Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance

Abstract.  It is commonplace that economic globalization poses new challenges to legal theory. But instead of responding to these challenges, legal scholars often get caught up in heated yet purely abstract discussions of positivist and legal pluralist conceptions of the law. Meanwhile, economics-based theories such as "Law and Social Norms" have much less difficulty in analysing the newly arising forms of private and hybrid "governance without government" from a functional perspective. While legal theory has much to learn from these approaches, we argue that they fail in one crucial point: They cannot uphold the analytical distinction between law and non-law. The reasons for this shortcoming are theory-immanent in that the economic theories' focus on efficiency and their actor-based perspective are necessarily blind to "law's own rationality." We therefore propose to further develop those functional approaches to the study of global governance by complementing them with elements from Niklas Luhmann's systems theory of law. This will provide us with a conceptual framework for analyzing the workings of global governance regimes without ignoring their potential for "legalisation" and "constitutionalisation." As we will show in three concrete examples (Corporate Social Responsibility, lex mercatoria , and internet regulation) we can thus describe the evolution of new forms of legal regulation beyond the nation-state. This will also allow us to draw some preliminary conclusions on the role of law in the context of globalization and, at the same time, show the direction for further empirical research.     

公司法人治理结构的当代发展——兼论我国公司法人治理结构的重构

由于建立在股东本位这一理论基础上的公司法人治理结构难以适应当代经济发展的需要 ,因此自二十世纪中期以来 ,随着公司理念的不断更新 ,公司法人治理结构也出现了新的调整。本文在分析公司法人治理结构的当代发展趋势后 ,提出重构我国公司法人治理结构的指导原则 ,建议实行国有股权法人化、允许银行参与公司法人治理、大力推行职工董事制度     

“利益相关者”公司治理模式探析

“利益相关者”治理就是要让所有通过专用性资产的投入,而为企业的财富创造做出过贡献的产权主体参与到公司的治理中。“公司所有者”理解的更新,人力资本因素地位的提高,社会契约理论,管理的伦理道德化及社会本位思潮,是“利益相关者”公司治理产生的理论基础。比较国际上几种主要的“公司治理模式”,“利益相关者”公司治理模式较符合我国的法律选择。“利益相关者”治理模式的法律价值是社会正义和经济民主,“利益相关者”的公司治理与公司的社会责任有很多相似之处,然而利益相关者内涵更加明确。“利益相关者”公司治理模式并不是最完善的,它只是在诸多的公司治理模式中的一种,但它顺应了世界范围内的公司治理模式从单边治理走向多边利益主体共同治理的趋势。     

全球经济治理新模式的法治化路径

传统全球经济治理模式不能反映当前国际经济关系的变化,既缺乏民主性,也不适应经济全球化带来的新挑战,必须加以改革。各国可以考虑制定《国际经济合作宪章》,确立平等及相互尊重、实现共同利益和促进合作与广泛共识的法律原则;扩大新兴经济体和广大发展中国家参与治理,在G20机制的基础上设立具有最高权威的"国际经济合作组织";以WTO争端解决机制为蓝本建立一整套国际经济争端解决机制,从而实现全球经济治理的法治化。     

Business Ethics as Corporate Governance

The paper analyses ethical business codes as governance mechanisms, i.e. institutions which facilitate coordination of economic behaviour. Ethical business codes are compared to other social institutions (market solutions, government intervention, the prevailing social ethic), and their efficiency is evaluated in terms of transaction costs. A normative rationale for ethical codes is found when other institutions fail to achieve socially optimal outcomes, in particular when the firm has access to unique information. Some economic incentives are identified which induce firms to commit to socially optimal ethical codes but it is argued that economic forces will not in general be sufficient for optimality.     

Corporate Monitorships and New Governance Regulation: In Theory,in Practice,and in Context

Over the last few years, it has become increasingly common for government agencies to resolve corporate criminal law and securities regulations violations through the use of settlement agreements that require corporations to improve their compliance programs and hire independent monitors to oversee the changes. Based on our interviews with corporate monitors, regulators, and others, we find that these monitorships are failing to meet their full potential in reforming corrupt corporate cultures. After reviewing potential reforms to improve monitorships from a new governance perspective, we discuss the limits of these reforms that are due to the sociological and institutional environment in which monitorships are embedded.     

'New Governance' in European Corporate Law Regulation as Transnational Legal Pluralism

The present transformation of European corporate governance regulation mirrors the challenges that have been facing the EU's continuously evolving polity, marked by tensions between centralised integration programmes, on the one hand, and Member State's embedded capitalisms, path-dependencies and rent-seeking, on the other. As longstanding concerns with remaining obstacles to more mobility for workers, services, business entities and capital in recent years are aligned with post-Lisbon commitments to creating the world's leading competitive market, European corporate governance regulation (ECGR) has become exposed to and implicated in a set of highly dynamic regulatory experiments. In this context, 'New Governance' offers itself as both a tentative label and immodest proposal for a more responsive and innovative approach to European law making. The following article assesses the recently emerging regulatory forms in ECGR as illustrations of far-reaching transformations in market governance. The arguable parallels between the EU's regulatory transformation in response to growing legitimacy concerns and the recurring question about whose interests a business corporation is intended to serve, provide the framework for an exploration of current regulatory trajectories in European corporate law that can most adequately be understood as a telling example of transnational legal pluralism.     

Anxiety Governance

This article explores the role of anxiety in neoliberal regimes of self‐governance, arguing that anxiety has become a technique of governance. Discourses of anxiety produce anxious subjects who undertake a range of self‐governing projects to manage and mitigate the experience. I explore anxiety governance in the environmental context of “eco‐anxiety,” motherhood, and the controversy over Bisphenol A in baby bottles. Maternal toxic vigilance, in which individual mothers assume responsibility for the environmental health of their children through better consumer choices, is a classic example of this anxiety governance. The regulatory failure of the neoliberal state reinforces this self‐governance; governments cannot be trusted to protect children from the toxins that are poisoning them, so mothers must do it themselves. Finally, notwithstanding the depoliticizing tendency of these self‐governing projects, I consider the political potential of this maternal toxic vigilance, exploring whether anxiety governance might more productively engage the political.     

英国行业性组织在公司治理中的作用

英国公司治理研究致力于解决因所有权和控制权分离而产生的经典代理问题,理论界和实务界分别提出了两种机制:董事会内部监督机制和"要素市场"外部治理机制来约束监督管理层,降低代理成本。在机构化持股时代,机构投资者越来越积极参与所投资组合公司的治理事务,代表机构投资者的行业性组织在一般性参与方面起着举足轻重的作用,机构监督已成为英国公司治理的新机制。     

Company Law and Corporate Governance Renewal in Transition Economies: The Bulgarian Dilemma

The main objective of company law and corporate governance structures is to provide rules and secure efficient functioning of decision-making mechanisms that maximise the value of enterprises and safeguard interests of various stakeholders. Company laws and corporate governance models in different countries have evolved in specific historical, cultural, market and legal conditions that prevent their direct transplantation elsewhere. Assessing available experiences, former centrally planned European economies, engaged in sweeping transformations, are challenged by the need to recreate a delicate balance between investor protection and business discretion of managers to work for corporate value maximisation and social welfare. This essay undertakes an explorative discussion on the possible choices and the costs and benefits related to principalagent problem resolution in economies in transition, with special emphasis on institutions and the case of Bulgaria.     

论公司治理与公司控制人侵权责任的追究

完善的资本市场是影响公司治理的一个非常重要的外部因素,同时,健全的公司治理又是健康的资本市场不可或缺的组成部分。良好的公司治理机制需要多方面因素的合理组合。从公司法的角度看,追究大股东、董事、经理等公司控制人的侵权责任是我国当前完善公司治理机制的核心内容之一。     

The governance of the financial action task force: an analysis of power and influence throughout the years

The international fight against money laundering illustrates changes in global governance as a result of the increasingly cross-border nature of crime and the need it creates for all involved to cooperate. The economic priorities and security concerns that surround it contributed to the strong evolution of global governance in this area and the status of anti-money laundering as a shared problem. The creation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), its expansion and cementation throughout the years, is a good example of the many forces working together to responding to the demands of emerging criminal threats and trends. It offers a good illustration of how relationships in global governance have influenced FATF’s priorities and action and ultimately the way in which illicit financial flows are tackled. This analysis offers an overview of FATF’s network across time taking into account the role of states, international organisations, and the private sector in the decision-making processes. It argues that Great Powers – a small, but aligned, group of states of global economic relevance – are responsible for FATF’s direction and the international efforts against illicit financial flows. It suggests, however, that unlike what could be expected, their power is declining following the rise of private sector influence through resourceful, organised and transnational actions e.g. on information sharing.     

法律治理中的激励模式

法律治理的最高境界是实现非强制性的法律激励。法律激励的场域存在于法律关系的实践之中。法律激励的实现模式主要包括三类六种模式:权利模式与义务模式、奖励模式与惩罚模式、助力模式与阻力模式。各种模式之间具有相互联系、互相辅助的关系。     

论破产重整中的公司治理——美国经验及其借鉴

破产重整中公司治理结构在现实上必然会产生一些张力和变化,破产公司治理在宏观上与破产重整的立法目的密切相关,因此构建公司治理结构首先就要受制于破产债务人在破产重整或者破产清算之间所做出的选择。     

实践《公司治理规则》的法律途径--论修订后的《德国股份法》第161条

自经济合作与发展组织(OECD)制定了《公司治理结构规则》以后,很多国家都相继制定了自己的公司治理规则。德国不仅制定了《公司治理规则》,而且通过对《股份法》的修订,从法律的角度强化上市公司对公司治理规则的遵行,以期达到完善公司治理的目的。     

New Governance,Chief Privacy Officers,and the Corporate Management of Information Privacy in the United States: An Initial Inquiry

While the turn from traditional regulation to more collaborative, experimentalist, and flexible forms of governance has garnered significant academic focus, far less attention has been paid to the effects of such “new governance” approaches on regulated firms' understanding of the laws' demands, and on the structures employed within business organizations to meet them. This article targets this analytic gap by examining internal corporate practices regarding consumer privacy, an arena in which the Federal Trade Commission and the states have adopted new governance models. Using data from qualitative interviews with leading corporate Chief Privacy Officers, as well as internal corporate documentation, it examines the way privacy practices have been catalyzed in the shadow of new privacy governance approaches and the combination of regulatory, market, and stakeholder forces they seek to harness. Specifically, it suggests the convergence of a set of practices adopted by privacy officers identified as “leaders,” regarding both high‐level corporate privacy management and the integration of privacy into entity‐wide risk management goals through technology, decision‐making processes, and the empowerment of distributed expertise networks throughout the firm.     

论银行公司治理制度的构建

在银行中,利益冲突的范围不同于实体经济中一般的工商企业,但是,一直以来银行的公司治理制度并没有给予银行中特别的利益冲突以特别关注。美国2007-2009年的金融危机表明,有必要调整和改革银行的公司治理结构。银行功能的社会公益性以及银行中特殊的利益冲突和其它的特点使得在构建银行的公司治理结构时,不能够简单地适用普通公司的治理模式,而要在股权治理、债权治理和监管治理之中寻求平衡。     

The Role of Competition in Determining Corporate Governance Outcomes: Lessons from Australia's Corporate Governance System

Successive waves of corporate collapse in every decade of Australia's history suggest that there is a significant unresolved corporate governance problem in Australia. Corporate collapse has been followed by reform but with little effect on the overall pattern of collapse and reform every decade. This article suggests that one of the elements which entrenches corporate governance problems in Australia is the competitive environment in which companies operate, which currently is not regulating management. It is argued that this anti-competitive environment has two significant effects. First, key shareholders have retained controlling blocks of shares as the benefits of control and the costs of unconstrained management are high in such distorted markets. Secondly, management skills have stagnated, so that bad management and regular management failure have become features of the corporate governance system.     

Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination

Abstract:  The open method of coordination (OMC) has increased the competence of the European Union to regulate areas where the traditional Community legislative processes are weak, or where new areas require coordination of Member State policy, either as part of the spillover of the integration project as a result of economic and monetary union, or as a result of the case law of the European Court of Justice. The OMC is viewed as an aspect of new, experimental governance, which is part of the response by the EU to regulatory shortcomings. This article explores the normative aspects of the OMC using case studies. The article examines the conditions in which the OMC emerges, the conditions upon which it thrives, and the claims that are made for its effectiveness as a new form of governance.