Theorizing Sovereignty and European Integration

This article examines the relationship between the concept of sovereignty and the process of European integration. It is argued that the nature of this relationship has been both mutually informative and transformative. As a particular understanding of sovereignty has influenced and determined the perception of European integration, i.e., its conceptualization, so the process of European integration has reflected back on sovereignty and entailed its rethinking. This poses a particular challenge for legal theorists: how to pin down the meaning of sovereignty and European integration so as to put both in the best conceptual and normative light. The article begins by looking at the traditional perspective on sovereignty and how this has been challenged by European integration. The focus then shifts from sovereignty to European integration in order to examine how different perspectives on sovereignty, when used as an epistemic lens for understanding the process of European integration, have produced uneven conceptions of this integration. Finally, the article concludes by making a choice between the various conceptions of sovereignty and European integration. It is argued that the best conception of European integration is offered by the constitutional form of a union founded on pluralist sovereignty.     

European Integration: Popular Sovereignty and a Politics of Boundaries

The problem raised by popular sovereignty in the framework of the EU is not whether it is relevant to European integration; it is. The problem is another, namely the identity and, thus, the boundary of a democratic polity. The very idea of ‘European’ integration suggests that integration is only imaginable by reference to the closure provided by an identity, a boundary that is normative rather than merely geographical. In this minimal sense, a European people is the necessary presupposition of integration, not merely its telos. Bluntly, there is no integration without inclusion and, also, no integration without exclusion. This, then, is the real problem raised by popular sovereignty in a European context: if there is no such thing as non‐exclusionary integration, how can a reflection on the boundedness of European integration be more than a rationalisation of exclusion?     

Becoming a Threat: The Burqa and the Contestation Over Public Morality Law in France

Through an examination of legislative debate and court opinions, this article illustrates that the French understanding of public order policing as a bulwark of freedom and national sovereignty deeply informed the development of (and contestation surrounding) the 2010 ban on all facial coverings in public. This ban notably includes the burqa or niqab, garments worn by a small minority of Muslim women in France. This article has two aims. The first is to expand on the sociolegal argument about the contested nature of rights protections and constitutional constraints on legislative authority by highlighting how a nation's legal culture can profoundly shape that contestation. The second aim of this article is to show, through a technique called legal archaeology, how longstanding French views on rights confront current European‐inspired alternative views that would give more weight to individualistic protections against state action than has traditionally been the case in France.     

Multiple Sovereignty: On Europe's Self-Constitutionalization and Legal Self-Reference

This article focuses on theoretical reflections on sovereignty and constitutionalism in the context of the globalization and Europeanisation of the nation states, their politics, and legal systems. Starting from a critical assessment of the Kelsen-Schmitt polemic, the author claims that sovereignty needs to be analysed by the sociological method in order to disclose its current structural differentiation. The constitution of society may be imagined as the multitude of self-constituted and functionally differentiated social subsystems. The constitutional pluralism argument subsequently reconceptualizes sovereignty as socially differentiated and divided between specific subsystems. The EU's differentiated constitutional domain and the paradox of divided sovereignty are used as examples of profound structural and semantic changes in contemporary national and transnational societies. While the sovereign nation-state institutions have become marginalized in political structures of European societies, the self-constitutionalization of the functionally differentiated EU legal system proceeds by internalizing the concept of divided sovereignty and using it semantically as its mode of self-reference.     

Constitutionalism and Dissonances: Has Europe Paid Off Its Debt to Functionalism?

Abstract The negative outcomes of the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty have opened a period of profound constitutional disenchantment in relation to the EU. This impression seems confirmed by the recent Presidency Conclusions of the European Council which, although salvaging many important solutions contained in the Constitutional Treaty, explicitly sanction that ‘the constitutional concept . . . is abandoned’. In the light of this context, what role could the constitutional scholarship play? How to make sense of a polity in which the claims of constitutionalism as a form of power are politically unappealing though legally plausible? This article tries to respond to these questions by reaffirming functionalism as a valid analytical and normative perspective in facing the current constitutional reality of European integration. The analytical value associated with functionalism is evidenced by testing against the current context of the EU legal framework the accounts for EU constitutionalism which postulate functional equivalence between the EU and the Member States. The normative potential of functionalism, then, is discussed by arguing that there may be a value worth preserving in a degree of functional discrepancy between the EU and state constitutionalism and, notably, that the transformative and civilising dividend inherent in functionalism could still be exploited, at least in certain areas of EU policy making. Finally, the article suggests that the difficulties in accounting for EU constitutionalism in the light of state‐centred constitutional theory could be regarded as symptoms of European integration marking a moment in the theoretical evolution of constitutionalism.     

European Union Constitution-Making, Political Identity and Central European Reflections

Abstract: This article focuses on the European Union's constitution‐making efforts and their specific reflections in the Central European accession states. It analyses both the temporal and spatial dimensions of constitution‐making and addresses the problems of political identity related to ethnic divisions and civic demos. It starts by summarising the major arguments supporting the Union's constitution‐making project and emphasises the Union's symbolic power as a polity built on the principles of civil society and parliamentary democracy. The EU's official rejection of ethnically based political identity played an important symbolic role in post‐Communist constitutional and legal transformations in Central Europe in the 1990s. In the following part, the text analyses the temporal dimension of the EU's identity‐building and constitution‐making and emphasises its profoundly future‐oriented structure. The concept of identity as the ‘future in process’ is the only option of how to deal with the absence of the European demos. Furthermore, it initiates the politically much‐needed constitution‐making process. The following spatial analysis of this process emphasises positive aspects of the horizontal model of constitution‐making, its elements in the Convention's deliberation and their positive effect on the Central European accession states. The article concludes by understanding the emerging European identity as a multi‐level identity of civil political virtues surrounded by old loyalties and traditions, which supports the conversational model of liberal democratic politics, reflects the continent's heterogeneity and leads to the beneficial combination of universal principles and political realism.     

Constitutional pluralism: Chronicle of a death foretold?

What remains of the idea of constitutional pluralism in the wake of the Euro‐crisis? According to the new anti‐pluralists, the recent OMT saga signals its demise, calling to an end the tense stalemate between the ECJ and the German Constitutional Court on the question of ultimate authority. With the ECJ's checkmate, OMT represents a new stage in the constitutionalisation of the European Union, towards a fully monist order. Since constitutional pluralism was an inherently unstable and undesirable compromise, that is both inevitable and to be welcomed. It is argued here that this is misguided in attending to the formal at the expense of the material dimension of constitutional development. The material perspective reveals a deeply dysfunctional constitutional dynamic, of which the judicial battle in OMT is merely a surface reflection. This dynamic now reaches a critical conjuncture, encapsulated in the debate over ‘Grexit’, and the material conflict between solidarity and austerity. Constitutional pluralism, in conclusion, may be an idea worth defending, but as a normative plea for the co‐existence of a horizontal plurality of constitutional orders. This requires radical constitutional re‐imagination of the European project.     

Plurinational democracies in Europe: the quest for a profane constitutionalism

How should we understand the claims on the right to decide on status made within plurinational member states of the European Union by actors and institutions seeking to protect the self-government of sub-state nations or peoples, or at least their right to consent to their ascribed status? Peaceful solutions to conflicts involving contested claims over territory, citizenship, and national sovereignty (authority) can be found when a conceptual or cultural transformation takes place towards a pluralist and bottom-up or federal concept of plurinational democracy, recovering the centrality of self-determination as the self-assertion of a political community. Constitutional law based on the popular sovereignty of a majority nation within plurinational democracies often neglects the question of the definition of the demos as the prefigured constituency, and the existence of national or territorial minorities. If constitutions are interpreted as precluding any claim to self-determination by a constituency, and any debate about that claim, then an undemocratic, sacralized model of militant constitutionalism may emerge. That model is not so much about protecting democracy as it is about imposing a national mould, a pre-defined demos. This article revisits the claims of sovereignty made by national territorial minorities in Spain, against the background of the constitutional doctrine of the Spanish judiciary that precludes these constituencies from engaging in political debates on the right to decide. The resulting sacralization of the Constitution leads to a new version of the model of ‘militant democracy’, a militant nationalist constitutionalism, which can be countered by an alternative, secular, even profane approach to the Constitution.     

Constitutionalism,populism, and the imaginary of the authentic polity: a socio-legal analysis of European public spheres and constitutional demoicratization

The sociology of constitutionalism emphasizes the duality of constitutions as both power limitations and power enhancements. Following the socio-legal perspective, this article focuses on the constitutional imaginary of the public sphere and distinguishes it from the imaginary of the authentic polity, in which the constituent power of the people is protected against the corrupting effect of representative institutions and technocratic bodies. The promise of authenticity is behind the recent resurgence of populism and the constitution of what Zygmunt Bauman describes as ‘explosive communities’. The final part of the article focuses on the transnational politics and law of the European Union (EU) and discusses its possible responses to the imaginaries of constitutional populism – most notably, the emergence of European public spheres and demoicracy. Without the constitutional imaginaries of an anti-explosive transnational and democratically constituted community, further enhancement of the power of EU institutions will always lead to populist backlash at the national and local levels of its member states.     

Incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK Law: Implications for education

This article focuses on the UK government's proposal to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law, and the consequences of incorporation for the individual in the context of education. The first part of the article explores the mechanisms proposed for bringing about incorporation, and stresses in particular the importance attached by the government to upholding the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of the UK Parliament. In this context it emphasises the government's decision to deny to the British courts the capacity to strike down legislative provisions as being incompatible with Convention rights. The second part of the article goes on to explore (highly selectively) a number of key areas in which incorporation of the ECHR has the potential to enhance individual rights in the field of education, including parental choice of school, collective worship and religious education, and aspects of the secular curriculum. The discussion emphasises strongly the likely significance of the UK government's reservation to the second sentence of Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. Broadly, the conclusion drawn is that the incorporation of the Convention will have only a very marginal impact on the reality of individual rights to education.     

El Control De Convencionalidad Y Su Relación Con El Sistema Constitucional Mexicano. Hacia Una Simple Actividad Protectora De Los Derechos Humanos

This article deals with subjects referent to constitutional control and conventionality control in Mexico and its respective aspects. Our study proposes an interpretative mechanic that touches the idea of monopoly in behalf of the state in the subject of recognizing and protecting human rights, to allow a wide vision where any authority or citizen are able to exercise a protective human rights activity. We also pretend to show the inadequacy, at the moment, of moving into a conventional supremacy, without leaving out the analysis of subjects relative to sovereignty and constitutional supremacy.     

Examining the Aesthetic Dimensions of the Constitutional Treaty

Abstract:  One of the most important issues surrounding the new Constitutional Treaty is the extent to which it will be able to generate a greater popular identification with the European integration project. This article explores this issue in more depth by looking at the role of popular identification in securing polity legitimacy in general. An argument is then developed that although popular identification and polity legitimacy are often separated, from a practical point of view, it is preferable to think of polity legitimacy in such a way as to incorporate questions of identity and affectivity. The article then outlines a way in which such a theory can be constructed, termed an 'aesthetic' theory of political legitimacy. Such a theory is then applied to understand both the EU as a distinctive type of post-state polity and the role that the constitutional tradition might play in securing its legitimacy.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

The Institutional Requirements of the WTO in an Era of Globalisation: Imperfections in the Global Economic Polity

To the liberal economist, ‘globalisation’ denotes the virtuous circle of expanded trade, investment and economic growth around the globe. In the political world, ‘globalisation’ is the vaguely understood and yet powerful undercurrents of irrevocable economic changes which have generated social tensions and environmental damage, loss of domestic competitiveness and national sovereignty. Throughout the social sciences, the usage of the term ‘globalisation’ is largely inconsistent and inconclusive—but its imprecision is matched only by its popularity. This article suggests that globalisation should be understood as a reconstruction process of the market as well as the polity. It is essentially a form of global market integration which can be observed from different vantage points, including governance. The premise of the article is that global market integration is surprisingly fragile and requires an adequate institutional foundation in order to move forward. Globalisation and governance are mutually constitutive phenomena. The polity governing the global market integration process cannot be separated in any meaningful sense from the changes in the market itself. This article concerns the institutional requirements of globalisation. While globalisation has produced institutional changes, it has not necessarily produced the most effective or legitimate ones. Exactly what polity construction should underpin globalisation? Should globalisation be left ungoverned? Should existing institutions be improved? Does it require the establishment of supranational sites and the re‐construction of hierarchical legal order at global level?     

Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro‐Crisis

This article analyses how the European Union's response to the euro‐crisis has altered the constitutional balance upon which its stability is based. It argues that the stability and legitimacy of any political system requires the structural incorporation of individual and political self‐determination. In the context of the EU, this requirement is met through the idea of constitutional balance, with ‘substantive’, ‘institutional’ and ‘spatial’ dimensions. Analysing reforms to EU law and institutional structure in the wake of the crisis – such as the establishment of the ESM, the growing influence of the European Council and the creation of a stand‐alone Fiscal Compact – it is argued that recent reforms are likely to have a lasting impact on the ability of the EU to mediate conflicting interests in all three areas. By undermining its constitutional balance, the response to the crisis is likely to dampen the long‐term stability and legitimacy of the EU project.     

National Constitutional Courts in supranational litigation: A contextual analysis

The article examines the role of national constitutional courts in supranational litigation. It firstly illustrates their value and situates well‐known judicial doctrines affecting their jurisdiction in the context of the normative claims, policy agenda and institutional framework promoted by the European Union. Against this background, it gauges the potential of national constitutional courts in countering the process of intergovernmental and technocratic encroachment of national constitutional democracies characterising the most recent evolutionary stages of the European integration process. It is claimed that constitutional courts are in the position of reinforcing, resisting or correcting Union measures with a detrimental impact on national constitutional principles. After having identified in correction the approach more coherent with their constitutional mandate, the article highlights a disturbing paradox: in remaining faithful to their constitutional role, constitutional courts contribute to the sustainability of a comprehensive institutional setting corroding the idea of constitutional democracy on which they are premised.     

欧洲近现代历史上宪政民主政制的生成、建构与演进

宪政民主政制与社会经济发展之间的关系,是一个值得深入进行理论探讨和实证研究的新课题。本文对西方宪政民主的起源、生成与演变史做了一个鸟瞰式的回顾,为探究宪政民主与经济发展之间的关系提供一些背景知识。在从词源和辞义上辨析了西方文字中的"constitution"以及以及与之对应的中文"宪法"和"宪政"的基本含义之后,本文对英国、法国和德国近现代宪政民主政制的生成、建构和演变史做了一些简略的历史考察,并在最后一部份对近现代欧洲历史上宪政民主政制下的法律制度的生成原因做了理论的和历史的分析。     

Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint

This article offers a new interpretation – the ‘constitutional constraint’ model – of the duty the Human Rights Act imposes on the courts to give horizontal effect to European Convention rights through the common law. The model requires courts to develop the common law compatibly with the Convention, but only where compatibility can be achieved by incremental development. We argue that models requiring more than incremental development are unsustainable; that deep constitutional norms compel the constraint of incrementalism, which is preserved under the HRA; and that by virtue of section 2 of the HRA, Convention rights function as principles rather than hard‐edged rights in this context. This further undermines the idea that the courts must strictly apply Convention rights and cannot allow them to be overridden by non‐Convention factors. The final section explores the nature of incrementalism in this context and the impact of the model on the doctrine of judicial precedent.     

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court,the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor1

The ECJ has long asserted its Kompetenz‐Kompetenz (the question of who has the authority to decide where the borders of EU authority end) based on the Union treaties which have always defined its role as the final interpreter of EU law. Yet, no national constitutional court has accepted this position, and in its Lisbon Judgment of 2009 the German Constitutional Court (FCC) has asserted its own jurisdiction of the final resort' to review future EU treaty changes and transfers of powers to the EU on two grounds: (i) ultra vires review, and (ii) identity review. The FCC justifies its claim to constitutional review with reference to its role as guardian of the national constitution whose requirements will constrain the integration process as a standing proviso and limitation on all transfers of national power to the EU for as long as the EU has not acquired the indispensable core of sovereignty, i.e. autochthonous law‐making under its own sovereign powers and constitution, and instead continues to derive its own power from the Member States under the principle of conferral. Formally therefore, at least until such time, the problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz affords of no solution. It can only be ‘managed’, which requires the mutual forbearance of both the ECJ and FCC which both claim the ultimate jurisdiction to decide the limits of the EU's powers—a prerogative which, if asserted by both parties without political sensitivity, would inevitably result in a constitutional crisis. The fact that no such crisis has occurred, illustrates the astute political acumen of both the FCC and the ECJ.