Democracy and emergency: finding the constitutional foundation of the knowledgeable state in social dynamics

This article aims to bring to light the law–society dynamic relationship in constitutional governance by engaging with the question of political constitutionalism from the perspective of institutional epistemology. It first reframes the debate surrounding legal and political constitutionalism as one concerning the state's ‘epistemic competence’ in governance shaped by the constitution, and then traces how constitutional ordering has given rise to the ‘knowledgeable state’ by setting a unique social dynamic in motion: the ‘epistemico-political constitution’. Using the example of the World Health Organization's initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a the article presents a two-part argument. First, constitutional ordering institutes a process of knowledge production embedded in the interaction between the state and society – a unique law–society dynamic – that responds to governance needs. Second, given the current law–society dynamic in the suprastate political landscape, the legitimacy challenge facing expertise-steered global governance is further intensified as more crisis responses are expected from outside the state.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law,Convention, Soft Law

The Governance of Britain Green Paper continues the programme of constitutional reform begun in 1997, and appears to reinforce the juridification of the UK's constitution. Nevertheless, several key reforms will be implemented not by legislation, but by creating new conventions. This article argues that such ‘declared’ conventions are best understood as a form of constitutional ‘soft law’, which attempt to influence constitutional behaviour rather than generating binding norms. Applying a regulatory analysis, it then argues that the case for a soft, rather than hard law approach to constitutional reform is weaker than its widespread use in the UK suggests. Finally, the article challenges the thesis that the political constitution is being replaced by a legal constitution, arguing that the government's attitude to constitutional reform still exhibits basic characteristics of political constitutionalism. Moreover, there is more to contemporary constitutional developments than a bipolar contest between political and legal constitutionalism.     

宪政基因概论——英美宪政生成路径的启示

宪政基因是具有历史传承性的 ,能够引起宪政产生并决定其性质与发展方向的基本的社会因素。英美宪政之所以能率先生成并成为其他国家的学习典范 ,一个至关重要的原因是英美社会中较早地生成了个人权利诉求、政治权力多元和法律至上的宪政基因。这些基因是宪政产生及发展的原始动力 ,体现为宪法中的人民主权、基本人权、分权与制衡以及法治等原则。缺乏宪政基因的东方国家 ,最重要的是在社会上有意识地移植和培养这种基因 ,否则即使制定了宪法 ,也未必能够很好地实施。     

Unpopular Sovereignty?

Popular sovereignty was presented in modern constitutional discourse as a mode of collective action. It was supposedly manifest in the power to constitute, control and dismantle governments. Important strands of contemporary constitutional theory, notably legal constitutionalism and deliberative democracy, have taken leave of this tradition. They have severed the connection between sovereignty and action. What remains of popular sovereignty is fundamental rights and values, or dispersed networks of deliberation. This is based on the the idea that the place of power is ‘empty’ and legitimised on the principle of including ‘All-Affected-Interests’. The very concept of sovereignty thus becomes unpopular. This contribution aims to re-establish the link between popular sovereignty and action by examining sovereignty's emancipatory telos, its majoritarian mode of operation and its dependence on political citizenship.     

西方宪政危机成因分析

西方宪政危机本质上是宪政内部矛盾运动的结果。具体到不同宪政国家,其宪政危机的发生,则各有其复杂而深刻的历史背景和现实原因。从世界近现代宪政史来看,宪政制度的缺失,国家权力秩序的失衡,国家权力的腐败,政治势力的恶斗,经济基础薄弱,社会发育不成熟等是导致宪政危机产生的主要因素。从政治、经济、社会等方面深入探讨宪政危机的成因,对于寻求化解和预防宪政危机的有效对策,促进宪政文明的健康发展有着十分重要的意义。     

Asking the Sovereignty Question in Global Legal Pluralism: From “Weak” Jurisprudence to “Strong” Socio‐Legal Theories of Constitutional Power Operations

The article examines recent theories of legal and constitutional pluralism, especially their adoption of sociological perspectives and criticisms of the concept of sovereignty. The author argues that John Griffiths's original dichotomy of “weak” and “strong” pluralism has to be reassessed because “weak” jurisprudential theories contain useful sociological analyses of the internal differentiation and operations of specific legal orders, their overlapping, parallel validity and collisions in global society. Using the sociological methodology of legal pluralism theories and critically elaborating on Teubner's societal constitutionalism, the author subsequently reformulates the question of sovereignty as a sociological problem of complex power operations communicated through the constitutional state's organization and reconfigured within the global legal and political framework.     

自由主义宪政观评析——兼论宪政的核心价值

上世纪90年代中期之后,自由主义宪政观理论被大量介绍进中国,为相当部分学者接受。自由主义宪政观否定宪政的核心价值是民主,主张宪政的核心价值是国家权力的有限性,是保护个人自由。他们所说的个人自由的核心权域是私有财产自由,他们所说的国家权力有限性实质是以私有财产制度为基础的经济活动自治性,自由民主政体也不是所谓共和政体而具有鲜明利益色彩,当代自由主义者将个人自由的制度保障寄托于给司法注入政治功能。我们坚持民主是宪政的核心价值,实质就是要坚持大多数人民的利益至上,规范、限制国家权力只能主要依靠民主进行,违宪审查也只能在民主制度的大框架内运作。     

政治文明与宪政的关系

政治文明是一个从物质文明和精神文明之中抽象出来的且相对独立的概念。从内涵上说 ,政治文明的核心是政治民主 ;从外延上说 ,政治文明包括政治观念的文明、政治规范的文明和政治秩序的文明。政治文明同宪政的关系表现为 :政治文明是宪政的前提和基础 ;宪政是政治文明的支柱和灵魂 ;现代政治文明发展的主流、本质和终极趋向是政治文明的宪法化和宪政文明。文章最后还讨论了政治文明与中国宪政的建构问题 :即建构“民主”与“宪政”的协调并用模式 ,重塑“权力”与“权利”的互动关系模式及完善“国家”和“社会”的二元结构模式     

作为宪政实践机制的合宪性审查

合宪性审查作为一种宪政实践机制,蕴涵了宪法的“高级法”观念、自然正义、宪法保障、分权与权力理性、宪政民主、人权保障等思想基础,集中展示它的宪政性与现代意义。为此,应当认真对待宪政生活中的合宪性,当前我国的关键问题不在于应否创制,而在于如何创制合宪性审查机制。     

European Constitutionalism and the Modern Social Imaginary

This article seeks to shed light on some of the problematic assumptions underpinning the contemporary debate over the constitutional identity of the European Union. The central claim put forward here is that the development of the European Union’s constitution is significantly constrained by what Charles Taylor has described as the modern social imaginary. The constraint operates at two levels. First, modern understandings of constitutionalism typically ignore or underemphasize its dynamic and historical characteristics and its relationship with the self-understanding of political subjects. Thus, modern constitutionalism fails to acknowledge the importance of historically conditioned assumptions involved in the formation of the identities of political subjects. In short, it fails to understand constitutionalism as a ‘regime’. Second, modern constitutionalism’s blind-spots result in a relatively unreflective adherence to a particular type of constitutional regime: the modern economy and its associated ‘consumerist’ form of political citizenship.     

Transnational constitutionalism – conflicts-law constitutionalism – economic constitutionalism: the exemplary case of the European Union

Transnational constitutionalism is both a sociological given and a legal challenge. We observe the emergence of ever more legally framed transnational arrangements with ever more power and impact. Do such arrangements deserve to be called legitimate rule in Habermasian terms? Is it at all conceivable that the proprium of law can be defended against the rise of its informal competitors? This article opts for a third way that listens to neither the siren songs on law beyond the state nor to the defences of nation-state constitutionalism as the monopolist of legitimate rule. The proposed alternative suggests that transnational legal ordering of the European Union should build on its reconceptualization as a ‘three-dimensional conflicts law’ with a democracy-enhancing potential. This reconceptualization operationalizes the ‘united in diversity’ motto of the Draft Constitutional Treaty of 2004, preserves the essential accomplishments of Europe's constitutional democracies, provides for co-operative problem solving of transnational regulatory tasks, and retains supervisory powers over national and transnational arrangements of private governance.     

Constitutional Directives: Morally‐Committed Political Constitutionalism

About 37 state constitutions around the world feature non‐justiciable thick moral commitments (‘constitutional directives’). These directives typically oblige the state to redistribute income and wealth, guarantee social minimums, or forge a religious or secular identity for the state. They have largely been ignored in a constitutional scholarship defined by its obsession with the legitimacy of judicial review and hostility to constitutionalising thick moral commitments other than basic rights. This article presents constitutional directives as obligatory telic norms, addressed primarily to the political state, which constitutionalise thick moral objectives. Their full realisation—through increasingly sophisticated mechanisms designed to ensure their political enforcement—is deferred to a future date. They are weakly contrajudicative in that these duties are not directly enforced by courts. Functionally, they help shape the discourse over a state's constitutional identity, and regulate its political and judicial organs. Properly understood, they are a key tool to realise a morally‐committed conception of political constitutionalism.     

The Material Constitution

What is the material context of constitutional order? The purpose of this paper is to offer an answer to that question by sketching a theory of the material constitution. Moving beyond the interwar constitutional theories of Heller and Mortati, the paper outlines the four ordering forces of the material constitution: political unity; a set of institutions; social relations, and fundamental political objectives. These forces constitute the substance and dynamic of constitutional ordering, in internal relation with the formal constitution. Because these ordering forces are multiple, and in tension with one another, there is no single determining factor of constitutional development. Neither is order as such guaranteed. The conflict that characterises the modern human condition might but need not be internalised by the process of constitutional ordering. The theory of the material constitution offers an account of the basic elements of this process as well as its internal dynamic.     

关于宪政的几个基本理论问题

宪政要义在于限制政治权力、保护个人自由和权利,而民主则主要解决政治权力的来源及其获得方式问题。为了达成一种宪法秩序,应在宪政与民主之间建立相互支持的关系。实行宪政的关键在于“良宪之治”,而非“宪政程序化”。     

政治变革与国家能力——对中国近代宪治探寻的再思考

从现代化的角度看,宪治探寻在近代中国不是自发启动的,而是在原有的政治体系难以容纳、应付外部因素的强烈挑战时不得不作出的一种反应。在此过程中,政治变革与国家能力呈现出鱼和熊掌难以兼得之势。一方面,中国近代宪治探寻所启动的政治变革始终无法在国家有效政治统合能力的帮持下顺利进行。另一方面,政治变革所具有的合法性因素并未给国家能力提供有效帮助,反而对其进一步消解。这种近乎“负和博弈”的现象可以从中国传统社会形态和中国现代化特殊路径得到部分解释。     

Political constitutionalism and populism

Criticisms of political constitutionalism's relationship to populism point in two opposed directions. Legal constitutionalists consider it too open to, and even as legitimating, populist politics, whereas radical democrats consider it too closed to popular participation, prompting an anti-system politics of a populist character. I dispute both these views. Underlying these contrasting assessments are differing conceptions of populism and constitutionalism. This article distinguishes right- from left-wing populism, and limited government from non-arbitrary rule, as constitutional ideals. Legal constitutionalism typically embraces the first ideal. However, that can be a driver of both right- and left-wing populism, and allow types of arbitrary rule that democratic backsliding and illiberal regimes can (and do) exploit. By contrast, political constitutionalism involves the second ideal and is antithetical to right-wing populism while potentially friendly to the legitimate demands of left-wing populism. Nevertheless, the practical reality of political constitutionalism in the United Kingdom (and elsewhere) often falls short of its ideal theoretical potential. Addressing these shortcomings, however, requires strengthening democracy rather than the legal constitution, not least through electoral reform.     

Activism and Popular Constitutionalism in Contemporary Vietnam

Based on Chinese constitutional analysis, political science, and law and society studies, we argue that work extending the application of popular constitutionalism to authoritarian states applies in Vietnam, as popular constitutionalism targets sites relevant to constitutional reform. We contend that popular constitutionalism located in authoritarian states requires three factors: a tradition of activism, space for reformist and pragmatic dialogue targeting constitutional change, and the political need for legitimacy. This article analyses activism in Vietnam, focusing on the lodging of Petition 72 with the Constitutional Amendment Drafting Commission in 2013, and the resulting responses. We conclude that this activism was pivotal in advocating for new constitutional norms, evidencing popular constitutionalism in Vietnam. The long history of Vietnamese scholar activism, the relative space for governance debates, and the political need for legitimacy made this possible. We also note that popular constitutionalism faces constraints in authoritarian states, which may shape its trajectory.     

‘Delegated’ Legislation in the (new) European Union: A Constitutional Analysis

This article brings classic constitutionalism to an analysis of delegated legislation in the European Union. To facilitate such a constitutional analysis, it starts with a comparative excursion introducing the judicial and political safeguards on executive legislation in American constitutionalism. In the European legal order, similar constitutional safeguards emerged in the last fifty years. First, the Court of Justice developed judicial safeguards in the form of a European non‐delegation doctrine. Second, the European legislator has also insisted on political safeguards within delegated legislation. Under the Rome Treaty, ‘comitology’ was the defining characteristic of executive legislation. The Lisbon Treaty represents a revolutionary restructuring of the regulatory process. The (old) Community regime for delegated legislation is split into two halves. Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) henceforth governs delegations of legislative power, while Article 291 TFEU establishes the constitutional regime for delegations of executive power.     

共和精神与宪政中国

共和主义是西方宪政理论的重要渊源之一,共和传统是西方宪政文明的重要组成部分。共和精神与当代宪政理论之间至少存在法治原则的推崇、权力制约的强调与公共利益的彰显三重契合。共和精神是宪政中国建设的重要精神指引,其中,天下为公是宪政中国之情感凝聚纽带,和谐均衡是宪政中国之构建运作理念。