Constrained Waiver of Trial Rights? Incentives to Plead Guilty and the Right to a Fair Trial

This article develops an interpretative framework to examine when incentives to plead guilty should be found to constrain defendant choice to waive fair trial rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. This framework is informed by existing jurisprudence, specifically the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia and Deweer v. Belgium, and socio‐legal literature. According to the framework, an incentive to plead guilty should be found to violate fair trial rights where it makes it unreasonable to expect defendants to exercise their right to a full trial, is independent of the projected outcome at trial, and causes the defendant to plead guilty. An empirical analysis of guilty‐plea practice in England and Wales informed by this new framework identifies problematic incentives and suggests such incentives may disproportionately influence vulnerable defendants.     

Plea Discounts or Trial Penalties? Making Sense of the Trial-Plea Sentence Disparities

Abstract

There is a consensus that defendants who plead guilty generally receive less harsh sentences than similarly-situated defendants convicted at trial. However, there is less consensus on how to characterize this disparity in the sentence. Some researchers refer to the disparities as “trial penalties,” whereas others refer to them as “plea discounts.” We contend that the two terms have different theoretical backgrounds and underlying assumptions. As a result, the theories require different modeling strategies, and can lead to different predictions on the relationship between the disparity and some key case characteristics.

We start by differentiating the two perspectives theoretically. We then present an empirical analysis on defendants in New York State to substantiate our theoretical arguments. We demonstrate that the estimates of the trial-plea disparities depend on the assumption of the default, as estimates of the trial penalties differed considerably from the estimates of the plea discounts.     

Defending the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of Crime, Procedure, and Sanctions

Recent years have seen mounting challenge to the model of the criminal trial on the grounds it is not cost-effective, not preventive, not necessary, not appropriate, or not effective. These challenges have led to changes in the scope of the criminal law, in criminal procedure, and in the nature and use of criminal trials. These changes include greater use of diversion, of fixed penalties, of summary trials, of hybrid civil–criminal processes, of strict liability, of incentives to plead guilty, and of preventive orders. The paper will assess the implications of these changes for the function of the criminal law, assessing the reasons behind them, and examining whether or not they are to be welcomed. Identifying the larger import of these changes draws attention to the changing relationship between state and citizen as well as changes in the nature of the state itself. These can in turn be attributed to a jostling among the different manifestations of the authoritarian state, the preventive state, and the regulatory state. These changes have profound normative implications for a liberal theory of the criminal law that require its re-articulation and its defence. A modest start may be to insist that where the conduct is criminal and the consequences are punitive the protections of criminal procedure and trial must be upheld.

Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions,Pleas, Communication with Attorneys,and Appeals

While there is an increasing recognition that developmental differences may exist in legal decision-making, little research has examined this. This study examined the legal judgments of 152 defendants aged 11–17 (73 females, 79 males). Adolescents aged 15 and younger were more likely than older adolescents to confess and waive their right to counsel, and less likely to report that they would appeal their case or discuss disagreements with their attorneys. Also, while adolescents aged 15–17 were more likely to confess, plead guilty, and accept a plea bargain if they perceived that there was strong evidence against them, younger defendants’ legal decisions were not predicted by the strength of evidence. Importantly, defendants with poor legal abilities were more likely to waive legal protections, such as the right to counsel and to appeal. Defendants from below-average socioeconomic backgrounds were more likely to waive their interrogation rights, and defendants from ethnic minority groups were less likely to report that they would disclose information to their attorneys. The advice of attorneys, parents, and peers emerged as important predictors of plea decisions. None of the defendants reported that their parents advised them to assert the right to silence during police interrogation.     

VARIATION IN TRIAL PENALTIES AMONG SERIOUS VIOLENT OFFENSES*

We examine the differences in the sentencing of those who plead guilty and those convicted by jury trial among defendants convicted of serious violent offenses. Drawing from a focal concerns and court communities perspective on court decision making, we develop several hypotheses about jury trial penalties for serious violent offenders, and how such penalties may vary by offense characteristics, defendant characteristics, and court contexts. Our hierarchical models using Pennsylvania sentencing data from 1997 to 2000 reveal that defendants are substantially penalized if they exercise their right to a jury trial and then lose. Furthermore, this jury trial penalty is not evenly assessed, but depends on the seriousness and type of offense, defendant criminal history, and court contextual characteristics such as caseload, court community size, local violent crime rates, and the size of local black populations.     

Limitations on the ability to negotiate justice: attorney perspectives on guilt,innocence, and legal advice in the current plea system

In the American criminal justice system the vast majority of criminal convictions occur as the result of guilty pleas, often made as a result of plea bargains, rather than jury trials. The incentives offered in exchange for guilty pleas mean that both innocent and guilty defendants plead guilty. We investigate the role of attorneys in this context, through interviews with criminal defense attorneys. We examine defense attorney perspectives on the extent to which innocent defendants are (and should be) pleading guilty in the current legal framework and investigate their views of their own role in this complex system. We also use a hypothetical case to probe the ways in which defense attorneys consider guilt or innocence when providing advice on pleas. Results indicate that attorney advice is influenced by guilt or innocence, but also that attorneys are limited in the extent to which they can negotiate justice for their clients in a system in which uncertainty and large discrepancies between outcomes of guilty pleas and conviction at trial can make it a sensible option to plead guilty even when innocent. Results also suggest conflicting opinions over the role of the attorney in the plea-bargaining process.     

Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Power of Innocence

In a laboratory experiment, 72 participants who were guilty or innocent of a mock theft were apprehended for investigation. Motivated to avoid prosecution and trial, they were confronted by a neutral, sympathetic, or hostile male "detective" who sought a waiver of their Miranda rights. Later, 72 other participants watched videotapes of these sessions and answered questions about the detective and suspect. Strikingly, results showed that although the detective's demeanor had no effect, participants who were truly innocent were significantly more likely to sign a waiver than those who were guilty. Naively believing in the power of their innocence to set them free, most waived their rights even in the hostile detective condition, where the risk of interrogation was apparent. The conceptual and policy implications of these results are discussed.     

Rethinking the presumption of innocence

This article is concerned with what constitutes interference with the presumption of innocence and what justifications there might be for such interference. It provides a defence of a theory of the presumption of innocence that suggests that the right is interfered with if the offence warrants conviction of defendants who are not the intended target of the offence. This thesis is defended against two alternative theories. It then considers what might justify interference with the presumption of innocence. It explores the idea that interference is justified if it is necessary in a democratic society and considers the presumption in relation to the aims of the criminal trial. It is concluded that no good grounds have been provided for interference with the right, and that the right should be regarded as inviolable.

Does Gender Modify the Effects of Race–ethnicity on Criminal Sanctioning? Sentences for Male and Female White, Black, and Hispanic Defendants

Using data from large urban courts for the years 1990–1996 and drawing from the “focal concerns” framework on case-process decision making, we examine the main and interactive effects of gender and race–ethnicity on sentence outcomes. The main focus of the present study is whether the effects of race–ethnicity (and gender) on sentence outcomes are similar or different across gender (and racial–ethnic) groups. Consistent with the findings of prior research, we find that female defendants receive more lenient sentences than male defendants and that black and Hispanic defendants receive less favorable treatment than white defendants. However, these main effects are strongly dependent on whether the sample is partitioned by gender or race–ethnicity. We find that race–ethnicity influences male but not female sentences. Conversely, gender strongly influences sentencing across all racial–ethnic groups. These findings are at odds with the traditional view that leniency in court sanctioning typically by-passes “women of color.” Instead, it appears that black and Hispanic female defendants actually benefit more from their “female” status than would be expected all else equal.

Symbolic Hate: Intention to Intimidate,Political Ideology,and Group Association

In Virginia v. Black (123 S.Ct. 1536, 2003), the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment did not bar statutes that prohibit cross burnings in which defendants acted with intention to intimidate others. Using a variety of symbols including cross burnings, swastikas, confederate flags, and skin fists, the current research tested how mock jurors used alternative actor intentions to judge culpability in symbolic hate speech cases. Only partially validating the Court’s assumptions, participants rated guilt certainty highest when they believed the speakers conveyed direct threats, sometimes regardless of whether defendants intended to intimidate others. Further, results showed the level of perceived intimidation only partially mediated the relationship between type of fact pattern and guilt certainty ratings. While alternative intentions did produce different levels of intention to intimidate, path analysis showed that the participants’ ratings of the defendant’s intention to convey a direct threat influenced guilt certainty ratings in all cases. Perceived intimidation levels predicted culpability in only some of the cases and not for cross burning on private property.

Response to Tudor: Remorse-based Sentence Reductions in Theory and Practice

Steven Tudor defends the mitigation of criminal sentences in cases in which offenders are genuinely remorseful for their crimes. More than this, he takes the principle that such remorse-based sentence reductions are appropriate to be a ‘well-settled legal principle’—so well settled, in fact, that ‘it is among those deep-seated commitments which can serve to test general theories as much as they are tested by them’. However, his account of why remorse should reduce punishment is strongly philosophical in character. He sets to one side the many practical difficulties in implementing such reductions in the real world of criminal justice institutions so that he can focus on the question of whether a plausible account of sentencing can show that remorse should mitigate punishment. I contend that Tudor’s defense of such reductions is unpersuasive in certain respects. Yet even if it can be made more persuasive, I argue that the conditions that would have to be satisfied for remorse-based sentence reductions to be justifiably implemented are so many and various that they would likely exceed our abilities to responsibly grant them in real world legal contexts. I therefore claim that Tudor has failed to provide a defense of the ‘remorse principle’ that serves to explain or justify existing legal practices.

Certainty of punishment and sentence mitigation in plea behavior

Mitigation of sentence severity has been cited as a primary factor underlying defendant decisions to plead guilty. It has been studied extensively and it has been assumed, but rarely examined, that few defendants plead guilty in the absence of significant benefits. This paper examines the relationship between sentence benefits and plea behavior. A crime-specific analysis reveals that some defendants frequently plead guilty in the relative absence of significant benefits; conversely, others plead not guilty even though significant benefits are available for guilty pleaders. Applying several decision theory constructs to justice system processing, the defendant's desire to reduce uncertainty is discussed and offered as a tentative explanation for the phenomenon of pleading guilty in the relative absence of significant benefits.     

Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases? Evidence from New York's 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Punishment

This article investigates whether the death penalty encouragesdefendants charged with potentially capital crimes to pleadguilty in exchange for lesser sentences. I exploit a naturalexperiment in New York State: the 1995 reinstatement of capitalpunishment, coupled with the public refusal of some prosecutorsto pursue death sentences (N.Y. Penal Law 125.25 [McKinney1975]). Using individual-level data on all felony arrests inthe state between 1985 and 1998, I find the death penalty leadsdefendants to accept plea bargains with harsher terms, but doesnot increase defendants’ overall propensity to plead guilty.A differences-in-differences analysis of a national cross-sectionof homicide defendants confirms these results.     

White-collar,organised and cyber crimes in the media: some contrasts and similarities

This article examines the media reportage of white-collar crimes, organised crimes and cybercrimes, principally in the British but also in the US media. It illustrates the ways in which different newspapers depict crime seriousness and how some defendants adapt to these portrayals. It examines competing explanatory models and suggests that although reportage has an ideological component, ‘news values’ and production pressures as well as ‘action triggers’ such as prosecutions or regulatory interventions are important.

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被告人认罪案件处理程序的比较法考察

英国、美国、法国、日本和俄罗斯等国都对被告人认罪案件规定了特殊的处理程序。这些国家的被告人认罪案件处理程序在具有简化诉讼程序、强调被告人认罪的自愿性等共同特征的同时,在适用的案件范围和被告人认罪的效果等方面存在一定的差异。我国于2003年确立了被告人认罪案件的处理程序。我国的被告人认罪案件处理程序在程序保障、适用范围等方面尚需要继续研究。     

Desert, Justice and Capital Punishment

Our purpose in this paper is to consider a procedural objection to the death penalty. According to this objection, even if the death penalty is deemed, substantively speaking, a morally acceptable punishment for at least some murderers, since only a small proportion of those guilty of aggravated murder are sentenced to death and executed, while the majority of murderers escape capital punishment as a result of arbitrariness and discrimination, capital punishment should be abolished. Our targets in this paper are two recent attempts, by Thomas Hurka and Michael Cholbi respectively, to defend the view that ‘levelling down’ (that is, reducing the punishment imposed on a criminal from the punishment he absolutely deserves to a less severe punishment in order to achieve proportionality relative to the criminals who have escaped the punishment they absolutely deserve) is, in the context of capital punishment, morally permissible. We argue that both Hurka and Cholbi fail to show why the arbitrariness and discrimination objection impugns the death penalty.

The Time Penalty: Examining the Relationship Between Time to Conviction and Trial vs. Plea Disparities in Sentencing

Although studies of sentencing routinely find that defendants who plead guilty receive relatively lenient sentences compared with similarly situated defendants convicted by trial, we have yet to fully understand the role of “mode of conviction” in the sentencing process. In particular, we know little about how the size of the disparity between guilty pleas and trial convictions may depend upon time in case processing, or the timing of pleas; that is, when during the process defendants plead guilty. This is a considerable issue, as “time” often is central to explanations given for plea-trial disparities. The current study examines this central, yet seldom empirically captured, dimension of the sentencing process. Using information gathered in an ancillary data collection effort operated under the supervision of the American Terrorism Study, we differentiate between the mode of conviction and time to conviction and explore the role of “time” in sentence severity, especially with regard to the plea-trial disparity. While consisting of defendants identified in connection with terrorism investigations, and sentenced in federal courts, our study takes advantages of a unique opportunity to isolate the effects of time from the mode of disposition and to explore time correlates of sentencing outcomes. In doing so, we raise important questions about the multiple ways in which time and mode of conviction may affect sentencing more generally and contribute to the larger theoretical discussions of how punishment decisions are made.     

Determining ease of access to arms methodology and coding

This paper aims to establish an initial determination of what the primary indicators of the ease of access to small arms and light weapons are. Guns are so abundant and ubiquitous in most parts of the world that the right question to ask is not how many guns are out there but what are the conditions, or lack thereof, that promote the ease of access. This paper also aims to offer researchers with initial tools for coding indicators for the ease of access in future investigations on this important topic. At the outset, I introduce three sets of indicators: legal, ‘black market feeder indicators’, and socialeconomic indicators.

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The Case of Weak Will and Wayward Desire

In this article, I confront Garvey’s argument that a weak-willed individual deserves partial excuse for trying to resist a strong desire that pushes him toward commission of a criminal act even though in the end he unreasonably abandons his resistance and commits the crime. I attempt to refute Garvey’s argument on two counts: one, I question whether the law should indeed provide mitigation to such an offender; and two, I argue that, even if it should, this mitigation may not come in the form of a partial defense. Defenses, even partial, are desert based, and there is nothing in Garvey’s offender’s circumstances that makes him less blameworthy for the crime he committed. A court may choose to treat such an offender more leniently but it should not be mandated to do so.