The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and the Criminal Suspect

In In re JR38, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a 14 year‐old boy who argued that the dissemination of his image, taken whilst he was participating in sectarian rioting, to local newspapers, violated his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, the Court was divided on whether or not the measures taken by the police engaged the applicant's Article 8(1) rights at all. This case raises fundamental questions as to the scope of private life in the context of criminal investigations, and the place of the European Court of Human Rights’ ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test in determining whether Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged. This case comment subjects the majority's interpretation of Article 8(1) to critical scrutiny, concluding that this interpretation may unduly restrict the scope of Article 8 protection for those subject to criminal investigations.     

The Place of Wishes and Feelings in Best Interests Decisions: Wye Valley NHS Trust v Mr B

In Wye Valley NHS Trust v Mr B the Court of Protection decided that it was not in the best interests of Mr B to receive amputation surgery against his will, notwithstanding that he would die without the treatment. The judge met with Mr B in person and his best interests decision placed significant weight on Mr B's wishes and feelings. This case note considers this influential case in the context of ongoing debate about the place of wishes and feelings in best interests decisions under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. It considers the history of the best interests principle, its interpretation by the Supreme Court in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James, ongoing debates about its compatibility with Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and recent proposals by the Law Commission for statutory amendments to the Mental Capacity Act.     

Interpreting Statutory Purpose – Lessons from Yemshaw v Hounslow London Borough Council

Yemshaw v Hounslow LBC is a significant case in the fields of housing and family law, as well as giving rise to important issues as to the judicial role and statutory interpretation more broadly. This note critically analyses the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Yemshaw, in which the principal issue was whether the definition of ‘violence’ for the purposes of the Housing Act 1996 extended to non‐physical as well as physical forms of harm. In rejecting the view of the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court adopted a wider definition of violence to encompass emotional and psychological as well as financial abuse. This commentary adopts a fresh stance by examining closely the context surrounding the enactment of the Housing Act 1996 and how this informs the question of statutory interpretation. In so doing, the author suggests that the interpretation employed by the court is significantly undermined.     

Delfi AS v Estonia: The Liability of Secondary Internet Publishers for Violation of Reputational Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights

In October 2013, the European Court of Human Rights in Delfi AS v Estonia upheld a decision of the Estonian Supreme Court to impose liability on the owners of an internet news portal for defamatory comments which had been posted on their website by anonymous third parties. This note suggests that the decision is important in the context of publications with a ‘public interest’ element to them, because it appears to afford more protection to the right to reputation (deriving from the Article 8 right to privacy) and less to freedom of expression than was formerly the case. It is further argued that the Court's emphasis on the positive obligation of states to protect this right to reputation may mean that the existing English law in this area, including, potentially section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013, is inconsistent with the ECHR jurisprudence.     

Mavericks or misconstruction? A reply to Campbell and Allan

In a jurisdiction without a codified constitution clearly demarcating the role of the courts, and given the centrality of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty to the United Kingdom's constitutional framework, criticism of the courts for overstepping the mark – particularly in politically contentious cases – is par for the course. In their 2019 article, Professors David Campbell and James Allan offer a criticism of the Supreme Court for what they describe as its surreptitious creation of judicial supremacy at the expense of parliamentary sovereignty. In support of their claim, the authors examine two particularly significant judgments: R (Miller and another) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission's Application for Judicial Review. This reply discusses several problematic aspects of the authors’ critique of those judgments, demonstrating that, contrary to the authors’ claims, these cases do not provide evidence of a surreptitious attempt by the Supreme Court to expand its power.     

A study of section 3 of the Maltese Official Secrets Act,its Canadian and British counterparts and its effects on freedom of expression

This article answers the question whether s 3(1) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act breaches freedom of expression as contained in art 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and s 41 of the Constitution of Malta. Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights is briefly analysed in the light of obtaining case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Section 3(1) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act – which finds counterparts in several Commonwealth criminal law statutes – is subsequently studied by reference to United Kingdom and Canadian case law. A freedom of expression impact assessment of s 3(1) of the Official Secrets Act is carried out with the ensuing conclusion being that only s 3(1)(c) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act might, in certain circumstances, constitute a breach of art 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and s 41 of the Constitution of Malta.     

Procedural Innovation and the Surreptitious Creation of Judicial Supremacy in the United Kingdom

In Re an Application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review, the Supreme Court made unfavourable comments about Northern Irish abortion legislation in a way which showed complete disregard for elements of civil procedure which are a foundation of proper adjudication within the context of respect for democracy. This was but the latest of a number of cases in which the senior judiciary has made unaccountable procedural innovations furthering judicial supremacy in defiance of the sovereignty of Parliament. In addition to Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, two other of these cases, Simmons v. Castle and R (Miller and another) v. The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, will be discussed. These cases reveal an effort to create judicial supremacy by means which we are obliged to call surreptitious.     

Confronting Religion: Veiled Witnesses,the Right to a Fair Trial and the Supreme Court of Canada's Judgment in R v N.S.

The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v N.S. is significant because the majority seems to endorse an understanding of confrontation that assumes a defendant's right to a fair trial is imperilled by a witness who seeks to give evidence while wearing the niqab. The case is of interest because it permits reflection upon the interrelationship between the right to a fair trial and the right to confront witnesses enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Given that the European Court of Human Rights conceptualises confrontation in epistemic terms, it is argued that it would be unlikely to find that a conviction based upon evidence from a niqab‐wearing witness would infringe the right to a fair trial. This note examines the value of demeanour evidence and whether the majority in R v N.S. was correct that the abrogation of the ability to assess demeanour evidence necessarily undermines trial fairness.     

Equal Civil Partnerships,Discrimination and the Indulgence of Time: R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development

In R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development the Supreme Court unanimously declared that the ban on different‐sex civil partnerships was incompatible with Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In a strikingly robust and, at times, acerbic manner, the Court systematically dismantled the Secretary of State's request for tolerance of a discriminatory and unsustainable legal position. The decision represents a clear victory for those campaigning for reform and the issuing of a declaration of incompatibility by the Court is likely to have influenced the later announcement by Prime Minister Theresa May in October 2018 that different‐sex civil partnerships will ultimately be introduced in England and Wales.     

A bad trip for health-related human rights: implications of Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 85 ALJR 957

Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 85 ALJR 957; [2011] HCA 34 arose from a prosecution for drug trafficking brought under the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic). The Australian High Court held that the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (the Charter) validly conferred a power on the Victorian Supreme Court and Court of Appeal to interpret legislation in a manner consistent with a defined list of human rights. By a slim majority it also held that the Charter validly created a judicial power to "declare" a law inconsistent with one or more enumerated human rights. In reaching its decision, however, the majority supported a narrow interpretation likely to undermine the intended capacity of the Charter to act as a remedial mechanism to reform laws, regulations and administrative practices which infringe human rights and freedoms. Although Momcilovic involved interpretation of a specific State human rights law, the High Court judgments allude to significant problems should the Federal Government seek to introduce a similar charter-based human rights system. Momcilovic, therefore, represents a risk to future efforts to develop nationally consistent Australian human rights jurisprudence. This has particular relevance to health and medically related areas such as the freedom from torture and degrading and inhuman treatment and, in future, enforceable constitutional health-related human rights such as that to emergency health care.     

Barriers to the ballot: implications for the development of state and national crime policies

In 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Shelby County v. Holder that Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which included the preclearance formula for determining which state and local jurisdictions needed to obtain federal approval before changing their election laws and voting procedures, was unconstitutional. By requiring federal approval, this provision prevented historically repressive jurisdictions from enacting covert policies to hinder non-whites from voting. The ruling in Shelby County is problematic because methods in use across the country prevent non-white citizens from casting their ballots, leaving their interests unaddressed. As people of color hold different attitudes and views than whites towards specific criminal justice measures, contemporary barriers to the ballot have potential implications for criminal law and policy. Consequently, analyses of two contemporary methods of denying non-whites a voice in government are warranted: felon disenfranchisement and voter identification laws. After considering the disproportionate effects of these laws on non-white voting, the paper reveals the potential harm that may result from Shelby County if similar laws spread to jurisdictions no longer covered by the Voting Rights Act.     

Standing and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission

On 7 June 2018, the UK Supreme Court held that the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) did not have standing under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (NIA) and Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) to challenge the legality of abortion law in Northern Ireland. This case note argues that while a literal reading of the NIA exposes its inconsistencies, a purposive reading of both the NIA and HRA indicates that the NIHRC should have had standing. The note seeks to highlight the unique democratic function of the NIHRC in a consociational setting in protecting rights that are not represented along ethno‐national lines. It also considers the negative ramifications that the judgment will have on women who have been victims of the legislative regime and seek to challenge the compatibility of Northern Irish abortion law with the HRA in the future.     

Human rights and health law

Important statutory and common law developments are changing the landscape of health law in Australia. Human rights considerations are formally included amongst the factors to be applied in the interpretation of statutory provisions and evaluating the lawfulness of actions on the part of government instrumentalities. The Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) create limited bills of rights at State/Territory level in two Australian jurisdictions. Although neither is entrenched, they have the potential to make it more difficult for government to promulgate laws that are inconsistent with human rights, as defined. They will have important repercussions for the evolution of health law in these jurisdictions. The decision of Royal Women's Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board (Vic) [2006] VSCA 85 by the Victorian Court of Appeal has also provided a legitimation for parties to incorporate human rights perspectives in submissions about the interpretation of statutory provisions where health rights are in conflict.     

Citizen Led Policing in the Digital Realm: Paedophile Hunters and Article 8 in the case of Sutherland v Her Majesty's Advocate

In Sutherland v Her Majesty's Advocate, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal which argued that the use of communications obtained by a paedophile hunter group as evidence in criminal prosecution was a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case raises fundamental questions of the scope of the right to private life as regards to the content of communications and the role played by private actors in the criminal justice process. This note argues that by limiting the protection of Article 8 to private communications which satisfy a contents-based test, the Court has bypassed the Article 8(2) balancing test to the detriment of the due process rights of the accused. The note concludes that the decision opens up the prospect of the state circumventing the accused's Article 8 privacy rights by lending tacit approval to the proactive investigations of these private ‘paedophile hunter’ groups.     

侵犯知识产权刑事案件法律适用问题研究

2004年12月,最高人民法院和最高人民检察院颁布了《关于办理侵犯知识产权刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释》(以下简称《知识产权刑事司法解释》)。该《知识产权刑事司法解释》进一步完善了我国知识产权刑法保护的制度,但是从这一《知识产权刑事司法解释》出台之后的实践来看,这一解释在构成犯罪的情节认定等方面仍然存在一些不足之处。     

Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom: Sensible Dialogue or a Bad Case of Strasbourg Jitters?

In Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom a majority of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that the UK's statutory broadcasting ban on political advertisements under the Communications Act 2003 did not breach the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The judgment departs from the Court's established case law and, it is argued, raises several issues of concern both with regard to freedom of expression, and for human rights adjudication more generally. In particular, the Court's use of a doctrine of ‘general measures’ led it to place a great deal of reliance on the quality and quantity of legislative debate that preceded the UK ban, rather than its actual impact upon the applicant.     

Where There's a Will There's a Way: Marley v Rawlings and Another

In Marley v Rawlings and another, a unanimous Supreme Court has widened the scope of judicial power to rectify a will under section 20 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982. An intended will that falls foul of formality requirements may now have such defects resolved by rectification, and the meaning of ‘clerical error’ – one of the two possible bases for invoking the rectification doctrine – has been expanded. The Court's decision to resolve the issue by this method rather than by recourse to the doctrine of construction may prove to have implications for the extended scope of the latter. Moreover, the recent award of a third party costs order in this case is also likely to have a significant impact on the manner in which similar disputes are conducted in the future.     

Abortion in Northern Ireland: Has the Rubicon Been Crossed?

On 7 June 2018, the Supreme Court delivered their long anticipated ruling on whether the abortion laws in Northern Ireland are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the case was dismissed on procedural grounds, a majority of the court held that, obiter, the current Northern Irish law was incompatible with the right to respect for private and family life, protected by Article 8 ECHR, “insofar as it prohibits abortion in cases of rape, incest and fatal foetal abnormality”. This Supreme Court decision, seen alongside the May 2018 Irish referendum liberalising abortion, and the 5 June 2018 Parliamentary debate seeking to liberalise abortion laws in Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, places renewed focus upon the abortion laws of Northern Ireland and Great Britain, which suggests that the ‘halfway house’ of the Abortion Act 1967 Act finally be close to being reformed to hand the decision of abortion to women themselves.     

How to control interception-does the UK strike the right balance?

This Article critically analyses the regime for intercepting the content of communications under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 in the light of the recent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in Kennedy v the UK. It looks at the safeguards for privacy protection provided such as the requirement for a warrant and the roles of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and the Interception of Communications Commissioner and whether these safeguards are compliant with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.     

Changing the meaning of ‘vulnerable’ under the homelessness legislation?

The Supreme Court judgement in Hotak v Southwark London Borough Council (Equality and Human Rights Commission and others intervening) [2015] UKSC 30; [2015] 2W.L.R. 1341 appears to have significantly altered prevailing understandings of the meaning of ‘vulnerability’ within the homelessness legislation’s concept of priority need. This paper analyses Hotak’s doctrinal effects, and questions both the adequacy of the court’s reasoning and the likelihood of those formal doctrinal changes leading to a concomitant alteration to the content of the decisions that local authorities reach.