India's “potential” endgame in Kashmir

This article presents an Indian view of the endgame in Kashmir. It seeks to answer two essential, if prosaic, questions: Does India have a plan for the final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir? If so, what are its essential elements? While there may not be a publicly discernable Indian game-plan, there is the possibility of durable peace in Kashmir. Events subsequent to the Kargil war of 1999, the terror attacks against America on September 11, 2001, and a shift in international public opinion regarding Kashmir all provide an opportunity for India settle the Kashmir question. These factors are, however, rooted in deeper changes within the Indian polity, including the growing consensus on economic and political decentralization and an ambition to increase India's international influence, which may increase India's willingness to commit itself to a potentially more long-term and imaginative course for its Kashmir policy.     

Indian counterterrorism policy and the influence of the Global War on Terror

India has been a major victim of Islamist terrorism and has long fought against an array of Islamist terrorist groups. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, India's previously lonely struggle against terrorism has taken place against the background of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT). After outlining India's Islamist terrorist challenge, this article examines India's evolving approach to counterterrorism and how the GWOT has influenced it. It concludes that India has adopted a localized, defensive, law-and-order approach to counterterrorism which has evolved in response to various attacks over the years but still remains seriously underdeveloped. The GWOT has influenced Indian counterterrorism in important ways, although its influence has been subtle and indirect rather than transformative. The GWOT has enhanced Indo-American counterterror cooperation, shaped India's terror environment by launching the war in Afghanistan and enriched Indian counterterrorism with American experience. Just as important, it has also had an impact on India's debate on counterterrorism, civil liberties and human rights.     

“India's Rasputin”?: V. K. Krishna Menon and Anglo–American Misperceptions of Indian Foreign Policymaking, 1947–1964

From 1947 until his political demise in late 1962, Vengalil Krishanan Krishna Menon stood at the forefront of India's international relations. One of Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru's closest political confidantes, Menon served variously as India's High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, leader of its delegation to the United Nations, self-styled mediator in the Korea, Indo–China, and Suez crises of the 1950s and, from 1957, his country's Defence Minister. Vilified in the West as “India's Rasputin,” Menon's left-wing credentials, anti-colonial rhetoric, and willingness to engage with the Communist bloc were seen by Anglo–American diplomats as a threat to Western interests in South Asia. Drawing upon recently released British and American archival records, this article argues that Western misperceptions of Menon, and his role in the Indian foreign policy-making process, undermined Anglo–American relations with India for much of the early Cold War.     

Religion as a Factor in Ethnic Conflict: Kashmir and Indian Foreign Policy

ABSTRACT

Ethnic conflicts with a strong religious component do not have merely domestic or foreign causes and consequences. As a result, internationalization of ethnic conflict has become an important subject of inquiry both in terms of pure research and policy-oriented studies. This article presents a case study of Indian-Pakistani relations over Kashmir, used to evaluate the role of religion and the explanatory power of the approach presented here. The aim of the study is to apply a foreign policy approach that simultaneously incorporates domestic and external factors in an analysis of how and in what ways religious elements of the Kashmir question affect India's foreign policy. The approach, an application of “systemism,” contributes to current developments in the realist school of international relations through its emphasis on the need to look at both international and state levels in combination. Earlier applications of realism, as both neotraditional and structural realism clearly demonstrate, tend to remain restricted to one level or the other. In this approach, a religious dynamic can have a domestic source yet be effectively examined in terms of international ramifications.     

America,Britain, and Swaraj: Anglo-American Relations and Indian Independence, 1939–1945

In the years before and during the Second World War, the Roosevelt Administration played an important and often overlooked role in encouraging Britain's disengagement from the Indian subcontinent. Roosevelt's motivations in pressing for Indian independence were varied. They included a mix of principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war and pragmatic jockeying for influence with post-colonial nations when the war was won. Churchill's government was wary of being pushed by Washington to move more quickly to “quit India” than it thought prudent. U.S. policy and actions clearly influenced the direction of events toward independence, but U.S. caution as the war ground on led to disillusionment among nationalist leaders. This reaction would have consequences once swaraj was won and India came into its own, at a time when the Cold War was becoming the dominant factor in America's view of the world.     

India's Role in the South China Sea: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics in Play

This article looks at the South China Sea, an area of dispute between China and other littoral states, as a new area of geopolitical and geoeconomic interest for India. The article follows the strategic discourse on the South China Sea circulating in the Indian government and wider strategic community, and brings in Chinese responses and interpretations of India's involvement. India's role in the South China Sea is four-fold: first, naval deployments; second, increasing strategic-military links with littoral states like Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam; third, economic involvement of Indian energy companies in South China Sea waters; and fourth, discussions between India and other regional and extra-regional China-concerned powers about the South China Sea. India's involvement in the South China Sea represents a new development in its Look East Policy, a new balancing factor in the interplay of actors within these waters, and a new friction factor within India-China relations.     

India's response to terrorism after 13 December 2001

The nature of the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament brought about an Indian reaction significantly different from the restraint exercised in the past, influenced by the ongoing global “war on terror”. India's response to terrorism became dynamic and multi-faceted, with alternating emphasis on a variety of measures, including diplomatic, military, political, administrative, and legal. Considerable emphasis was also placed on international cooperation, especially with the U.S. With continuing tensions in Indo-Pakistani relations, and the regrouping of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the risk of a high-value Al Qaeda-linked attack in New Delhi remains high. This could well escalate into another military confrontation between India and Pakistan, with inherent uncertainties.     

US policy and the Kashmir dispute: prospects for resolution

Washington refuses to chart a roadmap for peace in Kashmir. Although the chances for resolving the dispute are low, the probability of failure should not inhibit the US government from pursuing a more proactive role in resolving the conflict. The United States is the “sole pole” in a unipolar international system; regarding the world's thorniest disputes, it either leads or bears the brunt of its own passivity. Leadership requires more than devising policies that are guaranteed to work; it also involves taking risks on bold initiatives that may fail, but whose unlikely success would produce greater stability in global affairs. This article examines the admittedly slim prospects for settling the Kashmir dispute and the role Washington might play in such a process. It argues that only one conflict-resolution option seems even remotely viable: a phased conversion of the existing Kashmiri Line of Control into an internationally recognized Indo-Pakistani border.     

The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy has long been seen as a viable alternative to war by political decision-makers. There is, however, a long line of credible academic and policy critique—stretching back to the Cold War—that asserts the failures of coercion almost always overwhelm its benefits. Our examination of the 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani crisis supports the overall analytical consensus that coercive methods, under certain circumstances, accomplish little. We discover that India's use of coercive diplomacy was severely hobbled because of Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons, strong Pakistani conventional forces, and other geopolitical realities that strongly favored Pakistan. Despite careful attempts by Indian elites to apply the principles of “forceful persuasion” to end the crisis on terms favorable to India (the stronger power in the dispute), the Indian strategy failed to accomplish most of its objectives. Our analysis thereby exposes the limits of coercion and compellance for solving chronic territorial and ideological disputes between enduring rivals.     

Consolidating democracy by containing distribution: “sandwich tactics” in Indian political development, 1936–96

How did Indian democracy avoid the fate of other Third World democracies that collapsed in the face of distributional conflicts, when such conflicts were in ample evidence in India? The traditional answer is that the inclusiveness of the Indian National Congress during the independence movement gave the party legitimacy after independence and allowed it to contain social conflict. This argument fails to account for the persistence of Indian democracy after the 1960s. This article suggests that the pre-independence Congress did not accommodate challengers from below as is commonly suggested, but rather outflanked them by championing still weaker groups further down the social ladder. This “sandwich tactic” has been used repeatedly by Congress leaders during successive crises and accounts for the party's long innings in power, its continued strength today, and, inter alia, the acquiescence of Indian elites in electoral democracy.     

How to Tame Your Dragon: An Evaluation of India's Foreign Policy Toward China

In the past 60 years, India-China relations have oscillated between friendship, hostility and indifference. In recent times, both countries have started competing for global economic gains and political status. In light of these events, the objective of this article is to analyze various strategies used by China against India, and India's policy response to these strategies. The article evaluates the process of foreign policy decision making in India, and traces the historical evolution of India's foreign policy towards China. It then deconstructs China's foreign policy towards India, and provides the rationale behind its strategies. The article suggests that after initial engagement with India on the question of boundary disputes, Chinese foreign policy has undergone a dramatic shift since 2007. It specifically evaluates the twin Chinese tactics of military incursions and denial of legitimacy to the Indian territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Based on an analysis of China's previous boundary disputes resolution record with neighbors, these tactics are identified as an extension of China's new strategy for resolving such disputes. The article concludes by suggesting various policy options available to India to counter China's new strategy on the Sino-Indian border.     

Intimate yet dysfunctional? The relationship between governance and conflict resolution in India and the European Union

The rise of India and the EU as global actors has sparked growing interest in their peace-building approaches. This paper compares the objectives and effects of the EU's and India's engagement in different conflict contexts within and alongside their borders. It examines whether their practices of conflict resolution or peace-building strive for more than conflict management or ‘governmentality’. This article asks whether there is sufficient consistency across either actors' governance interventions to even speak of a distinct ‘strategy’ or ‘governance culture’. It illustrates the close relationship between governance and conflict response initiatives but finds that the relationship is often dysfunctional.     

India’s fitful quest for seapower

Building on several years of research, and many interviews of Indian naval officers and government officials, both serving and retired, this article aims to provide a deeper understanding of the context and ramifications of India's naval rise. In particular, it seeks to explain a troubling paradox: the relative neglect of the navy vis-à-vis the other services, and the seeming misalignment of New Delhi's military strategy with its maritime geography. Indeed, the country's enviable position at the heart of the Indian Ocean, along with its peninsular formation, large exclusive economic zone, and extensive coastlines, would seem to suggest a natural predisposition towards the exercise of naval power. In reality, however, India's navy since independence has consistently been the most poorly funded of its military services, and has frequently struggled to make do with limited resources. The core question this article endeavors to address is whether this trend will persist, or whether various factors will combine in order to provoke a gradual rebalancing of the nation's military strategy and force structure.     

A Means of First Resort: Explaining “Hot Pursuit” in International Relations

This article provides a new theory of hot pursuit—the use of military force by a state against a nonstate actor across borders—in international relations. Drawing from the literature on civil-military relations, I argue that attitudes on limited use of force in peripheral areas will vary between civilian and military, with the latter preferring to treat hot pursuit as a policing operation, whereas the former will treat it as a military one. The logic of my argument is that militaries are oriented structurally and culturally to fight conventionally and against state near-peer adversaries. Threats emanating from nonstate actors, while at times perceived to be existential, require “pin-prick”-style targeted airstrikes, raids by commando forces, or policing operations along a state's periphery. I draw on an original dataset of “hot pursuit” (1975–2009) I collected and examine two recent case studies: India's hot pursuit of ethnic militants into Myanmar and Turkey's pursuit of Kurdish militants into Iraq and Syria.     

Social cleavages and electoral competition in India

Given the great diversity in language, ethnicity, and caste in India, and the resulting millions of possible winning electoral combinations, why is it that in contemporary India we see large state-wide and inter-state political coalitions built around categories such as “Bahujan” or “Backward Caste” instead of thousands of separate caste parties competing at the regional or zila (district) level? This question is the focus of Christophe Jaffrelot's India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in India, Pradeep Chhibber's Democracy without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India, and Anirudh Krishna's Active Social Capital: Tracing the roots of development and democracy. This review assesses how these works address the question of political organization and social cleavages in India, examining the differences in approaches and discussing what still needs to be addressed.     

The security dilemma in Sino‐Indian relations

With the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the old economic order in India a dozen years ago, the outmoded methods New Delhi had employed for four decades to engage the world were no longer tenable. C. Raja Mohan, one of India's leading strategic thinkers, has traced the remarkable transformation in New Delhi's foreign policy during the 1990s in Crossing the Rubicon, a thoughtful new study of the ideas shaping Indian diplomacy. Mohan highlights five changes in the conceptual underpinnings guiding Indian foreign policy since the early 1990s: a shift from domestically focused socialism to a globalized free market economy; a de-emphasis on politics in favor of economics; an abandonment of New Delhi's earlier infatuation with “Third Worldism” and non-alignment; a rejection of anti-Westernism; and a loss of idealism. These new forces have left India, Mohan contends, with a foreign policy infinitely more suitable for meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. New Delhi is now poised, he adds, to break out of the South Asian box in which it has been confined, and assume its rightful place among the world's leading powers.     

Being Nuclear on a Budget: Churchill,Britain and “Atoms for Peace,” 1953–1955

This analysis critiques the impact of President Dwight Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for Peace” initiative on Washington’s alliance with Britain, itself a newly crowned nuclear state. Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s taste for personal diplomacy led him to support his friend’s proposal without real consideration for how the contributions of fissionable materials and manpower demanded by the scheme would damage Britain’s overstretched domestic nuclear project. Membership of an international atomic agency allowed Britain to reaffirm its global status whilst depleting the resources needed to develop its native technology. In turn, the article discusses the commercial challenge posed by American nuclear firms and highlights how reactor exports quickly became a contest between the quality of British research and the quantity of American subsidies. In this way, it establishes how “Atoms for Peace” prejudiced both Britain’s domestic nuclear effort and export potential, in turn shedding light on Washington’s relations with an ailing Great Power.     

Learning to Think the Unthinkable: Lessons from India’s Nuclear Tests

This article examines the impact that national economic policies adopted during Indira Gandhi's final term in office (1980–84) had on four “national” social groups, namely the big industrialists, the middle class, the rich peasantry, and the poor. The study argues that the Congress (I) chose the former two as its major allies, while the rich peasantry and the poor were relegated to a secondary position. In the process, the focus of India's strategy of development shifted from the agrarian to the industrial sector, and from the rural to the urban world.     

France and the Origins of the United Nations, 1944–1945: “Si La France ne compte plus,qu’on nous le dise”

During their long exile during 1940–1944, various components of the “Free French” were largely kept out of the “Post-War Planning” process that took place in the American State Department. They perceived this absence as a major, and often deliberate, humiliation that made the circumstances of their exile all the more exasperating. Charles de Gaulle was seen by the “Anglo–Saxon” Allies as a figure of dubious worth and usefulness, and Washington’s general tone was to dismiss the exiles as the “so-called Free French.” They were admitted to the decision-making process only slowly and grudgingly, and not until after many of the key decisions about organising the United Nations had been taken. This article shows how that exclusion affected the French leadership, how they reacted, and suggests some lasting results. It also assesses to what extent France had a coherent contribution to the formation of a global international organisation during 1943–1944, and what factors inhibited France properly articulating that contribution.     

From Warfare to Imagefare: How States Should Manage Asymmetric Conflicts With Extensive Media Coverage

Conflicts in the 21st century differ from past conflicts based on two central factors: the level of asymmetry and disparity between the actors taking part in the conflict and the amount of foreign media coverage that a conflict receives. This article aims to develop a new theoretical perspective on the implications of these two factors on how the involved states manage a conflict. Most actors in current conflicts have vast levels of disparity and receive extensive media coverage; events in those conflicts are referred to as occurrences in the “information space” because a conflict's borders are anywhere people can receive information about it. “Imagefare”—the use of images as a guiding principle or a substitute for traditional military means to achieve political objectives—is argued to be the main tool for better facing adversaries in the information space.