NEGOTIATING BUREAUCRATS

This article will present the argument that frontline bureaucrats fulfilling their duties within an infrastructure bureaucracy can be understood as negotiating bureaucrats, policymakers, and cousins to street‐level bureaucrats. Empirically, the argument is based on data from an exploratory case study of a major road construction project in Sweden collected through passive participatory observation, interviews, and documents; the main source of theoretical inspiration is implementation theory and the theory of street‐level bureaucracy. Working conditions, both similar to and different from street‐level bureaucrats, are discussed, and patterns of negotiating practices are identified and analyzed. The analysis indicates that a fragmented implementation structure has effects on when and how negotiating practices are applied, and on policy outcomes, bureaucratic legitimacy, and political efficacy.     

Quo Vadis Judicial Reforms? The Quest for Judicial Independence in Central and Eastern Europe

This article examines judicial reforms in the new member states of the EU in a comparative perspective. It explores the interactions between domestic and European actors in the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria and explains why the EU has had a differential impact on the way the principle of judicial independence has been implemented nationally. The differential impact of the EU is explained by considering both the nature of EU conditionality and the relationship between the judiciary and the political actors at the domestic level. The comparison reveals that the power of the EU is greater when tensions at the domestic level between judicial and political actors increase.     

Macro‐economic coordination and elusive ownership in the European Union

The notion of ownership is well known in relation to global governance. In the realm of EU macro‐economic coordination, it has become a buzzword since the revamping process of the European Semester in 2015. This article investigates how ownership by four types of domestic actors (governments, administrations, parliaments and social partners) manifests itself in the European Semester. We conceptualize three types of ownership, namely institutional, political, and cognitive. Using network analysis, semi‐structured interviews, and a small‐scale survey, we find that ownership is strongest among governments and administrations which are able to shape the outputs of the European Semester (institutional ownership) with little political disagreement (political ownership). While national parliaments display low levels of all types of ownership, employers and unions exhibit relatively strong cognitive ownership. We conclude that the European Semester remains a bureaucratic process contributing to building a multi‐level administrative space rather than an arena for political debates.     

AT A SNAIL'S PACE: ON THE LIMITED EUROPEANIZATION OF DOMESTIC CONSULTATION PRACTICES

Consultation of major interest groups is a widespread administrative practice in many EU member states. To date it is unclear, however, how advancing European integration influences domestic consultation practices. This article examines the impact of European integration on domestic consultation practices by conceptualizing how the underlying rationales of government–interest group interactions and the level of involvement of interest groups are affected by European integration. The study draws on original survey data on senior civil servants in Britain and the Netherlands to empirically examine these effects. European integration is related in a limited way to domestic consultation practices, both in Britain and the Netherlands. This small but significant effect is mostly observed during the process of domestic preference formulation in EU‐level policy making. Our findings suggest that intra‐organizational processes, for example organizational routines and task‐specialization, potentially play a greater role than has thus far been appreciated in Europeanization studies.     

Reinforcing public responsibility? Influences and practices in street‐level bureaucrats' engagement in policy design

Previous literature demonstrates that when street‐level bureaucrats believe that the policy as designed is not desirable, they utilize various strategies to change the situation. This study suggests that when street‐level bureaucrats believe that fixing a policy through the manner in which it is implemented is not enough, they will try to influence the design of the policy directly. Three factors promote this decision: public perceptions revealed in their interactions with clients, professional ethical values and a supportive organizational environment. We test this argument using Israeli public social workers in the context of urban renewal. We discuss the problems and benefits of involving street‐level bureaucrats in policy design and view such actions as related to welfare reform and changes in the state's responsibility for its citizens. We maintain that in this changing environment, street‐level bureaucrats' involvement in policy design should be formally institutionalized.     

IS OUTPUT PERFORMANCE ALL ABOUT THE RESOURCES? A FUZZY‐SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STREET‐LEVEL BUREAUCRATS IN SWITZERLAND

This article refines Lipsky's assertion that lacking resources negatively affects output performance. It uses fuzzy‐set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to analyse the nuanced interplay of contextual and individual determinants of the output performance of veterinary inspectors as street‐level bureaucrats in Switzerland. Moving ‘beyond Lipsky’, the study builds on recent theoretical contributions and a systematic comparison across organizational contexts. Against a widespread assumption, output performance is not all about resources. The impact of perceived available resources hinges on caseloads, which prove to be more decisive. These contextual factors interact with individual attitudes emerging from diverse public accountabilities. The results contextualize the often‐emphasized importance of worker–client interaction. In a setting where clients cannot escape the interaction, street‐level bureaucrats are not primarily held accountable by them. Studies of output performance should thus consider gaps between what is being demanded of and offered to street‐level bureaucrats, and the latter's multiple embeddedness.     

Do tax officials use double standards in evaluating citizen‐clients? A policy‐capturing study among Dutch frontline tax officials

In line with psychological and economic discrimination theories, street‐level bureaucracy studies show a direct effect of citizen characteristics on officials' judgements, or show how street‐level bureaucrats employ stereotypical reasoning in making decisions. Relying on sociological double standards theory, this study hypothesizes that citizen‐clients' status characteristics influence officials' evaluations not only directly, but also indirectly and more pervasively by influencing the interpretation of other signals. By means of a policy‐capturing study among Dutch frontline tax officials, this study takes a first step in testing double standards propositions in the context of official–citizen encounters. The findings support only some hypotheses, but indicate that citizen‐clients' level of education could serve as a moderating context affecting the interpretation of cues. The article provides important theoretical and methodological guidelines for future research on stereotyping at the front line.     

ARE STREET‐LEVEL BUREAUCRATS COMPELLED OR ENTICED TO COPE?

Traditional studies of street‐level bureaucrats see the bureaucrat’s behaviour as a kind of self‐defence – a way to minimize negative aspects of the job and thereby job frustration. I argue – and empirically show – that it is equally relevant to consider at least part of street‐level bureaucrat behaviour as positively motivated – as a way of maximizing job satisfaction. Behavioural mechanisms such as coping are not just a way to avoid frustration, but also a way to gain satisfaction. This becomes clear when we attempt to explain differential treatment among regulated companies.     

SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE OR NATIONAL BUSINESS‐AS‐USUAL? THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF EU STRUCTURAL FUNDS IN THE NETHERLANDS AND DENMARK

The partnership principle in EU cohesion policy was introduced in order to involve subnational authorities and interest organizations in policy formulation and implementation. In this article we examine how the member states have reacted to this call for a new way of making public policy. We argue that the multi‐level governance literature and the critics of the multi‐level governance framework have not examined implementation structures properly, but have focused on regional influence. We conduct a comparative analysis of the Dutch and Danish implementations of the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund. Our findings show that when examining implementation structures it becomes clear that member states are in full control of the re‐allocation of EU funds. They show that Denmark and The Netherlands have been able to absorb EU cohesion policy within already existing national implementation structures of labour market policies and regional development. One central theoretical implication of our study is that the focus of studies of any fundamental re‐allocation of power resources in cohesion studies should comprise the entire network of implementation rather than the strategies of its individual component actors.     

Street‐level bureaucrats,rule‐following and tenure: How assessment tools are used at the front line of the public sector

Studies on street‐level bureaucracy examine actions of frontline workers within the public sector. In this literature, there is a lack of evidence on how job tenure affects how frontline workers respond to formal steering. We contribute to prior research by studying the nationwide introduction of an assessment support tool to be used by caseworkers to assess clients’ needs under the Swedish active labour market policy. We examine the potential effects of tenure on how caseworkers use this tool. The empirical analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative data. We show that as tenure increases, street‐level bureaucrats, especially male caseworkers, tend to act in accordance with policy signals to a lesser extent. The qualitative analysis shows that this pattern can partly be explained by the fact that increasing experience with meeting clients face to face increases caseworkers’ perceived confidence and skills.     

A VERY PUBLIC SEARCH FOR PUBLIC VALUE: ‘RHETORICAL SECRETARIES' IN WESTMINSTER JURISDICTIONS

Senior bureaucrats in central agencies in Westminster jurisdictions frequently give keynote speeches as a part of their official function. What are these administrative leaders talking about, and to whom, and why does it matter? This paper will seek to answer those questions through the lens of public value theory by considering whether ‘public rhetorical leadership’ by senior bureaucrats is a legitimate contribution to the search for public value, and what challenges such behaviour may present to good governance. The speeches of senior bureaucrats in four Westminster jurisdictions – Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom – are examined as examples of how bureaucratic ‘public rhetorical leadership’ is currently being exercised. The paper concludes that the way in which senior bureaucrats exercise their rhetorical power can have significant implications for the implementation of policy, and for questions of bureaucratic accountability.     

STREET‐LEVEL BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

The concept of ‘street‐level bureaucracy’ was coined by Michael Lipsky (1980) as the common denominator for what would become a scholarly theme. Since then his stress on the relative autonomy of professionals has been complemented by the insight that they are working in a micro‐network of relations, in varying contexts. The conception of ‘governance’ adds a particular aspect to this: the multi‐dimensional character of a policy system as a nested sequence of decisions. Combining these views casts a different perspective on the ways street‐level bureaucrats are held accountable. In this article some axiomatic assumptions are drawn from the existing literature on the theme of street‐level bureaucracy and on the conception of governance. Acknowledging variety, and arguing for contextualized research, this results in a rethinking of the issue of accountability at the street level.     

WHY STRONG COORDINATION AT ONE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH STRONG COORDINATION ACROSS LEVELS (AND HOW TO LIVE WITH IT): THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union (EU) inherited ‘indirect administration’ from classical international organizations: policies adopted by the international organization are subsequently to be implemented nationally by member states themselves, and not by bodies owned by the international organization. This arrangement has often led to legislation being incorporated and applied rather differently across countries. In order to harmonize implementation practices within the EU, we have witnessed a development from ‘indirect administration’ to more ‘direct administration’ in the sense that national agencies work closely with the European Commission, EU agencies and sister agencies in other member states, partly bypassing national ministries. Thus, stronger coordination across levels may counteract strong coordination at the national level. This ‘coordination dilemma’ seems to have been largely ignored in the literatures on EU network governance and national ‘joined‐up government’, respectively. The ambition of this article is twofold: first, the coordination dilemma is theoretically and empirically illustrated by the seeming incompatibility between a more direct implementation structure in the multilevel EU administrative system and trends towards strengthening coordination and control within nation states. Second, the article discusses organizational arrangements that may enable systems to live with the coordination dilemma in practice.     

MANAGING EUROPE FROM AN IRISH PERSPECTIVE: CRITICAL JUNCTURES AND THE INCREASING FORMALIZATION OF THE CORE EXECUTIVE IN IRELAND

This article analyses the management of European Union (EU) business by the Irish core executive. More specifically, it investigates the demands placed by EU membership on the Irish system of public administration and how the system has responded to these demands. Employing an institutionalist analytical framework, the article maps the formal and informal organizational and procedural devices or structures used to manage EU affairs in Ireland, as well as dissecting the key relationships that govern this management process and the role of the domestic agents actively involved in the EU’s governance structure, the cadre or boundary managers. The article also explores in a dynamic way the development of the capacity for the management of EU affairs in Ireland over time. Using the concepts of path dependence and critical junctures, we illuminate how key system‐management decisions became locked‐in over time and we isolate the triggers for significant adaptational change, be they domestic or external. Adaptation to EU business in Ireland was path‐dependent and consisted of gradual incremental adjustment. This system of flexible adaptation generally served Ireland well as the EU’s policy regime expanded and evolved, but in response to the shock rejection of the Nice Treaty by the electorate in 2001, significant formalization of the Irish system occurred with the establishment of new processes and rules for managing relations between the core executive and the EU.     

EUROPEANIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES: A CASE STUDY OF THE AGRICULTURAL PAYING AGENCY IN SLOVAKIA

The paper explores the impact of Europeanization on bureaucratic autonomy in the new EU member states using as a case study the Agricultural Paying Agency in Slovakia. The paper shows that Europeanization had limited sustained impact on the personal autonomy of senior officials; however, it requires and sustains the personal autonomy of an extensive cadre of mid‐level and junior civil servants. At the same time, it necessitates and continues to sustain significant change in the way agricultural subsidies are distributed, with a high level of autonomy in implementation and a lower, but still significant, measure of autonomy in policy‐making. These conclusions can also generally be supported by evidence from Lithuania and Poland. In addition, the coercive elements of Europeanization interacted with the temporarily high bureaucratic autonomy in Slovakia to ‘open’ non‐coercive channels of Europeanization of agricultural subsidies and beyond.     

THE EU AS LAWMAKER: THE IMPACT OF EU DIRECTIVES ON NATIONAL REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS

The impact of European directives on Dutch regulation is fairly limited when compared to the claims that are made by academics and politicians. We found that 12.6 per cent of all parliamentary acts, 19.7 per cent of all orders in council, and 10.1 per cent of all valid ministerial decisions were actually rules transposing EU directives. The total overall impact for all three types of legislation was 12.6 per cent. Departments generally employ the same type of rules in similar proportions both when transposing EC directives and when producing national rules. Departmental autonomy is a defining feature of Dutch central government in general, and this pattern persists in the coordination and implementation of EU directives. Nearly 90 per cent of the European directives in The Netherlands are transposed through delegated legislation in which no involvement of parliament is required. If we take into account the fact that the majority of formal laws are actually drafted by the executive and submitted to parliament, we could easily state that virtually all national rules that transpose European directives into the Dutch legal system are drafted by the executive.     

ORGANIZING FOR EU IMPLEMENTATION: THE EUROPEANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES IN ESTONIA,POLAND, AND SLOVENIA

Do different levels of exposure to EU law implementation have consequences for the organization of national ministries? Previous accounts suggest that European integration has little influence on the ‘hardware’ of member state administrations. Data covering the organization of 21 ministries in Estonia, Poland, and Slovenia show the Europeanization effect to be more pronounced than might be expected. Ministries responsible for transposing many EU directives tend to institutionalize centralized oversight in legislative planning, review, and monitoring; ministries with few implementation responsibilities rarely make such adaptations. This effect holds when one controls for the impact of partisan preferences and organizational conventions. The results offer a counterpoint to the studies of old member states that find little EU effect on the organization of domestic ministries.     

NATIONAL AGENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE: GOVERNMENT DRIVEN,COMMISSION DRIVEN OR NETWORKED?

In terms of national agencies in the European administrative space, case studies indicate that national governments may be partly split so that national (regulatory) agencies operate in a ‘double‐hatted’ manner when practising EU legislation, serving both ministerial departments and the European Commission. Applying large‐N questionnaire data, this article follows up these studies by investigating how important various institutions are with respect to influencing national agencies when they are practising EU legislation. How discretion is exercised at this stage of the policy process is not trivial; we demonstrate that, in addition, this activity is highly contested. Our main conclusion is that implementation of EU policies at the national level is neither solely indirect via national governments (as the standard portrayal says), nor solely direct (through Commission‐driven national agencies), nor solely networked (through transnational agency clusters). Implementation is instead compound with several sources of power represented more or less simultaneously.     

The Implementation of EU Environmental Policy in the Czech Republic: Problems with Post-Accession Compliance?

This article examines the implementation of EU environmental policy in the Czech Republic, focusing on the transposition and application of three key directives. It argues that, while the Czech Republic has had difficulty complying with EU environmental law since accession, overall its performance in this area does not conform to pessimistic scenarios of post-accession compliance. A key positive factor affecting the implementation of EU environmental policy in the Czech Republic, and a major reason for optimism about future Czech compliance with EU environmental law, is the active role of Czech environmental NGOs in the monitoring and enforcement of EU rules.     

BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS: EFFECTS OF ELECTED GOVERNMENT,PUBLIC AGENDAS AND EUROPEAN ATTENTION ON THE UK BUREAUCRACY

What determines the bureaucratic agenda? This article combines insights from models of bureaucratic behaviour with agenda‐setting models of government attention to test the effects of elected government, public, and EU agendas on the bureaucratic agenda. Using time series cross‐sectional analyses of subject and ministry coded data on UK statutory instruments from 1987 to 2008, I find strong effects for both the elected government and EU legislative agendas on UK statutory instruments. Furthermore, by breaking the data into different sets based on their relationship with the EU, several logical differences in these effects are found. These results include the EU agenda having exclusive influence on instruments implementing EU directives, and the UK agenda being the sole driver of bureaucratic attention on those instruments that mention the EU but do not implement EU legislation. This article opens a new avenue for research on bureaucracy by approaching it as a unique policy‐making institution.