The Persistent Significance of Jurisdiction*

According to Joseph Raz's sources thesis, the existence and content of authoritative directives must be identifiable by resort to the social fact of their provenance from a de facto authority, without regard to any of the normative considerations that the authority in question is supposed to rely on in its judgment. This article argues that the sources thesis fails to account for the role of jurisdictional considerations (namely, considerations about the scope of a de facto authority's power) in the identification of valid law. It examines a legal system with a legislature and courts and a practice of constitutional review of legislation by the courts for its conformity with fundamental rights and argues that the special normative status of (at least some) authoritative directives in this legal system depends on respect for jurisdiction. An assessment of whether an authority has stayed intra vires involves recourse to the normative considerations that it is the authority's job to weigh up. This criticism of the sources thesis highlights the importance of incorporating jurisdiction into our philosophical accounts of legal authority.     

Constitutional literacy in Africa: challenges and prospects

The issue of constitutional literacy has attracted very little attention in scholarship on constitutionalism in Africa. This is not surprising, because the early constitutions were virtually imposed by the departing colonial powers and perceived as alien, not only by the ordinary citizens but also the new leaders, who had little knowledge or experience of constitutional governance. Have the new generation of ‘made-in-Africa’ constitutions changed the state of constitutional literacy on the continent? In addressing this question, the paper examines the concept of constitutional literacy and, using the example of South Africa, considers ways in which it could be promoted. The paper also considers the challenges to promoting constitutional literacy. It concludes by underlining the fact that strengthening the democratic constitutional foundations laid in the 1990s, foundations increasingly under threat today, requires a comprehensive programme of constitutional education, with a focus on the poor and other marginalised groups in society. Without knowledge and awareness of constitutional rights, citizens will not be able to vindicate their rights or challenge any violation of them.     

Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order

The European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) jurisprudence of fundamental rights in cases such as Schmidberger and Omega extends the court's jurisdiction in ways that compete with that of Member States in matters of visceral concern. And just as the Member States require a guarantee that the ECJ respect fundamental rights rooted in national tradition, so the ECJ insists that international organisations respect rights constitutive of the EU. The demand of such guarantees reproduces between the ECJ and the international order the kinds of conflicting jurisdictional claims that have shadowed the relation between the ECJ and the courts of the Member States. This article argues that the clash of jurisdiction is being resolved by the formation of a novel order of coordinate constitutionalism in which Member States, the ECJ, the European Court of Human Rights and other international tribunals or organisations agree to defer to one another's decisions, provided those decisions respect mutually agreed essentials. This coordinate order extends constitutionalism beyond its home territory in the nation state through a jurisprudence of mutual monitoring and peer review that carefully builds on national constitutional traditions, but does not create a new, encompassing sovereign entity. The doctrinal instruments by which the plural constitutional orders are, in this way, profoundly linked without being integrated are variants of the familiar Solange principles of the German Constitutional Court, by which each legal order accepts the decisions of the others, even if another decision would have been more consistent with the national constitution tradition, ‘so long as’ those decisions do not systematically violate its own understanding of constitutional essentials. The article presents the coordinate constitutional order being created by this broad application of the Solange doctrine as an instance, and practical development, of what Rawls called an overlapping consensus: agreement on fundamental commitments of principle—those essentials which each order requires the others to respect—does not rest on mutual agreement on any single, comprehensive moral doctrine embracing ideas of human dignity, individuality or the like. It is precisely because the actors of each order acknowledge these persistent differences, and their continuing influence on the interpretation of shared commitments in particular conflicts, that they reserve the right to interpret essential principles, within broad and shared limits, and accord this right to others. The embrace of variants of the Solange principles by many coordinate courts, in obligating each to monitor the others' respect for essentials, creates an institutional mechanism for articulating and adjusting the practical meaning of the overlapping consensus.     

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court,the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor1

The ECJ has long asserted its Kompetenz‐Kompetenz (the question of who has the authority to decide where the borders of EU authority end) based on the Union treaties which have always defined its role as the final interpreter of EU law. Yet, no national constitutional court has accepted this position, and in its Lisbon Judgment of 2009 the German Constitutional Court (FCC) has asserted its own jurisdiction of the final resort' to review future EU treaty changes and transfers of powers to the EU on two grounds: (i) ultra vires review, and (ii) identity review. The FCC justifies its claim to constitutional review with reference to its role as guardian of the national constitution whose requirements will constrain the integration process as a standing proviso and limitation on all transfers of national power to the EU for as long as the EU has not acquired the indispensable core of sovereignty, i.e. autochthonous law‐making under its own sovereign powers and constitution, and instead continues to derive its own power from the Member States under the principle of conferral. Formally therefore, at least until such time, the problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz affords of no solution. It can only be ‘managed’, which requires the mutual forbearance of both the ECJ and FCC which both claim the ultimate jurisdiction to decide the limits of the EU's powers—a prerogative which, if asserted by both parties without political sensitivity, would inevitably result in a constitutional crisis. The fact that no such crisis has occurred, illustrates the astute political acumen of both the FCC and the ECJ.     

Constitutional Directives: Morally‐Committed Political Constitutionalism

About 37 state constitutions around the world feature non‐justiciable thick moral commitments (‘constitutional directives’). These directives typically oblige the state to redistribute income and wealth, guarantee social minimums, or forge a religious or secular identity for the state. They have largely been ignored in a constitutional scholarship defined by its obsession with the legitimacy of judicial review and hostility to constitutionalising thick moral commitments other than basic rights. This article presents constitutional directives as obligatory telic norms, addressed primarily to the political state, which constitutionalise thick moral objectives. Their full realisation—through increasingly sophisticated mechanisms designed to ensure their political enforcement—is deferred to a future date. They are weakly contrajudicative in that these duties are not directly enforced by courts. Functionally, they help shape the discourse over a state's constitutional identity, and regulate its political and judicial organs. Properly understood, they are a key tool to realise a morally‐committed conception of political constitutionalism.     

公正审判权的宪法性论说

从公正审判权在法律中的地位来看,公正审判权属于宪法性权利。公正审判权作为宪法性权利在许多国家的宪法中已经得到直接或间接的体现。公正审判权符合宪法权利的几个基本特征:公正审判权是公民所享有的重要的基本权利之一;公正审判权规制国家权力与公民权利之间的关系;公正审判权具有母体性;公正审判权是其他权利无法替代和不可转让的一项权利。     

Reconciling Constitutionalism with Power: Towards a Constitutional Nomos of Political Ordering

Drawing upon Hannah Arendt's and Carl Schmitt's theories on the relationship between nomos and boundary, this paper revisits how constitutionalism and political power are reconciled as constitutional ordering. It first analyzes constitutionalism in the light of political modernity. Indicating that political power grounded by constitutions is omnipotent, complementing and completing constitutionalism, the paper contends that an omnipotent constitutional ordering is anything but an unleashed Leviathan. It is argued that constitutional omnipotence is framed and thus constrained by a constitutional nomos, the matrix of which is a dual delimitation of boundaries, generational, and jurisdictional.     

宅基地管理与物权法的适用限度

对土地管理制度的既有讨论,通常是从宪法第10条出发,没有考虑宪法第6条对"生产资料的社会主义公有制"的规定,将"国家所有"与"集体所有"片面理解为民法所有权而忽视其所有制内涵。物权制度是所有制关系的法律反映,"生产资料的社会主义公有制"是超越新中国历部宪法和其它具体法律的基本宪法原则,运用物权规则完善宅基地管理制度,需以公有制为大前提。忽视公有制前提的物权化改革建议,陷入"私法‘宪法中立",的认识误区,加上对宅基地经济社会属性的误会,所提出的改革方案缺乏法理与现实依据。现有制度在实现社会财富公平分配、公共资源有效管理和农民权利保护等方面基本有效,下一步改革只需做局部调整而无需全盘重建。     

Educational policy of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht

This article analyses the jurisdiction of the German Federal Constitution Court over the basic rights of parents, pupils and private schools and the traditional interpretation of the term “supervision of schools by the state” in Art. 7 para 1 Grundgesetz. The term “school supervision by the state” is traditionally interpretated as the state's absolute rights with regard to organisation, planning, control and supervision of schools. The author argues for a new interpretation to limit such supervision to the question of the legality of school activities. Parents should have a free choice between private and state schools. For this it is necessary to give subsidies to private schools in a way that every pupil can enter a school without differentiation according to the social standards or the income of their parents. With these principles in mind, the German Federal Constitution Court tried in 1987 in exemplary fashion to harmonise the constitutional claim and the constitutional reality. However, its recent decisions cast doubt upon this positive assessment. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

人权的内核——兼论“以人为本”的宪法涵义

宪法上基本权利的保障有其基础理论和核心内容,西方实证宪法和宪政理论都肯定“人的尊严”构成了人权的内核。人的尊严是人权宪法保障的哲学依据,是人权生长的原点,是对基本权利限制的限制。“国家尊重和保障人权”是一种规范性表述,而非描述性表述,其中蕴含着一定的价值判断,表明“以人为本”已经从实证法形式上升为国家理念,构成了我国宪政制度建构的根本,是借鉴世界其他国家宪政和人权理论与制度的坚固基础。     

The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering the Reasons for Horizontality

This article analyses the horizontal effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Horizontal effect has been an integral part of the Union's application of fundamental rights, especially in the field of equality. However, the codification of fundamental rights in the Charter raises important questions as to how horizontal effect will continue to apply in the EU, particularly in the aftermath of the Court's reticent rulings in cases such as Dominguez and Association de Médiation Sociale. This article argues that the emphasis on prior approaches to horizontal effect in recent rulings fails to address the profound constitutional issues that the horizontal effect of a fundamental rights catalogue raises, which concern the role of private responsibility within the developing constitutional order of the European Union. It therefore calls for a more systematically theorised approach towards the horizontal application of fundamental rights under the Charter framework.     

Fundamental rights in the EU after Kadi and Al Barakaat

This article takes stock of the emerging scholarship on the European Court of Justice's 2008 Kadi decision and seeks to make sense of the court's apparent evasiveness towards international law. The article argues that Kadi is best understood as an act of civil disobedience prompted by the UN Security Council's misapplication of foundational principles of the international order. In turn, the court's forceful articulation of the stakes in this case signals a prioritisation of basic rights within the supranational constitutional architectonic. In this respect, the ‘domestic’ constitutional implications of Kadi are just as far reaching as its consequences for the EU's status as an actor under international law.     

Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment and Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection in Nigeria: Gbemre v. Shell Revisited

In recent years, there has been an increasing practice of incorporating the right to a healthy/clean environment into national constitutions. This practice can be found in various parts of the world. Importantly, the judiciary in many countries has not only enforced such a right but has increasingly tended to interpret other constitutionally guaranteed human rights, especially the right to life, to include the right to a healthy/clean environment. In Nigeria, there are various environmental concerns which raise the question of environmental protection. This article seeks to consider recent developments in Nigeria in relation to the constitutional right to a healthy/clean environment – more specifically, the adoption of the human rights approaches to environmental protection by a Nigerian Federal High Court judge in deciding a case of alleged environmental damage.     

公民司法救济权的入宪问题之研究

司法救济权是宪法上的一项基本人权,其行使与保障首先需要由宪法做出安排。司法救济权与诉权在制度化的发展轨迹上有着明显的不同,司法救济权的入宪,绝不意味着是对诉权的简单重复。我国宪法并无关于司法救济权的直接规定,这种状况不仅淡化了宪法在保护公民司法救济权方面的功能,割裂了宪法与部门法之间在权利保护上的联系,也使得司法救济权这样一项基本人权被淹没在非基本权利之中而为人们所忽视甚至否定。基于司法救济权本身所固有的特定的宪法含义,只有将其纳入公民宪法权利的体系范畴之内,才能给予强有力的法律保障,也才能给各项具体诉讼法律制度的设计和运作提供最高依据和准则。     

The Constitutional Imagination

The constitutional imagination refers to the way we have been able to conceive the relationship between thought, text and action in the constitution of modern political authority. The lecture seeks to demonstrate how modern constitutional texts come to be invested with a ‘world‐making’ capacity. The argument is advanced first by explaining how social contract thinkers have been able to set the parameters of the constitutional imagination (thought), then by showing that constitutions are agonistic documents and their interpretative method is determined by a dialectic of ideology and utopia (text), and finally by examining the degree to which constitutions have been able to colonise the political domain, thereby converting constitutional aspiration into political reality (action). It concludes by suggesting that although we seem to be entering a constitutional age, this is an ambiguous achievement and whether the power of the constitutional imagination can still be sustained remains an open question.     

论基本权利的发展趋势

基本权利是宪法的核心和关键,是宪法的生命和价值所在,是宪法之所以成为根本法的原因.通过历史和实证分析,探讨近代宪法和现代宪法在确认和保障公民基本权利方面的若干发展趋势,即由自由权发展到社会权,由法律保障发展为宪法保障,由国内保障发展为国际保障.基本权利的这些发展趋势对我国的宪政制度建设提出了若干引人深思的问题.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

Eclipse of the Constitution {Europe Nouveau Siècle}

The Court of Justice of the European Union has come to adopt a peculiar mode of balancing, revolving around a set of ‘general principles of law’, which results in key social rights at the core of the postwar constitutional settlement no longer being sheltered from review by reference to supranational economic freedoms. It is submitted that this does not only imply a kind of ideological restyling of European law, as noted in the literature but, more fundamentally, the erosion of Europe's composite constitutional architecture (at once European and national) resulting from playing down social rights qua ‘constitutional essentials’. As the new jurisprudence ‘obscures’ Europe's constitutional constellation, it is submitted that the Court should rule under the constitution and not over it.     

基本权利的双重性质

在德国的宪法理论中,基本权利被认为具有“主观权利”与“客观法”的双重性质。除了作为个人权利的性质外,基本权利被认为是德国基本法所确立的“客观价值秩序”,是对国家权力产生直接约束力的法律。这一理论构成了对基本权利的宪法解释的基本框架,在此基础上,德国建构了一套严密的基本权利保障体系。这一理论对中国宪法的基本权利问题具有借鉴意义。     

Constitutional Competition Between the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal and the Chinese National People's Congress Standing Committee: A Game Theory Perspective

The competition between the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, a cosmopolitan common law supreme court, and the Chinese National People's Congress Standing Committee, a Leninist parliamentary body, over the “proper meaning” of the Hong Kong Basic Law constituted a very important facet of the territory's constitutional history since the end of British rule in 1997. This article applies the insights of game theory to explain why constitutional stability, in the sense that the two players have never entered into an open collision with each other despite the ambiguity of the Basic Law and the “One Country, Two Systems” formula, endured until the present day. It is argued that successful coordination between the two resulted from the strong aversion of the Court and the Standing Committee to constitutional crises, as well as from the fact that neither entity was capable of credibly signaling its commitment to an aggressive strategy all the time.