The European Union’s trade and investment policy in Asia: new challenges and opportunities in a changing global environment – or: following individual roadmaps

Asia is Europe’s largest trading partner and EU-Asia trade relations have undergone a rapid change since the global financial crisis. On a global scale, the new multilateral trade agreements such as the now stalled Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) involving European Unions’ (EU) major trading partners such as Japan, Singapore and Vietnam also have the potential to change the trade equations. In this paper, we evaluate the new EU trade policy which has been designed to ensure that the EU benefits from the changing global trade scenario and also look at the steps which have been taken by the EU to promote trade relations with its major trading partners in Asia in the predicted ‘Asian century’. We look into the Free Trade Agreements, which are being negotiated with its Asian partners and seek to understand the reasons which have resulted in delays in their signing and negotiations. We evaluate new policies pushed forward by its Asian partners such as the One Belt One Road policy by China and Japan’s policy of securing a large number of trading agreements in the America. Moving ahead, we also shed light on the indirect factors that may influence the success of EU trade negotiations in Asia such as the EU policy on granting China market economy status and the commencement of the ‘Brexit’ process. Lastly, we try to present a list of immediate priorities for EU in Asia, which will ensure that it secures a toehold in trade with the region. All in all, it is shown that the EU has not one and the same approach for all Asian countries but it negotiates flexibly and individually country by country. Because of this “country by country approach” the EU is also not ready to enter into general EU-ASEAN trade negotiations again.     

German crisis management and leadership—from ignorance to procrastination to action

The financial crisis of 2008 and even more so the crisis of the Eurozone drastically increased the demand for decisive leadership and public crisis management. Due to the size of its economy and its position in the global as well as in the European economy, Germany should take the lead in this crisis management. Germany’s management of the two crises differs but also shows strong similarities. A “center-left Grand Coalition” managed the global financial crisis; a global crisis in which Germany was one among several relevant global players. A center-right government under the leadership of the same chancellor then during the sovereign debt crisis manages the Eurozone crisis. This is a regional crisis but with global implications. German government was slow in responding to both crises but acted eventually after some procrastination. Both cases, however, differ with regards to Germany’s actual role in crisis management. During the global financial crisis, other global actors pushed Germany to the forefront. The Eurozone crisis, a regional crisis, demands a leading role of Germany, the largest economy and member state of the EU. The paper, however, argued that the German crisis management with regards to the Eurozone is very much driven by ideas that preserve German norms but do not live up to the challenges of the crisis. Germany’s insistence in its own interests and norms hinders the delivery of a comprehensive crisis management of the Eurozone crisis within the European Union.     

哈萨克斯坦参与全球治理的举措、动力及前景

自1991年独立以来,哈萨克斯坦不但成功巩固了国家主权,在政治、经济、社会发展等领域取得了举世瞩目的成就,而且在外交领域赢得了国际社会的高度赞誉,使哈萨克斯坦成为全球治理舞台中最为活跃的中亚国家。在参与全球治理进程中,哈萨克斯坦将自己定位为“有实力的重要地区大国”,奉行以巩固主权独立和维护国家利益为中心的“全方位务实平衡”外交战略,通过建立睦邻友好信任带的“近邻外交”和以伙伴关系为基础的“远邻外交”,拉近与世界各大国及周边国家的外交关系,在国际和地区热点问题上扮演着“沟通者”和“调停者”角色,积极推动中亚地区内部的一体化进程,广泛参与全球与地区性国际组织,在核不扩散和文明对话等领域提出了各种有影响力的倡议,力图将本国的利益和世界的利益融为一体,为哈萨克斯坦的发展赢得了很大的机遇和空间,使哈萨克斯坦在国际社会中的能见度不断提升。作为中亚国家经济发展最为成功、外交最为活跃、国际影响力最为显著的国家,哈萨克斯坦参与全球治理的实践经验值得发展中国家学习借鉴。     

Leadership, decision-making and governance in the EU and East Asia: crisis and post-crisis

The global financial crisis of the late 2000s has affected the EU and East Asia differently. The EU has seen its economic, political and social structures undermined by the problems derived from the global crisis and subsequent eurozone sovereign debt crisis. In contrast, East Asia has gone through the global crisis relatively unscathed and has seen its standing at the global level reinforced. As a result, there has been a reconfiguration of leadership, decision-making and governance structures in both regions. In the case of the EU, Germany has emerged as the clear leader of European efforts to solve regional economic problems. Meanwhile, intergovernmentalism has replaced supranationalism as the decision-making and even implementation procedure of choice. Differently, there is no single leader in East Asia. China has become one of the most important powers at the global level, but at the regional level, different countries have shaped East Asia’s response to the crisis. Concurrently, there has been some move towards increasing integration, even though intergovernmentalism still defines governance structures in the region. Thus, the global financial crisis of the late 2000s has helped to shape new leadership, decision-making and governance structures in both regions.     

The EU,regional cooperation,and the North Korean nuclear crisis

North Korea poses a security threat by developing nuclear weapons. To address this source of regional insecurity, institutionalized frameworks of regional cooperation have been employed. Despite its usefulness as an alternative route to deal with the North Korean case, controversies still remain in terms of its relevance and effectiveness. Even so, the regional integration, consistently promoted by the EU as an integral part of its Asian policy, still requires systematic evaluation. This paper thus examines how and under which conditions regional integration can make a contribution to the transformation of the current crisis. In answering this question, it concludes that a long-term model-setting effect is hard to disregard, in spite of the mixed view of substantial compulsory and social learning effects. The underlying reasons are the ontological-seeking activities of North Korea, along with regional and global actors’ reservations about the contributions of the EU as a key security provider in Asian affairs and in its promotion of the regional integration scheme.     

Two crises, two responses: adjustment of economic governance in ASEAN and the European Union

The financial crisis of 1997/1998 in Southeast Asia triggered institutional developments inside the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and beyond. They deepened intra-regional cooperation in the economic area and laid down the foundations for the ambition of creating an ASEAN Economic Community that would allow easier exchanges of productive factors. Concurrently, ASEAN also widened its response in the financial domain by initiating various “ASEAN plus” arrangements to pool risks and address volatility in financial markets. The European Union (EU) was hit by the global financial crisis in 2008 and subsequently by the sovereign debt crisis. The EU response to this has been a deepening of legally binding macroeconomic cooperation and the strengthening of the regulatory framework. On top of this, and contrary to the ASEAN case, the EU 27-Minus initiatives go further towards closer political coordination. In parallel, the legally binding scheme has been adopted to strengthen the stability of the Euro Area. This paper analyses the policy responses in both regions to their respective crises. It aims at understanding the driving forces behind the different policy responses, looking at both the region-specific and the more generic institutional and regulatory responses to the crises.     

“东向行动”下印越合作新发展及其对华影响

2014年印度总理莫迪当选后将“东向”政策升级为“东向行动”政策,期望凭借印度在南亚次大陆的地缘优势,寻求南亚霸权的同时,向东扩展自己的战略利益。基于地缘政治和区域战略的需要,越南成为莫迪政府的“东向行动”政策的重要战略支持,两国不断推进多渠道的联系与交往,并逐步发展成为全面战略伙伴关系,在双边和多边层次上加强政治、军事、安全、经济等多方面的合作。尽管印越两国合作是基于战略和安全的现实需要,但由于两国均为中国邻国,且当前两国仍与中国存在着领土争端,因此在战略上相互借力,平衡中国在区域内的影响就成为两国发展伙伴关系的重要目标,印越两国在各领域的合作也在一定程度上对我国的周边安全环境造成了影响。     

东亚经济复兴与东亚经济发展模式

东亚模式曾经受到广泛赞扬,成为众多落后国家争相效仿的楷模.经历了1997年金融危机洗礼,东亚模式随着经济发展不断完善、不断更新.这次面临全球金融危机,东亚经济发展模式在金融风暴中展示出的一些优势,是抵御冲击的有效措施.因此,有必要再辨东亚经济发展模式的新特征,探讨东亚生产网络的形成与区域经济的构建以及目前面临的能源和通货膨胀新挑战,为东亚乃至世界经济的发展探索新途径.     

The Biden Administration's Policy Toward Southeast Asia: Momentum,Motivation and Challenges

After Biden took office,the United States,on the basis of inheriting the main framework of the Trump administration's Southeast Asia policy,has gradually increased its strategic input in Southeast Asia to expand the depth and breadth of cooperation with Southeast Asian countries.First,consolidate its diplomatic influence.     

韩国文化产业的发展及启示

在新经济时代背景下,整个人类社会环境发生了极为深刻的变化,文化在综合国力竞争中的地位和作用更加凸显,发展文化产业也是推进现代经济社会可持续发展的必然要求。当前,很多国家都把文化产业作为核心产业来发展,把文化贸易作为国家战略来推进。其中,韩国自亚洲金融危机以来,十分重视文化产业的发展,视之为支柱产业。韩国的文化产业管理与发展模式,是政府诱导、私人兴办。实践证明,这种模式取得了巨大的成功,为韩国创造了巨大的经济价值,赢得了国际声誉。因此,深入分析韩国文化产业的发展机制,并加以借鉴,对创新和发展我国文化产业具有重要的现实意义。     

全球金融危机下东亚货币金融合作的路径选择

当前的"美元体制"在今后相当长时期内具有可持续性.正是在布雷顿森林体制和"美元体制"下,东亚各经济体的工业化和经济发展取得了巨大成功,成为"美元体制"的主要受益者和支撑者,也自然成为全球金融危机的主要受害者.现阶段的东亚货币金融合作巴经取得了一定进展,但东亚各经济体尚不具备推进国际货币体系改革的能力;同时,东亚货币金融合作应改变应对危机的实用主义哲学,以促进区域经济的持续、稳定增长为目标进行更加长远的路径设计,在区域整体层面和局部层面两个层次上加快货币金融合作的深化发展.在此过程中,人民币国际化战略的实施将使中国在区域货币金融合作中占据较为有利的地位,但其能否成功一方面取决于中国经济结构能否进行顺利的调整,使中国成为能够替代美国的区域内最终产品市场的提供者,另一方面也取决于中日两国能否比较顺利地开展汇率政策的协调与合作.东亚地区复杂的历史、文化、政治和社会背景等因素,决定了该地区难以出现"一家独大"式的货币合作模式.因此,中日两目的协调与合作在很大程度上决定着东亚货币金融合作的未来.     

Whither East Asian economic integration? Korea��s regionalization cum globalization strategy

The recent regionalization in East Asia can be defined in terms of regionalization cum globalization. In the case of Europe, regionalization was originally intended to create a preferential and protected area. From its inception, however, regionalization in East Asia emphasized open membership and global liberalization. This so-called open regionalism was then adopted as a fundamental principle of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Given that APEC is an inter-regional institution, however, the concept of open regionalism is not applicable to characterize exclusively Asian integration process that gained momentum on the basis of the ASEAN + 3 framework. For many East Asian countries, a regionalization initiative, especially after the 1997 financial crisis, was a natural response to cope with globalization. Indeed, although East Asian economies are increasingly regionalized, the global market remains crucial and exclusively Asian arrangements are still rare. Globalization and regionalization processes are mutually reinforcing. Singapore is one example that developed into a regional economic hub through the regionalization cum globalization strategy. Given that Korea concluded recently two important free trade areas with the USA and the EU, Korea is also capable of building such a regional economic hub. The first step is to strengthen a cooperation network between the three Northeast Asian countries, China, Japan, and Korea. This network, together with ASEAN, is expected to catalyze the regional integration in East Asia and shape its future evolution.     

Learning geoeconomics: China’s experimental financial and monetary initiatives

China’s rise is increasingly impacting on the global financial and monetary order. To manage its growing centrality in global financial flows and its new relevance for patterns of currency usage, Beijing has been creating a set of new institutional arrangements in three crucial fields: the provision of crisis liquidity, development financing, and a global infrastructure to internationalize its currency. In contrast to the dominant power political interpretation of such developments, this article highlights the strong linkages of Beijing’s new initiatives with the changes in China’s capitalist development path and stresses their experimental character that serves to manage the economic and political risks of China’s accelerating financial internationalization. With a distinct learning attitude regarding its rising geoeconomic prominence and engagement, Beijing’s risk-averse strategy involves a very careful linking, layering, and nesting of new arrangements.     

Regional and multi-level governance: East Asian leadership after the global financial crisis

Although the economies of East Asia emerged from the global financial crisis of 2008 in comparatively strong positions, they remain structurally embedded within global markets. The degree of regional integration that has occurred within East Asia is thus predicated on the on-going interdependence with the economies of Europe and North America. Moves to advance East Asian regional cooperation in the wake of the crisis reflect this global interdependence, as well as intra-regional differences in interests and a lack of strong leadership within the region. Modest cooperation on an East Asian basis has continued since 2008 but the region is very far from realising a substantive regional governance model on economic and financial issues and does not appear to be pursuing a distinctive governance agenda. This article examines recent developments in East Asian regional cooperation, with a view to assessing the significance of current achievements and explaining the mixed and sometimes contradictory nature of initiatives for regional governance in East Asia.     

Chinese network diplomacy as a challenge for transatlantic partners

For decades, a prevailing view has been that a very limited number of global issues can be resolved without the USA and European Union acting together. But in recent years, we have seen a growing body of scholarship addressing the question of the ‘diffusion of power’, ‘the rise of the rest’ or ‘global zero’. With the financial crisis, questionable foreign policy choices and growing global competition from other international actors, both in terms of trade and ideas, the idea of the Western domination is increasingly questioned. At the same time, many international actors, including the European Union, are increasingly shifting—or ‘rebalancing’—their attention towards China and other Asian markets introducing new dynamics to old alliances and relationships. Borrowing from the network analysis scholarship, this paper looks at the EU relationship with China through a conceptual lens of ‘network power’ and ‘network diplomacy’. It applies this analytical lens to investigate the implications of EU–China relations for (1) the relations with the USA, (2) the relations with the ASEAN and (3) the effects of the trilateral EU–China–US cooperation on the region.     

The challenge of institution-building in Asia and its implications for Asia-Europe relations

  East Asia, including Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, has developed tightly-linked production/distribution networks through globalizing corporate activities. The vertical chain of production in East Asia has been even more sophisticated than economic integration in East Europe or Latin America. However, the political environment of East Asia for trade and investment has been far from borderless. The integration effort at the policy level has been very much limited so far, due to the historical background as well as geopolitics surrounding East Asia. The Asian currency/financial crisis provided these countries a historical turning point. After the burst of the crisis, East Asians realized that they have to take care of themselves in their difficulties, not depending on outside forces. A natural choice for them was to step into the realm of regionalism. In 1998, Japan and Korea officially announced that they would discard the long-lasting GATT/WTO-only approach and adapt the multi-layered approach, including both regionalism and multilateralism. The ultimate goal of regionalism would be a region-wide integration including ASEAN+3. As a steppingstone, Japan signed the Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA) in January 2002. In a parallel move, the ASEAN and China Leaders announced in November 2001 the establishment of an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) within 10 years. This article will follow up the most recent advancement of regional institutional building in East Asia with the emphasis on peculiar characteristics of economic integration in the region and discuss its implications for Asia-Europe relations. This paper is heavily drawn from Kimura (2002, 2003).     

Long-term outlook for China’s political reform

China’s post-1978 economic reform is generally acclaimed as success, for the Chinese economy has expanded nine-fold in a matter of 25 years and the country rose from the world’s 34th largest trading nation in 1978 to the third largest in 2004 ahead of Japan. Interestingly, the Chinese experiment is often described in the West as “economic reform without political reform”. This begets the question: how could a politically un-reformed system be able to deliver such an economic miracle? In reality, China has conducted, by its own standards, major political reforms since 1978. Though far short of the Western expectations, the Chinese experience since 1978 should better be described as “great economic reforms with lesser political reforms”, without which China’s economic success would be inconceivable. China’s “lesser political reforms” have reduced country’s opportunities for greater political change, thus alienating many reform-minded intellectuals. Nevertheless, it may also have helped China avert the possible economic and social upheavals which could have resulted from rushing too fast into a radically different economic and political system. There is a strongly held belief, especially among the more ‘ideological’ observers of Chinese affairs that unless there were a radical political reform, perhaps tantamount to a revolution, to rid China of its “oppressive” Communist Party, the Chinese system would inevitably collapse just like what had happened in the USSR and Eastern Europe. As the party has been in power, China had been predicted to face collapse in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, the Soviet Union’s disintegration of 1990, the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1996, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 2003 outbreak of SARS. Yet all these forecasts turned out to be wrong and the track record of the China doomsayers over the past 20 years is indeed poor. Will China become a democracy through its political reform in 20 years? Indeed, a full democracy could be the best scenario for China, the region and beyond, but it is difficult to give a definitive answer, which will, to a great extent, depend on how to achieve democracy in China, i.e. the costs/risks involved, as well as what kind of ultimate shape such a democracy will take. If full-fledged democratisation will take more time, the pressure for a more accountable government and more democratic society is growing, and this trend will continue with the rise of China’s middle class and civil society. Therefore, the most likely scenario for China in the coming two decades is that China will continue its own approach to political reform, and the relative successful experience of China’s economic reform may well set a pattern for China’s political reform in the years to come. As part of Europe’s general approach towards China’s political change, it is in Europe’s interest to assist, in line with the view of most Chinese, gradual reform rather than revolution or ‘regime change’, which could produce hugely negative consequences for China itself, Sino–European relations and European interests in China and even East Asia.     

The sovereign debt crisis: why Greece,but not Japan?

This paper asks why Japan has not yet suffered from a sovereign debt crisis, although its gross public debt as a percentage of GDP is much higher than in Greece. We use a simple stylized model to explain the occurrence of both a fundamental and a speculative debt crisis. We apply this model to both countries and derive some hypotheses about why investors are still ready to hold Japanese Government Bonds. In particular, we point to the significance of domestic debt holdings, to the central bank’s government debt purchases, to investors’ access to “safe havens,” and to the role of an autonomous monetary policy. We also analyze potential challenges to Japan’s long-term fiscal situation, resulting from its aging population.     

美国金融危机阴影下的东南亚经济

美国金融危机引发全球性经济衰退，对东南亚各国的虚拟与实体经济同样产生严重影响。由于东南亚国家在经历了1997年金融危机之后执行了较为审慎的宏观经济与金融改革，国家层面、地区和泛地区层面的危机应对举措得力，2008年大部分国家的经济基本良好，金融体制依然健康，资本和外贸市场的动荡仍在可控范围内。但随着美国金融危机“溢出”效应的加强，2009年东南亚的实体经济还会受到进一步损害，金融和经济增长仍面临更为严峻的挑战和考验。     

Region-building and critical juncture: Europe and Northeast Asia in comparative perspective

China, Japan, and Korea have begun to engage one another vigorously since the 1997 crisis. As intraregional economic ties have further deepened and broadened, interconnectedness in cultural and political aspects has risen rapidly in a variety of forms. Decision-makers and intellectuals in China, Japan, and Korea have been floating ideas and interests for establishing various types of Northeast Asian community formation. New security dialogues and co-operation frameworks also emerge. Accordingly, the rapidly growing Northeast Asia is likely to emerge as an identifiable regional community. With the incipient emergence of regional community in Northeast Asia, Northeast Asian region-building becomes a salient issue of major academic and policy debates. Yet, in spite of the recent mushrooming of research in and attention to the region-building, the questions regarding within what surrounding and under what situation regional community can be built, as well as what motivates people to choose region-building, and when and how state system can be transformed into a regional community remains only partly resolved. In order to solve this puzzle, this paper will compare the current Northeast Asian region-building with the early stage of European region-building, arguing that while there are important differences in evolution, format, and kind of region-building in Europe and Northeast Asia, critical juncture is influential in region-building.