To Disclose or not to Disclose? That is the Question in Collaborative Law

Collaborative Law (CL) is a dispute resolution process increasingly used in family law and divorce designed to encourage problem solving negotiations by parties represented by counsel. Many states have adapted legislation to authorize and facilitate CL and thousands of lawyers have been trained in the CL process. CL lawyers and participants sign a Participation Agreement in which they agree that the lawyers will be disqualified if the CL process terminates without settlement. They also promise full and voluntary disclosure of information. The extent of the obligation of disclosure is, however, unclear. Through analysis of an extended hypothetical divorce settlement negotiation, this article advocates that CL lawyers and clients should assume an obligation to disclose material facts without a request from the other side. Traditional legal ethics, based on an adversarial framework, requires only disclosure of information when requested by another party. In addition, in traditional legal ethics, a lawyer cannot disclose information obtained in the course of the lawyer‐client relationship without the client's consent even if material to the negotiation. Some authority regulating CL, however, suggests that CL participants and counsel should disclose material information without a specific request even if a client does not want the information disclosed. In that situation, the CL lawyer should encourage the client to disclose the information but if the client refuses to do so, withdraw from the representation. This Article reviews the arguments for and against an obligation of affirmative disclosure in CL. It suggests that affirmative disclosure obligations should be the subject of discussion between CL participants and lawyers and that CL Participation Agreements should be drafted to establish a clear obligation. Finally, this article identifies key areas for further discussion and research on CL disclosure obligations.     

Should we trust the gatekeepers?: Auditors’ and lawyers’ liability for clients’ misconduct

Many corporate scandals of the past years (Enron, Worldcom) have made apparent the essential role of professional service providers, such as auditors, corporate lawyers, and securities analysts, in detecting and revealing corporate misconduct on the part of their clients [Coffee, J., Jr. (2006). Gatekeepers. The role of the professions in corporate governance. Oxford University Press]. Political and legal responses in the aftermath of those scandals have increased the level of regulatory intervention upon auditors and lawyers. For instance, several measures were introduced in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and were recommended by the European Commission.The imposition of duties of care and reporting on gatekeepers, conditional on their having observed an underlying wrongdoing or misconduct of their clients, is, however, more complicated at a theoretical level than believed by policymakers and commentators. Using framework similar to the one we have recently employed to analyze heterogeneous victims in terms of their costs of care [Ganuza, J., & Gomez, F. (2005). Caution, children crossing! Heterogeneity of victim's cost of care and the negligence rule [article 3], Review of Law and Economics, 1], we model the interaction as one in which the gatekeeper observes the state of the world affecting misconduct with a given probability, and Courts or regulators imposing duties or liabilities are unable to verify whether, in fact, misconduct had or not been observed by the lawyer or auditor. The wrongdoing by the client, however, is ex post costlessly verifiable by the Courts or regulators. Information on wrongdoing is thus verifiable but hideable. In this setting, we show that general (albeit maybe increased) standards of professional behavior by auditors or lawyers may well be sufficient as incentives. If those standards can be adequately set by Courts or regulators, in anticipation of the opportunities for strategic behavior derived from the imperfect observation and the unverifiability of actual observation, legal rules do not need to rely on more complex policies of trust or distrust towards the statements, or on the proofs, provided by the gatekeepers, concerning the actual observation of clients’ misbehavior. The implications of the model tend to imply that the distinction between voluntary violation (scienter) of duties, and mere negligence, contrary to existing Law, is not very useful in this context.     

Specialization and Prestige in the Legal Profession: The Structure of Deference

The process of specialization is now well advanced within the legal profession, and the specialties have acquired clearly varying levels of prestige among the practicing bar. What are the characteristics of the specialties, or of the lawyers who practice in them, that might account for these variations in prestige? In describing the prestige differences and several of the variables that might be thought to account for them, the authors analyze the results of a survey of a large random sample of Chicago lawyers. Among the findings are a strong relationship between prestige within the legal profession and the type of clients that the specialty serves, a substantial correlation between prestige and the degree of intellectual challenge presented by the subject matter of the specialty, and the perhaps surprising result that prestige is not significantly associated with the income earned by lawyers practicing in the specialty. The authors conclude that legal specialties that regularly confront personal suffering lose social standing as a result, that prestige within the profession is directly proportional to the degree to which the specialty facilitates the conduct of corporate enterprise, and that the varying prestige of the specialties is likely to affect the political and professional power of the lawyers who practice in them and to influence the patterns of recruitment of lawyers into law practice.     

Working for Corporate Actors: Social Change and Elite Attorneys in Chicago

Elite attorneys have been the objects of social scientific study and speculation for many years. This article contributes to that body of thought by reporting some of the results of a research project that studied 59 members of Chicago's corporate actor legal elite-the lawyers who serve the city's major business, social, civic, political, and cultural organizations.
The article briefly defines the elite studied and the design of the overall re-search project. It then focuses on the working situations of these lawyers and the professional roles they play for their respective corporate actors. A division of legal labor that is discovered to separate house counsel from law firm partners among the elite is analyzed in some depth.
Since the professional roles of these elite attorneys differ from those de-scribed by other social scientists earlier, the article concludes by offering a theory to explain this apparent social change. By tapping recent discussions of the coming of postliberal society, it suggests that corporate actors engineer this new division of legal labor for their attorneys in response to the complex new legal problems posed by institutional changes in the larger society.     

Representing the healthcare organization in a post-Sarbanes-Oxley world: new rules, new paradigms, new perils

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Act) significantly changed the expected corporate behavior of public companies. The Act governs the relationship between corporate organizations and their in-house or outside counsel. Under Section 307 of the Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission initially proposed expansive rules regarding counsel's duties. After comments and criticism from much of the bar, a final, narrower, version of rules under Section 307 (Final Rule) was adopted. The Final Rule contains alternative reporting procedures, attorney responsibilities, and sanctions for violations. In addition to the Act, the American Bar Association's (ABA) Task Force on Corporate Responsibility(Task Force), which was itself a reaction to Enron, reported on the importance of counsel's role in a corporate setting (Cheek Report). The ABA adopted amendments to its Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) 1.6 and 1.13 as proposed in the Cheek Report. The Final Rule and amended Model Rules together suggest that attorneys may owe duties beyond those owed to their clients.     

传统与转型：坚守正义、守护良知和维护荣誉

律师是法律职业共同体中的一员,既要代表和维护委托人的利益,又要看重正义和司法公正。律师应当成为社会的一个阶层,构成一个重要的社会群体,构成公民社会一个最成熟的层面,成为反对专制和建设民主的重要社会力量。新世纪初,中国律师随社会政治转型再次面临新的转型,律师将从传统职业角色中走出来．部分地转向社会公共事务和政治生活。律师职业转型应当适度保持传统本色,以实现社会正义为根本使命,以守护社会良知为职业本分,以维护共同体的荣誉为最高利益。     

Client Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their Relations with Criminal Clients

In this study, relations between criminal defense lawyers and their clients are explored from the attorneys'perspective using interviews with 155 defense counsel from nine felony trial courts. Attorneys claim public clients are more skeptical and less willing to accept their professional authority than private clients and that they need to take extra steps to gain their cooperation. The accountability of attorneys is investigated in relationship to the need to establish "client control. " This problem is resolved through a gamelike situation leading to the apparent paradox that attorneys share decision-making power with public clients contrary to their expectations.     

Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private Lawmaking

Through an intensive examination of the development and diffusion of a new legal device—the shareholder rights' plan or poison pill—this article demonstrates the entrepreneurial, lawmaking role of corporate lawyers. This study case suggests that corporate lawyers may act as legal entrepreneurs, developing and promoting new legal devices and strategies on behalf of actual and potential clients. If affirmed by the courts, these devices or techniques are rapidly diffused thereby contributing to the creation of new legal knowledge. The creation and successful defense of the shareholder rights' plan led to both new caselaw and statute law. In this way, corporate practitioners contribute to the creation of new legal knowledge, suggesting a bottom-up approach to knowledge creation rather than the conventional top-down view. It is suggested that legal innovations like the shareholder rights' plan are more likely to be developed in newer firms than in established firms and in specialized firms than general service law firms.     

Ways of Improving State Guidance of Advocates

Collegia of advocates [advokaty] in the USSR are self-governing public organizations of professional lawyers, voluntarily associated, whose purpose is to provide defense services during the preliminary investigation and before the court, representation in civil cases in court and before the arbitration system, and other kinds of legal help to citizens, enterprises, institutions, and organizations. The collegia of advocates are social organizations of the independent type, occupying an important place in the system of political organization of Soviet society.     

Defence counsel in early modern Scotland: A study based on the High Court of Justiciary

This article explores the practice of those advocates who acted as counsel for defenders in Scotland in the High Court of Justiciary in the early seventeenth century. By 1587, defence counsel was confirmed as a ‘right’ in Scotland in every criminal court except the Privy Council. The advocates who acted as counsel were well educated and respected members of their profession, amounting to possibly forty-one per cent of the bar. They served their clients both in and out of court, and their services were vital: a defender was much more likely to be convicted if he did not have defence counsel. Their pleadings also help to illustrate the conservative nature of Scots criminal law. The way in which defence counsel developed and functioned can be seen as an example of the growing professionalization of the law and its institutions in early modern Scotland.     

Legal Professionals and Development Strategies: Corporate Lawyers and the Construction of the Telecoms Sector in Brazil (1980s–2010s)

This study explores the role of corporate lawyers in the construction and operation of a key area of the Brazilian economy over a thirty‐year period. It looks at three periods in the history of the Brazilian telecoms sector: the fall of state monopoly; global restructuring, neoliberalism, and privatization; and the recent resurgence of state activism. In the first two periods, lawyers worked to facilitate privatization and to create a lightly regulated market for telecoms services that attracted foreign capital. Things changed, however, when the industry was faced with new industrial and social policies. In this period, lawyers oscillated between resisting government intrusion and negotiating engagement with regulators. This sequence of events encompasses changes in the field of state power, hierarchies in the legal profession, and core‐periphery relations, which invite new syntheses of existing theoretical traditions about law, lawyers, and capitalist development in emerging economies.     

“He did everything he possibly could for me”: medical malpractice claimants’ experiences of lawyer–client relations

Lawyers are obliged to act in the interests of their clients, however, it is not clear how lawyers should do this in practice. Should lawyers follow their clients' instructions without deviation, should they actively manage their clients' expectations, or as many studies suggest, do lawyers place their own interests first? This paper examines how lawyers interact with medical malpractice claimants. It reveals that lawyers take a client-aligned approach, where lawyers acknowledge their client's goals, but do not necessarily do what the client says. We argue that this approach is made necessary by legal and organisational constraints which limit the ability of lawyers to produce the types of outcomes that their clients want.     

Lawyers and Embedded Legal Activity in the Southern Civil Rights Movement

We introduce the concept of embedded legal activity to capture the ways in which lawyers and legal organizations can become intertwined in the ongoing activities of social movements. Embedded legal activity is characterized by diverse issues and venues and comprises legal activities that help support movement infrastructure, close coordination between movement lawyers and other activists, and responsiveness to constituent needs. Investigating a comprehensive data set on legal activity during the southern civil rights movement, we identify forms of legal activity beyond the typical focus of legal mobilization, including defense for movement participants charged with misdemeanors and other crimes, movement assistance on organization‐level legal matters, and general legal aid to movement constituents. These were by far the more common types of legal activity and emerged from the embeddedness of lawyers in a mass movement. We argue that embedded legal activity is likely where movements prioritize grassroots leadership and community organizing and face significant countermobilization, hostile legal and political opportunity structures, and substantial social and economic inequality.     

Consequential Responsibility for Client Wrongs: Lehman Brothers and the Regulation of the Legal Profession

Should transactional lawyers bear responsibility when their competent actions facilitate unlawful activity by their client? Or is a lawyer's only concern to act in the client's interest by providing her with the advice and support she seeks? The high profile failure of Lehman Brothers provides a unique opportunity to explore these questions in the context of the provision of a legal opinion by a magic circle law firm. A legal opinion which, although as a matter of law was accurate, was a necessary precursor to an accounting treatment by Lehman Brothers which was described by the Lehman's Bankruptcy Examiner as ‘balance sheet manipulation’. The article argues that the law's existing understanding of when consequential responsibility should be imposed on those who assist another's wrongdoing provides a theory and a tool‐kit whose application can be justifiably extended to the professional regulation of transactional lawyers.     

Giving and Getting Respect: Prestige and Stratification in a legal Elite

This article focuses on the corporate actor elite of Chicago's legal community—those attorneys who practice law with and for the major business, social, civic, and cultural organizations in the city. A continuation of a previous article, this article focuses on the differential allocation of professional respect made within that elite. Specifically, the discussion centers on the "second-class citizenship" in the legal community to which elite house counsel are relegated by elite partners in private law firms.
The first half of the article probes the social bases for that stigma. Examining a number of alternative explanations, it offers most support to one based on differences in the educational preparations of the respondents, to the effect that house counsel attended less prestigious law schools and performed less outstandingly at these schools than did firm partners at theirs. In the concluding half of the article, the effects of the stigma on elite social cohesion and commonality of purpose are examined. What emerges from this analysis is the finding that the house counsel stigma—strongly felt as it may be by all concerned—nevertheless generates no lasting lines of social cleavage within the corporate actor legal elite.     

Lawyers' Roles in Voluntary Associations: Declining Social Capital?

The extent and nature of lawyers'participation in civic life probably has important effects on the character of the community's activity and its out-comes. Where and how lawyers participate in voluntary associations may influence the ability of those organizations to function within the larger structure of American institutions.
This paper compares findings from two surveys of Chicago lawyers, the first conducted in 1975 and the second in 1994-95. Contrary to some expectations, the available evidence does not suggest that community activities of lawyers decreased. Moreover, lawyers'energies in 1995 appear to have been devoted more often to socially concerned organizations, those with a reformist agenda, than had been the case in 1975. The types of organizations with the greatest increase in activity were religious and civic associations. A smaller percentage of the respondents held leadership positions in 1995 than in 1975, but, because of a doubling in the number of lawyers, the best estimate is that the bar's absolute level of contribution to community leadership did not change greatly.
In both 1975 and 1995, a hierarchy of social prestige appears to have influenced the pattern of lawyers'community activities. Lawyers who had higher incomes, were middle-aged, were Protestants, and who had attended elite law schools were more likely to be active or leaders in most kinds of organizations. In ethnic and fraternal organizations, however, the elites of the profession had relatively low rates of participation, while government lawyers, solo practitioners, and graduates of less prestigious law schools predominated. Status hierarchies within the broader community—as well as social differences in taste, preference, or "culture"—clearly penetrate the bar.     

The Social Organization of Legal Services to Indigent Defendants

This article draws together materials portraying appointed counsel services in a variety of jurisdictions to illustrate the role of court organization in shaping legal services to indigent defendants. Many criminal courts are bifurcated into preliminary hearing and trial courts. Legal representation of indigents is frequently organized to parallel these stages. As a result, indigent defendants receive defense services from a succession of different lawyers at different stages of their cases. This occurs in three ways. First, some defendants legally eligible for appointed counsel at the inception of their cases have counsel appointed for them only at the trial court after initially employing their own counsel at the preliminary hearing. The dual court system encourages such one-stage representation by private lawyers by facilitating their withdrawal between stages of a case. Second, indigents may also have different private lawyers appointed to represent them at different stages because judges, interested in efficiently running their court calls, desire that particular lawyers represent indigents in their courtrooms. Finally, defender offices often assign different lawyers to different stages as a result of both the demands by judges that defenders be assigned exclusively to their courtrooms and the costs of delivering continuous legal services in a tiered judicial system. For indigent defendants the sequential system of representation may adversely affect the quality of case preparation and undermine a sound attorney-client relationship.     

From refuge to trap: formalist misadventures of Poland’s postsocialist legal profession

ABSTRACT

Since 2015 the populist government of the Law and Justice Party in Poland has spearheaded a highly effective campaign against the country’s lawyers, encountering relatively muted social opposition. Using Bourdieuan lenses, the article traces the roots of that remarkable institutional weakness of the Polish legal profession to the highly formalist approach to law and legal thinking that Poland’s lawyers espoused. Prior to the fall of communism, and in democratic Poland, the role of lawyers in society was to act as guardians of “neatness” of the legal system – or that system’s internal clarity, cohesion, and completeness. Such a sterile approach to legal practice was initially attractive, among other reasons, because it protected the legal profession from difficult legitimacy challenges stemming from that profession’s pre-1989 coexistence with the communist regime. With time, however, the refuge that formalism offered became a trap that undermined lawyers’ political and economic power.     

Varieties of Responsibility and Organizational Crime

Data from interviews at the head offices of Japanese companies are used to illustrate the highly varied ways in which large organizations hold individuals and subunits responsible for corporate wrongdoing. Noblesse oblige, captain of the ship responsibility, nominated accountability and fault-based responsibility are identified as important types of individual accountability all of which can be unjust and ineffective when decisionmaking is more or less collective. In the face of immense diversity in varieties of responsibility for organizational crime, different strategies for bringing law and organizational culture into alignment are tentatively evaluated.