Social Justice and Legal Form

Abstract
This essay argues for a conception of law as a normative practice, a conception which departs from traditional, particularly positivist, conceptions. It is argued that Dyzenhaus's book (Dyzenhaus 1991), with its fascinating case study of unjust judicial decisions in South Africa, makes a compelling argument for such a conception. However, the essay takes issue with Dyzenhaus for romanticising the liberal tradition, and inflating the power of law and legal theory. Nonetheless, the essay agrees that positivist accounts tend to downplay the emancipatory promise of law, and ends with some remarks about promise.     

Dyzenhaus on Positivism and Judicial Obligation

Abstract
The author criticizes the argument in Dyzenhaus (1991) that a study of South African judicial decisions establishes the superiority of Dworkinian anti-positivism over legal positivism. Among the claims criticized are: (1) Positivism and anti-positivism each imply a specific theory of judicial duty, and the decisions of South African judges are explained by their adherence to one or the other of these theories; (2) resistance to South African government policy was morally required of judges; (3) the only theory which supports this resistance (anti-positivism) is therefore the correct one; (4) the cases establish that judges do not have discretion in hard cases; (5) Dworkin's theory does not imply that South African judges are required to apply the wicked principles embedded in their legal system; (6) positivism involves a pragmatic contradiction.     

The Legitimacy of Law: A Response to Critics*

Abstract
In this paper, the author responds to the claim that his critique of legal positivism, based on an account of adjudication in South Ahica, misses its target because it ignores, first, the positivist thesis of judicial discretion and, secondly, the fact that positivism offers no account of judicial obligation. He argues that these theses expose a tension in positivism between its commitments to liberal individualism and to the supremacy of positive law, a tension which can be resolved only by situating positivism in its true context, the Hobbesian argument for the legitimacy of law. Following Dworkin, he advocates the practice-oriented common law tradition, one that makes the legitimacy of law a matter of standards already implicit in law which are best revealed in adjudication.     

The Regular Practice of Morality in Law

Abstract. This article examines the possibility of moral considerations and arguments serving as validity conditions of law in legal positivist theory. I argue that, despite recent attempts, this possibility has yet to be established. My argument turns on a defense of Joseph Raz's Sources Thesis, yet I do not adopt his famous “argument from authority.” Rather, I offer a renewed defense of the distinction between creation and application of law and argue that moral considerations and arguments, whether recognized in law or not, remain arguments about the modification of law.     

On the Thesis of a Necessary Connection between Law and Morality: Bulygin's Critique

In this article the author adduces a non‐positivist argument for a necessary connection between law and morality; the argument is based on the claim to correctness, and it is directed to an attack stemming from Eugenio Bulygin. The heart of the controversy is the claim to correctness. The author first attempts to show that there are good reasons for maintaining that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness. He argues, second, for the thesis that this claim has moral implications. Finally, he attempts to refute Bulygin's objection that the claim‐based argument for non‐positivism boils down to contradiction and triviality.     

Why Tolerate Conscience?

In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well. However, in the last chapter of his book, he objects to a universal regime of exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, highlighting the practical and moral flaws associated with it. We believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and important contemporary legal and philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his reasoning. However, we raise questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument. The first claim is that it is not religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and respect. The second claim is that respect for religion and conscience demands ‘principled toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal exemptions. Against the first claim, we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular conscience and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience (which shares many of religious conscience’s epistemic features) deserves respect. Against the second claim, we argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of liberal toleration.     

拉兹的法哲学趣向——将法律实证主义导向实践哲学

约瑟夫.拉兹是法律实证主义后期的重要代表人物。在研究法律时,他除了继续保持实证主义传统、使用法律实证主义惯用的分析方法以外,还试图用新的方法来替代早期的分析法学家们广为使用的方法,并使用新的哲学理论来改造法律实证主义。他的法哲学思想表现出的一个重要趣向就是：将法律实证主义导向实践哲学。这一趣向贯穿于拉兹法哲学思想的方方面面,是理解拉兹法哲学思想的关键。     

On the Concept and the Nature of Law

Abstract. The central argument of this article turns on the dual‐nature thesis. This thesis sets out the claim that law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical dimension. The dual‐nature thesis is incompatible with both exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal positivism. It is also incompatible with variants of non‐positivism according to which legal validity is lost in all cases of moral defect or demerit (exclusive legal non‐positivism) or, alternatively, is affected in no way at all by moral defects or demerits (super‐inclusive legal non‐positivism). The dual nature of law is expressed, on the one hand, by the Radbruch formula, which says that extreme injustice is not law, and, on the other, by the correctness argument, which says that law's claim to correctness necessarily includes a claim to moral correctness. Thus, what the law is depends not only on social facts, but also on what the law ought to be.     

Inclusive Legal Positivism,Legal Interpretation,and Value‐Judgments

In this paper I put forward some arguments in defence of inclusive legal positivism. The general thesis that I defend is that inclusive positivism represents a more fruitful and interesting research program than that proposed by exclusive positivism. I introduce two arguments connected with legal interpretation in favour of my thesis. However, my opinion is that inclusive positivism does not sufficiently succeed in estranging itself from the more traditional legal positivist conceptions. This is the case, for instance, with regard to the value‐freedom principle, which is commonly accepted by inclusive positivist scholars. In contrast with this approach, I try to show, in the concluding section, how a constructivistic version of inclusive positivism could legitimately acknowledge the presence of value‐judgments in the cognitive activities of jurists and legal theorists.     

Insights,Errors and Self‐Misconceptions of the Theory of Principles

The theory of principles is multifaceted. Its initial expression contained an important argument against positivist theories of adjudication. As a legal theory, it fails in its effort to claim a structural difference between rules and principles. It also fails as a methodological theory that reduces adjudication to subsumption or balancing. It misunderstands itself when it is conceived as a doctrinal theory especially of fundamental rights. Its most promising aspect could be its contribution to a more comprehensive theory of legal argumentation.     

Positivism,Legal Validity,and the Separation of Law and Morals

The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only. On the other hand, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (here and now, it is necessarily involved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project.     

Farewell to the Exclusive-Inclusive Debate

In recent years there has an ongoing debate between two versionsof legal positivism. According to one, called exclusive positivism,whenever the law refers to morality, the law necessarily directsits subjects to an external, non-legal, standard, because thereis a conceptual impossibility in incorporating moral standardsinto the law. According to the rival inclusive positivist position,such incorporation is possible, and therefore moral standardscan be (although they need not be) part of the law. In thisarticle I argue that both views are mistaken since they bothassume that whenever words like ‘equality’, ‘justice’etc. appear in the law they refer to moral standards. Rather,I argue, these words refer to legal standards, which are differentfrom the moral standards. As a result the question of the possibilityof incorporation can be avoided, and the debate between exclusiveand inclusive positivists put to rest.     

Was Inclusive Legal Positivism Founded on a Mistake?

In this paper, I present a new argument against inclusive legal positivism. As I show, any theory which permits morality to be a condition on legality cannot account for a core feature of legal activity, namely, that it is an activity of social planning. If the aim of a legal institution is to guide the conduct of the community through plans, it would be self-defeating if the existence of these plans could only be determined through deliberation on the merits. I also argue that, insofar as inclusive legal positivism was developed as a response to Ronald Dworkin's critique of H. L. A. Hart's theory of law, it was founded on a mistake. For once we appreciate the role that planning plays in legal regulation, we will see that Dworkin's objection is based on a flawed conception of legal obligations and rights and hence does not present an objection that inclusive legal positivists were required to answer.     

A Typological Reading of Prevailing Legal Theories

A classic debate in the history of philosophy is that between rationalists and empiricists concerning the “true” source of human knowledge. In legal philosophy this debate has been reflected in the classic opposition between natural law and legal positivist perspectives. Even the currently predominant inclusivist perspectives on the nature of law, such as inclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal non‐positivism, are not immune to such a dichotomy. In this paper I attempt to present an understanding of specific cognitive characteristics of prevailing legal theories from the perspective of the theory of psychological types as developed by Carl G. Jung.     

The Ambiguity of Force

The author argues that Schauer's understanding of appropriate empiricism and relatedly what he wishes to take from the positivist classics might have an even more reductive impact on legal philosophical inquiry than the legal positivist quest (which Schauer rejects) to confine such inquiry to a search for necessary and sufficient conditions. The argument is based on the example of the legal order of the Arab territories occupied by Israel. In the author's view, this legal order is very close to what Schauer regards as the normal case of a properly functioning legal order and in its closeness one can discern the flaws in his argument.     

The Philosophy of Scandinavian Legal Realism

Abstract.  The jurisprudential movement known as Scandinavian Legal Realism was founded by the Swedish philosopher Axel Hägerström and the Danish philosopher and jurist Alf Ross in order to destroy the distorting influence of metaphysics upon legal thinking and to provide the secure philosophical foundation for scientific knowledge of the law. I shall present Hägerström's philosophical theory and argue that he is committed to the metaphysical view that the world in time and space consists of causal regularities between things and events devoid of any values that is related to his epistemological view that what there is can be known by experience. Hägerström's philosophy advances a naturalistic approach that conceives the positive law as a system of rules in terms of behavioural regularities among human beings and legal knowledge as an empirical inquiry into the causal relations between legal rules and human behaviour. This approach is followed by his pupils, the Swedish lawyers A. V. Lundstedt and Karl Olivecrona, whereas Ross appeals to logical positivism. The naturalistic approach should be taken seriously since it leaves no room for the normativity of the law and for legal knowledge in terms of reasons for belief and action.     

Realism about the Nature of Law

Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non‐cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis (in a fairly broad sense) is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti‐metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non‐cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the nature of law. I argue (i) that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and (ii) that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, (iii) that the objection to non‐naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values (the ‘world of the ought’) and the world of time and space—is convincing, and (iv) that Kelsen's introduction of a so‐called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue (v) that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue (vi) that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms.