,为此,两人运用实证方法,通过对比美苏冷战和当下的中美战略竞争,深入剖析了大国竞争关系生成与传导机制的演进阶段及主要影响因素,以把握大国竞争关系的类型,最终引导大国走向良性竞争,构建中美新型大国关系. 中美博弈不仅给两国关系带来深刻变化,对国际社会的一个重大影响是造就了若干第三方国家.它们在中美竞争中如何站队以及中美两国对这些国家的政策,成为研究大国博弈走向以及国际格局转变的重要视角.本期有两篇文章聚焦于第三方国家问题.曹玮重点分析了中美战略竞争和美国对战略第三方政策会如何影响战略第三方的对华政策问题,运用相关模型揭示了中国、美国和三个战略第三方——印度、俄罗斯和欧盟——自2008年以来的动态互动规律.张立和胡大一则重点分析了第三方国家在中美之间"选边站"的内在机理,指出当代国际关系中的选边站现象是国家对外决策理性的体现,主要与国际体系层次因素、国家间单元层次因素、国内结构因素和议题因素相关.两篇文章在研究视角和方法上各有特点,为我们深入把握大国竞争背景下的第三方问题,构建了一个更为立体、全面的认知图景.     

浅论中美关系的大环境和发展趋势

中美关系的国际大环境是:“一超多强”的大国关系基本稳定,全球非传统安全问题突出。2005年是冷战结束以来中美关系最平稳、最成熟的一年,脱离了“非敌即友”的简单逻辑。美国明确地把中国定位为崛起的大国,视为仅次于伊斯兰激进势力的战略对手。中美双边问题日益多边化,特别是在中日摩擦增加的情况下,中美日三边互动具有重要意义。台湾问题暂时不处于中美关系的中心位置,有利于两岸关系的良性互动。     

日本在国际气候谈判中的立场转变及原因分析

日本是国际气候谈判的主要参与国家之一,在美国退出《京都议定书》的情况下日本最终选择批准议定书,让国际社会对作为京都会议东道国的日本在关键时刻表现出的担当态度赞赏有加。然而《京都议定书》的第一承诺期还未过去,日本就对《京都议定书》的未来表现出消极态度。文章试图分析日本在国际气候谈判中的立场由积极转变为不积极的原因,并在此基础上提出日本的谈判态度对国际气候谈判的启示。     

从边缘到中心:美国气候变化政策的演变

本文简要地论述了气候变化在美国从环境问题上升为安全问题的历程,并分析了自1989年以来美国政府气候变化政策的演变.本文认为,气候变化问题在美国政策议程中经历了从边缘向中心移动的过程,现已被美国当作21世纪国际安全中具有战略意义的核心安全议题之一.     

全球环境治理“领导者”的蜕变:加拿大的案例

加拿大长期以来曾是西方发达国家中积极领导全球环境治理的典范,一度也是全球气候治理的积极参与者,但是近年来却俨然蜕变为气候谈判中的"拖后腿者"。发生这种转变的原因究竟是什么?本文通过国际和国内、政治与经济多个层面的分析发现,除了美国因素以外,加拿大国内的经济形势变化和政治体制是导致其战略变化的主要原因。20世纪90年代以来,油砂大规模开发和原油出口(特别是对美国的市场依赖),导致加拿大在气候变化问题上处于比较劣势;而相关利益集团的游说,正好与加拿大松散的联邦制等制度因素相结合,导致了加拿大气候政策的转向。从这个层面上看,经济利益的变化和政治决策制度特征共同成为决定国家气候或环境战略的主要因素。在某种程度上,这一案例也反驳了发达民主国家因其制度因素必然成为全球环境保护积极支持者的命题。     

Is institutionalization of the six-party talks possible?

During 2003 and 2004, after having successfully hosted two six-party talks and a round of working-group level meetings on the North Korean nuclear crisis, China pushed to institutionalize the talks. Such an initiative coming from China was a shock to the world, since it has long maintained a passive, negative and defensive posture against multilateral cooperative security arrangements. This article declares that China's idea to utilize the six-party talks as a steppingstone toward a multilateral cooperative security arrangement is premature. It argues that the first priority is to address the failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea—what was, then, believed to be the solution for the North Korean nuclear crisis. This article dissects the failure and identifies one critical factor for the viability of any future peaceful resolution—the economic sanctions that the US has placed against North Korea for the past half-century. The authors argues that if the issue of sanctions is not addressed, the current six-party talks will not be successful.     

Coercive Diplomacy: Israel,Transjordan and the UN—a Triangular Drama Revisited

The Arab states suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel during the first Arab–Israeli war. Immediately following the war, Israel made brilliant and shrewd use of diplomacy to achieve its goals at the negotiating table, much as it had previously used armed force. Israel refused to negotiate with a united Arab negotiation team, preferring to isolate the states, picking them off one after the other. The Israeli–Transjordanian talks differed radically from the other armistice negotiations. Here, two parallel tracks were followed. At Rhodes, the two countries negotiated openly under UN auspices, while in Jerusalem and at King Abdullah's palace in Transjordan, representatives of the two countries held secret bilateral talks. Israel masterfully used the context of these talks to maximise its gains, using military operations to create ‘facts on the ground’, combined with direct coercion in the shape of blackmail, while taking full advantage of international power structures and abusing the trust that King Abdullah had placed in personal relations. The UN Acting Mediator, Ralph Bunche, was aware of the secret back channel, where the clearest cases of coercion took place. Physically and mentally exhausted by the protracted negotiations, he allowed the secret talks to progress despite his dislike of the outcome. The British government, at the time the protector of Transjordan, was unable to assist its client for fear of falling out with the USA, while the US government, in many ways the protector of Israel, maintained an equally ‘hands off’ stance because the talks concerned only an armistice, not a peace treaty. Already at this early stage in their relations, the power asymmetry between Israel and the Arab states was the main reason the parties could not arrive at a peaceful, sustainable solution. This article reinvestigates this diplomacy by using a combination of US, Israeli, British and UN archives, as well as the almost untouched Ralph Bunche diary.     

Arab Nationalism and British opposition in Dubai, 1920–66

The article examines the armistice talks between Israel and Jordan (March–April 1949) from the perspective of the UN mediator, Ralph Bunche, who coordinated them. The period described was stormy and complex: at its start, Israel took control of the southern Negev. Later, the two countries conducted formal talks in Rhodes, under Bunche's watchful eye, in parallel to informal negotiations, without UN involvement, in Jordan. The article, based to a large extent on Bunche's unpublished diary, explains why Bunche, who maintained rigorous control of all of the other armistice talks, behaved differently in this case, giving his post factum seal of approval to the Israeli takeover of the southern Negev and allowing Israel to pressure Abdullah to hand over the Triangle. The thesis is that Bunche, who could have put an end to the talks by resigning, or drawn the US into the crisis (as he did in the other rounds of negotiations), recognized the complexity of the relations between Israel and Abdullah and chose to act in a way that would prevent a new eruption of hostilities. In effect he was protecting Abdullah, who would have been likely to lose the West Bank to Israel in another round of fighting.     

Post-Hegemonic Climate Politics?

The article argues that the effects of a new US president on global climate politics will be rather less than might be expected. This is partly because the rhetorical differences between Bush, his predecessor Clinton and President Obama mask great continuities in US climate change politics since the early 1990s. It is also because, unlike in other issue areas, the EU has moved into a position of clear international leadership, which is likely to provoke diplomatic conflict, both for standard reasons of realpolitik but more precisely because of the different growth strategies pursued by each side and the different implications of those strategies for climate policy. Finally, the emergence of a dense pattern of transnational climate governance will increasingly constrain the options for either side in pursuing new climate change agreements after 2012.     

Domestic Contestation and Presidential Prerogative in Colombian Foreign Policy

The study of Colombian foreign policy emphasises external constraints and presidential prerogative in foreign policymaking. Drawing on insights from recent foreign policy analysis literature and evidence from several cases (Plan Colombia, US military bases, free trade talks with China, and ICJ arbitration of a maritime border with Nicaragua), this article challenges commonplace presidentialist assumptions. A novel model of ‘contested presidentialism’ better captures how Colombian domestic actors mobilise to raise political costs to block or modify presidential preferences. When the opposition fails to raise costs, presidentialist assumptions apply. Otherwise, presidents respond strategically by abandoning policies or substituting second-best alternatives.     

The rise of BASIC in UN climate change negotiations

This paper assesses the role of the BASIC countries — Brazil, South Africa, India, and China — in UN climate change negotiations. The paper explores the formation and evolution of the group, and focuses on how the four major developing countries of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa have coordinated their positions and acted jointly to achieve an agreed outcome with other players in the recent UN Climate Change Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun, based on an analysis of their country profiles and negotiation positions on a wide range of climate issues. The paper argues that the emergence of the BASIC Group is a reflection of the ongoing power shift from EU–US agreement to BASIC–US compromise in UN climate negotiations since the early 1990s. The rise of BASIC also has its roots in recent global market dynamics and further reflects the power transformation in the economic dimension of the international system.