The Influence of Administrative Law Judge and Political Appointee Decisions on Appellate Courts in National Labor Relations Board Cases

Scholars have long been simultaneously concerned with the factors that influence appellate court decision making and the level of deference that the courts allow for agencies. However, scholars have treated administrative agencies as unitary actors with a single level of decision making, but in reality agency decisions involve input from multiple actors within the agency. I argue that appellate courts rely more heavily on decisions made by actors in the bureaucracy with greater levels of expertise and who are less politically motivated as cues in their decision making. This theory is bolstered by legal precedent in the area of administrative law that suggests courts should more heavily rely on the expert judgment of administrative judges. Thus, as a result of their increased expertise, appearance of political neutrality, and institutional support, courts will be more reliant on decisions issued by administrative law judges (ALJs) than those issued by the political appointees as cues in their decision making. Using over 300 unfair labor practice decisions issued by the federal appeals courts on review of cases from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), I develop a model of appeals court decision making in unfair labor practice cases as a function of the initial decision of the ALJ, the final order of the political appointees of the NLRB, case characteristics, the ideology of the deciding appeals court panel, Supreme Court influence, and economic factors. Though the ideology of the court plays a role in its decision making, cues from ALJ decision making and that of the Board weigh more heavily in appellate court outcomes. However, cues from ALJ decisions play the most consistent role in appellate court decision making, even in more difficult cases. This has important implications for agency strategy in courts and suggests that future research should consider the influence of lower‐level decision making over appellate court decision making in the area of administrative law.     

Double Whammy: Lay Assessors as Lackeys in Chinese Courts

Primarily drawing on in‐depth interviews with lay assessors and judges in Chinese courts, this study suggests that assessors are little more than lackeys. To determine the role of lay participation in decision making across different jurisdictions, this article proposes two variables. The first is whether lay assessors are separate from, or mixed with, professional judges; the second is whether the regime is democratic or authoritarian. Viewed according to these variables, China's lay‐assessor institution is subject to a double whammy: one, the superior legal knowledge of professional judges and their dominance in procedures, and two, the ultimate control of the regime over judges, who, for self‐protection, firmly control lay assessors. This article advances our understanding of the operation of the Chinese lay‐assessor institution, and more generally the relationship between lay participation and political regimes.     

High‐End Demand: The Legal Profession as a Source of Judicial Selection Reform in Urban China

Most studies of comparative judicial politics suggest that judicial autonomy emerges from democratic competition, but despite its authoritarian political system, China has introduced reforms that increase merit‐based competition, transparency, and modest professional autonomy in local courts. Variations in judicial selection procedures across urban China reflect differences in local markets for professional legal services: when mid‐ranking judges can easily find lucrative local employment as lawyers, court leaders strategically reform appointment and promotion mechanisms to retain these young, but experienced, judges. These findings are based on nearly fifteen months of in‐country fieldwork, conducted between 2012 and 2014, including forty‐nine interviews with judges across three different cities: Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Chengdu. Employing the subnational comparative method, this article not only builds theory regarding the legal profession's role in authoritarian states, but also offers new empirical detail regarding the selection, performance evaluation, and behavior of judges in urban China.     

Gender,Critical Mass,and Judicial Decision Making

We examine the role of gender in legal decision making by applying critical mass theory to the U.S. federal district courts. We analyze whether behavioral differences manifest themselves in the decision‐making proclivities of male and female judges, contingent on the existence of a critical mass of female judges at a court point (i.e., each city in which a district court is located). Our results indicate that women jurists exhibit distinctive behavior in certain cases when there is a critical mass of women at a court point. These differences are most significant in criminal justice cases; modest differences between men and women are also identified in civil rights and liberties cases. Gender is not significant in labor and economic regulation cases. These findings suggest that the increasing presence of women on the federal bench could have substantial policy ramifications in the American polity.     

Roles and Power within Federal Problem Solving Courtroom Workgroups

Problem solving (PS) courts (e.g., drug, family, gang, prostitution, reentry) are becoming more commonplace. Today, PS courts exist or are planned in nearly all of the ninety‐four U.S. federal districts. These courts focus on integrating therapeutic jurisprudence into the courtroom environment while emphasizing group decision‐making processes among courtroom workgroup members. In this legal setting, courtroom workgroup teams, regularly consisting of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers (POs), and treatment providers engage a collective, case management approach to decision making with shared power among team members. However, despite the court's therapeutic and collaborative design, we find that POs wield powerful influence in decision making. Informed by sixteen months of qualitative fieldwork, including semistructured interviews, observation of courtroom workgroup meetings, and court observations in five federal PS courts in three federal districts, we find that POs exert undetected informational, technical, and relational power within the PS courtroom workgroup. This role and its accompanying power transforms POs into key decision makers, regardless of PS court type, workgroup dynamics, and decision‐making style. The POs' role makes them critical contributors to the outcomes in federal PS courts with important implications for punishment decisions in the federal justice system. With an increasing number of PS courts currently in the planning stages at the federal level, our study has implications for the structure and decision outcomes in these growing courtroom workgroups.     

Courts between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: Evidence from the Venezuelan Supreme Court

This article offers a theoretical discussion about courts in “hybrid regimes” that evolve from formerly democratic countries. The evolution toward authoritarianism typically allows governments more latitude to reduce judicial independence and judicial power. Yet, several reasons, including legitimacy costs, a tradition of using courts for judicial adjudication and social control, and even the use of courts for quenching dissent may discourage rulers from shutting down the judicial contestation arena and encourage them instead to appeal to less overbearing measures. This usually leads to a decline of the judiciary's proclivity to challenge the government, especially in salient cases. To illustrate these dynamics, I discuss the rise and fall of judicial power in Venezuela under Chávez's rule, focusing on the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. Formerly the most powerful institution in the country's history, the Chamber briefly emerged as an influential actor at the beginning of the regime, but a comprehensive intervention of the judiciary in 2004 further politicized the court and effectively reduced its policy‐making role.     

The Politics of Benchcraft: The Role of Judges in Mental Health Courts

Mental health courts (MHCs) offer community‐based treatment in lieu of criminal prosecution for chronic offenders with psychiatric disabilities, and MHC judges enjoy expanded powers to achieve the court's objectives. Because scholars know little about how judges transition into a new occupational role in the problem‐solving courtroom, this ethnographic study of four MHCs in the United States focuses on how judges learn to orchestrate their responses to treatment noncompliance in this novel court setting. The goal of this article is to examine the professionalization of MHC judges and the emergent craft of therapeutic adjudication. To achieve this goal, I investigate judicial strategies for motivating, questioning, and defending participants accused of wrongdoing. I conclude that the art and practice of problem‐solving justice requires judges to rise to the larger institutional challenges embedded in the alternative courtroom, a process I call the politics of benchcraft.     

Judges,Litigants, and the Design of Courts

Two important perspectives on courts highlight fundamentally different elements of adjudication and yield distinct predictions about judicial outcomes. The Attitudinal Model of judicial voting posits judge ideology as a strong predictor of court outcomes. Alternatively, the Law and Economics perspective focuses on the settlement behavior of litigants and reasons that while judges may vote ideologically, litigants adapt to these ideological proclivities, nullifying the effect of judge ideology. This analysis focuses on reconciling expectations about the effects of judge ideology and litigant strategies by examining their contingent nature and the conditioning effects of institutional design. The analysis examines state supreme courts from 1995–1998 to identify empirical evidence supporting both perspectives. While some state supreme courts have discretionary dockets allowing judges greater opportunities to exercise their ideology, others lack discretionary docket control, making dockets and outcomes largely litigant driven. Support for each perspective largely hinges on this fundamental feature of institutional design.     

Adjudication of Islamic banking and finance cases in the civil courts of Malaysia

The adjudication of Islamic banking and finance (IBF) laws in Malaysia is unique given the Malaysian parallel legal systems. Although IBF is a branch of Islamic law, the civil court has the appropriate jurisdiction to decide the cases. This is due to the fact that banking falls under the items 7 and 8 of the Federal List of the Federal Constitution. The trails of decided cases showed that there are problems in resolving IBF cases in the civil courts. This paper aims to discuss the adjudication of Islamic Banking in the civil courts. The authors employed the method of legal documents analysis in analyzing the IBF cases. The analysis highlighted four obstacles in adjudicating IBF in civil courts, namely; inadequacy of existing legal framework, complications of legal documentation, competency of civil court judges and expert evidence. It also analysed the four approaches adopted by the civil courts in deciding IBF cases; the ‘parties to be bound by their agreement’, the ‘strict adherence to civil law’, the ‘justice and equitable’ and the ‘looking into the substance’.     

From Helping Court to Community‐Based Services: The 30‐Year Evolution of Australia's Family Relationship Centres

As a centrepiece of Australia's 2006 family law reforms, the community‐based Family Relationship Centres (FRCs) represented a major development in the Government's commitment to incorporate family relationship services into its family law system. This paper sees FRCs as a logical development of the original conceptualising the Family Court of Australia as a “helping court”. The paper suggests that the aspiration to create a helping court was partially achieved in 1976 via the creation of an in‐house family court counselling service, which was primarily focused not on law and legal principles, but on supporting the ways in which family members were managing the task of redefining relationships. While generally valued by judges and others, this service nonetheless found itself in tension with the Family Court's continued primary commitment to legally informed and adversarially driven negotiation and decision‐making processes. Since 2006, the creation of FRCs has spearheaded a family law system that provides relationship‐focused interventions away from the courts as the default option for most parenting disputes. Consistent with this aim, there is evidence of a diminished percentage of cases now requiring judicial intervention. The 2006 legislation also provides for courts to conduct “less adversarial trials.” Paradoxically, this has occurred alongside unequivocal evidence from the Australian Institute of Family Studies’ evaluation data that judicial officers are dealing mainly with families displaying seriously dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours. The legal challenge in dealing with these cases is for courts to provide child focused, fair and non‐destructive internal processes. In addition, however, it is increasingly clear that to support and help facilitate their decisions, courts also need good working relationships with FRCs and other community based services. FRCs and the 2006 reforms offer the possibility of moving beyond the ideal of a “helping court” to the broader concept of helping family law system.     

In Defense of Asbestos Tort Litigation: Rethinking Legal Process Analysis in a World of Uncertainty, Second Bests, and Shared Policy-Making Responsibility

A central question in American policy making is when should courts address complex policy issues, as opposed to defer to other forums? Legal process analysis offers a standard answer. It holds that judges should act when adjudication offers advantages over other modes of social ordering such as contracts, legislation, or agency rule making. From this vantage, the decision to use common law adjudication to address a sprawling public health crisis was a terrible mistake, as asbestos litigation has come to represent the very worst of mass tort litigation. This article questions this view, arguing that legal process analysis distorts the institutional choices underlying the American policy‐making process. Indeed, once one considers informational and political constraints, as well as how the branches of government can fruitfully share policy‐making functions, the asbestos litigation seems a reasonable and, in some ways, exemplary, use of judicial power.     

组织视角下的民事诉讼发回重审制度

民诉法学界和实务界有关二审程序中的发回重审存在较大争议,该制度成为本次民诉法修改的重要议题之一。为了形成共识,对这一问题从法解释论的角度进行阐释解说尤为必要。为了限制发回重审裁量权的滥用,我国司法实践中采用程序细化与加强对审判的组织管理并行的策略。不过这种"程序"与"组织"的交织并不能真正抑制裁量权滥用,反而因剥夺当事人的程序参与权而损害审判的公信力。为调整二者的相互关系,应在审判管理的组织背景下保障审判程序的自主性,恢复当事人在程序运作中的结构性位置。     

Splitting the Difference: Modeling Appellate Court Decisions with Mixed Outcomes

In rendering a decision in a particular case, judges are not limited to finding simply for the appellant or for the respondent. Rather, in many cases, they have the option to find for the former on one or more issues and for the latter on one or more other issues. By thus “splitting the difference,” judges can render a judgment that favors both litigants to some degree. What accounts for such mixed outcomes? Several theoretical perspectives provide potential explanations for this phenomenon. First, Galanter (1974) suggests that litigants with greater resources will achieve more favorable outcomes in the courts. Where two high‐resource, repeat‐player litigants meet in the appeals courts, these more sophisticated and successful parties may be able to persuade the court to render decisions with mixed outcomes that at least partially favor each party. Second, split outcomes may result from strategic interactions among the appeals court judges on the decisionmaking panel. Where majority opinion writers seek to accommodate other judges on the panel, split outcomes have the potential to serve as an inducement for more ideologically extreme judges to join the majority opinion. Finally, Shapiro and Stone Sweet ( Stone Sweet 2000; Shapiro & Stone Sweet 2002 ) propose that courts will sometimes split the difference in order to enhance their legitimacy (and ultimately enhance compliance by losing parties). For example, in highly salient cases, where noncompliance would more clearly threaten court legitimacy, judges may be more likely to split the difference in order to mollify even the losing party. We develop an empirical model of mixed outcomes to test these propositions using data available from the U. S. Courts of Appeals Database and find evidence supportive of all three theoretical perspectives.     

Judicial Activism in the Name of the Nation: Reneging on the Integration of Immigrants in Greece

Why do courts sometimes decide to liberalize migrants’ rights, while at others restricting such rights, even contrary to the policies of elected governments? This article addresses this question in the context of Greece. It explores the causes and consequences of judicial decision making in a major decision of the Council of State that suspended the most important government reform of 2010, promoting the integration of third‐country nationals. Drawing on judicial politics scholarship, it argues that the ideological and political preferences of key judges were an important influence on the first Council of State decision considered here. However, in the final decision, intra‐court dynamics and the judges’ consideration of external political constraints influenced the court's reasoning, leading to a more moderate outcome, with important consequences for the relaunching of policy reform.     

Judicial Impartiality and Independence in Divided Societies: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia‐Herzegovina

The role of constitutional courts in deeply divided societies is complicated by the danger that the salient societal cleavages may influence judicial decision‐making and, consequently, undermine judicial impartiality and independence. With reference to the decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia‐Herzegovina, this article investigates the influence of ethno‐national affiliation on judicial behaviour and the extent to which variation in judicial tenure amplifies or dampens that influence. Based on a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the Court's decisions, we find that the judges do in fact divide predictably along ethno‐national lines, at least in certain types of cases, and that these divisions cannot be reduced to a residual loyalty to their appointing political parties. Contrary to some theoretical expectations, however, we find that long‐term tenure does little to dampen the influence of ethno‐national affiliation on judicial behaviour. Moreover, our findings suggest that this influence may actually increase as a judge acclimates to the dynamics of a divided court. We conclude by considering how alternative arrangements for the selection and tenure of judges might help to ameliorate this problem.     

Common law country update on international humanitarian law: annual update on national legislation, 2010

The article highlights the challenge before the courts to the decision of the parliamentary select committee to remove the former Chief Justice of Sri Lanka in January 2013. Parliament and the President proceeded with the impeachment and removal of the Chief Justice, despite court decisions, on the basis that this was a power specifically granted to the parliament under the constitution. The article examines how the legitimacy of impeachment proceedings of superior court judges can be ensured within the concept of the separation of powers without adversely impacting on the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law.     

Discretionary review and undesired cases

Courts sometimes face cases that may result in adverse post-judgment official or public reactions. Such real-world repercussions—e.g., open defiance by public officials—can be more costly for the court than the benefit of hearing and deciding the case. In these situations the court may be better off not taking the case from the outset. This paper examines how courts deal with such cases when they can avoid adjudication—discretionary dockets. Using a stylized screening model, the paper examines the implications of such discretion. In particular, it shows that some undesired real-world outcomes are inevitable; and that broad control over their dockets should lead judges to take fewer cases in which the government is involved. Further, the paper discusses this logic from a comparative design perspective. The two prevalent models of judicial review, the American and the European, seem to take opposing stances on discretionary review; however, both narrow supreme courts’ control over their dockets, either by directly limiting their discretionary jurisdiction or by decentralizing judicial review.     

What's So Special about Specialized Courts? The State and Social Change in Salt Lake City's Domestic Violence Court

The nationwide growth in specialized or problem‐solving courts, including drug courts, community courts, mental health courts, and domestic violence courts, among others, raises questions about the role of the state with respect to social change. According to social control theories of the state, especially theories of technocratic or rationalized justice, law is increasingly about efficiency, speed, and effectiveness. Specialized courts, however, take on a social problem approach to crime, seeking to address crime's “root causes” within the individual, the society, and the larger culture in ways more characteristic of social movements. Are specialized courts about social control or social change? This study examines state action in a specialized court in domestic violence in order to examine this question. I focus on a domestic violence court that arose in February 1997 and four years later employed full‐time judges, prosecuting and defense attorneys, and numerous other staff to handle all misdemeanor domestic violence cases in Salt Lake County, Utah. I ask how legal, political, and community officials justify the court and its operation in order to examine some important issues about the role of the state and social change. Ultimately, I suggest that my findings about the complementary roles of social control and social change within domestic violence courts have implications not only for critical theories of technocratic justice and for the battered women's movement but also for democratic theories of the state.     

中国“例制”构建中的法院角色和法官作用

我国案例指导制度中的法院角色和法官作用有着鲜明的特色,案件审理阶段法院和办案法官往往并没有参与案例指导的意识,而是在案件裁判后由审判庭之外的综合部门通过遴选的方式确定典型案例,经编辑后报审判委员会研究讨论,再逐级报最高人民法院确定并发布。指导性案例的产生不是按照管辖制度自然地"涌现",而是被人为地"发现",这一点明显不同于国外的做法。相比较,"涌现"方式符合司法经济原则和司法规律,而"发现"方式充满人为因素,成本高而效率相对较低。案例指导制度不应被管辖制度"牵着鼻子走",而应当通过变更管辖制度,与司法规律相适应。