Anti‐suit Injunctions and the Doctrine of Comity

Hin‐Pro International Logistics Limited v CSAV is an important case in the areas of anti‐suit injunctions, contractual interpretation and private international law. Despite the ambiguities surrounding the jurisdiction clause contained in the bills of lading, the Court of Appeal construed the jurisdiction clause as ‘exclusive’ in the context of a ‘contractual background’, and affirmed the continuation of the anti‐suit injunction granted by the Commercial Court. It is argued that the approach of applying the common law principles of contractual interpretation to a bill of lading is questionable. The approach used to apply English private international law is problematic in a number of ways. There are legitimate reasons for concern that the doctrine of comity in English private international law may become undermined as a result.     

The truth and the trial: victim participation,restorative justice,and the International Criminal Court

In the field of international criminal justice, the international criminal court (ICC) has been lauded for its integration of victim participants into its legal proceedings. In particular, the ICC’s framework of victim participation has been understood to figure as a balance between retributive and restorative justice as it enables the actual voices of the victims to be heard. However, there has been little research that considers how victim participation works in practice as a form of truth-telling. In order to begin to address this gap, the integration of the ‘voices of the victims’ into the proceedings and outcome of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is explored. The forms of harms and experiences that comprise the truth of the events under adjudication put forward by the victim participants are considered, and then how the truth-telling functions of the ICC represent these states of injury. While the ICC’s legal proceedings enable victims to speak of their harms and experiences, their ‘voices’ are largely absent from its judgment. To address this issue, the ICC needs to develop and maintain a level of ‘restorative justice coherence’ to manage victims’ expectations of its justice approaches.     

Rectification of the Register – Prospective or Retrospective?

In Gold Harp v MacLeod the Court of Appeal considered paragraph 8 of Schedule 4 of the Land Registration Act 2002 and interpreted this provision to mean that the priority between mistakenly de‐registered interests and registered interests can be altered following rectification. The court can give the de‐registered interest the priority which it ‘would have had’ but for the mistake. In other words, it allows for retrospective rectification. This case note concludes that this is the correct interpretation of paragraph 8 and of the words ‘for the future’. However, it argues that the current range of options available to the court in terms of rectification are producing uncertainty, and that a better approach may be to rely on the priority provisions in sections 28 and 29.     

Statutory interpretation and the counterfactual test for legislative intention

In this paper I examine the counterfactual test for legislative intention as used in Riggs v. Palmer. The distinction between the speaker's meaning approach and the constructive interpretation approach to statutory interpretation, as made by Dworkin in Law's Empire, is explained. I argue that Dworkin underestimates the potential of the counterfactual test in making the speaker's meaning approach more plausible. I also argue that Dworkin's reasons for rejecting the counterfactual test, as proposed in Law's Empire, are either too weak or unsound. A deeper reason for rejecting the counterfactual test as a method for the speaker's meaning approach is proposed in this paper. The difference between the counterfactual test and other tests for legislative intention which seem also to make use of counterfactual conditions in explained.     

Interpreting Statutory Purpose – Lessons from Yemshaw v Hounslow London Borough Council

Yemshaw v Hounslow LBC is a significant case in the fields of housing and family law, as well as giving rise to important issues as to the judicial role and statutory interpretation more broadly. This note critically analyses the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Yemshaw, in which the principal issue was whether the definition of ‘violence’ for the purposes of the Housing Act 1996 extended to non‐physical as well as physical forms of harm. In rejecting the view of the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court adopted a wider definition of violence to encompass emotional and psychological as well as financial abuse. This commentary adopts a fresh stance by examining closely the context surrounding the enactment of the Housing Act 1996 and how this informs the question of statutory interpretation. In so doing, the author suggests that the interpretation employed by the court is significantly undermined.     

Following Legal Rules: Visibility and Feasibility

This paper reflects on the idea of ‘visualization’ of legal rules as part of an account of rule following in action. Presenting an alternative to Van Schooten’s (Jurisprudence and communication. Deborah Charles, Liverpool, 2012) account of interpretation, I first distinguish between two modes of interpretation: rehearsing and discursive. I argue that the former is the more basic one, relating to our respecting sources, rather than noticing signs, in action. In other (Wittgensteinian) words, we have to understand how we take guidance from rules. This account can profit from an analysis of what ‘seeing’ amounts to. Taking my cue from Merleau-Ponty, I point to the intertwinement between agent and world in seeing, in rule-following, and eventually in legal rule-following. The proof of the pudding is an alternative account of the time-honoured paradigm of legal interpretation: Hart’s ‘no vehicles in the park’. I show how this example is predicated on detecting ‘depth-clues’ in a rule, which allow an agent to correlate his vantage point to a vanishing point of a rule. The example illustrates a key-feature of rule following: reflexivity. I cannot follow a rule unless I project myself into its picture.     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

When a ‘Like’ Is Not a ‘Like’: A New Fragmented Approach to Data Controllership

In Fashion ID, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) held that an operator of a website featuring a Facebook ‘Like’ button is a data controller under EU Directive 95/46 (‘Directive’) jointly with Facebook in respect of the collection and transmission of the personal data of website visitors to Facebook, but Facebook alone is a data controller for any subsequent data processing. While the CJEUs expansive interpretation of joint controllership aims to leave ‘no gaps’ in the protection of individuals, we question whether the proposed solution to ‘fragment’ controllership into different stages of processing helps to achieve that goal. We argue that CJEUs ‘fragmented’ approach is incompatible with the GDPR, as it does not reveal the intended purposes of data processing, and thus negates informed and specific consent. We suggest that such ‘fragmentation’ undermines the consistency, predictability and transparency of EU data protection law by obscuring the pervasiveness of data commodification in the digital economy.     

The NHS Information Revolution: ‘Choice of Control’ to ‘Choice’ and ‘Control’

This paper provides a novel and critical analysis of the necessary and important balance between ‘individual privacy’ and ‘collective transparency’. We suggest that the onset of the Information Revolution has created a dilemma for the National Health Service (NHS) in terms of how it addresses its obligation to use information to improve best practice in healthcare for society (‘collective transparency’) whilst also keeping sensitive personal information confidential (‘individual privacy’). There is clearly a need to consider both whether the NHS is balancing this critically important informational relationship and whether its approach is fit for purpose. We argue that the NHS's ‘proxy-individual’ information guardian role could inadvertently mask individuals' intended roles, effectively circumventing autonomy-based laws by limiting the power of individuals to be autonomous. In this article we have identified three issues – first the prevailing ‘Mindset’ (the ‘M’) of ‘privacy’, which is viewed as individualistic, resulting in an overpowering concept of confidentiality; second, the quality and control of Information (the first ‘I’); and third, the concept of innovation (the second ‘i’), which is being used as a ‘solution’ rather than a vehicle for transparency. Indeed, transparency is our target of ‘best practice,’ and we suggest that individual privacy and collective transparency are best embedded within a complementary privacy framework that offers a better fit than the current split of control between the roles of the NHS and the roles of the individual. It is suggested that when facilitated by transparency, ‘control’ and ‘privacy’ form a continuum, aligning through the desire for choice. Therefore, the choice of control could facilitate control and choice. Together, they could replace the concept of privacy by empowering ‘informed patients’ to support the NHS's ‘No decision about me, without me’ pledge.     

Mega/City/Crime: Notes on the Cultural Significance of Reggio’s Koyaanisqatsi (1982)

In his “non-narrative” film Koyaanisqatsi (Hopi for ‘life in imbalance’) Godfrey Reggio documents the ecologically disastrous ‘imbalanced’ life in modern, industrialised mega-cities. In the film, he seems to mourn the loss of what he suggests was a more ‘balanced’ form of life, when Man was one with nature. This contribution draws on elements in Hopi culture and reads Reggio’s iconic film as part of a cultural trend in which submission, in all its guises, is no longer accepted. In this cultural trend submission always is submission to code (that is: to a certain structured solidity or ordered coherence), and therefore, to wasteful destruction and to ‘life in imbalance’. This trend has, however, in the course of the decades, also spawned a void of “Luciferian” desires of absolute sovereignty, and has done this to such an extent as to undermine the conditions of possibility for anything like a non-submissive life ‘in balance’ to endure.

     

Interpreting the Political Theory in the Practice of Human Rights

In this discussion of The Heart of Human Rights, I support Allen Buchanan’s pursuit of a theory-in-practice methodology for interpreting the foundations and meaning of international legal human rights from within the practice. Following my use of that methodology, I recharacterize the theory of rights revealed by this methodology as political not moral. I clarify the import of this interpretation of international legal human rights for two problems that trouble Buchanan: (1) whether the scope of ‘basic equal status’ is a global or an ‘intrasocial’ standard and (2) whether there is a ‘proliferation’ of rights that risks undermining the legitimacy of international legal human rights. I argue that the scope of basic equal status is global and that the practice of making what he calls ‘new’ rights claims is part of the practice of human rights.     

Realism about the Nature of Law

Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non‐cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis (in a fairly broad sense) is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti‐metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non‐cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the nature of law. I argue (i) that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and (ii) that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, (iii) that the objection to non‐naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values (the ‘world of the ought’) and the world of time and space—is convincing, and (iv) that Kelsen's introduction of a so‐called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue (v) that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue (vi) that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms.     

Merger—the name of the FE game

In the Australian legal environment today the overwhelming importance of laws made by Parliament is obvious, yet many first year law programmes pay insufficient attention to the coordinated teaching of statutory interpretation (SI). This project formed part of a collaborative initiative between an educational developer and the coordinator of legal research methods (LRM) to introduce statutory interpretation into a first year unit of study. Our study used a qualitative research framework – a questionnaire was administered to students at two intervals throughout the first semester. In Week 3, 160 students participated in the questionnaire and at Week 4, a keystone module on statutory interpretation using a building block approach was introduced in LRM. Since the nature of assessment in LRM is largely reflection, this unit lent itself well to investigating the language and literacy challenges of statutory interpretation, in particular, to students monitoring their own progress in this regard. The overall aim of the project was to establish a framework for students to build on their knowledge and understanding of statutory interpretation throughout their undergraduate studies, and in the interests of improved learning and teaching outcomes, for staff to be able to document the changes in student thinking. This paper focuses on the preliminary stage of our investigation into the language and literacy challenges involved in introducing statutory interpretation into a first year unit of study.

I know of only one authority which might justify the suggested method of construction. “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s all.”

(Alice Through the Looking Glass, c. vi.)

After all this long discussion, the question is whether the words “If a man has” can mean “If a man thinks he has.” I am of opinion that they cannot, and that the case should be decided accordingly.

(Lord Atkin in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206)     

Does contextual information bias bitemark comparisons?

A growing body of research suggests that the interpretation of fingerprint evidence is open to contextual bias. While there has been suggestion in the literature that the same might apply to bitemarks – a form of identification evidence in which a degree of contextual information during the comparison phase is generally unavoidable – there have so far been no empirical studies to test this assertion. We explored dental and non-dental students' ability to state whether two bitemarks matched, while manipulating task ambiguity and the presence and emotional intensity of additional contextual information. Provision of the contextual information influenced participants' decisions on the ambiguous bitemarks. Interestingly, when participants were presented with highly emotional images and subliminally primed with the words ‘same’ and ‘guilty’, they made fewer matches relative to our control condition. Dental experience also played a role in decision-making, with dental students making more matches as the experiment progressed, regardless of context or task ambiguity. We discuss ways that this exploratory research can be extended in future studies.     

Interpretation of Unilateral Acts in International Law

The article explores the question of interpretation of unilateral acts in international law both from the perspective of ascertaining their binding force (law determination) and from the perspective of ascertaining their content (content determination). It argues that the objective intention of the author to be bound is what distinguishes binding commitments of unilateral origin from non-binding ones. In turn, this involves the interpretation of a unilateral act in accordance with its content and the circumstances surrounding its making. In practice, the use of clear and specific wording in conjunction with a set of contextual indicators are indicia of the intention to create a binding unilateral commitment. Against this backdrop, the article continues by addressing the question of interpretation of unilateral acts from the standpoint of ascertaining their content. It shows that the text of the act is the primary consideration in determining its content—and that its context as well as the circumstances surrounding its making are also interpretative elements that need to be taken into account. Due to the unilateral origin of these acts the interpretative rule applicable to international agreements can only be used as a point of reference when it comes to interpreting the content of these acts. In this light, the article concludes that more practice is needed in order to elucidate the exact role and weight that should be ascribed to non-textual elements in the context of interpreting unilateral acts. At the same time, the article argues in favour of adopting a broader approach to the concept of ‘interpretation’ in international law. Viewing interpretation not merely as content determination but also as law ascertainment allows us to better assess the persuasive value of arguments in favour or against certain interpretative rules when practice is scant—as is the case with unilateral acts.

     

Privacy and Search Engines: Forgetting or Contextualizing?

This article considers the much‐criticized ‘right to be forgotten’ in the context of the European Court of Justice's judgment in the Google Spain case. It defends the ‘right to be forgotten’ as a metaphor that can provide us with a better understanding of the particular privacy concerns of the search‐engine age and their interaction with the freedom to access information, and draws on Goffman's idea of ‘information games’ and Nissenbaum's theory of ‘contextual integrity’. While supporting the principles that underpin the judgment, the article rejects the Court's binary approach of ‘forgetting’ versus ‘remembering’ personal information. Instead, it argues that the EU legislator should introduce more nuanced means of addressing modern privacy concerns. By establishing two remedies – ‘delisting’ or ‘reordering’, depending on the nature of the information – online information flows can be adjusted to preserve both the right to privacy and the freedom to access information in more contextually appropriate ways.     

Belize It or Not: Implied Contract Terms in Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas

In Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas, the Supreme Court restated the law on the implication of terms in fact, rejecting the previously authoritative approach taken by Lord Hoffmann in Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd. This article examines two major departures from Belize in Lord Neuberger's leading judgment: the treatment of implication as a process separate from interpretation, and a return to the ‘traditional tests’ for the implication of terms. It argues that these are retrogressive steps in our understanding of contract terms, which risk fostering an incoherent and unprincipled approach to the law.     

Extending the Confusion About Bayes

In R v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439, [2011] 1 Cr App Rep 85, the Court of Appeal indicated that ‘mathematical formulae’, such as likelihood ratios, should not be used by forensic scientists to analyse data where firm statistical evidence did not exist. Unfortunately, when considering the forensic scientist's evidence, the judgment consistently commits a basic logical error, the ‘transposition of the conditional’ which indicates that the Bayesian argument has not been understood and extends the confusion surrounding it. The judgment also fails to distinguish between the validity of the relationships in a formula and the precision of the data. We explain why the Bayesian method is the correct logical method for analysing forensic scientific evidence, how it works and why ‘mathematical formulae’ can be useful even where firm statistical data is lacking.     

Grasping Snakes and Touching Elephants: A Rejoinder to Garfield and Siderits

Some time ago I advanced on the pages of this journal a critique of the interpretation given by Jay L. Garfield and Mark Siderits (hereafter GS) of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two truths (Ferraro, J Indian Philos 41(2):195–219, 2013.1); to my article the two authors responded with a ‘defense of the semantic interpretation’ of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (GS, J Indian Philos 41(6):655–664, 2013). Their reply, however, could not consider my personal understanding of Nāgārjuna’s notions of ?ūnyatā and dve satye. My interpretation of these notions was in fact absent in the paper GS responded, and was only related in a second paper of mine (Ferraro, J Indian Philos 41(5):563–590, 2013.2), still unpublished at the time of GS’s drafting of their ‘defense’. Therefore, in the present rejoinder, I found it appropriate, rather than responding point by point to the passages of GS’s reply, to advance a comparison between the semantic interpretation and my ‘realist antimetaphysical’ understanding of Nāgārjuna’s thought.