One Standard Fits All? The Pros and Cons of Performance Standard Adjustments

Despite the wide‐ranging use of performance measures within the public sector and the growing use of performance bonuses to recognize performance achievements, the use of formal performance standards adjustment procedures in public performance measurement systems is relatively rare. Burt S. Barnow of Johns Hopkins University and Carolyn J. Heinrich of the University of Wisconsin–Madison set forth the basic arguments in favor of and against the use of formal or informal procedures for adjusting performance expectations. They describe how performance standards adjustments processes are currently (or have been) in use, review the evidence of their effectiveness or problems encountered in their application, and explore the consequences of the inadequacy of performance standards adjustments. The authors offer recommendations for the improvement of public sector performance measurement systems and conclude why this area remains fruitful for future research experimentation. The nice thing about standards is that there are so many of them to choose from. —Andrew S. Tannenbaum     

How is the Use of Performance Information Related to Performance of Public Sector Professionals? Evidence from the Field of Academic Research

There is inconclusive evidence as to how performance management is actually related to performance, particularly in subfields of the public sector where professional work prevails. We propose that the association between the use of performance information and performance of public sector professionals varies with the targets of management control. We test our hypotheses in the field of academic research, a prime example of professionalism in the public sector. The overall results of an online survey with 1,976 observations suggest that performance management is positively related to publication performance when performance information is used for the control of input targets. In contrast, we find negative associations of performance information with performance when used to control output targets. Public managers in professional fields should consider these countervailing relationships when they compose and use control systems.     

公共部门绩效评估:来自发展中国家的经验

在过去的几年中,公共部门绩效评估的理念在很多发展中国家日渐盛行。但是,由于发展中国家的公共部门软弱无力,法律框架不一致,公共服务提供的数量和质量不足,以及问责机制不完善等因素,导致公共部门绩效评估变得愈加复杂,且充满挑战。因此,总结和分析发展中国家公共部门实施绩效测量系统所取得的经验和教训,提出更具指导性的建议就显得尤其重要。基于此,本文以菲律宾、尼泊尔和印度尼西亚三个亚洲国家公共部门的绩效测量系统为分析对象,采用案例研究的分析方法,着重探讨了近几年来这些国家在绩效测量系统的设计、实施和管理等方面的一些经验教训。尽管没有一种放之四海而皆准的解决方案,但是本文在对这些经验教训反思的基础上,总结出的具有可持续性的绩效评估系统成功的五个关键要素,即所有权、激励、简单化、透明度和部门政策目标,可以为发展中国家的公共部门绩效评估提供最好的实践指导①。     

THE DESIGN AND USE OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION IN INDONESIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER DIVERGING STAKEHOLDER PRESSURES

Public sector managers in less developed countries are confronted with opposing forces. A lack of sufficient resources along with a tradition of corruption are obstacles for developing and using performance measurement systems. However, recent public sector reforms in less developed countries, including decentralisation and anti‐corruption programmes, stimulate the development and use of such systems. On the basis of a framework, which distinguishes different types of stakeholders, each with particular performance interests, we analyse how public sector managers are coping with the two opposing forces, given the relative power positions and the interests of their stakeholders. On the basis of four cases studies of local government agencies in Bali (Indonesia), we found that with respect to the annual performance reports, managers in these agencies focus more on fulfilling the formal requirements regarding the format of these reports and on their timely submission than on their contents, which are all symptoms of a symbolic rather than functional use of performance information. However, the reports include information on inputs that is linked to similar information in short‐term reports, which the managers use in a functional manner. These managers show a kind of juggling behaviour, in the sense that they partially try to serve conflicting performance interests. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance Measurement in the Public Sector in England: Searching for the Golden Thread

Despite the significant volume of studies on public sector performance measurement, a paucity of empirical research describes in detail the systems and processes used at different levels of government to measure and manage performance. This study focuses on the experience of Public Service Agreements in the public sector in England. In particular, the impact of a centralized, performance measurement‐driven approach on public service delivery is analyzed using case studies in a health care and a police organization. Despite efforts to introduce a “golden thread” to link different levels of the public sector hierarchy, in both cases, there was relatively low consistency in terms of performance indicators, targets, and priorities. Significant implications are evident for the design and role of performance targets and indicators, for the possibility to align frameworks at different levels of the public sector, and for the importance of feedback loops in measurement systems.     

Not All Bad News After All? Exploring the Relationship Between Citizens’ Use of Online Mass Media for Government Information and Trust in Government

Mass media coverage of government is often blamed for inciting anti-public sector sentiment. Yet there have been few empirical assessments of these claims. To address this gap in the literature, this study examines whether relationships between citizens’ expectations of public sector performance, satisfaction with public services, and levels of trust in government vary according to their use of online mass media for information about government. Using data collected in 2012 from a survey of 1,100 Seoul citizens, we find that greater use of online mass media to obtain information about government reinforces negative relationships between (1) expectations of public sector performance and satisfaction with public services, and (2) expectations of public sector performance and trust in government. Moreover, the size and strength of the negative indirect relationship between expectations of public sector performance and trust in government increase as respondents use online mass media more frequently for information about government.     

Fukuyama Is Right about Measuring State Quality: Now What?

Much has recently been written about how to best measure governance or “state quality.” Should we evaluate government performance by looking at what government achieves (outputs) as Robert Rotberg and Craig Boardman recently suggested? Or should we focus on measuring state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy, as Francis Fukuyama concludes? This commentary argues in support of Fukuyama's approach by using a public administration lens to disaggregate the public sector into two domains: upstream bodies at the center of government and downstream delivery bodies that deliver, commission, or fund services under the policy direction of government. It goes further by recommending a measurement framework that focuses on identifying indicators that are behavioral and action worthy in relation to five public management systems ultimately owned and operated by the central, upstream agencies.     

Public sector efficiency: leveling the playing field between?OECD countries

In this paper we seek a robust methodology for the measurement of the relative public sector efficiency of 19 OECD countries over the period 1980?C2000. We estimate relative efficiency scores for five disaggregated accounts of public spending as well as for aggregate public spending. Then, we use a semi-parametric econometric method to isolate the impact of government inefficiency from the inefficiency arising from the socioeconomic environment and luck. To verify the validity of our index, we use it to examine a number of well-established relationships in the public choice literature, which have only been tested using local government data.     

From Measurement to Management: Breaking through the Barriers to State and Local Performance

The Winter Commission’s aspirations for improvement of governance at the state and local level resulted in proposals to modernize public institutions and systems to remove the barriers on executive and managerial authority to act. Improving government performance and accountability to citizens requires leadership to empower employees by reducing rules, increasing discretion, and rewarding innovation. The performance measurement movement and its related performance management movement are public management trends of wide influence in state and local government that are both an adjunct to, and a reflection of those aspirations. Case studies of cities that have sought to develop and use performance measurement and engage citizens demonstrate great potential to improve governance and manage for results that citizens want. But even exemplary jurisdictions face challenges using evidence‐based, data‐driven performance management approaches. Promoting best practice requires better scholarship to understand the determinants of successful implementation, adoption, and use of performance measurement. The outcomes of performance management systems are generally unmeasured and little is known about their cost effectiveness or endurance over time. The promise is there, but our expectations should be tempered.     

Zone of Acceptance under Performance Measurement: Does Performance Information Affect Employee Acceptance of Management Authority?

Public sector employees have traditionally enjoyed substantial influence and bargaining power in organizational decision making, but few studies have investigated the formation of employee acceptance of management authority. Drawing on the “romance of leadership” perspective, the authors argue that performance information shapes employee attributions of leader quality and perceptions of a need for change in ways that affect their acceptance of management authority, conceptualized using Simon's notion of a “zone of acceptance.” A survey experiment was conducted among 1,740 teachers, randomly assigning true performance information about each respondent's own school. When employees were exposed to signals showing low or high performance, their acceptance of management authority increased, whereas average performance signals reduced employee acceptance of management authority. The findings suggest that performance measurement can alter public sector authority relations and have implications regarding how public managers can use performance information strategically to gain acceptance of management authority and organizational change.     

Status and Power: The Principal Inputs to Influence for Public Managers

The authors identify status and power as the principal bases of influence for public managers and describe how managers can use this conceptual distinction to increase their influence. Status is defined as the degree to which one is respected by one's colleagues, and power is defined as asymmetric control over valued resources. Different social and relational processes govern (1) how people determine who is, and who ought to be, high status versus powerful and (2) how status and power affect individual psychology and behavior. To illustrate key points, the authors provide examples of individuals from the public sector and public service organizations. The framework of interpersonal influence gives practitioners behavioral strategies for increasing their status and power as well as a way to assess and diagnose interpersonal dimensions of their own performance in their jobs and careers.     

Performance Appraisal and Its Use for Individual and Organisational Improvement in the Civil Service of Ghana: The Case of Much Ado about Nothing?

Recent efforts to modernise public sector institutions have led to the adoption of performance management systems worldwide. The belief in performance management is that information generated can be used to help individuals improve themselves in terms of what they do in their organisations, which will subsequently impact positively on the organisation. An instrument for collecting performance information (PI) is performance appraisal (PA). Since the early 1990s, the Ghanaian government has attempted to develop a systematic appraisal system as a strategy to obtain PI in the civil service (CS). In spite of this, the CS continues to perform below expectations despite individuals getting promoted every year. What has been the effect of PA in the CS? How has the collected information been utilised to improve performance? What are the main barriers to the use of PI, and what practices can be put in place that might encourage the effective collection of PI and its use in the CS? We argue that the PA system is much ado about nothing. In analysing why this is so, we will look at the impediments that continue to affect the collection and usage of PI and to suggest ways that will help improve the system. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual Ambidexterity and Performance in the Public Sector: A Multilevel Analysis

In this study, we examine individual ambidexterity (i.e., individuals’ balanced pursuit of exploitative and explorative activities) in a public management context. In particular, we combine survey data from junior scholars and secondary data from the Center for Higher Education to investigate the role of individual ambidexterity in an academic context. We conduct multilevel analyses and find that individual ambidexterity is positively related to research performance, indicating that individual ambidexterity positively influences individual performance in the public sector. In addition, we observe a negative relationship between the supervisory ratio and research performance, indicating that having a lower number of employees supervised by a single person leads to lower performance in the public sector.     

Political Pressure,Conformity Pressure,and Performance Information as Drivers of Public Sector Innovation Adoption

Why public organizations adopt and abandon organizational innovations is a key question for any endeavor to explain large-scale developments in the public sector. Supplementing research within public administration on innovation with the related literature on policy diffusion, this article examines how external factors such as conformity pressure from institutionalized models, performance information from other organizations, and political pressure affect innovation adoption. By the use of two survey experiments in very different political contexts—Texas and Denmark—and a difference-in-differences analysis exploiting a reform of the political governance of public schools in Denmark, we find that public managers respond to political pressure. We find no indications that they emulate institutionalized models or learn from performance information from other organizations when they adopt organizational innovations. The results thereby point to political pressure as an important factor behind large-scale adoptions of organizational innovations in the public sector.     

Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market

Why do some parties fail to benefit from patronage in pork‐ridden political systems? This article analyzes the interaction between patronage and partisanship to explain why some incumbents are more likely to benefit from pork politics than others. We explain such differences by focusing on political parties' access to resources (supply side) and voters' dependence on fiscal largesse (demand side). We show how these differences affect the patron's choice of public sector wages and employment. We use subnational level data to show different electoral returns from patronage for the two major political coalitions in Argentina—Peronism and the UCR‐Alianza—and their effect on preferences over public sector wages and employment.     

Public Service Motivation: A Test of the Job Attraction–Selection–Attrition Model

ABSTRACT

Public service motivation (PSM) research suggests that PSM influences employee sector choice, yet relatively little research examines how time moderates this relationship. In this research we examine public service motivation among private and public sector lawyers. Using survey data that measure sector of employment at multiple time periods, we investigate the stability of the relationship between individual reward orientations and sector employment choice over time. Our findings suggest that while PSM may not clearly predict the employment sector of a respondent's first job, it does increase the likelihood that a respondent's subsequent job is in the public sector.     

Pedagogy of regulation: Strategies and instruments to supervise learning from adverse events

Diverse scholars have argued that standards and performance measurements are “instruments of control” that have a profound influence on the day‐to‐day lives of individuals and organizations, causing constitutive effects. Regulatory bodies increasingly use standards to oversee and monitor the regulated. This paper discusses the Dutch Health and Youth Care Inspectorate's use of both standards and a performance measurement system introduced to monitor how Dutch hospitals investigate and learn from serious adverse events. Rather than focusing on how standards affect regulated practices and organizations, our study examines how the use of these instruments affects the standard maker, that is, the Inspectorate. We explore how the Inspectorate's work practices, standards, and coupled performance measurement system influence its regulatory pedagogy, reviewing practices, and decisionmaking. We conclude that standards and performance measurement systems are not by definition “instruments of control” as their constitutive effects are (under)determined by the relationships in which they are enacted.     

Searching for Efficiency in the Public Sector: Interim Evaluation of Performance Budgeting in New Zealand

In this article I examine the efforts to promote performance measurement in the public sector with particular reference to New Zealand. In section two I examine the State Sector Act of 1988 and the Public Finance Act of 1989, which together brought about changes in the New Zealand public sector. In section three I examine the problems of implementing the reform. In section four I discuss the experience of developing statements of performance measurement required under the Financial Administration Act of 1989 and in section five I develop an alternative scheme on the basis that a uniform approach is less likely to be applicable to a range of public sector agencies. The final section contains a brief conclusion.     

Individual Conceptions of Public Service Motivation

Many scholars and practitioners of public administration converge on the belief that some individuals are predisposed to perform public service. James L. Perry (1996) recently clarified the public service motivation (PSM) construct and proposed a measurement scale. The present study builds on and extends this important stream of research by examining how individuals view the motives associated with public service. Specifically, we use an intensive research technique called Q-methodology to examine the motives of 69 individuals. We identify four distinct conceptions of PSM: individuals holding these conceptions are referred to as samaritans, communitarians, patriots, and humanitarians. The practical and theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.