论建立我国破产重整制度的几个问题

破产重整制度又称作企业整顿制度或公司重整、公司更生制度,是针对具有一定规模的公司企业出现破产原因或有破产原因出现的危险时,为防止企业破产,经公司利害关系人的申请,在法院的干预下对该公司企业实施强制治理促使其复兴的制度。作为现代破产法的重要组成部分,它是考虑大企业在社会经济生活中日益重要的地位与作用,为克服破产制度的消极之处而发展起来的一种新型的破产预防制度。最早的破产重整制度起源于 1867年的英国《铁路公司法》。而后在 1952年的日本《会社更生法》、 1966年的中国台湾《公司法》修正案、 1979年的美国联邦…     

公司破产重整中的几点思考——以法律和会计交叉研究为视角

破产重整,通俗地说,就是指将要破产或已经有发生破产的迹象但是还有挽救希望的企业,通过各方利害关系人的协调对企业进行重组以避免破产的发生。按常理,破产重整应该会带来多赢局面以保护各方面的经济利益,所以现在越来越多资不抵债的ST公司将重生的希望寄托在破产重整上。     

上市公司重整中的公司集团破产问题

上市公司破产重整往往涉及公司集团,而我国《企业破产法》建立在单一企业模式的基础上,没有考虑到公司集团化经营的特殊情况。我国的上市公司重整实践已涉及公司集团重整的特别问题。在公司集团破产程序的设计中,在程序上要考虑联合申请问题、不同法院之间程序协调问题以及破产程序中止的效力范围;在公司集团的资产处置上,会涉及实质合并、债权居次、摊付令、公司集团内部融资等问题。     

破产重整公司治理结构逻辑分析——以利益相关者间利益冲突为视角

当公司财务状况恶化、经营状态不佳,面临严重经营危机时,利益相关者在不同目标函数的驱动下,其利益冲突样态也发生变动,"股东—债权人"等利益相关者之间利益冲突尤为明显。利益冲突根源在于公司控制权的配置,立法机关应重新审视我国企业破产法中的相关规定,探究其存在的制度缺陷,在此基础上以重整控制权在利益相关者之间的合理配置为核心重构破产重整中公司的治理结构。     

日本破产重整程序中的股东代表诉讼

日本法律明确规定,破产重整程序开始后,债务人失去诉讼资格,债权人代位诉讼应当中止。与此相对,关于破产重整程序开始后的股东代表诉讼如何处理,日本法律并未明确规定,由此造成司法界与学术界存在各种争论。由于股东代表诉讼本质上是一种代表诉讼,其不以公司具有诉讼资格为前提,因此,在破产重整程序中,股东代表诉讼仍有适用的余地。考虑到股东在破产重整程序中的利益仍然需要法律的保护以及管理人追究高管人员责任的消极态度,在破产重整程序中引入股东代表诉讼十分具有现实意义。由于我国立法、司法以及学理对此问题并无太多关注,日本司法界的实践、学术界的讨论可为我们提供参考。     

上市公司破产重整融资风险及其防范

上市公司破产重整期间,首要问题是解决资金,支付重整费用、人员开支和购买原材料维持生产经营。由于信息不对称、企业难以估值和无担保财产,向破产重整公司提供资金面临比一般借款甚至担保借款更大的风险。对破产重整企业融资的风险防范制度随之创设,被称     

破产重整操作模式之律师实务探究

破产重整是2006年8月27日第十届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二十三次会议通过的《企业破产法》中新引进的一项制度。该制度源于英国,由美国立法发展至巅峰。该制度的确立旨在防止濒临危困的债务人进入破产清算,以积极挽救危困债务人使其摆脱困境为主要目的。破产重整中的一个重要环节就是重整计划草案的制作。而重整模式的选择是重整计划草案的核心,它关系到破产重整能否成功进行。本文从律师实务角度出发．将上市公司和非上市公司破产重整模式的种类及适用对象作全面的梳理。     

破产重整制度有效运行的问题与出路

对“僵尸企业”的处置需要我国《企业破产法》中重整制度的有效运行.为了解决破产重整“启动难…运行难”、防止重整计划“纸上画饼”,需要通过确立多元化的破产重整“营运价值”、完善破产重整启动条件、设立专业化破产法院(法庭)、建立执行转入破产机制以保证破产重整程序顺利启动;同时通过多元化企业重整模式选择、设立预重整程序以保证破产重整程序的有效运行;更为重要的是为保证重整计划的最终实现,必须合理选择重整营业机构、完善债务人信息披露义务、规范法院重整计划批准原则、完善对重整计划成败处置制度.     

讼公司重整制度

一、公司重整制度的概念及特征。公司重整制度,又称公司更生制度。它是指由利害关系人申请,在审判机关的主持和利害关系人的参与下,对财务陷入困境、濒临破产边缘,但又有重整能力的公司进行生产经营上的整顿和债权债务关系上的清理,以期摆脱困境,重获经营能力的特殊法律程序和制度,是通过调整债权人、股东及其他利害关系人与重整公司的利益关系,综合社会各方力量,挽救濒临倒闭公司,实现社会利益总体价值最大化的一种积极预防破产的程序。所以,公司重整制度具有以下基本特征：     

破产重整制度中各方主体的角色定位

新《破产法》(草案)①引入了破产重整制度,并对其专设一章,可见重整制度之重要。破产重整的立法精神是再建主义精神。笔者认为,要想使破产重整制度发挥其最大功效,实现立法者拯救企业的立法本意,最关键的是在利益制衡原则的基础上,对破产重整制度各方主体的角色进行科学合理的定位,在此基础上,对破产重整制度中各主体的权限与职责做明确科学的规定,这样才能最大限度的发挥破产重整制度的作用。本文基于破产重整的制衡原则,对破产重整中各方主体进行了角色定位,希望能构建起破产重整制度中各方主体间完善科学的关系,从而加深对破产重整制度的理解,促进破产重整制在我国度发挥其最佳效果。     

The New Insolvency Law and Governance of Corporate Legal Person

Start of the insolvency proceedings influences the two basic problems of corporate governance: restriction about the “soft budget” of corporation and “information asymmetry” between the interior and exterior person. In fact, the insolvency law is a mechanism of the potential exterior supervision. In the insolvency proceedings, most of the information is open to the creditor and to the superintendent, who is liable for protecting the interest of the creditor. The key problems of corporate governance are transparency and information disclosure. The insolvency law provides the power of supervision to the creditor when corporation insolvency. Of importance is that power is conducted by collectivity and supported by judicatory and professional organization. In June 2004, the finance committee submitted the new draft of the insolvency law to the standing committee of the national people’s congress. There are many articles about corporate governance. These articles are generally divided into two kinds, one is restriction on conduct of the supervisors in the period of the insolvency proceedings, and the other is examination of the conduct before the start of the insolvency proceedings. Translated from Jurist Review, Vol. 2, 2005 (in Chinese)     

The Recasting of Insolvency Law

Over the last decade corporate insolvency laws and processes have changed in two important ways. There has been a philosophical shift away from ex post responses to corporate crises and towards influencing the way that corporate actors manage the risks of insolvency ex ante . In addition, there has been a revision of insolvency roles so that participants in corporate and insolvency processes are increasingly encouraged to see corporate decline as a matter to be anticipated and prevented rather than responded to after the event. In this development turnaround specialists have gained a new prominence. These are changes that reflect broader social and governmental trends to audit performance more actively and to see issues in terms of needs to manage risks. Such developments are important for corporate and insolvency lawyers – they recast a host of issues within new framing assumptions and they force a re-thinking of corporate insolvency law's challenges and agendas.     

Corporate governance and financial development: a study of the French case

This paper belongs to the growing body of the “Law and finance” literature based on time-series study. It carries out an empirical investigation of the role of corporate governance in financial development. We focus on French corporate governance reforms in order to examine whether these reforms are consistent with the reorganization of the French financial system, which took place during the period 1977–2004. This research aims at evaluating one proposition of the legal origin claims based on the idea that there is a strong and stable relationship between legal origin, investor protection and financial system. A key question the study addresses is how corporate governance rules and the French financial development have changed over time. Our study suggests that indicators related to investors’ rights (shareholders, employees, and bondholders) have been increasing over time, despite the specific legal origin of the French system. On the contrary the creditors’ rights have followed a less clear trend. Our econometric investigation is fairly new as the Law and finance literature has not until now provided corporate governance indicators suitable for French legislation. From that perspective, our work undergoes a multiple criteria analysis of corporate governance reforms. Following this approach, we suggest that the causality links between changes in the French legal environment and financial growth in France are more bidirectional than unidirectional.     

The development of insolvency law in Ghana

Insolvency is a phenomenon of increasing importance yet Ghanaian lawmakers and scholars shun the subject. The increasing access to finance across the country, however, raises significant concern regarding the treatment of over-indebtedness. This article explores the development of insolvency law in Ghana setting out the various stages of the life of the first through to the current laws enacted in the country. The research finds that while the current law dealing with personal insolvency is a relatively new legislation embracing key insolvency choices, the law dealing with corporate insolvency is dated depriving ailing companies the benefit of modern rescue efforts.     

论有限责任公司债权人权利的回归

The contingent governance theory based on state-contingent ownership has exerted an important impact on economic academia, and its application in the field of company law is also of significant value. The lack of internal restraint mechanism and public supervision of limited liability companies makes it feasible to implement contingent governance. Under the mechanism of contingent governance, creditors of a limited liability company may intervene in its governance. The right of intervention is mainly reflected in three aspects, i.e., (1) mandatory debt-for-equity swap, (2) obligation of the actual controller to creditors when the limited liability company is on the edge of insolvency, and (3) creditor’s right of objection with respect to the decision of corporate substantial business. Ding Guangyu, Ph.D in civil and commercial law, works in the Chinese Institute of Applied Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of China. His publications include Introduction of Chinese Labor Law: Cases and Materials (China Legal Publishing House, 2008), Tracing the right of creditors in LLC: From the perspective of contingent governance theory (Studies in Law and Business, 2008.2), Judicial Discretion and the Rule (Legal Daily, 2007-4-20), Uniform of Legal Application (Legal Daily, 2006-12-9).     

英国的不法交易规则研究

公司濒临破产时，股东的利益与债权人利益出现分野，董事如何行事即成为焦点之所在。英国的不法交易规则模式的适用要件、法律构造等均堪完备，为处理该问题的典型立法例，对于我国填补这方面的法律空白有重要的示范意义和可移植价值。并且，我国当前的制度架构具备引进该制度的现实条件，可考虑进行法律移植。     

论域外公司治理改革实践经验之借鉴

近年来,英美等国开始对其公司治理模式进行了一系列改革,包括制定各种公司治理的原则、指引、章程、鼓励机构投资者参与公司治理、要求公司增强董事会的独立性、在董事会内引入一定数量的独立董事等,希望通过这些措施,增强公司的内部监控力度,以弥补由于外部监控不足所造成的问题.而德日的内部监控模式也开始学习、借鉴和效仿英美的公司治理模式.剖析、借鉴实践中各国公司治理改革经验将对我国公司治理的改进提供有益的帮助.     

公司法人治理结构的当代发展——兼论我国公司法人治理结构的重构

由于建立在股东本位这一理论基础上的公司法人治理结构难以适应当代经济发展的需要 ,因此自二十世纪中期以来 ,随着公司理念的不断更新 ,公司法人治理结构也出现了新的调整。本文在分析公司法人治理结构的当代发展趋势后 ,提出重构我国公司法人治理结构的指导原则 ,建议实行国有股权法人化、允许银行参与公司法人治理、大力推行职工董事制度     

Ownership structure, regulation and the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector

This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the existing corporate governance regulations and different ownership structures of banks in the EU. The results indicate the there is trade-off in EU corporate governance regulation between better investor protection and a higher efficiency of the market for corporate control. The main problem is differences in the ownership structure of banks in the EU banking sector. This implies that EU corporate governance regulations should be customized to the specific ownership structure of banks and not toward harmonising national regulations.     

New Governance,Old Norms,and the Potential for Corporate Governance Reform

While the new governance approach to corporate governance offers intriguing ideas about participatory governance, it cannot evade the effects of economic self‐interest. This article addresses three nested concerns relating to the potential of new governance in the corporate context, using three specific examples that illustrate the challenges. The first case illustrates that new governance principles cannot be easily integrated with models of corporate governance that rest on the logic of shareholder primary. The second case study offers an example of a new governance type corporation, but illustrates that new governance faces thorny internal structural challenges, given economic incentives and power imbalance. The third example illustrates that even without these normative and structural problems, new governance would face issues arising out of current strategies employed by corporate decision makers to hedge their own personal risk through equity swaps and other derivatives products, which in turn create new incentives for shirking their responsibilities.