Driving Legislators' Policy Preferences: Constituent Commutes and Gas Taxes

Understanding differential policy costs across constituencies, and how they link to legislators' policy preferences, can facilitate policy changes that solve pressing problems. We examine the role of policy costs on constituents by studying legislator support for taxing gasoline. Analysis of survey responses from US state legislators, as well as of their voting records, shows that legislators whose constituents would be most affected by an increased gas tax—those whose constituents have longer commutes—are more likely to oppose higher gas taxes. Separately estimating the impact of time spent driving to work versus using public transit shows that the effect of commute times comes from those who have long drives, not from those who ride public transit, highlighting how the policy costs to constituents is a major driver in legislators' considerations. We finish the article by discussing the implications of our findings for combating climate change and for understanding policy feedbacks.     

Free voting in a provincial parliament: The case of ‘same‐sex’ legislation in Ontario, 1994

Previous research on parliamentary free voting, which has been confined exclusively to national parliaments and almost exclusively to the British House of Commons, has found relatively little constituency impact on members’ voting decisions, even on the most contentious issues of social policy. Since sub‐national parliaments tend to be smaller, less professionalised, and (arguably) ‘closer to the people’, it is possible that a more significant ‘constituency connection’ might be observed in these legislative arenas. This study extends the literature on this topic by empirically examining the fate of a recent homosexual rights bill in the Ontario Legislative Assembly. Contrary to expectations, none of the constituency characteristics used in logistical regression models generates a significant MLE coefficient, suggesting that Canadian provincial legislators may be even less sensitive to constituency preferences than their national counterparts.     

Exchanging Favours: The Predominance of Casework in Legislators' Behaviour in Jordan and Lebanon

Responsiveness to constituents' demands and needs is considered an essential element of representation. Responsiveness takes several forms – service, allocation (casework), policies, and symbolic responses – and legislators usually respond to constituents using a combination of these means. However, this article discusses a category of Jordanian and Lebanese legislators, called ‘Favours legislators’, who respond to their constituents only through casework. These legislators use all tools available to them (party/parliamentary bloc, bureaucracy, and fellow legislators) to improve their access to services important to successful casework. Favours legislators assume that by providing a successful favour, constituents who received the favour will reciprocate in kind and vote and/or encourage others to vote for them.     

Representation,Competing Principals,and Waffling on Bills in US Legislatures

Legislators are often placed in the position of representing the interests of their constituents against the preferences of their own party leaders. We develop a theoretical framework indicating that these cross‐pressured legislators are more likely to initially support legislation and subsequently change their minds than are legislators whose constituents and leaders share similar preferences. Moreover, we expect this pattern to be most pronounced among members of majority parties than minority‐party members. We test our expectations using data on bill cosponsorship and final passage votes from 46 lower state legislative chambers and the US House, finding considerable support for our theory.     

Casework,issues and voting in state legislative elections: a district analysis

Congressional research has addressed questions regarding the electoral consequences of service and policy responsiveness, as well as whether service responsiveness eliminates the need for policy responsiveness. However, less is known about the criteria by which constituents reward their state representatives. Part of the problem with resolving these questions at the state level has been the absence of data, since individual-level data on state legislative districts are hard to find and are unlikely to combine measures of both kinds of responsiveness. This study utilises data gathered in a particular state legislator's district (both data on actual member–constituent contacts and survey data) to discern more explicitly whether ombudsman service and constituent issue proximity to the incumbent affects vote choice. Our findings support the proposition that like their counterparts in Congress, state representatives prosper when paying attention to both service and policy responsiveness; however, we find convincing evidence that casework enables state legislators to gain support from constituents who otherwise would not vote for them.     

Dyadic Representation in a Westminster System

Is policy representation in contemporary Westminster systems solely a function of programmatic national parties, or does the election of legislators via single‐member districts result in MPs whose policy positions are individually responsive to public opinion in their constituencies? We generate new measures of constituency opinion in Britain and show that, in three different policy domains and controlling for MP party, the observed legislative behavior of MPs is indeed responsive to constituency opinion. The level of responsiveness is moderate, but our results do suggest a constituency‐MP policy bond that operates in addition to the well‐known bond between voters and parties.     

Judicial Responsiveness to Valence Issues: An Event History Analysis of the Initial Sex Offender Registration and Notification (SORN) Laws

Under what conditions does judicial responsiveness to the public's policy preferences compromise the court's role as a countermajoritarian institution? Scholars have yet to examine whether and how quickly state appellate court justices respond to valence issues. This study investigates the relationship between retention elections and judicial responsiveness to the initial sex offender registration and notification (SORN) laws popularized in the 1990s. Findings show that judges who participated in nonpartisan retention elections exhibited greater democratic accountability by engaging in judicial review of SORN laws earlier than judges in other retention election systems. Valence issues create political challenges for nonpartisan judges who, like their counterparts in other retention systems, are expected to balance majoritarian interests with minority rights.     

A Field Experiment on the Effects of Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status on the Quality of Representation

The principle of equal representation is the cornerstone of modern democracy, yet there have been concerns that the benefits of representation can be skewed, advantaging some over others. We argue that elected officials will be more responsive to constituents whom they perceive as more like themselves and more likely to be politically active. We examine inequalities in representation in a parliamentary democracy where, intrinsic to the institutional framework, there is a long‐standing reputation for serving constituent needs: the United Kingdom. We also advance the literature by focusing on the expediency of responsiveness and the helpfulness of response. Drawing on a field experiment, we find both an overall high level of responsiveness and helpfulness but also biases affecting MP's responsiveness. Our findings raise important questions about equal access to representation, even in a political system where constituency service is the norm and expectation.     

Legislators as Lobbyists

Public policy is produced by elected and unelected officials and through the interactions of branches of government. We consider how such interactions affect policy implementation and representation. We argue that legislators try to influence bureaucratic decisions through direct communication with federal agencies, and that such contact is effective and has consequences for policy outcomes. We provide empirical evidence of this argument using original data about direct communication between members of Congress and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) along with decisions made by the DOL regarding trade and redistributive policies. We find that direct contacts influence DOL decisions, and the agency is more likely to reverse previous decisions when requested to do so by legislators. Our results challenge key assumptions and findings in the previous literature and have important implications for interbranch relations and informal means of control over the implementation of national policy.     

Constituency Congruency and Candidate Competition in U.S. House Elections

Research on candidate competition has focused on how much context matters in emergence decisions and election outcomes. If a candidate has previously held elected office, one additional consideration that may influence entry decisions is the relative degree of overlap between the candidate's current constituency and the “new” set of voters she is seeking to represent. Using GIS software, we derive a measure of the challenger's personal vote by focusing on constituency congruency between state legislative and congressional districts. Results suggest state legislators are more likely to run for a seat in the U.S. House if constituency congruency is relatively high.     

Predicting Bureaucratic Control: Evidence from the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments

The extent to which politicians control bureaucracies that are delegated authority over public policy involves fundamental positive and normative issues for the study of politics. Considerations related to such issues have stimulated a great deal of debate about whether the legislature exercises control over bureaucratic performance. However, establishing the measurable empirical conditions under which elected officials do and do not assure agency responsiveness remains unsettled.
In light of this state of affairs, we try to determine whether it is possible to develop a general means of predicting control, or at least of predicting what we term "intent to control," based on the assumption that legislators' preferences toward agency responsiveness reflect the nature of the policy environment. Our application to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 finds strong empirical evidence that statutory provisions vary predictably, depending upon whether legislators possess the requisite technical ability and are likely, or wish, to be held politically accountable. Our results indicate that control varies for reasons that fit well with our understanding of how elected officials deal with complexity and their own political situations. Our findings also imply that subtle, but measurable, differences in the specific policy environment are crucial for understanding control.     

A Bridge Too Far? Examining Bridging Assumptions in Common-Space Estimations

While most common-space estimations rely upon members who served in both the House and Senate as “bridges” to scale the remaining members, this assumes that these “bridge members” do not change their preferences when they change chambers. Such an assumption conflicts with standard notions of representation, that is, that legislators’ votes reflect (at least to some degree) the wishes of their constituents. We examine the constancy of this common-space voting assumption by focusing on a subset of House members who move to the Senate: those who come from statewide House districts. Using these members as the bridge actors—and thus bridging by constituency explicitly—in a one-dimensional item response theory model, we find that the standard assumption of chamber switchers in common-space estimations is technically, but immaterially, false. While there are statistically distinguishable differences in House and Senate voting records for chamber switchers, they are not sufficiently large to meaningfully undermine bridging.     

Women's Substantive Representation: Defending Feminist Interests or Women's Electoral Preferences?

To what extent does the inclusion of marginalised groups in policymaking institutions influence policy outcomes? This article examines whether and under which conditions female legislators are more likely to represent women's interests compared with male legislators. Building on the literature on women's substantive representation, it is argued that the advocacy of women's interests by female representatives depends on a number of factors, namely party affiliation, contact with women's organisations, electoral district, and seniority. This argument is evaluated using vote-level fixed-effect models based on a unique data set from a direct democratic context that combines representatives' voting behaviour, women's voting preferences, and recommendations from feminist groups. The findings show that female legislators defend feminist interests more than their male colleagues but that they only marginally respond to women's electoral preferences. Moreover, gender has its most visible effect within the populist party.     

Do female legislators have different policy priorities than their male colleagues in an undemocratic/semi-democratic legislature? The case of Hong Kong

This article investigates the impacts of democratic transition on gender outcomes in Hong Kong, which has a unique path of transition. The author studies whether democratic transition in Hong Kong since the mid-1980s has brought positive gender outcomes. Specifically, this article examines the extent to which Hong Kong’s female legislators acted for women’s interests from 1970 to 2012. The study finds that after the introduction of legislative elections, female legislators were more likely to represent women’s interests than male legislators. Apart from gender, the study also finds that political orientation of a legislator significantly affected legislator policy priorities and/or gender outcome. Liberal legislators proposed significantly more motions related to women’s interests than conservative legislators. Finally, the study highlights that as the legislature was transited from an undemocratic to a semi-democratic body, legislators were significantly more likely to propose motions related to women’s interests.     

When Free Traders Become Protectionists: Constituent Advocacy at the International Trade Commission

Although Members of Congress vote on few trade bills, they participate regularly in venues such as the International Trade Commission (ITC), where important trade policy decisions are made. We assert that once removed from the voting chambers of Congress, legislators are motivated overwhelmingly by the desire to advance constituents’ trade policy interests, even those that contradict the member’s established positions on trade. Utilizing an original dataset on legislator participation in antidumping cases, we find that both Democratic and Republican members advocate protection at the ITC when they have numerous firms and constituents in their district who benefit from trade restrictions, particularly when they receive sizeable financial contributions from them. Notably, self‐proclaimed free‐traders are just as likely to seek protection for their constituents as are trade opponents. Away from Capitol Hill, then, trade policymaking exhibits few partisan and ideological influences and serves as a means for members to expand political support. [Correction added on 21 August 2018, after first online publication: Abstract was added to article]     

It Takes a Coalition: The Community Impacts of Collaboration

Members of Congress frequently collaborate on policy initiatives, reaching out to colleagues in both parties to find common ground on solutions for the problems faced by their constituents. Using a novel dataset of over 30,000 “Dear Colleague” letters sent by members of the 111th Congress, I use the collaborative relationships that exist in the earliest stages of the policy process to measure the social influence of legislators. I demonstrate that districts represented by members of Congress who are better connected to their colleagues receive a greater share of federal grant money. I argue that this is because collaborative legislators are well‐positioned to be influential allies to strategic bureaucrats who want to maintain a broad base of support for their programs in Congress. Thus, devoting resources to building relationships with their colleagues is one way members of Congress can more effectively support the communities they represent.     

Legislative Institutions as a Source of Party Leaders' Influence

Legislators' actions are influenced by party, constituency, and their own views, each weighted differently. Our survey of state legislators finds that legislator's own views are the strongest influence. We also find that institutions are an important source of party leaders' influence. Legislators in states where members rely more on party leaders—states without term limits, with less professional legislatures, and where the majority party controls the agenda—put more weight on leaders' preferences. Beyond direct party influence, the views of party leaders are preemptively incorporated into legislators' preferences when the rules of the legislature make party leaders more powerful.     

Pink‐Collar Representation and Budgetary Outcomes in US States

Legislatures worldwide are dominated by wealthy elites, who are often out of touch with the needs and problems of citizens. Research shows that the underrepresentation of the working class matters in terms of policy processes and outcomes. Yet the research on class has largely focused on blue‐collar representatives, who are primarily men. Working‐class women are more likely to hold pink‐collar jobs, or low‐status occupations dominated by women. We argue that pink‐collar legislators are uniquely positioned to legislate over education and social service policy. To test our argument, we combine a new coding of working‐class backgrounds that accounts for pink‐collar representation with state spending data on education and social services from US states over time. Modeling compositional budget data, we find that class and gender intersect to shape policy outcomes via state budget allocations, with women's pink‐collar representation associated with increased spending on both education and social services.     

Legislative voting in the pork-dominant parliament: evidence from the Philippine House of Representatives

In this paper I investigate how legislators behave in extremely pork-oriented, or pork-dominant, systems where virtually no party-line voting takes place and politicians strive to deliver individual/local benefits instead of national public policies. I argue that, in the pork-dominant context, most legislators vote with the president, who controls access to the pork pipeline, irrespective of their party affiliations. Thus, the president’s party legislators should have little incentive to vote against the president, regardless of voter demands for pork or policy; however, sometimes opposition-party legislators elected particularly from more-developed districts (where voters often desire policy over pork) should have strong incentives to vote against the president. These arguments are supported with quantitative studies of the post-authoritarian Philippine House of Representatives. It is found that, in the highly homogeneous legislature dominated by pork-seeking politicians, (1) most bills are passed with unanimous or near-unanimous consent, (2) governing-party legislators almost always vote with the majority of the members of the parliament, regardless of voters’ socio-economic conditions, and (3) opposition-party legislators, especially in more-developed areas, tend to vote against the parliamentary majority. These findings indicate that voters’ high socio-economic status promotes programmatic accountability, leading their representatives to undermine voting unity within the extremely cohesive pork-dominant legislature.