Limitations on the ability to negotiate justice: attorney perspectives on guilt,innocence, and legal advice in the current plea system

In the American criminal justice system the vast majority of criminal convictions occur as the result of guilty pleas, often made as a result of plea bargains, rather than jury trials. The incentives offered in exchange for guilty pleas mean that both innocent and guilty defendants plead guilty. We investigate the role of attorneys in this context, through interviews with criminal defense attorneys. We examine defense attorney perspectives on the extent to which innocent defendants are (and should be) pleading guilty in the current legal framework and investigate their views of their own role in this complex system. We also use a hypothetical case to probe the ways in which defense attorneys consider guilt or innocence when providing advice on pleas. Results indicate that attorney advice is influenced by guilt or innocence, but also that attorneys are limited in the extent to which they can negotiate justice for their clients in a system in which uncertainty and large discrepancies between outcomes of guilty pleas and conviction at trial can make it a sensible option to plead guilty even when innocent. Results also suggest conflicting opinions over the role of the attorney in the plea-bargaining process.     

被告人不认罪案件量刑程序的理想模式

被告人不认罪案件的量刑程序如何设计是当前量刑规范化改革试点过程中一个争议较大的问题,在司法理论和实践中有两种不同的模式——相对独立的量刑程序模式和隔离的量刑程序模式。量刑规范化改革的目的在于使量刑过程程序化、公开化,从而实现量刑公正,达到罪责刑相适应的要求。针对被告人不认罪案件,建立理想的量刑程序模式,将定罪程序与量刑程序有效地分隔开来,有利于达到量刑规范化改革的目的。     

Is Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the Trial” a Mirage?

It has been well established that a ??plea discount?? or ??trial penalty?? exists, such that defendants who plead guilty receive significant sentencing discounts relative to what they would receive if convicted at trial. Theorists argue that the exact value of this plea discount is determined by bargaining ??in the shadow of a trial,?? meaning that plea decision-making is premised on the perceived probable outcome of a trial. In trials, the strength of the evidence against defendants greatly impacts the probability of conviction. In the present study, we estimate the probability of conviction at the individual level for those who pled guilty. We find that, contrary to the shadow of the trial model, evidentiary factors either do not impact or negatively impact the probability of conviction, which stands in stark contrast to the impact evidence has at trials. These findings suggest that plea bargain decision-making may not occur in the shadow of the trial.     

ADVERSARIAL AND NONADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: A COMPARISON OF GUILTY PLEAS AND TRIALS*

Despite the frequency of guilty pleas, researchers disagree about the ability of plea bargaining to provide justice. Critics argue that plea bargaining deprives defendants of due process rights and procedural safeguards Proponents argue that guilty pleas save resources for cases that require trial and allow officials flexibility to tailor justice to individual defendants. This article explores these issues by examining the effect of defendant and case characteristics on sentence severity for 3,269 male robbery and burglary defendants who either pled guilty or were tried in six U.S. jurisdictions, three of which had recently attempted to eliminate or greatly reduce plea bargaining and three with few restrictions on plea bargaining. The results confirm some criticisms of plea bargaining, but refute others. More criminally experienced defendants and defendants who pled guilty at the earliest opportunity did not receive sentencing leniency. Moreover, to a large extent, the same variables predict sentence severity for guilty pleas and trials. In contrast, the results show that defendants convicted at trial received more severe sanctions than defendants who pled guilty, controlling for case severity, evidence, and offender characteristics The results also suggest that the jurisdictions which attempted to control plea bargaining through more centralized control of assistance succeeded in tightening the fit between case characteristics and sentences for both cases adjudicated by guilty plea and trial.     

Plea Discounts or Trial Penalties? Making Sense of the Trial-Plea Sentence Disparities

Abstract

There is a consensus that defendants who plead guilty generally receive less harsh sentences than similarly-situated defendants convicted at trial. However, there is less consensus on how to characterize this disparity in the sentence. Some researchers refer to the disparities as “trial penalties,” whereas others refer to them as “plea discounts.” We contend that the two terms have different theoretical backgrounds and underlying assumptions. As a result, the theories require different modeling strategies, and can lead to different predictions on the relationship between the disparity and some key case characteristics.

We start by differentiating the two perspectives theoretically. We then present an empirical analysis on defendants in New York State to substantiate our theoretical arguments. We demonstrate that the estimates of the trial-plea disparities depend on the assumption of the default, as estimates of the trial penalties differed considerably from the estimates of the plea discounts.     

Convicting and sentencing differences among black,Hispanic, and white males in six localities

The many studies examining differences in convicting and sentencing black, Hispanic, and white defendants have not led to solid generalizations about the treatment of these defendants because the studies have been done at different times and with different methodologies. This study examines differences in convicting and sentencing male defendants in six localities, at the same time and with the same methodology. It concludes that discrimination is directed against blacks and is manifested in incarceration rates. The exact source of this discrimination is not identical in all cities. In some, it seems to occur because whites get better plea bargains than blacks; in others, it is due to the different rates of guilty pleas by black and whites. Overall, there is less evidence of discrimination in cases where a trial is held than in those where a guilty plea is entered.     

VARIATION IN TRIAL PENALTIES AMONG SERIOUS VIOLENT OFFENSES*

We examine the differences in the sentencing of those who plead guilty and those convicted by jury trial among defendants convicted of serious violent offenses. Drawing from a focal concerns and court communities perspective on court decision making, we develop several hypotheses about jury trial penalties for serious violent offenders, and how such penalties may vary by offense characteristics, defendant characteristics, and court contexts. Our hierarchical models using Pennsylvania sentencing data from 1997 to 2000 reveal that defendants are substantially penalized if they exercise their right to a jury trial and then lose. Furthermore, this jury trial penalty is not evenly assessed, but depends on the seriousness and type of offense, defendant criminal history, and court contextual characteristics such as caseload, court community size, local violent crime rates, and the size of local black populations.     

Effects of Individual Characteristics on Plea Negotiations Under Sentencing Guidelines

ABSTRACT

Research conducted on the decision points between arrest and sentencing is scarce. There is a need for research to examine processing decisions. This research attempts to fill in the gap of knowledge about case processing decisions by focusing on plea negotiations; specifically, the examination of the effect of individual characteristics on the prosecutor's plea bargaining decisions in a sentencing guideline state by using two dependent variables (negotiated plea vs. a non-negotiated plea and a three category dependent variable simultaneously analyzing negotiated pleas, non-negotiated pleas, and bench or jury trials). The results indicate that race/ethnicity, sex, and age of the offender did not predict the likelihood of receiving a negotiated guilty plea. Using multinomial logistic regression, it was discovered that demographic characteristics were predictors of the decision to negotiate a guilty plea compared to the bench/jury trial conviction. Black offenders were more likely than white offenders to have their case go to trial rather than straight pleading or negotiating a guilty plea.     

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING DEPARTURES ACROSS MODES OF CONVICTION*

Recent analyses of guideline sentencing practices have demonstrated that sentences departing from guidelines serve as a significant locus of racial/ethnic and other extralegal disparity. Little is known, however, about the ways that different courtroom processes, such as modes of conviction, condition these effects. Using recent data from the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing (PCS), I analyze the overall effects of race/ethnicity and other factors on judicial decisions to depart from the sentencing guidelines, and then I reexamine these relationships according to four modes of conviction (non‐negotiated pleas, negotiated pleas, bench trials, and jury trials). I argue that the mode of conviction provides a useful indicator of the differential exercise of discretion by different courtroom actors in the sentencing process. As such, it is likely to condition the use of stereotypical patterned responses, thus moderating the effects of race/ethnicity and other relevant sentencing factors. Findings support this expectation, demonstrating that extralegal effects vary considerably across modes of conviction. These results raise important questions about the role of different courtroom actors in contributing to racial and ethnic disparities under sentencing guidelines.     

Is a Plea Really a Bargain? An Empirical Study of Six Cities in China

There is a belief in the criminal justice system that it is better to take a plea offer to avoid uncertain consequences than risk going to trial. Prior studies using the data in Anglo-American courts have suggested that many legal and extralegal factors influence the decision of a guilty plea versus trial. China developed its own plea-bargaining system in 2016. Using 6826 DUI cases adjudicated in six cities, this study examines what factors affect the decision of a guilty plea and whether the guilty plea brings true benefits in Chinese courts. The results show that more serious crimes and more dangerous defendants were less likely to be disposed of through guilty pleas (as opposed to going to trial). One possible explanation is that prosecutors may make more punitive offers in these cases, which in turn discourages defendants from accepting them. In addition, using a propensity score weighting technique to control for potential confounding variables, this study finds that defendants who pleaded guilty were more likely to receive favorable case outcomes regarding pretrial detention and probation decision, which supports the argument that a guilty plea could help a defendant to avoid the “trial penalty” in Chinese criminal justice system.

     

Constrained Waiver of Trial Rights? Incentives to Plead Guilty and the Right to a Fair Trial

This article develops an interpretative framework to examine when incentives to plead guilty should be found to constrain defendant choice to waive fair trial rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. This framework is informed by existing jurisprudence, specifically the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia and Deweer v. Belgium, and socio‐legal literature. According to the framework, an incentive to plead guilty should be found to violate fair trial rights where it makes it unreasonable to expect defendants to exercise their right to a full trial, is independent of the projected outcome at trial, and causes the defendant to plead guilty. An empirical analysis of guilty‐plea practice in England and Wales informed by this new framework identifies problematic incentives and suggests such incentives may disproportionately influence vulnerable defendants.     

Direct and Indirect Effects of Case Complexity, Guilty Pleas, and Offender Characteristics on Sentencing for Offenders Convicted of a White-Collar Offense Prior to Sentencing Guidelines

Previous research on the punishment of offenders convicted of a white-collar offense estimated models that specify only direct effects of defendant characteristics, offense-related variables, and guilty pleas on sentence severity. Drawing from conflict or labeling theories, much of this research focused on the effects of offender's socioeconomic status on sentence outcomes. Findings from this research are inconsistent about the relationship between defendant characteristics and sentence severity. These studies overlook how differences in case complexity of white-collar offense and guilty pleas may intervene in the relationship between offender characteristics and sentence outcomes. This study seeks to contribute to an understanding of federal sentencing prior to the federal sentencing guidelines by testing a legal-bureaucratic theory of sentencing that hypothesizes an interplay between case complexity, guilty pleas and length of imprisonment. This interplay reflects the interface between the legal ramifications of pleading guilty, prosecutorial interests in efficiency and finality of case disposition in complex white-collar cases, and sentence severity. Using structural equation modeling, a four-equation model of sentencing that specifies case complexity and guilty pleas as intervening variables in the relationship between offender characteristics and length of imprisonment is estimated. Several findings are noteworthy. First, the hypothesized interplay between case complexity, guilty pleas, and sentence severity is supported. Second, the effect of offender's educational attainment on sentence severity is indirect via case complexity and guilty pleas. Third, offender's race and gender effect length of imprisonment both directly and indirectly through the intervening effect of case complexity and guilty pleas. These findings indicate the need to specify sentencing models that consider the direct and indirect effects of offender characteristics, offense characteristics, and guilty pleas on judicial discretion at sentencing.     

To Waive or Not to Waive: The Right to Trial and Plea Bargaining

Criminal defendants in many countries are faced with a dilemma: If they waive their right to trial and plead guilty, they typically receive charge or sentence reductions in exchange for having done so. If they exercise their right to trial and are found guilty, they often receive stiffer sanctions than if they had pled guilty. I characterize the former as ‘waiver rewards’ and the latter as ‘non-waiver penalties.’ After clarifying the two and considering the relation between them, I briefly explicate the grounds for a moral right to trial. I then assess the defensibility of such rewards and penalties. In addition to considering whether waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties serve the aims of legal punishment, I address the three main arguments for permitting them. The first suggests that defendants willing to plead display more remorse for their crimes and thus are deserving of lighter sentences. The second defends waiver rewards and non-waiver penalties in cases where prosecutors are alleged to know that defendants are guilty but face problems establishing their guilt at trial. The third holds that guilty defendants who are willing to plead conserve scarce state resources and should be rewarded for it, whereas those unwilling to plead squander such resources and should be penalized accordingly. I contend that none of these arguments provides persuasive grounds for waiver rewards or non-waiver penalties, even on the assumption that we can distinguish those defendants who should waive their right to trial from those who should not. This conclusion presents a fundamental challenge to contemporary plea bargaining practices.

AN EXPLICIT TEST OF PLEA BARGAINING IN THE “SHADOW OF THE TRIAL”

Bargaining in the “shadow of the trial,” which hinges on the expectations of trial outcomes, is the primary theory used by noncriminologists to explain variation in the plea discount given to defendants who plead guilty. This study develops a formal mathematical representation of the theory and then presents an empirical test of the theory using an innovative online survey with responses to a hypothetical case from 1,585 prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. The key outcomes are the probability that the defendant will be convicted at trial, the sentence for the defendant if convicted, and the best plea that the respondent would accept or offer. Variation in the outcomes is created through experimental variation in the information presented to the respondents. Structural regression models are estimated to fit the formal theoretical models, and the instrumental variables method is used to correct for measurement error in the estimate for probability of conviction. The data support the basic shadow model, with minor modifications, for only prosecutors and defense attorneys. Controlling for the characteristics of the individual actors and their jurisdictions adds explanatory value to the model, although these control variables did not affect the key coefficients from the shadow model.     

Certainty of punishment and sentence mitigation in plea behavior

Mitigation of sentence severity has been cited as a primary factor underlying defendant decisions to plead guilty. It has been studied extensively and it has been assumed, but rarely examined, that few defendants plead guilty in the absence of significant benefits. This paper examines the relationship between sentence benefits and plea behavior. A crime-specific analysis reveals that some defendants frequently plead guilty in the relative absence of significant benefits; conversely, others plead not guilty even though significant benefits are available for guilty pleaders. Applying several decision theory constructs to justice system processing, the defendant's desire to reduce uncertainty is discussed and offered as a tentative explanation for the phenomenon of pleading guilty in the relative absence of significant benefits.     

Trial Penalties in Federal Sentencing: Extra‐Guidelines Factors and District Variation

The guarantee of the right to a jury trial lies at the heart of the principles that underlie the American criminal justice system's commitment to due process of law. We investigate the differential sentencing of those who plead guilty and those convicted by trial in U.S. District Courts. We first investigate how much of any federal plea/trial sentencing differences are accounted for by substantial assistance to law enforcement, acceptance of responsibility, obstruction of justice, and other Guideline departures. Second, we investigate how such differences vary according to offense and defendant characteristics, as well as court caseloads and trial rates. We use federal sentencing data for fiscal years 2000–02, along with aggregate data on federal district court caseload features. We find that meaningful trial penalties exist after accounting for Guidelines‐based rationales for differentially sentencing those convicted by guilty plea versus trial. Higher district court caseload pressure is associated with greater trial penalties, while higher district trial rates are associated with lesser trial penalties. In addition, trial penalties are lower for those with more substantial criminal histories, and black men. Trial penalties proportionately increase, however, as Guideline minimum sentencing recommendations increase. We also supplement our analysis with interview and survey data from federal district court participants, which provide insights into the plea reward/trial penalty process, and also suggest important dimensions of federal court trial penalties that we cannot measure.     

RACE,RACIAL THREAT,AND SENTENCING OF HABITUAL OFFENDERS*

As legislatures proliferate novel “enhancements” to criminal sentencing, such as “three-strikes” and related provisions, and as criminologists debate their effects, the role of existing enhancements, such as habitual offender statutes, has received little empirical attention. This article explores the effect of race in the decision to prosecute and sentence eligible defendants as “habitual” offenders. During FY 1992–93, 9,690 males admitted to prison in Florida were statutorily eligible (two prior felony convictions or one prior violent felony conviction) for sentencing as “habitual” offenders. Approximately 20% received that disposition. They will serve at least 75% of their enhanced sentence as compared with the state average of about 40%. Logistic regression, controlling for prior record, crime seriousness, and other relevant factors, shows a significant and substantial race effect. The disadvantage of black defendants is particularly strong for drug offenses and for property crimes that have relatively high victimization rates for whites (larceny, burglary). Race is less consequential for violent and weapons-related crimes. Race effects are more often significant in sentencing contexts that are low in terms of percent black, racial income inequality, drug arrest rates, and violent crime rates. The relevance of these findings for a “racial threat” interpretation of sentencing outcomes is discussed.     

An aggregate-level examination of the caseload pressure hypothesis

The idea that guilty pleas may be encouraged by time-conscious attorneys to process court caseloads expediently implies that some defendants may be influenced to forego their constitutional right to trial. If true, these defendants may be denied an adequate determination of legal guilt. Building on previous research, this paper presents a more thorough aggregate level test of the caseload pressure hypothesis than has previously been offered. Controlling for variation in structural and procedural characteristics across 101 Illinois circuit courts, this study supports the idea that felony caseload pressures significantly covary with felony guilty plea rates. Also, this relationship was stable between 1973 and 1984.     

被告人认罪案件处理程序的比较法考察

英国、美国、法国、日本和俄罗斯等国都对被告人认罪案件规定了特殊的处理程序。这些国家的被告人认罪案件处理程序在具有简化诉讼程序、强调被告人认罪的自愿性等共同特征的同时,在适用的案件范围和被告人认罪的效果等方面存在一定的差异。我国于2003年确立了被告人认罪案件的处理程序。我国的被告人认罪案件处理程序在程序保障、适用范围等方面尚需要继续研究。     

Does Racial Balance in Workforce Representation Yield Equal Justice? Race Relations of Sentencing in Federal Court Organizations*

Increasing racial and ethnic group representation in justice‐related occupations is considered a potential remedy to racial inequality in justice administration, including sentencing disparity. Studies to date yield little evidence of such an effect; however, research limitations may account for the mixed and limited evidence of the significance of justice workforce racial diversity. Specifically, few studies consider group‐level dynamics of race and representation, thus failing to contextualize racial group power relations in justice administration. To consider these contextual dynamics we combine court organizational and case‐level data from 89 federal districts and use hierarchical models to assess whether variably “representative” work groups relate to district‐level differences in sentencing. Using district‐specific indexes of population and work group dissimilarity to define representation, we find no relationships between black judge representation and sentencing in general across districts, but that districts with more black representation among prosecutors are significantly less likely to sentence defendants to terms of imprisonment. We also find in districts with increased black representation among prosecutors, and to a lesser degree among judges, that black defendants are less likely to be imprisoned and white defendants are more likely to be imprisoned, with the effect of narrowing black‐white disparities in sentencing. Consistent with the “power‐threat” perspective, and perhaps “implicit racial bias” research, findings encourage modeling diversity to account for relative racial group power in processes of social control and suggest that racial justice may be moderately advanced by equal representation among authorities.