论法律解释的融贯性——评德沃金的法律真理观

以融贯性作为检验法律真理的标准,是一种超越真理观上的绝对主义与相对主义立场的尝试。德沃金的法律解释思想以融贯论作为法律真理观,以罗尔斯的"反思性均衡"作为法律解释的方法,以信念之间、信念和经验之间的融贯性作为法律解释的标准,从而为"法律唯一正解"提供了哲学上的正当化根据。但是,原则之间的竞争与冲突是不容否定的事实,并不存在理想意义上的融贯;法官的类推解释只能达致局部融贯而无法形成整体融贯;法律的无穷解释使德沃金的解释理论陷入无法自拔的"明希豪森困境",这些理论上的难题使德沃金的法律真理图景成为一种虚假的幻相。     

麦考密克论融贯

麦考密克对规范性融贯和描述性融贯的区分，启示我们在司法裁判或证立过程中不但要重视规范要素的融贯、而且要重视事实要素的融贯，规范性融贯与描述性融贯密不可分，法律方法领域不应忽视对证据融贯性要求的研究。努力在法律体系内确保价值融贯的原则论证方式，不仅是对司法证立的一种形式要求，而且含有正当性要求，它把司法行为限制在合法范围内，在约束法官判决主观因素的同时，增加了司法行为的机动性。     

法律融贯论辨析

"法律融贯论"一词具有多义性和模糊性。从类型学上看,法律融贯论至少可分为认识性法律融贯论、构成性法律融贯论、整全性法律融贯论三种。认识性法律融贯论是一种关于法律知识的证成理论;构成性法律融贯论是一种关于法律本质以及正确裁判的理论;整全性法律融贯论则是一种关于法律知识最优证成理论的广义融贯论。从真理论的角度看,认识性法律融贯论属于真理证成计划,构成性法律融贯论属于真理形而上学计划,而整全性法律融贯论则对认识性法律融贯论的真理论价值给予元理论说明。三种融贯论互不具有可替代性。     

权威命题与来源命题——排他性法律实证主义的一种论证理路

来源命题(the sources thesis)指的是法律的存在及内容完全是一个社会事实问题,拉兹用来自权威的论据(即法律必然主张合法性权威)来论证这一命题。同时拉兹也以权威论据批判德沃金的融贯命题和Coleman的道德安置命题(moral incorporation thesis),并最终表明,来源命题是唯一与权威论相符合的理论主张。     

宪法解释的融贯性

佩策尼克的融贯性理论要求理由之间的相应证立,德沃金的融贯性解释理论要求法官对法律的解释与体制中的价值观念相一致,法农教授的融贯性宪法解释理论要求不同的宪法论证尽量符合法治、政治民主性、通过尊重个人权利推动实质正义的价值要求。中国宪法学也出现了解释方法多元主义的特征,要保持宪法解释的融贯性,就需要寻找中国宪法的"宪法核"。     

法律规则与法律原则:质的差别?

国内对法律原则的研究模式大量援引德沃金的相关理论,却没能突出德沃金的一个重要定性:法律规则与法律原则存在质的差别。在这种一般模式之外,国内外学者在抽象程度之别、实定性之别、形式原则之别、理由类型之别等方面试图实现对法律规则与法律原则质的差别的建构。但是,这要么不符合德沃金的基本论述,要么无法实现德沃金的理论目标——挑战法律实证主义的法律概念理论。本文尝试提出一种解读:放弃分类学模式,不把法律规则和法律原则看作两种规范类型,而将其看作两种不同的规则理论。     

原则与法律的来源——拉兹的排他性法实证主义

解读任何一位重要的法理学家,都不止需要一种解经式的典籍阅读的耐心,更重要的是,还需要对其置身的法学主流思想变迁及其背景的宏观洞见能力,所以任何重要法理学家都有被误读的可能,但也有被反复咀嚼的必要。本文志向宏大,通过选择解读法理学家拉兹的理论,意欲在当今法理学主流变迁的思想纷呈中截取一段具有象征意义的思路,加以透彻的评价,从而传递出有关当代法理学核心论域为何的一种信息。作者有意识地运用了背景分析方法,并力图在一种骨架探索的策略下点描拉兹的核心思想,因而不无启发意义。作者认为,拉兹是在“德沃金对哈特”的那场当今法学领域至关重要的学术论战的激发下,以一种回应型姿态,维护和发展正统法理学的理论。针对德沃金提出的原则理论以及由此展开的对于哈特为代表的新分析法学赋予以承认规则支撑的法律规则体系以确定性和与政治道德的区隔性的努力的颠覆式批评,拉兹认为,自己可以通过发展一种“排除性实证主义”的强硬立场(与科尔曼等人的包容性实证主义的妥协立场不同)对德沃金进行有效的反批评。这一立场的关键是,应在根本上否认德沃金有关“原则是法律的组成部分”的主张,因为通过“社会来源命题”可以发现,相当一部分原则并不具有效力因此存身在法律之外,由此可以关上德沃金试图打开的法律与政治道德沟通的大门,从而维护法律实证主义的纯粹性。     

浅谈德沃金的司法自由裁量权理论——从原则模式的角度

罗纳德·德沃金的成名是对以哈特为代表的法律实证主义理论的批判开始,论战的核心就是与司法自由裁量权紧密相关的,本文主要从原则模式的角度阐述德沃金的司法自由裁量权理论。     

基于行政法基本原则裁判的一般方法初探——以张成银诉徐州市人民政府房屋登记行政复议决定案为例

在行政法领域,以有效率的行政权和有限制的行政权两个维度构建较为完整的行政法基本原则体系,行政诉讼中基于法律原则的裁判可以通过行政法的基本原则体系识别并筛选相关法律原则。对相关法律原则的权衡和选择是基于法律原则裁判的重要步骤,"借助于具体个案中的法益衡量"被公认为一种可能的权衡方法。通过权衡相关原则所保护的法益,确定优位的法律原则,并尝试对限制条件进行设定。借此过程,裁判者基于法律原则构造了一条新的规则。基于行政法基本原则裁判的一般方法意义在于提供裁判者一种可能的裁判思路,避免裁判者因无从下手而畏于做出超越法规范的裁判,并使得裁判的过程可供外部考查。     

德沃金正确答案命题下的司法裁判结果确定性分析——兼论司法裁判结果的实质

司法裁判结果确定性与司法裁判活动维护正义的现实功能之间存在着逻辑上的必然联系,因此对于司法裁判结果的确定性进行分析将有助于透视司法裁判各个主导因素的内在结构,从而更好的履行其维护正义的职能。但这一解构过程中似乎存在着一些难以用具象标准来阐释的司法环节,如自由裁量权的行使。因此本文尝试以德沃金的正确答案命题为坐标,构筑一个更易于直观理解的分析体系。     

Insights,Errors and Self‐Misconceptions of the Theory of Principles

The theory of principles is multifaceted. Its initial expression contained an important argument against positivist theories of adjudication. As a legal theory, it fails in its effort to claim a structural difference between rules and principles. It also fails as a methodological theory that reduces adjudication to subsumption or balancing. It misunderstands itself when it is conceived as a doctrinal theory especially of fundamental rights. Its most promising aspect could be its contribution to a more comprehensive theory of legal argumentation.     

The One-System View and Dworkin’s Anti-Archimedean Eliminativism

Many of Dworkin’s interlocutors saw his ‘one-system view’, according to which law is a branch of morality, as a radical shift. I argue that it is better seen as a different way of expressing his longstanding view that legal theory is an inherently normative endeavor. Dworkin emphasizes that fact and value are separate domains, and one cannot ground claims of one sort in the other domain. On this view, legal philosophy can only answer questions from within either domain. We cannot ask metaphysical questions about which domain law ‘properly’ belongs in; these would be archimedean, and Dworkin has long argued against archimedeanism. The one-system view, then, is best understood as an invitation to join Dworkin in asking moral questions from within the domain of value. Finally, I argue that Dworkin’s view can be understood as a version of ‘eliminativism’, a growing trend in legal philosophy.

     

基于法律原则的裁判

基于法律原则的裁判需依次解决以下三个问题:如何识别与个案相关的法律原则;如何处理原则与规则的适用关系,或者说在何种情况下,允许裁判者依据法律原则得出判决;如何解决原则之间的冲突问题,亦即能否籍由原则权衡获取法律上的“唯一正解”。现有的裁判理论对这三个问题作了不同回应,但欠缺可靠的操作程式。究其根源,是因为原则裁判的实质,是裁判者在规则穷尽之际,选择并依据法律体系内的价值判断为个案判决提供合理化论证;然而一旦涉及到价值判断,裁判就有主观、恣意和片面的可能。     

On "Coherence" and "Law": An Analysis of Different Models

The aim of this paper is to compare different conceptions of the role of (normative) coherence in the legal field. More precisely, it aims to deepen Neil MacCormick's theory of legal reasoning, in which coherence is essentially considered an interpretative tool, and Ronald Dworkin's legal theory, in which coherence occupies a more crucial place. The main results of this paper can be summarized in two points. A) For Dworkin, coherence is not just an interpretative standard but constitutes the hard core of his theory of law. B) As a consequence of A, Dworkin's reflections on coherence (as an interpretative standard) cannot be separated from his theory of law grounded on the concept of integrity.     

解释是一种“连锁活动”吗——法律解释理论的费什—德沃金之争

自20世纪80年代初至90年代中期,斯坦利·费什和罗纳德·德沃金进行了一场长达十多年的法律解释论战。该论战从德沃金的"连锁小说"隐喻开始,内容涉及法律规范的意义来源、文本和读者之间的关系、解释行为之限制甚至法律解释的道德性等更深层次的问题。费什从文艺批评和文学解释的角度对德沃金提出的批评和反驳极富启发性,他认为解释总是先在地渗透于我们的思考之中,受我们自身的镶嵌性背景所约束。这一观点无疑有助于丰富和深化人们对于法律解释性质的认识,对于正确看待解释者的自由裁量,增进对解释者解释合理性的信赖具有重要意义。     

Legal Argumentation and Justice in Luhmann’s System Theory of Law

The paper reconstructs Luhmann’s conception of legal argumentation and justice especially focussing on the aspects of contingency and self-referring operative closure. The aim of his conception is to describe/explain in a disenchanted way—from an external, of “second order” point of view—the work on adjudication, which, rather idealistically, lawyers and judges present as being a matter of reason. As a consequence of some surface similarities with Derrida’s deconstructive philosophy of justice, Teubner proposes integrating the supposed reductive image of formal justice described by Luhmann with the ideal conception of justice presented by Derrida. Here this kind of attempt is rejected as epistemologically wrong. In addition, Luhmann’s theory is argued to have other shortcomings, namely: the failure to understand the pragmatic function of principles, and the incapacity to describe the current legal questions linked with cultures and legal pluralism, which characterise our society.     

The role of coherence in legal reasoning

Many contemporary philosophers of law agree that a necessary condition for a decision to be legally justified, even in a hard case, is that it coheres with established law. Some, namely Sartorius and Dworkin, have gone beyond that relatively uncontroversial claim and described the role of coherence in legal justification as analogous to its role in moral and scientific justification, on contemporary theories. In this, I argue, they are mistaken. Specifically, coherence in legal justification is sometimes specific to a branch of law, and there is nothing isomorphic to this in the models of moral and scientific justification. Although Dworkin and Sartorius rely on the concept of coherence, they do not explicate it. In the course of examining their views, this essay offers a partial analysis of coherence on their models. Finally, two canons of relevance, governing when global coherence considerations are appropriate to legal justification, are presented.     

David Dyzenhaus and the Holy Grail

Abstract
In his book Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems David Dyzenhaus aims to provide a cogent refutation of legal positivism, and thus to settle a very old dispute in jurisprudence. His claim is that the consequences for practice and for morality if judges adopt positivist ideas in a wicked legal system are unacceptable. He discusses the South African legal system as a case in point. I argue that this claim is not secured. Dyzenhaus has three arguments for his view. The first is that positivism cannot account for legal principles, and legal principles are the key source of morally acceptable adjudication. I show that his argument does not go through for sophisticated positivist accounts of "principles" such as those of J. Raz and D. N. MacCormick. Dyzenhaus's second argument claims to find a pragmatic contradiction in positivism, between the belief in judicial discretion and the belief in a commitment to legislative sources as binding fact. I argue that there is no such commitment in a form that supports Dyzenhaus's theory. His final argument is that wicked legal systems are contrary to the very idea of law and legality. I argue that a strong doctrine of deference to legislative authority cannot be bad in itself: It can only be bad relative to a certain content to legislation. Thus Dyzenhaus's claim begs the question against positivism.     

Report of the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania on Congestion in Prisons

Since its formal inauguration in the year 2006, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) has arguably shown itself to be quite capable of effectively dispensing with its overarching aims of consistency, coherence and legal certainty in the process of adjudication. Indeed, through the adoption of a teleological approach to the construction of the Revised Treaty of Chaguramas, the CCJ has positioned itself as a major operational component in the new Caribbean legal order, serving, as the European Court of Justice as well as several domestic courts have done, to ensure transparency and accountability. The court’s relatively nuanced purpose-driven approach has arguably been the single biggest contributing factor to the region’s quickly evolving ‘indigenous jurisprudence’. Nevertheless, some of the court’s most recent original jurisdiction decisions reveal a growing trend towards judicial restraint. The varying degrees to which the CCJ has adopted a teleological approach to the interpretation of the Revised Treaty of Chaguramas, the concomitant effects of this important development as well as the challenges which invariably arise in this connection are the subject of this article.