Strategic Interaction Between Rebels and the State: A Study of the Maoist Conflict in Nepal

The “people's war” in Nepal during 1996–2006, led to two significant outcomes—the elimination of monarchy and political victory for the Maoists. These political outcomes raise important questions about the process of Maoist conflict in Nepal. While several studies on political conflict are concerned about “why” such conflicts happen, I focus on “how” the strategy of conflict unfolded in Nepal. In this article, I argue that strategic interaction between rebels and the state explain why the conflict led to negotiated settlement in Nepal. To discuss the sequence of rebel–state interaction, I introduce a game theoretic model. In addition, I show how territorial control, target selection, and levels of violence used by the rebels in comparison to the state are crucial in understanding the conflict process. The case study in this article analyzes the relevance of rebel–state interaction to reveal micro processes of political conflict and further suggests that negotiation can become an important tactical choice in resolving conflict.     

Repression and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict in Kurdistan

Why do ethnic conflicts spread to neighboring states? This article examines the effect of transborder ethnic groups on the spread of ethnic conflict. It argues that when a transborder ethnic group is in conflict in one state, neighboring states perceive a threat from members of that ethnic group residing in their own territory, leading the state to take preemptive repressive action. This repression in turn changes the ethnic group's security situation within the state and can result in violence and thus ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict spread is not determined by the actions of either the ethnic group or the state alone, but is a product of threat perception and interaction between the two groups. This argument is tested in a set of cases in a region where an ethnic conflict seems to have spread—the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey from 1961–2003.     

A DETHRONED KING? THE LIMITS OF STATE INFRASTRUCTURAL POWER IN FRANCE

Since the 1980s in Western Europe, centralized states' control over subnational territories has been deeply affected by processes of Europeanization and regionalization. These changes have raised the issue of state territorial restructuring in a particular fashion: what capacity have formerly centralized states retained to steer and control subnational territories? The article draws on Mann's concept of infrastructural power, which refers to the state's capacity to exercise control and implement political decisions over the national territory. The article applies the two main operationalizations of the concept, namely the capability of the state to exercise control and the weight of the state in the subnational territories. Empirically, the article focuses on the French state in two policy sectors (education and housing). Although France is a most likely case, this article challenges this expectation, and shows the limits of the French state's infrastructural power over the subnational territories since the late 1980s.     

The circulation of public officials in a fragmented system: Urban governance networks in Paris

Fragmentation and specialization—two characteristics of governance—have increased the number and variety of actors involved in the governing process, which can influence policy outcomes and legitimacy. To date, studies on governance or policy networks usually focus on one policy field and one moment in time. In this article, we analyse the dynamic aspect, thus how governance networks change over time, and examine whether the fragmentation and specialization of the governance system is mirrored in the circulation of public officials. Our case is the urban governance system of the Paris region, which is characterized by high fragmentation along policy fields and territory. The data show that Paris is governed by three sub‐systems that largely correspond to the different territorial levels of governance, but also to different types of organizations. Generally, territorial fragmentation seems to be stronger than policy field fragmentation. This structure is quite stable across time.     

Norms,persuasion and practice: landmine monitor and civil society

This paper describes a key aspect of the Israeli seizure and incorporation of Palestinian Arab lands that has been little examined to date, namely the dynamics of the Judaisation of Palestinian land as a result of circumstances of war, peace and conjunct agreements. I argue that this process has capitalised on a dynamics of disorder concomitant with armed hostilities. And, during peace negotiations, a policy of land takeover was pursued grounded in the power disparity between the two partners. I further emphasise that this policy has been in keeping with an ethnocratic state ideology and the perceived need to control ever more area within the Land of Israel for settlement and absorption of immigrants. The Israeli political class has repeatedly expropriated borderland space when such a window of opportunity for implementing its ethnocratic territorial imperative has arisen. This ideological imperative predated the formation of the state and has been central to the broader political enterprise of which the Israeli state was and remains the expression. The paper examines cases of land ‘expropriation’ in the early years of the state and specifically after the immediate termination of military hostilities, focusing on case studies in the northern demilitarised area, the Latrun area and in East Jerusalem. This fundamental state policy continues down into the present, evident in the land being seized from Palestinian territory for the building of the Separation Wall, an instrument of a significant new ‘grab’ of land.     

The Global South in Environmental Negotiations: the politics of coalitions in redd+

During international environmental negotiations developing countries have commonly employed a unified strategy through the G-77 and China (G-77/China). Compared with other negotiations, such as those on trade and security, this strategy has been relatively successful in securing financial and technical benefits. Unity among developing states is not, however, a characteristic of all environmental negotiations. This paper analyses the case of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation plus conservation ( redd +), where unity has been absent. It argues that the negotiation positions, strategies and coalition politics from 2005 to 2013 have been a result of identifiable power asymmetries among developing states (shifting over time). Some states with vast forest resources have held an effective veto, while others have had considerable moral influence and expert authority. Coalitions have courted such relevant and reputational leaders. At the same time some developing states have had enough diplomatic capacity and economic power to stand alone in negotiations. Taking a broad, historical view of the diverse forest interests and power asymmetries among developing states helps to explain the recent stagnation in negotiations to establish an international redd+ mechanism to mitigate climate change.     

When States Die: geographic and territorial pathways to state death

Abstract

State death, understood as the formal loss of control over foreign policy, is an important but neglected issue in the international relations literature. When do states die and why? How do states exit the system? The consequences of state death can be wide-ranging, from forced migration movements, regional instability, to general famine. Despite these severe consequences, political scientists have yet to adequately study the causes of state death. Fazal finds that states are prone to death when they are located as a buffer between two rivals; this suggests that being a buffer state is a cause of state death. Our expansion of current research seeks to add the concept of territorial disputes to the state death literature. We suggest that states are at greater risk of death when they become involved in territorial disputes that raise the stakes of conflict. The resulting research demonstrates that a reliable predictor of state death is engagement in a territorial dispute. Territorial disputes are the most prevalent issue that leads to war and can also be a leading cause of state death.     

From aid negotiation to aid effectiveness: the case of food and nutrition security in Ethiopia

This paper looks at aid ownership through the lens of negotiations that take place between a country and its development partners (DPs). Based on the case of Ethiopian food security policies, it combines a structural analysis of the negotiation capital of both parties with an actor-oriented analysis of the institutional setting through which negotiations take place. First, it shows that the growing influence donors have come to have in the shaping of Ethiopian public policies results from the relative loss of legitimacy the government has experienced after the 2005 political crisis and its greater need for external economic assistance. Second, the more recent creation of a negotiation platform between the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) and its DPs has allowed the GoE to enhance donor’s alignment with its development policies and regain some control over its development agenda, while giving them more room to contribute to several food and nutrition security policy reforms which have been positively evaluated. The paper stresses the need for donors to better recognise the centrality of politics in any aid intervention.     

The Perils of Weak Organization: Explaining Loyalty and Defection of Militant Organizations Toward Pakistan

Why do some militant groups defect against their sponsors, while others remain loyal? Pakistan's sponsorship of Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba offers a controlled case comparison as the former turned its guns against Islamabad, while the latter remained obedient despite a similar strength, ethnic ties to the regime, and the presence of alternative supporters. What explains Jaish's defection and Lashkar's loyalty? Drawing on organizational and principal-agent theory, I argue that militant organizations that are more decentralized and factionalized are more likely to turn on their sponsors, because their weak command and control as well as dispersed decision making limit the militant leaders' ability to follow through on their commitments to the sponsors and makes it more difficult for the sponsors to discipline the militant organization. When a sponsor attempts to coerce such organizations into submission by detaining militant leaders, freezing or confiscating their material assets the rank-and-file is likely to turn guns against the sponsor.     

State Weakness and “Vacuum of Power” in Lebanon

The conventional wisdom is that weak and failed states are at great risk of becoming havens for transnational terrorist and guerilla groups. The assumption is that lack of enforcement capabilities enables militant organizations to infiltrate and fill the “vacuum of power” that is created in the absence of a strong state. This article argues, though, that this is only one of the ways in which weak states are attractive to militant groups. It explores the various mechanisms through which the vacuum of power translates into opportunities for such groups. These mechanisms include the easiness of acquiring support and recruitment within refugees or marginalized populations; the ability of the violent non-state transnational organization to establish a “surrogate state” in supplying institutions and services that enhance its public appeal; the relations between civil or communal conflict and the success of such groups; and the use of transnational violent groups as proxies for other states. Using the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hezbollah in Lebanon as the primary cases, as well as two mini-cases from Central America and Africa, the paper illustrates the working of these mechanisms and contributes to our understanding of the relations between state weakness and transnational violent non-state organizations.     

Soviet legacies,organized crime,and economic gangsterism: Russia, 1995–2010

In countries like Russia, where legal institutions providing political accountability and protection of property rights are weak, some elite actors accept the use of violence as a tool in political and economic competition. The intensity of this violent exposure may vary depending on the position the province had had in the Soviet administrative hierarchy. The higher the province's position before 1991, the greater the intensity of business violence one is likely to observe there in post-communist times, because the Soviet collapse left a more gaping power vacuum and lack of working informal rules in regions with limited presence of traditional criminal organizations. Post-Soviet entrepreneurs also often find it worthwhile to run for office or financially back certain candidates in order to secure a privileged status and the ability to interpret the law in their favor. Businessmen-candidates themselves and their financial backers behind the scenes may become exposed to competitive pressures resulting in violence during election years, because their competitors may find it hard to secure their position in power through the existing legal or informal non-violent means. To test whether Soviet legacies and Provincial elections indeed cause spikes in commerce-motivated violence, this project relies on an original dataset of more than 6000 attacks involving business interests in 74 regions of Russia, in 1991–2010. The results show that only legislative elections cause increases in violence while there is no firm evidence that executive polls have a similar effect.     

Service-Seeking Behavior,Perceptions of Armed Actors,and Preferences Regarding Governance: Evidence from the Palestinian Territories

Armed non-state actors, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, are visibly engaged in providing social welfare in addition to participating in violence. A number of scholars have suggested that there is a relationship between service provision by terrorist organizations and support from service recipients, and have indicated that terrorist organizations use service provision strategically for this purpose. However, few studies have examined the experiences and opinions of service recipients themselves to understand if services do indeed influence populations' political loyalties and opinions regarding violent activities. Using data from more than 1,000 low to moderate income individuals in Palestine, this study seeks to understand if and how receiving services from a specific organization engenders loyalty to the organization, passive acceptance and/or favorable approval of the organizations' violent activities, and the likelihood of participation in the organization's violent activities. This paper explores if and how provision of aid and “governance” services by armed non-state actors is correlated with various aspects of individuals' experiences of conflict, such as their opinions about the use of violence and various strategies for attaining peace, their fellow community members' likelihood to join armed groups and engage in fighting, and their preferences regarding state structure and legal system.     

Terror Organizations' Uses of Public Diplomacy: Limited versus Total Conflicts

In the last few decades, terrorism has become a global threat and challenge, which many countries have had to face and fight. Conflicts involving terror organizations are, to a large extent, battles of ideas, and are not focused only on physical violence or military confrontation. This reality creates a need to better understand the tools through which terror organizations promote their messages, and to distinguish between different types of terror organizations. The current study examines different types of terror organizations' messages targeting foreign audiences. The analysis focuses on the organizations' usage of public diplomacy in promoting their messages and distinguishes between the different types of organizations (limited- versus total-conflict). Messages promoted by four terror organizations—Hamas and Hezbollah (limited-conflict organizations) and Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (total-conflict organizations)—are analyzed. The findings reveal that while limited-conflict organizations communicate with the international community, and use public diplomacy to try to change the international environment in which they operate, total-conflict organizations do not use public diplomacy; they talk about the international community rather than communicating with it.     

Organizing Civil Society in Russia and China: A Comparative Approach

Despite their authoritarian tendencies, the current regimes in Russia and China have both actively promoted stronger civil societies. This article explores this apparent paradox for insights both into the meaning of civil society and into the nature of governance in these two regimes. It argues that the social organizations that make up civil society both inhabit and construct a public sphere where individuals assist in their own governance. Recognizing that administered societies cannot compete in a globalizing economy, these regimes look to social organizations to perform functions previously left to the state, but at the same time use similar repertoires of regulation, revenue control, and repression to ensure such organizations do not transgress acceptable boundaries. Still, different notions of state–society relations in the two countries have led to different patterns of social organizations in the two countries. In Russia, a sharp distinction between state and society has contributed to a government strategy that seeks to dominate the public sphere leaving little room for autonomous civic action. In China, by contrast, deeply embedded institutionalized accounts see state and society as overlapping spheres of activity, creating pyramid-like structures encompassing both state-based and more autonomous organizations, and allowing more room for negotiation between the two.     

Great Expectations or Misplaced Hopes? The Role of the Visegrád Group in the Brexit Process

Abstract

The article explores the role played by the Visegrád Group—a multilateral platform of four Central and Eastern European states (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia)—in the Brexit process. It surveys the group's performance during two distinct phases of the Brexit process: first, David Cameron's EU renegotiations and, second, the first phase of the Article 50 (withdrawal) negotiations, ending in December 2017. The author concludes that while the group managed to maximise its clout in the case of EU renegotiations, it has been much less effective during the withdrawal negotiations in the period under study.     

WHY STRONG COORDINATION AT ONE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH STRONG COORDINATION ACROSS LEVELS (AND HOW TO LIVE WITH IT): THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union (EU) inherited ‘indirect administration’ from classical international organizations: policies adopted by the international organization are subsequently to be implemented nationally by member states themselves, and not by bodies owned by the international organization. This arrangement has often led to legislation being incorporated and applied rather differently across countries. In order to harmonize implementation practices within the EU, we have witnessed a development from ‘indirect administration’ to more ‘direct administration’ in the sense that national agencies work closely with the European Commission, EU agencies and sister agencies in other member states, partly bypassing national ministries. Thus, stronger coordination across levels may counteract strong coordination at the national level. This ‘coordination dilemma’ seems to have been largely ignored in the literatures on EU network governance and national ‘joined‐up government’, respectively. The ambition of this article is twofold: first, the coordination dilemma is theoretically and empirically illustrated by the seeming incompatibility between a more direct implementation structure in the multilevel EU administrative system and trends towards strengthening coordination and control within nation states. Second, the article discusses organizational arrangements that may enable systems to live with the coordination dilemma in practice.     

Targeting Civilians in Ethno-Territorial Wars: Power- and Preference-Based Sources of Ethnic Cleansing and Mass Killing Strategies

In internal ethno-territorial conflicts, what explains why state or rebel group leaderships use civilian-targeting strategies—expulsion or mass killing strategies designed to punish enemy civilians or to decimate the enemy civilian presence on contested territory? One argument is that those living under the worst initial conditions—defined in terms of collective goods such as weak collective autonomy, policy outcomes, and material conditions—are most likely to target enemy group civilians. Another approach focuses on relative power—arguing that the enemy civilian population is targeted either because of weaker or stronger relative power. A third approach argues that differences in leadership preferences—in particular, more ideologically extreme or power-seeking preferences—are likely to drive direct assaults on enemy civilians. We examine these proposed mechanisms in terms of expected effects on benefits and costs in a simple ethno-territorial bargaining framework. We argue that relative power advantages and more extreme nationalist preferences seem most likely to predict decisions to target enemy civilian populations. We expect strongly power-seeking preferences to lead to civilian targeting more conditionally—where there is a greater internal political threat along with either greater relative power or a more moderate enemy. Last, we do not expect that variation in initial conditions will have a significant direct effect. We apply the framework to explain patterns of civilian targeting following the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991.

[Supplementary material is available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism for the following free supplemental resource: online appendix.]     

Policy advocacy of nongovernmental organizations in China: A quasi-replication of Zhan and Tang (2013, 2016)

This study widely replicates the original studies by Zhan and Tang to verify the impact of political opportunities and the resources of organizations on policy advocacy, which uses a much larger sample of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who engage with social work. The main findings of the present study are similar to those of the original studies. First, the study finds that the higher the level of government support, the more likely NGOs is to engage in policy advocacy. Second, the NGOs with stronger political connections are more active in policy advocacy. Third, the income of an organization also has a positive effect on policy advocacy. However, the number of full-time staff, location, and the level of registration of an organization does not have a significant effect on policy advocacy. The study increases the understanding of policy advocacy and the relations between the state and society in China.     

Coercive capacity and the durability of the Chinese communist state

Why has the Chinese communist state remained so durable in an age of democratization? Contrary to existing theories, this article argues that the strong state coercive capacity has survived the authoritarian rule in China. We demonstrate that the Chinese Communist Party has taken deliberate actions to enhance the cohesion of its coercive organizations—the police, in particular—by distributing “spoils of public office” to police chiefs. In addition, the state has extended the scope of its coercion by increasing police funding in localities where the state sector loses control of the population. We use and rely on mixed methods to test this theory.     

Beyond the Pale? Exploring Prospects for Negotiations with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State

ABSTRACT

This article argues that prospects for negotiations with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have been undertheorized. Drawing on nearly two thousand pages of primary source material— all issues of Inspire and Dabiq magazines published at the time of writing—it examines these groups' statements about their motivations for violence, their objectives, and their views about the possibility of dialogue with the West. It finds stark differences in all three areas and suggests that assumptions that have prevented theorizing about negotiations with these groups should be revisited.