Shimane Prefecture,Tokyo and the territorial dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima: regional and national identities in Japan

Abstract

This paper joins the debate on Japan's territorial dispute with South Korea over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Informed by the ontological security framework of analysis, this paper seeks to explain the decision to adopt the ‘Takeshima Day’ ordinance by the Shimane Prefectural Assembly and the subsequent ascendance of ‘Takeshima’ to the fore of Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. In this paper, I distinguish between two processes: one that led to the adoption of the ordinance and another that resulted in the entrenchment of ‘Takeshima’ in Japan's identity construction vis-à-vis the Korean ‘other’. The paper argues that the former process should be understood within the context of Shimane Prefecture's distinct identity construction vis-à-vis Tokyo, while the latter can be attributed to recent changes in Japan–Korea relations unrelated to the territorial dispute per se.     

South Korean views on Japan's constitutional reform under the Abe government

In this Special Section, this article reviews South Korean views on Japan's ‘peace’ Constitution and the Abe government's attempts at constitutional reform. It identifies three different understandings among South Korean academics on why Japan is escalating attempts to revise the Constitution under the Abe government. An in-depth analysis demonstrates that all three perspectives pay specific attention to Japan's constitutional reform in relation to security policy changes. However, they differ in assessing the impact of Japan's constitutional reform on South Korea as well as how South Korea should deal with such a change. A minority opinion considers Japan's ‘remilitarisation’ through constitutional revision as conducive to South Korean security interests by increasing deterrence against North Korea, whereas the dominant opinion is that any attempt to revise the Constitution could be in and of itself a potential threat to South Korea's security due to a lack of trust attributed to unresolved historical conflicts between Korea and Japan. However, all three approaches pay hardly any attention to the positive role of Japan's peace Constitution while Japan's peace Constitution might provide a regional peace model in Northeast Asia.     

‘Land grabbing’ or harnessing of development potential in agriculture? East Asia's land-based investments in Africa

Abstract

Large-scale foreign investment in Africa's abundant but largely underutilized arable land has been criticised by international NGOs and social movements as ‘land grabbing’, which limits access of smallholder farmers to land, deprives local people of their livelihoods and threatens local and national food security across the continent. By way of contrast, many host governments and some leading international development agencies regard land-based investments as beneficial for development in terms of providing the necessary capital and technological know-how for modernising the region's neglected agriculture including take-off in agribusiness and agro-industrialisation, which is vital to much needed economic diversification in many African countries. East Asia's participation in the global land rush on Africa is examined from the standpoint of these two different perspectives: while China's growing presence and involvement in trade and investment in mining, energy and infrastructure in Africa is well known, less recognised is its involvement and those of other East Asian countries such as South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam in agriculture through large-scale land acquisitions. The development consequences and policy implications of these foreign land-based investments are analysed from a political economy perspective, which identifies motives, interests and benefits of the different actors and addresses the question of governance in terms of transparency and appropriate institutional arrangements to safeguard land rights and food security. In the bigger picture, the paper argues that the negative consequences of land grab has to be seen alongside the benefits flowing to Africa from growing economic relations with China and other dynamic East Asian economies and learning from the development experiences of those countries. African countries however need to re-assess the current approach and relationship with foreign land-based investors and decide how best this trend can be used to forward their economic and social agendas.     

The North Korean abduction issue: emotions,securitisation and the reconstruction of Japanese identity from ‘aggressor’ to ‘victim’ and from ‘pacifist’ to ‘normal’

Abstract

After Kim Jong-il's confession in 2002 that North Korean agents had abducted thirteen Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea has become the most detested country in Japan, and the normalisation of bilateral relations has been put on the back burner. The abduction issue has taken precedence in Japan even over North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. It has also grossly overshadowed the atrocities for which Imperial Japan was responsible in the 20th century. Why has there been such strong emphasis on an issue that could be disregarded as comparatively ‘less important’? This article understands the ascendency of the abduction issue as the epitome of an identity shift under way in Japan – from the identity of a curiously ‘peaceful’ and inherently ‘abnormal’ state, to that of a more ‘normal’ one. The differentiation of North Korea as ‘abnormal’ emphasises Japan's own (claim to) ‘normality’. Indeed, by incarnating the perils of Japan's own ‘pacifist’ ‘abnormality’, which has been so central to the collective sense of Japanese ‘Self’ in the post-war period, the abduction issue has become a very emotional argument for Japan's ‘normalisation’ in security and defence terms. The transformation from ‘abnormal’ to ‘normal’ is further enabled by Japan trading places with North Korea in the discourse, so that Japan is defined as ‘victim’ (rather than former aggressor) and North Korea as ‘aggressor’ (rather than former victim). What is at stake here is the question whether Japan is ‘normalising’ or ‘remilitarising’, and the role of the abduction issue discourse in enabling such foreign and security policy change.     

International and domestic challenges to Japan's postwar security identity: ‘norm constructivism’ and Japan's new ‘proactive pacifism’

Abstract

Japan today is widely portrayed as on the verge of a significant identity shift that could lead to dramatic new security policies. Yet, Japan's first formal national security strategy, adopted in December 2013, proclaims repeatedly Japan's long-standing ‘peace-loving’ policies and principles. Why does a conservative government with high levels of popular support not pursue policies more in line with views widely reported to be central to its values and outlook? The answer lies in Japan's long-standing security identity of domestic antimilitarism, an identity under siege to a degree not seen since its creation over 50 years ago, but – as evidenced in Japan's new national strategy document – one that continues to shape both the framing of Japan's national security debates and the institutions of Japan's postwar security policy-making process. Relational approaches to identity construction illuminate challenges to Japan's dominant security identity, but a focus on domestic institutions and electoral politics offers the best course for modeling identity construction and predicting its future resilience.     

Global citizenship as a national project: the evolution of segye shimin in South Korean public discourse

The idea of global citizenship in contemporary South Korean public discourse has revolved mainly around a national endeavor to boost the county's stature and competitiveness amid economic globalization. Based on a review of two decades of published media references to segye shimin (‘global citizen’ in the Korean language), this article shows that the specific usages of segye shimin – mainly by elites from government, academia, and journalism – underscore how the ‘developmental citizenship’ that marked South Korea's past authoritarian military regimes has carried on since the transition to civilian-led democracy. In contrast with the burgeoning academic discourse on cosmopolitanism that focuses heavily on moral responsibilities to humanity and the planet, South Korea's discourse of global citizenship has been closely aligned with neoliberalism and filled with exhortations to the domestic population to overcome numerous perceived liabilities seen as impeding the country's advancement. While global citizenship discourse in South Korea has emphasized top-down national strategic imperatives, a bottom-up approach to cosmopolitanism is also emerging as the country gains confidence and the notion of segye shimin gradually gains traction across the wider society.     

Reappraising the debate and practice of US strategic ambiguity/clarity in cross-strait relations

Abstract

China's influence in the South Pacific appears to be growing rapidly. Some analysts are concerned that China is on its way to replacing the West as the dominant power and China's rise in the region poses a major threat to the West. However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific is a calculated strategic move for its military security. The move can be strategic mainly in the sense that it has strong implications for China's reunification strategy and it serves China's long-term development strategy. The strategic value of the South Pacific to China's national security is limited at present and will remain so in the foreseeable future. China also lacks the military capability to challenge the US-led West in the region in the years to come. Chinese influence in the region is not deep-rooted and is largely based on its ‘no-strings-attached’ aid and its increasing economic interactions with the region. China has serious image problems in the region and these problems are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. China thus has neither the hard power nor the soft power to become a genuine hegemon in the region.     

South Korea's elusive middlepowermanship: regional or global player?

South Korea aspires to a larger regional and global role, fuelled by economic success, and complemented by cultural and diplomatic achievement. However, a gap exists between the rhetoric and reality of its foreign policy. This paper examines Seoul's middle-power activism. It poses questions about the conceptual deficit of ‘middle power’, proffering an operational definition in illuminating the characteristic identity formation of middle powers. It analyses how the Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak governments sought to articulate their respective middle-power foreign policy aspirations. Finally, it investigates how domestic political and institutional conditions shape Republic of Korea foreign policy, and identifies policy implications.     

China's engagement in South America and Africa's extractive sectors: new perspectives for resource curse theories

Abstract

China's engagement in South America and Africa's extractive sectors has increased significantly in the last decade. How comparable are the African and South American cases from a developmental perspective? This article explores resource curse theories, arguing that the ‘curses’ often associated to extraction are historically produced dynamic processes that need to be reevaluated in light of China's direct and indirect impacts on resource-endowed countries. It elaborates a framework to compare the developmental dynamics entailed by China's involvement in the South American and African extractive sectors, distinguishing between external, internal and intrinsic ‘curses’. The article holds that China's growth and investment have strengthened the position of resource-endowed countries in the international economy, revitalizing resource industries and improving terms of trade for commodities. Concurrently, the expansion of extractive activities has brought about increased environmental and economic sustainability challenges. Divergences between the African and South American cases are best observed at the national levels, where China's non-interventionist approach has different developmental implications depending on internal trends within investment host countries.     

Mongolia's evolving security strategy: omni-enmeshment and balance of influence

Abstract

With the publication of its 2010 National Security Concept and its 2011 Foreign Policy Concept, Ulaanbaatar has formalised a shift in foreign policy that has been readily apparent since 2000. Whereas Mongolia's foreign policy for the 1990s was formulated around an omni-enmeshment strategy, its foreign policy from 2000 onward is best conceptualised as an amalgam of omni-enmeshment and balance of influence. Ulaanbaatar's new foreign policy strategy implicitly identifies China as the country's largest security concern. This sense of a China ‘challenge’ is mirrored in Ulaanbaatar's post-2000 foreign policy relations.     

US Afghanistan policy: regional aspects

US President Donald Trump's new ‘Afghanistan and South Asia’ policy identifies Pakistan and India as key players but ignores or minimises other influential regional actors with vested interests in Afghanistan, including China, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Unless the US better integrates their interests, any regional approach to Afghanistan's stability and security is unlikely to succeed.     

The Japan–South Korea rift

Relations between Japan and South Korea reached a new low last year. Disagreements over the historical legacy of Japan’s occupation and colonisation of South Korea inflamed public opinion, leading each side to pursue tit-for-tat measures that, for the first time, spilled over into the economic and security dimensions of the relationship. Meanwhile, the United States, which has traditionally served as an intermediary, is questioning the wisdom of its own posture in East Asia.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

This paper posits four ranked, generic goals of state foreign policy, maps them against the American ‘pivot,’ and concludes with possible handicaps of that shift. Drawn broadly from realism and liberalism, those abstract goals are as follows: national security, economic growth, prestige among the community of states, and the promotion of cherished national values. Applying this framework specifically to Northeast Asia, the USA, regarding security, is likely to increasingly ‘hedge’ China, and its North Korean client, with regional allies, off-shore balancing, and a shift toward AirSea Battle. On trade, the USA will continue its decades-long effort to reduce Asian mercantilism by tying Asian traders into multilateral, neoliberal rule sets. Regarding prestige, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ is a growing challenge to US soft power which the pivot seeks to refute. In addition, on values, the USA will continue to nag especially China to conform to US standards of law and human rights. The USA will continue to push the broad liberalization of Asian polities and economies. The democratic peace and liberal trade are the ideological frame and motivation of the pivot. Nevertheless, significant US handicaps may slow the pivot: American cultural distance from Asia means little public support and understanding of its necessity; strong regional allies will tempt the USA toward offshore balancing on the cheap; and the dire US budget shortfall will reduce the resources necessary to fund it.     

The role of East Timor's security institutions in national integration – and disintegration

Abstract

This article examines the interplay between security sector developments and national unity in East Timor since the Indonesian occupation ended in 1999. Particular attention is paid to the regional distinction between Loromonu and Lorosae – people from the west and east of East Timor, respectively. In 2006, East Timor experienced a crisis that saw the disintegration of the military and police forces, and widespread violence that led to massive internal displacement. It was during this crisis that the Loromonu–Lorosae distinction first emerged as a major societal cleavage. The article argues that the independence cause and the guerrilla force Falintil had been an important focus of East Timorese national unity in 1999. In the years that followed, however, the implementation of flawed security policies led to new military and police forces that were politicized, factionalized and lacking in cohesion. Prior to the 2006 crisis, the Loromonu–Lorosae distinction was primarily an issue within the army. As the crisis escalated, however, the violence was to a large extent framed by the east–west dimension, and popular perceptions of the military as ‘eastern’ and the police as ‘western’ hardened. A year after the crisis, little if any progress had been made towards reducing the increased salience of the Loromonu–Lorosae distinction in society. The main internal security challenges – gang activity, the unresolved issue of the so-called ‘petitioners’, and the destabilizing role played by fugitive former head of military police Alfredo Reinado – all had an east–west dimension. The article also finds that new initiatives aimed at reforming East Timor's military and police forces appeared to be lacking in both depth and relevance for addressing the country's new level of internal division, and its immediate, internal security challenges.     

China in the era of globalization: the emergence of the discourse on economic security

Abstract

This article looks at the Chinese debate on economic security during the period between 1997 and 2004. The contemporary concept of economic security (jingji anquan, 经济安全) was first raised in the Chinese academic literature in 1997, partly as a reaction to the Asian financial crisis and partly due to the increasing role China began to play in globalization, the effects of which it increasingly felt as its economy became more integrated with that of the world. This article examines the emergence of the discourse on economic security within Chinese academic circles, and identifies the development of this concept in China between 1997 and 2004 prior to the ascendancy of the ‘fourth-generation’ leadership.     

Anatomy of a massacre: the roots of heightened labour militancy in South Africa’s platinum belt

Abstract

On 16 August 2012, a protracted strike at a platinum mine in Marikana, South Africa, culminated in the killing of 34 mineworkers by local security forces. Some viewed this tragedy through the lens of South Africa’s apartheid past, recalling such events as the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Others saw this episode as the latest cycle of angry protest and violent repression stemming from heightened inequality and poverty under global capitalism. This paper explores a set of institutional factors that occupy the middle ground between these two narratives about the massacre at Marikana. At the national level, despite progressive labour regulations and a long-standing alliance between the leading trade union (COSATU) and the ruling African National Congress, institutional channels for social dialogue and collective bargaining were less effective than expected given COSATU's inability to criticize policies focused on business-led growth at the expense of the social protection of workers. At the sectoral level, gigantic platinum companies faced with falling commodity prices sought to limit losses by planning retrenchments and limiting wage increases, triggering repeated and sometimes violent wildcat strikes, especially when workers’ grievances were set aside by local representatives of the COSATU-affiliated National Union of Mineworkers. The argument may be seen as a labour-focused variant of Huntington’s ‘gap hypothesis’: workers’ militancy has grown as existing institutional frameworks for ensuring labour peace have failed to effectively channel the frustrations of workers most in need of social protection.     

Multilateral CBMs on the Korean Peninsula: Making a virtue out of necessity

Abstract

As its economy has become near to collapse, North Korea has tried to avoid direct contacts with South Korea because of the ‘absorption phobia’. Instead, the North has made continuous efforts to improve its relations only with the United States, seeking a guarantee for its survival. Given this circumstance, this paper argues that useful multilateral approaches such as KEDO and Four‐Party Talks will contribute to improving inter‐Korean relations. Thus, it would be sensible to explore every possible way (even through multilateral mechanisms) until both Koreas make a breakthrough for the deadlocked inter‐Korean CBMs. But the multilateral CBMs constitute a transitional and complementary role as South and North Korea should be primarily responsible for addressing major problems such as reunification. Among the multilateral approaches, the Four‐Party Talks will be a most useful mechanism which will enable the two Koreas to resume dialogue for the peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula. In this peace process, more positive roles of major powers are also requested.     

American intelligence and the Soviet ICBM build‐up: Another look

Abstract

Since the events of 9/11 the terms ‘threat’ and ‘risk’ have entered the daily lexicon to a greater extent than ever before. News media report on changes to national threat assessments, commenting when the threat level rises from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Substantial’, in the case of the United Kingdom. The British government recently released a document that provided details of the issues that pose the highest risk to the national infrastructure. All of these are based, so we are told, on the work of the national intelligence agencies. But what are these indicators actually telling us and what is the relationship between threat assessments and risk assessments? These are both important questions because important decisions are made as a result of changes in these assessments. National defence and security planning is based upon perceived threats and risks. An entire risk management industry has grown up in the business world that covers everything from health and safety to financial risk. It is not only governments and businesses that base decisions on these indicators, but individuals as well. Tourists planning holidays in Europe were alarmed when the British, French and German governments increased their threat levels in response to intelligence that suggested that an attack against tourist sites in their respective capitals was imminent. Some will have changed their plans and travelled elsewhere, to the detriment of the tourist industry, while others will have chosen to defy the terrorists and travel anyway – potentially placing themselves in harm's way. With so much at stake, both nationally and individually, it is therefore important that we understand the difference between a ‘threat’ and a ‘risk’ and, as scholars of intelligence, the role that intelligence plays in assessing them.     

Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia,the Philippines and Thailand

Abstract

This article analyses the Kim Dae-jung government's industrial realignment (‘Big Deals’) policy in post-crisis Korea, which offers a valuable insight into the state's role in managing the transition from a developmental state to a free-market economy and into the changing nature of government–business relations. Although Kim was committed to creating a free-market economy in Korea, as the ‘Big Deals’ got under way critics accused him of violating market principles and employing tactics of intervention and coercion used by previous authoritarian regimes. The ‘Big Deals’ experience suggests a further stage in the evolution of the Korean developmental state; the dismantling of state powers and the implementation of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s had led to the emergence of a ‘transformative state’ in which the state acted as ‘senior partner’ rather than ‘commander-in-chief’. The transitional state charged with the task of rebuilding the economy after 1997 regained some of its lost powers and used some familiar methods of achieving its ends. However, it also demonstrated by the nature and scope of its interventions that it was gradually evolving and adapting to meet the changing economic environment. Although Kim's actions prompted allegations from the chaebol and their conservative allies of a return to autocratic economic management by the government, it was clear that the developmental state had not been resurrected. Rather, these criticisms serve to highlight the continuing antagonism in the state–business relationship; neither side had developed new strategies for dealing with each other and their relations were still characterized by mutual mistrust and staunch chaebol resistance to key reforms demanded by the government. Although suspicions of a permanent return to extensive state intervention were unfounded, they nevertheless diminished the prospects for the creation of a cooperative relationship between the state and big business that would be a crucial factor in revitalizing the Korean economy.