Information asymmetries: recognizing the limits of the GDPR on the data-driven market

Online search engines, social media platforms, and targeted advertising services often employ a “data-driven” business model based on the large-scale collection, analysis, and monetization of personal data. When providing such services significant information asymmetries arise: data-driven companies collect much more personal data than the consumer knows or can reasonably oversee, and data-driven companies have much more (technical) information about how this data is processed than consumers would be able to understand. This article demonstrates the vulnerable position consumers continue to find themselves in as a result of information asymmetries between them and data-driven companies. The GDPR, by itself, is in practice unable to mitigate these information asymmetries, nor would it be able to provide for effective transparency, since it does not account for the unique characteristics of the data-driven business model. Consumers are thus faced with an insurmountable lack of transparency which is inherent in, as well as the inevitable consequence of, the magnitude of the information asymmetries present on the data-driven market.     

Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define Administrable Legal Rules

European competition laws condemn as ‘exploitative abuses’the pricing policies of dominant firms that may result in adirect loss of consumer welfare. Article 82(a) of the EC Treaty,for example, expressly states that imposing ‘unfair’prices on consumers by dominant suppliers constitutes an abuse.Several firms have been found to abuse their dominant positionsby charging excessive prices in cases brought by the EuropeanCommission and the competition authorities of several MemberStates. Those cases show that the assessment of excessive pricingis subject to substantial conceptual and practical difficulties,and that any policy that seeks to detect and prohibit excessiveprices is likely to yield incorrect predictions in numerousinstances. In this paper, we evaluate the pros and cons of alternativelegal standards towards excessive pricing by explicitly consideringthe likelihood of false convictions/acquittals and the costsassociated with those errors. We find that the legal standardthat maximizes long-term consumer welfare, given the informationtypically available to regulators, would involve no ex postintervention on the pricing decisions of dominant firms. A possibleexception to this general rule is discussed.     

‘No banquet can do without liquor’: alcohol counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China

The illegal trade in alcohol has been an empirical manifestation of organised crime with a very long history; yet, the nature of the illegal trade in alcohol has received relatively limited academic attention in recent years despite the fact that it has been linked with significant tax evasion as well as serious health problems and even deaths. The current article focuses on a specific type associated with the illegal trade in alcohol, the counterfeiting of alcohol in China. The article pays particular attention to the counterfeiting of baijiu - Chinese liquor - in mainland China. The aim of the article is to offer an account of the social organisation of the alcohol counterfeiting business in China by illustrating the counterfeiting process, the actors in the business as well as its possible embeddedness in legal practices, trades and industries. The alcohol counterfeiting business is highly reflective to the market demand and consumer needs. Alcohol counterfeiting in China is characterised primarily by independent actors many of whom are subcontracted to provide commodities and services about the counterfeiting process. The business relies on personal networks – family and extended family members, friends and acquaintances. Relationships between actors in the business are very often based on a customer-supplier relationship or a ‘business-to-business market’. The alcohol counterfeiting business in China highlights the symbiotic relationship between illegal and legal businesses.     

The security of access to accounts under the PSD2

The revised Payment Services Directive (‘PSD2’) has been adopted to stimulate the development of an integrated internal market for payment services. In particular, it facilitates payment initiation services and account information services by granting the providers of these services access to the accounts of the payment service users. At the same time, the recitals state that the PSD2 guarantees a high level of consumer protection, security of payment transactions and protection against fraud.This paper answers the following question: To what extent does the access to accounts of the payment initiation service providers and account information service providers balance the development of the market for payment services with the security of the payment account and the privacy of the user? An analysis of the PSD2 shows that the development of the market for payment services has a higher priority. Security and privacy are ultimately subordinate.First, the PSD2 does not adequately protect the personal data of the users. The definition of ‘account information service’ is broad and covers a wide range of services. This allows the payment service providers to circumvent the limitations of the access to accounts.Next, the payment service providers have a ‘fall back option’ that allows ‘screen scraping’ if the dedicated interface is not functioning properly. Although this access is constrained by several safeguards, the fall back option gives the payment services provider unlimited access to the account of the user.Finally, the payment service providers have considerable freedom to arrange their authentication process as they see fit. The banks seem to be required to trust this process. The PSD2 and regulatory technical standards do not demand that a bank is able to verify the authentication or the integrity of the payment order.     

Singapore's Personal Data Protection legislation: Business perspectives

As global digitalisation of information and interconnecting technologies along with new marketing practices and business processes vastly increase the opportunities for data collection, storage, usage and delivery, there is a corresponding increase in consumer expectations of data privacy. These expectations must be met if business organisations are to promote consumer trust and confidence and maintain their overall competitiveness in a global market. It goes without saying that information is the most valuable business asset and “privacy is good business and information can be the basis of bigger business”. The need to protect data privacy has long been recognised and implemented by major trading nations. Surprisingly, Singapore as a financial centre and nation aspiring to be a trusted data hosting hub has been slow in enacting specific data protection laws. The first piece of legislation that has emerged is a light-touch baseline framework applicable to all organisations except the public sector. This article considers the new legislation from the business perspective and the implications for private sector business organisations facing the challenges of compliance.     

Online platforms and pricing: Adapting abuse of dominance assessments to the economic reality of free products

Online platforms, which are at the forefront of today's economy, are subject to intensive competition law enforcement. However, the platform business model presents challenges for the application of competition law. Most notably, they appear to offer consumers a great number of their products for free. The explanation for most of these supposedly free products is offered by two-sided market theory: consumers may not be paying, but the ‘other’ side of the market is. This other side of the market often consists of advertisers, which pay the platform for access to the consumers’ information (to target advertisements) and attention (to show the advertisements). As many of these platforms are now potentially dominant, they come within the scope of competition law's abuse of dominance provision, including the doctrines of predatory and excessive pricing. These price-based theories need to adapt to the often price-less platform business model in order to prevent competition authorities from making both type I and type II enforcement errors. At the same time, competition law enforcement needs to consider—and at times give priority to—other branches of law that address abusive behaviour concerning free products. Through the use of case studies, this article therefore suggests ways in which abuse of dominance assessments can take into account the economic reality of free products.     

Medicare program; granting and withdrawal of deeming authority to national accreditation organizations--HCFA. Final rule

This rule implements section 1865(a) of the Social Security Act, as amended by sections 2345 and 2346 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 and section 6019 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989. The amendments expand the types of providers and suppliers of services that we may consider to meet conditions of participation or certification, nursing home requirements, or conditions for coverage by virtue of their accreditation by a national accreditation program; these providers and suppliers are also subject to validation surveys. The rule also extends confidentiality to accreditation surveys, other than home health agency surveys, done by accreditation programs in addition to the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, except that we may disclose survey and related information to the extent that such information relates to an enforcement action we take on the basis of accreditation survey findings. The rule also provides for: the release to, and use by, HCFA of all accreditation surveys and other relevant information even if a provider or supplier is not subject to a validation survey; the removing of deemed status of a facility based on a validation survey, an accreditation survey, or other information related to either; and appeal procedures for denied or withdrawn approval.     

Can minimum prices assure the quality of professional services?

This paper studies the effects of a minimum price fixed by a bureaucratic non-monopolistic professional association on service quality and consumer surplus. It shows that the price set by a Niskanen-type professional association will maximize consumer surplus only if consumers demand the highest possible average quality. If consumers demand services of lesser quality, the association’s price will be too high if measured by consumer surplus. Moreover we show that a deregulated market will always reproduce the favorable result of a uniformly high price in the case of top quality demand, while delivering superior results in the case of a mixed demand for high and low quality services.     

Optimal law enforcement and the economics of the drug market: Some comments on the Schengen Agreements

In this paper, we extend the optimal law enforcement model to the illegal trade and consumption of narcotics. Three sources of risk in the narcotic business are considered: (1) The consumer can be detected while consuming narcotics; (2) the consumer and the retailer can be detected at the time of sale to the consumer; and (3) the retailer and the producer can be detected at the time of sale to the retailer. We derive the two levels of market equilibrium and a set of comparative static results. The welfare analysis is used to comment on the Schengen Agreements and the implications for the market of narcotics.     

Protection of the Rights of Consumers

Economic reform is greatly expanding the market for consumer services. Under contemporary conditions, unfortunately, this is accompanied by such negative phenomena as consumer fraud, the sale of products and medicinal preparations that are adulterated and sometimes dangerous for people's health, and also the ubiquitous rendering of poor-quality services.     

Medicare program; requirements for providers and suppliers to establish and maintain Medicare enrollment. Final rule

This final rule requires that all providers and suppliers (other than physicians or practitioners who have elected to "opt-out" of the Medicare program) complete an enrollment form and submit specific information to us. This final rule also requires that all providers and suppliers periodically update and certify the accuracy of their enrollment information to receive and maintain billing privileges in the Medicare program. In addition, this final rule implements provisions in the statute that require us to ensure that all Medicare providers and suppliers are qualified to provide the appropriate health care services. These statutory provisions include requirements meant to protect beneficiaries and the Medicare Trust Funds by preventing unqualified, fraudulent, or excluded providers and suppliers from providing items or services to Medicare beneficiaries or billing the Medicare program or its beneficiaries.     

Taking crime out of crime business

It is one thing to assert that conventional market analysis is critically useful in understanding criminal enterprise. It is more challenging to suggest that corrupt and compromised legal regulation interacts with other critical market variables to maximise market advantage for crime business in a similar manner to legitimate regulatory forces in their protection and enhancement of legitimate business enterprise. The central argument of this paper is that crime business mirrors other business forms when considered in terms of critical market variables, and that in particular regulatory forces when inverted from their original purposes can influence market conditions in the same ways desired from the legitimate regulatory form. The main research direction deriving from the analysis of regulatory influences over specific criminal enterprises is how do certain critical market forces essentially facilitate criminal enterprise as a market phenomenon. This paper suggests how through comparatively analysing nominated critical market forces in the context of lucrative and recurrent criminal enterprises, common business decision-making may be predicted and thereby controlled beyond a law enforcement paradigm. In fact, the paper argues that when perverted law enforcement regulation operates as an inter-connecting market characteristic then it can have a similar influence over illegitimate enterprise that law enforcement may provide legitimate business.By establishing a richer and more enterprise-oriented understanding of crucial market variables, it becomes possible to refine control strategies at critical entry and exit points in the operation of clandestine crime businesses. The paper will challenge a comparative theorising of what makes crime business a good business, and how normative distinctions between illegitimate markets are made less convincing when positioned against an analysis of the interaction of critical market variables.     

Market offenses and limits to growth

The purpose of this article is to explore various factors that may regulate or stabilize levels in market offenses. Instead of assuming that illegal markets are ‘out of control’, evidence is advanced to demonstrate, on the contrary, that there are indeed limits to growth in criminal markets. This is presented along three principal and interconnected arguments. First, social norms limit the ability of suppliers to shape demand for illicit goods and services. Using public opinion surveys, it is concluded that the more objectionable the moral status of an illegal market, the smaller the pool of potential consumers and sellers. Second, there are considerable obstacles that confront suppliers of illegal goods and services accumulating capital and upward mobility. The consequences of product illegality inhibit the organizational growth capacities as well as the geographic expansion of illicit firms. Third, while impunity via corruptible alliances do cancel some of the effects of product illegality, this impunity is not a constant that can always be depended upon. To the extent that corruption varies across jurisdictions and over time, illegal entrepreneurs may come to realize that impunity is intrinsically limited in scope and volatile in nature and over which they essentially have very limited control. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Security assessment of suppliers of telecommunications infrastructure for the provision of services in 5G technology

The process of commencing services based on 5G technology has begun. One condition for starting up 5G technology is the distribution of the frequencies required for the provision of those services. For the first time in the process of making frequencies available, requirements have arisen pertaining to the security of the infrastructure necessary for the provision of those services. In the EU, recommendations have been drawn up, based in particular on an NISCG report entitled Cybersecurity of 5G networks EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures. In this article, an analysis is made of the implementation of those recommendations concerning suppliers of infrastructure, based on examples from selected EU countries, in order to ensure that such assessments are objective and transparent. In some cases, the provisions implementing the recommendations do not fully protect the fundamental rights of the entities assessed as foreseen in EU and domestic law, particularly the right to a fair trial before an independent court. I propose certain changes in the regulations pertaining to suppliers of telecommunications equipment.     

An alternative industrial extension model: The experience of the food manufacturing industry

The ability to reach small manufacturers with productivity enhancing technology requires implementation of alternative industrial extension strategies. We describe one such strategy being pursued in the food manufacturing industry. Given the large numbers of small manufacturers and of potential technology suppliers, the challenge is to create an effective approach that takes advantage of the market aggregation capacity of food industry trade associations. Through a food manufacturing coalition, this extension effort will identify common industry needs for technology; assess and adapt existing technology;stimulate vendors to capitalize on the technology; and rely upon market forces to encourage innovative problem solving.     

Medicare program; fee schedule for payment of ambulance services and revisions to the physician certification requirements for coverage of nonemergency ambulance services. Final rule with comment period

This final rule establishes a fee schedule for the payment of ambulance services under the Medicare program, implementing section 1834(l) of the Social Security Act. As required by that section, the proposed rule on which this final fee schedule for ambulance services is based was the product of a negotiated rulemaking process that was carried out consistent with the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990. The fee schedule described in this final rule will replace the current retrospective reasonable cost payment system for providers and the reasonable charge system for suppliers of ambulance services. In addition, this final rule requires that ambulance suppliers accept Medicare assignment; codifies the establishment of new Health Care Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes to be reported on claims for ambulance services; establishes increased payment under the fee schedule for ambulance services furnished in rural areas based on the location of the beneficiary at the time the beneficiary is placed on board the ambulance; and revises the certification requirements for coverage of nonemergency ambulance services.     

The Outpost Office: How International Law Firms Approach the China Market

How are international law firms faring in China? Drawing on 2013 data, this article presents the first comprehensive overview of the field, including information about the global mix of players and variation in market niche. Three variables—years present in China, global strategy, and level of localization—help explain why some China practices grow bigger than others. Overall, however, there is a great deal of convergence on one business model: an outpost office with a median size of eleven lawyers responsible for under 5 percent of worldwide revenue. The common experience of stagnation following market entry illustrates the strength of hype, the constraints of partnership, and the persistent power of the Chinese state to shape the legal services market. At the same time, the rarity of market exit reflects perceptions that a China presence is a valuable symbol of global commitment and a worthwhile bet on future growth.     

The Harmonisation of Rules of Conduct in EU Financial Markets: Economic Analysis, Subsidiarity and Investor Protection

The rules that regulate the market conduct of traders and the conduct of the business of investment intermediaries in the context of financial markets have not been comprehensively harmonised in the EU. As a result, cross-border trading in financial products and provision of other financial services is regulated by largely asymmetrical national rules. Host state regulators have remained responsible for the supervision of the compliance of banks and investment firms with national rules of conduct when they engage in the cross-border provision of banking and investment services. However, the advent of both the EMU and global trends in the financial services industry have transformed the market landscape. The regulatory challenges that recent market developments pose require a more efficient supervisory regime and a harmonised regulatory environment. These points were focal in the Commission's recent Communication, entitled 'Action Plan for Financial Markets'. This article examines the current regulatory framework in the area of market conduct and conduct of business in the EU. It argues, with the aid of economic analysis, for the harmonisation of rules of market conduct and for the further harmonisation of conduct of business rules at retail investor level. The harmonisation of conduct of business rules goes beyond the Commission's plans and might raise issues of Community competence. However, such harmonisation is dictated by the challenges of investor protection that changing market conditions create. Also, the transaction costs associated with indirect fragmentation inhibit the growth of cross-border trade in this area.     

试论公共服务供给方式中“三大供给主体”全面发展

高效的公共服务供给方式有利于提高公共服务的质量和效率。随着社会的不断发展进步,主体较为单一的集中供给方式已无法满足人民美好生活需要,以政府为主导的分散供给方式即多主体参与的供给方式成为应然选择。新时代,明确政府主体责任、实现政府与市场“双到位”、强化社会组织主体地位、引入并稳定外资力量,是促进公共服务“三大供给主体”全面发展的必由之路。