On new rules for destroying old countries

The attacks on 11 September 2001 were not a major security threat to the United States, but they did create the political conditions for the implementation of an aggressive agenda by the Bush administration to assert U.S. dominance over the global control of oil and to establish an arc of military bases to contain China. Responding to Gowan, this article suggests that bid is unlikely to succeed because the concentration of military strength in the United States is paralleled by a concentration of financial strength in East and Southeast Asia. Though its Asian allies have been more supportive of the U.S. invasion of Iraq than their European counterparts, growing economic integration along Asia's Pacific coasts is likely to lead to a reduction in capital inflows to the United States and thereby aggravate the consequences of its high current accounts deficits and its low rates of domestic savings. The Bush administration's conservative social policies and anti-foreigner zeitgeist is also sapping the competitive edge of the U.S. economy in new technologies.     

ASIAN WAR MACHINES

ABSTRACT

The South Asian security landscape is increasingly dominated by a complex four-way dynamic between India, Pakistan, China, and the United States. The stresses and strains of the relationships between these states directly affect the prospects for peace and prosperity for almost half of humanity. This article describes some of the military contours of this landscape, with a focus on strategic postures, weapon acquisitions, and the role of nuclear weapons. It maps the India–Pakistan arms race over the past decade, the economic constraints on the two states, the role of China and the United States as weapons suppliers, and the risk and consequences for nuclear war. The authors then look at India's relationship with China, which is marked by both cooperation and competition, and the rise of China as a close military, political, and economic ally of Pakistan. While the United States has had long-standing cooperative relationships with both India and Pakistan, these relationships have been undergoing major shifts over the last two decades. U.S. concerns about China's increasing military and economic power have also intensified over this period as well. Of particular significance has been the effort to create a U.S.–India strategic partnership to balance and contain a rising China, which may become a central feature of the emerging global order. This article also offers a brief overview of what is publicly known about the nuclear arsenals of the four countries, ongoing production of weapons-usable fissile materials in Pakistan and India, as well as the race to build longer-range missiles.     

East Asian Economic Growth and its Implications for Regional Security

Rapid economic growth in East Asia is changing the nature of international relations in the region. In the economic sphere, mercantilist policies of promoting exports and limiting imports contributed to economic tensions between rapidly growing economies in the region and the region's major trading partner, the United States. These tensions over bilateral trade issues began between Japan and United States, moved on next to South Korea and Taiwan, and have now moved from there to China. In the security field, economic growth in China is leading to a major shift in the balance of power in the region. China's steadily increasing GDP is being accompanied by a comparable rise in its military expenditures despite the fact that China faces no obvious external threats at the present time. China's long term desire to be able to defend against any outside power probably means that this increase in defense expenditures will continue for the next decade or two. North Korea continues to be a threat to stability in the region but only because of its capacity to do enormous damage in one last suicidal attack. The one area where China's rising military expenditures could lead to major confrontation on terms very different from those that would occur today is Taiwan.     

Operation Lal Dora: India's Aborted Military Intervention in Mauritius

Abstract

As India expands its strategic reach in the Indian Ocean, it will need friends that it can count on. The island state of Mauritius has long been one of India's closest allies in the region. This article discusses India's plans for a military intervention in Mauritius in 1983 to prevent a feared coup that may have threatened India's interests. A naval task force was readied, but the intervention did not proceed because of disagreements in India's leadership. Instead New Delhi facilitated a political solution to the crisis that firmly consolidated its special role. This previously undisclosed episode sheds light on India's thinking about the Indian Ocean, the alignment of India's interests with the United States, and India's military capabilities.     

The Conventional Missile Capabilities of China's Second Artillery Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting

Abstract

Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the conventional missile component of the People's Liberation Army's Second Artillery Force (SAF) has emerged as a centerpiece of China's accelerating military modernization program. The conventional missile force has grown in size and sophistication, and China has developed a doctrine for its employment. Chinese military publications emphasize that it plays an increasingly important role in deterrence and warfighting. In particular, Chinese sources underscore its role in achieving information dominance, air superiority, and sea control as well as countering third-party intervention. China's development of advanced conventional missile capabilities highlights the growing vulnerability of fixed bases and surface ships. Moreover, organizational tendencies, could fuel dangerous escalation. In response to these challenges, the United States must adapt its traditional approach to military operations and deterrence in the Asia-Pacific.     

UZBEKISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES: INTERESTS AND AVENUES FOR COOPERATION

Uzbekistan has recently initiated a series of reforms in the wake of (former) President Islam Karimov's death in 2016. To what extent and why does Tashkent seek to liberalize? Concurrently, the United States - which curtailed ties with the Uzbekistani government in the aftermath of the 2005 Andijan massacre - has expressed renewed interest. What do Washington and Tashkent seek to gain by improving relations? This article posits that while the United States aspires to bolster regional support for the War in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is mainly interested in consolidating a new regime and balancing against nearby Great Powers. As such, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's reformist drive should not be construed as a categorical embrace of good governance but a means to reestablish Uzbekistan's geopolitical footing after more than a decade of isolation. Based upon this assessment, both sides can work to foster avenues for cooperation, while the United States encourages Uzbekistan to liberalize at its own pace.     

Yitzhak Rabin,the Ambassador to Washington, 1968–73: A Diplomat and Policy Maker

Rabin differed considerably from the average ambassador – a representative receiving and issuing reports. He viewed himself not only as a diplomat, but as capable of shaping policy with respect to both the Arab–Israeli conflict and the relationship with the United States. During his term as ambassador to Washington he displayed sober realism with regard to the political, and to some extent the military, reality – the very realism that was absent from the government that sent him.     

Nasser's Dilemma: Egypt's Relations with the United States and Israel, 1967–69

The article examines the American political efforts to bring about an agreement between Israel and Egypt between 1967 and 1969 and analyses the reasons for their failure. But it does not focus exclusively on the Americans; it also outlines the alternatives for Egyptian action during the period in question and looks at the political and military steps taken by Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. The main conclusion is that despite Egypt's dependence on the Soviet Union for economic aid and the rebuilding of the decimated Egyptian army, Nasser knew that the only route to a political process to regain Sinai ran through the United States. His diplomatic efforts were all derived from this insight. At the same time, the Egyptian president's attempts to exploit American pressure to his benefit, as he had done in 1957, was undercut by his overestimation of his bargaining chips, a mistake that was one factor in the collapse of the efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement in the region.     

美国并吞菲律宾过程中在香港之部署——以美国领事活动为中心

香港沦为殖民地后,美国在港活动愈趋频繁。时至美西战争前夕,美国驻香港总领事的委任及其活动为美国军事行动提供了重要支援;在港英当局奥援下,美国方面对菲律宾香港委员会开展舆论、情报及司法等斗争,并思考战后如何利用华人开发菲岛;为策应香港部署,广州、上海、新加坡与马尼拉等地美国领事与香港展开合作,加速并吞菲律宾。上述行动构成美国在东南亚扩张的重要环节,香港成为美国在远东扩张之战略要点,是菲岛以外不见硝烟的"战场"。     

Changing Global Landscape and Enhanced US Engagement with Asia—Challenges and Emerging Trends

United States President Barack Obama's announcement of significant shifts in US polices towards the Middle East and East Asia in 2009 has affected the global strategic landscape. President Obama's announcement of enhanced US engagement with Asia has posed certain challenges to the prevailing regional architecture of ASEAN centric institutions and ASEAN centrality which has fostered peace and stability, and prosperity in the region. The rise of China and its growing political and economic influence in the region and its military modernisation have aroused US concern that a rising China could in the future challenge its primacy in the Asia region. President Obama's announcement of a web of military alliances of treaty allies and strategic partners with the stationing of US marines in Darwin in November 2011 was perceived by China as an attempt by the US to contain China or constrain its rise. ASEAN is uneasy about any emergence of big power rivalry in the region.     

The Other from within: Pan-Turkist mythmaking and the expulsion of the Turkish left

The British sovereign bases on Cyprus, granted with the 1960 treaty establishing the Republic of Cyprus, played a key role in maintaining the fragile military structure of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Although Britain and the United States urged the alliance to play a more active role, CENTO degenerated into an organization with no assigned forces with the exception of RAF bombers carrying nuclear weapons, stationed on Cyprus. Thus, Britain's contribution in political and military terms became vital for CENTO's deterrence capability. The Shah of Iran, one of the key regional leaders, was interested in the RAF bombers on Cyprus; the FCO and the MoD were always cautious over how force restructuring would be presented to the Iranians. Eventually, the need for cutting defence spending for non-NATO purposes made Whitehall decide in 1975 to withdraw the bombers permanently based in Cyprus. Britain could not be the only power paying for this ‘alliance of the unwilling’, as CENTO could be called with the benefit of hindsight. In 1976, Whitehall started scaling down financial support of military exercises; by 1983 they had planned to spend nil on the alliance. The British disengagement policy proved the correct one since this alliance had only a few years of life left. After the fall of the Shah, CENTO collapsed in 1979.     

Editors’ Introduction

Abstract

This article explains why the United States has not fought a preventive war against North Korea despite that country’s moves to arm itself with nuclear weapons. I argue that the absence of war is mainly attributable to military strategies that the US military has with regard to North Korea. With only attrition strategies available, the United States neither expects to lose a precious military opportunity nor anticipates grave future vulnerabilities vis-à-vis North Korea. The prospect of a costly attritional campaign deters both Washington and Pyongyang from resorting to military force. Straightforward attrition strategies also allow little chance for miscalculation, thereby making inadvertent escalation to war unlikely. The research finds sufficient evidence for my argument, whereas conventional explanations offered by international relations theory fall short when applied to this case.     

Whither Mr Abe's Japan?

This article reviews Japan's strategic options and policy initiatives under Prime Minister Abe, taking into consideration strategic changes in the region; chiefly a rising China and a United States approaching geopolitical retreat, and the policy implications of these developments. Mr Abe's announced goal is to restore Japan to its once great power status, and thus far success is proving elusive.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Hurdles in Mr Abe's path include the differing perceptions between Japan and its neighbours regarding Japan's history, and the deeply entrenched nature of these differences pose a significant barrier. A related aspect is the territorial disputes. A second task is to be a “normal” nation, that is exercising greater independence in security matters and matters of economic policy, and here differences arise with Japan's main ally, the United States. Furthermore Mr Abe also needs to convince the Japanese public as well as Japan's prospective allies about his views regarding Japan's security role in the region. A third task is to increase Japan's economic weight by turning around the Japanese economy from its existing stasis to sustained, robust growth.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Mr Abe is making urgent policy efforts in all directions and the rather uneven outcome experienced thus far has not deterred him, thus creating uncertainty for Japan, and enhancing the feeling of insecurity in the region. The ostensible policy choice facing Mr Abe now is to either persist with his existing policies, hence entrenching the increasing tensions in the region, or to accept a rapidly rising China and formulate policies more accommodative of that development.     

The Russian-U.S. Military balance in the post-cold War Asia-Pacific region and the “China Threat”

The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have undertaken major arms reduction in the Asia-Pacific region since the late 1980s, but they have not withdrawn from the region. The United States and Russia will maintain greater military forces than any other countries in the region. China has increased its military strength steadily due to its booming economy. However, Chinese military modernization has been modest compared with other countries in the region and its rapidly growing economy. China focuses on economic development; it is not filling the “power vacuum” because there is no such vacuum left in the Asia-Pacific region.     

South Africa's maritime power in the Indian Ocean Rim∗

The article assesses South Africa's maritime power in the Indian Ocean. It is argued that South Africa needs a credible navy to exercise power and influence in support of foreign policy imperatives in the Indian Ocean. The maritime potential of other states which may have an impact on South Africa's interests is examined, including Australia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Kenya and, from outside the region, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The contrast between the growth and modernisation of other navies and the contraction and ageing of the South African Navy is highlighted. It is concluded that these developments leave South Africa strategically vulnerable.     

Keeping face in the public sphere: recognition,discretion and Uzbekistan's relations with the United States and Germany, 1991–2006

The manner in which President Karimov's roles were recognized in the global arena affected how Uzbekistan's international relations developed – a perspective that highlights both the form and the content of bilateral relationships. While mutual interests are crucial to beginning a relationship, it is also important to understand how those relations were recognized in public and dealt with in private. If partners managed to recognize Karimov's agenda publicly, or at least act with discretion, this tended to create an atmosphere favouring cooperation. As such, recognition and discretion reveal much about Karimov's concerns with international equality and self-reliance, pointing to the reasons why Uzbekistan's relations fluctuated more with some actors than others. The United States and Germany are ideal examples of that ambivalent situation: Washington often cooperated with Uzbekistan on security matters, but then saw its military personnel excluded from Qarshi-Qanabad after the 2005 Andijan crisis; whereas Berlin witnessed little change in its relationship with Uzbekistan and continued to lease a base in Termez after 2005. This difference in outcomes can be explained in part by a dynamic of recognition and discretion.     

美国“反叛乱”理论的发展及其困境

20世纪中期以后,随着第三世界民族解放运动的勃兴和美国加大在第三世界的政治、军事干涉力度,美国政府日益关注和重视"反叛乱"理论与实践。美国"反叛乱"理论的形成与发展大体经历了三大阶段:肯尼迪时期、里根时期和小布什-奥巴马时期。其中肯尼迪时期强调对所谓"反叛乱"政府的扶持,与苏联争夺对第三世界的政治、军事控制;里根时期的"叛乱"和"反叛乱"被纳入"低强度冲突"理论的框架;小布什时期则是为了应对所谓的伊斯兰圣战主义"全球叛乱"。然而"反叛乱"理论作为美国海外干涉的一种理念依据,总是面临着对外干涉本身所固有的政治、军事和道义困境。     

Why Japan still matters

This article challenges the prevailing view that China is displacing Japan as Asia's leader and the pre-eminent power in Asia. On the contrary, it argues that in understanding the future of Northeast Asia and the broader Asia–Pacific, it would be a mistake to look only to a rising China and to relegate Japan to a diminishing position. China's rise does not automatically herald Japan's decline. Japan is an emerging, not a retreating power. The rise of China is both obscuring and accelerating the transformation in Japan's regional and global position. Japan is increasing its economic power, technological capabilities, military reach, soft power and diplomatic influence. Furthermore, the rise of China makes Japan strategically more important to the United States and to other countries in the Asia Pacific. Japan will become the main regional counterweight to China and an indispensable partner in America's strategy of balancing China.     

A Post-American Middle East? US Realities Vs. Chinese and Russian Alternatives

For the past 15 years, there have been increasing calls for the United States to reduce its overseas force structure and to bring troops home. Such discussion accelerated during the Trump administration, and perceptions of American retrenchment were heightened by President Joe Biden's decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. This article asks the key question: Is Washington really engaging in a systematic pullout from the Middle East? Based on publicly available evidence, I argue that, contrary to common perceptions, the American military is actually increasing its forward presence in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf region. In addition, I contend that the two other states that have the potential to replace the United States in the Middle East, Russia and China, are for multiple reasons incapable of doing so. In addition to puncturing the myths, the article contributes to the ongoing policy debates and theoretical literatures regarding Middle East security and great-power competition.     

Japan as America’s global partner: Problems and prospects

The concept of global partnership remains a central theme in the conduct of U.S.-Japan relations in the post-Cold War world. This article critically evaluates Japan’s performance and potential as a global partner for the United States. It notes the qualified outcomes to Japan’s extended quest for a world role, its inability to lead by example in world trade and its preference for international status and contributions as a substitute for international political leadership. On the other hand the article recognizes the increasing significance of Japan’s human contribution to international peacekeeping, its willingness to tackle global problems in cooperation with the United States, and its potential to reduce security costs in Asia by means of foreign aid allocations, increased host-nation support for American forces and by promoting regional security dialogue. The article highlights Japan’s emerging identity as an Asian power and the problem of diverging U.S. and Japanese perspectives on democracy in the region. At the same time, it acknowledges the crucial importance Japan attaches to the continued American military presence in Asia and its desire to insulate the U.S.-Japan security relationship from economic and trade friction. The article concludes with the observation that Japan’s ability and willingness to operate as a global partner of the United States is much greater in some areas than in others. She is the co-author ofThe Political Economy of Agricultural Protection in Northeast Asia: East Asia in International Perspective (Allen and Unwin, 1986).