欧美科技制裁协作的动力与分歧：基于欧盟的视角

科技制裁在持续的军事冲突中发挥着关键作用,在和平时期的地缘政治中也从未消失。欧盟与美国是最大的制裁实施者,双方的制裁协作在多个地区和领域产生了重要影响。虽然欧美科技制裁协作较为频繁,但欧盟和美国在制裁政策上仍存在诸多分歧。文章从欧美价值观、安全威胁和二级制裁这三个维度出发,剖析欧盟与美国进行科技制裁协作的动因与诱发分歧的因素,并选择俄罗斯、伊朗和中国这三个具有代表性和差异性的案例进行比较。欧盟与美国对俄罗斯的制裁协作水平最高;在伊朗案例中,二级制裁因素带来的欧美分歧较为突出;在中国案例中,欧美尚未达成明显的制裁共识。共同价值观、安全威胁的紧迫性、二级制裁压力等要素是促使欧盟参与美国科技制裁的重要动因。然而,不同的外交政策理念、安全认知的错位和二级制裁的反作用力也使欧美分歧难以弥合,大大削减了制裁效率。     

The transatlantic dialogue on Iran: the European subaltern and hegemonic constraints in the implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran

This article analyses the US–EU transatlantic dialogue on the Iranian nuclear dossier with a particular view to the implications for EU foreign policy on Iran. Doing so, it uses neo-Gramscian scholarship to put the EU’s “over-compliance” with Iran sanctions into perspective. Constrained by the imperatives of hegemonic coercion in the form of US financial Iran sanctions against third country entities and with the hegemonic consent of a Western US-led “historic bloc”, Europe was relegated to a subaltern below its mediatory potential. It will be shown how this finding complicates the EU’s ambition to renew relations with Iran. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with experts and delegation members from the P5+1, this article thus analyses “the normative element” in the transatlantic security dialogue on Iran at a time where the latter is undergoing a sea change in the wake of the implementation of the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” of July 2015.     

Humanitarian impacts of economic sanctions on Iran and Syria

International sanctions against Iran and Syria have been tightened to unprecedented levels since 2012, particularly in the case of the European Union's (EU's) restrictions on the countries' energy and finance sectors. Marking a departure from the EU's carefully targeted sanctions policies of recent decades, they represent de facto comprehensive measures widely associated with negative humanitarian impacts. This paper analyses semi-structured interviews, official discourse and case studies to explore early reports of negative impacts on the health of ordinary citizens in Iran and Syria and examines associated policy responses, particularly in the EU context. The author outlines why a shift towards broader-based sanctions could be problematic for the EU and outlines constraints currently preventing more efficient risk mitigation. This paper suggests ways that sanctions, representing an increasingly vital, albeit contested, tool of EU foreign and security policy, could be used in a more prudent manner if a worsening humanitarian situation is to be avoided.     

The rocky road of interregionalism: EU sanctions against human rights-violating Myanmar and repercussions on ASEAN–EU relations*

From 1991 until 2012, the European Union (EU) applied sanctions on Myanmar with the purpose of promoting democracy and human rights. In addition, the EU called on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to exert pressure on Myanmar. This paper analyses, in the context of Myanmar’s 1997 accession to ASEAN, how the EU’s sanctions approach towards Myanmar was perceived within ASEAN and related repercussions of this approach on ASEAN–EU interregional relations. With the accession of Myanmar as the base story, it is argued that a regional organizations membership concept implies specific dealings with normative ideas such as democracy and human rights as well as strategies of punishment such as sanctions. The differing membership concepts of ASEAN and the EU explain ASEAN’s critical perception of the EU’s sanctions on Myanmar. Further, the conceptual difference in membership also explains that the EU’s pressure on ASEAN has severely impaired the interregional relations.     

Rising to the Challenge: Europe’s Security Policy in East Asia amid US-China Rivalry

ABSTRACT

China’s growing power and assertiveness towards its smaller and weaker neighbours has been a wakeup call for the European Union and its member states which, as a result, have stepped up their involvement in East Asia. EU security policy in the region shows many elements of alignment with the United States, but also differences. In North East Asia, the EU has adopted harsh sanctions against North Korea but, contrary to the Trump administration which continues to seek regime change, has left the door open for dialogue. Moreover, the EU supports the process of trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea, while Washington has traditionally been lukewarm towards a process that excludes the US and risks being dominated by Beijing. The transatlantic allies also show differing approaches with regard to maritime disputes in the South China Sea. While EU security policy in East Asia is largely complementary to that of Washington, in some cases Europe tends – albeit inadvertently – to favour Beijing.     

Framing the EU’s policy towards the neighbourhood: the strategic approach of the Seventh European Parliament (2009–2014)*

The Lisbon treaty afforded the European Parliament (EP) increased powers in foreign policy. These have included new legislative competences in the area of international agreements or the European Union’s (EU) relations with third party states. This article analyses the way the last mandate of the EP, which was the first to benefit from the changes introduced by the Lisbon treaty, framed EU foreign policy. More specifically, it explores the way in which the EP strategically framed the EU’s approach towards the neighbourhood countries. The focus on the neighbourhood is justified by the fact that it is the most salient area of the EU’s foreign policy. The article shows that the EP pushed for the EU to have a stronger presence in the neighbourhood. The EP also strategically aimed that it should have a more central role in shaping the EU’s approach towards the neighbourhood.     

Counter‐terrorism and commercial interests: Do they conflict?

This paper concentrates on whether there is an inherent conflict between commercial interests and the fight against state‐sponsored terrorism.¹ It examines the differences between US and EU policy, particularly in relation to Iran; the roles of Russia and China and the wider impact of international responses. The author concludes that symbolic sanctions and sporadic dialogue are completely inadequate instruments, but that genuine international sanctions and critical dialogue should not be viewed as mutually exclusive policy instruments.     

The transatlantic partnership: Holding China accountable for the Uyghur genocide

This article focuses on Metropolitan State University Denver Debate’s participation in the 2020 Schuman Challenge, a competition hosted by the Delegation of the European Union to the United States. Undergraduate participants were asked to answer the question: “How should the EU and the U.S. respond to China’s alternative models of governance?” In response, the debate team focused on the People’s Republic of China’s human rights violations against the Uyghurs. Three recommendations to address this injustice were presented: (1) expand the use of the Magnitsky Act; (2) amplify current EU/U.S. sanctions; and (3) apply pressure on China’s efforts to secure natural resources. Overall, the debate team’s research suggested that these approaches would both strengthen the EU/U.S. partnership and promote a coordinated response to China aimed at pursuing justice for the Uyghur people. This article also highlights the authors’ journey to engage in advanced undergraduate research focused on foreign policy.     

欧美对华政策协调及其局限

随着中国的持续崛起以及欧美对华政策的转型,中国因素在跨大西洋关系中的重要性更加凸显。为了应对中国崛起、巩固跨大西洋关系以及维护在国际秩序中的主导地位,欧美加快了对华政策协调的步伐,试图围绕意识形态、经贸投资、科技创新以及全球治理等议题协调共识并采取更加一致的行动。当前欧美对华政策协调也有别于过去“美主欧从”的模式,呈现出更具机制化和更全面的新特点。在协调的过程中,欧美对华政策出现了一定的趋同,但分歧也显露无遗。欧美对华认知与政策分歧、欧盟“战略自主”倾向以及“特朗普主义”遗产的影响都将对欧美协调的深度和效果构成制约。当今国际体系的特点和中国和平发展道路也决定了欧美协调难以复制冷战时期的遏制战略,“和平共处”是欧美协调和中美欧三边关系应该遵守的基本原则。     

Mixing Grand Strategies: Trump and International Security

ABSTRACT

When a new President is elected in the United States, the first thing analysts do is define that President’s grand strategy; yet, naming Donald Trump’s grand strategy was a difficult task as his pre-election speeches often contradicted traditional US foreign policy norms. Trump’s ambiguous grand strategy combines two US foreign policy strategies: nationalism in the sense that his preference is for unilateral policies prioritising American interests, and a traditional foreign policy approach, as seen in the moves taken against China and Iran. Surprisingly, this grand strategy unintentionally contributes to cooperation in Eurasia, as actors like Russia, China, Turkey, India and the European Union continue to try to balance the threat from the United States instead of competing with each other, while smaller countries are reluctant to challenge the regional powers due to mistrust towards Trump.     

An effective sanctioning actor? Merging effectiveness and EU actorness criteria to explain evolutions in (in)effective coercion towards Iran

EU sanctions invoked in response to the Iranian nuclear crisis (2006–2016) were long considered to be of limited effectiveness in halting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Recently, however, sanctions seem to have contributed to a breakthrough in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme. This article aims at explaining this evolution. It, therefore, designs a framework that explains why sanctions (fail to) change targets’ behaviour. Since the sanctions effectiveness literature lacks an integrated framework to explain evolutions in effective coercion, this article merges sanctions effectiveness variables and Bretherton and Vogler’s actorness criteria. Applying the resulting framework to two broad episodes of the Iranian case (2006–2013 and 2013–2016), this article provides a first test of the framework’s added value. It concludes that a full understanding of sanctions effectiveness requires consideration of external, internal, and in-between factors.     

The European Union and Iran: What Next?

EU-Iranian relations have reached a stalemate. EU engagement with Iran makes sense as long as it is accompanied by stringent sanctions that are imposed by the international community (i.e. E3?+?3 format and UNSC) and that focus on the nuclear file only. In the end, such an approach could allow the EU to find that delicate balance between the US position of imposing sanctions for the sake of sanctioning, thereby rendering them ineffective, and a Russian-Chinese position of applying minimal sanctions that would make them equally inefficient.     

Either with us or against us? Third-country alignment with EU sanctions against Russia/Ukraine

Since the mid-1990s, selected neighbours have in impressive numbers aligned with European Union (EU) foreign policy sanctions. However, much more than for any other sanctions case, neighbours have declined joining recent measures against Russia/Ukraine. This article uses freshly gathered data from the entire period of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to analyse how the practice of alignment influences international relations in Europe. Thereby, the article demonstrates that: (1) sanctions are not a two-party game, but an instrument that impacts broadly on relations with third countries; (2) alignment with sanctions not only articulates similarity, but contributes to normative polarization in wider Europe; (3) for a high-salience case such as Russia sanctions, neighbours are reluctant to be instrumentalized for EU foreign policy purposes.     

Learning From a Troubled Experience – Transatlantic Lessons from the Nuclear Standoff with Iran

With the US eventually embracing the European-devised ‘dual track’ approach comprising both sanctions and incentives, the transatlantic partners have currently reached a remarkable level of convergence on how to deal with the Iranian nuclear conundrum. Although EU--US unity might not be enough to solve the dispute, the experience of transatlantic cooperation on Iran offers some important lessons. It shows that strategic convergence between the transatlantic partners, or lack thereof, has a considerable impact on the way a crisis unfolds in an area in which both parties have a stake. It highlights the added value represented by European/EU political and economic assets in a situation in which US military options are both unlikely to have the desired effect and at grave risk of backlash. Finally, it sets an important precedent for a specific option for intra-EU and EU--US cooperation – the contact or lead group – that seems to suit the emerging multipolar world better than other, more institutionalised methods.     

The EU as a Global Actor? EU Policy Towards Iran

Abstract

This paper explores EU policy towards Iran to challenge the common implicit or explicit notion that the EU's ‘actorness’ in the international system rests primarily, or solely, on its Pillar I external relations. Utilising criteria developed to examine the ‘actorness’ of the EU, the article explores this policy area to demonstrate that the EU's ‘actorness’ resulted not only from the ‘Community’ aspects of foreign policy, but also from its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).     

Just How Special is “Special”: Britain,Cuba, and US Relations 1958–2008 an Overview

In June 2008, despite intense lobbying from the Bush administration, the Council of Ministers of the European Union lifted the diplomatic sanctions on Havana that it had imposed in 2003 and agreed to resume a “comprehensive political dialogue” with the revolutionary regime. Instrumental in this decision was a change in policy by the UK that had hitherto stood against such a normalisation of relations. The move came as a surprise to many who had anticipated that the British would oppose the lifting of sanctions in deference to their “special relationship” with their transatlantic ally. However, as this overview suggests, the UK decision was not unusual. Even from the earliest days of the revolution, the UK has differed with the US over Cuba. By surveying the five decades of the UK–Cuba relationship since 1959 the article explains how the UK has maintained an ambivalent attitude towards Washington's embargo. While recognising US primacy of interest in Cuba, London has consistently attempted to follow an independent policy that at times has come between the close allies. It concludes that although the UK (along with other European partners and Canada) shares the US goal of seeing the end of Communism on the island, it has ironically helped to thwart this ambition. The history of the relationship provides an example of the limitations of unilateral economic sanctions as policy instruments. The failure of the US embargo to affect the behaviour of the Castro regime should be no surprise when Washington's closest ally has never fully agreed to it.     

Dead on arrival: normative EU policy towards China

The European Union’s (EU) normative roles in global politics have in recent years been a hotly debated topic. The EU promotes its political values outside of the Union, especially with regard to prospective accession countries and small developing countries. However, a normative foreign policy approach encounters considerable challenges when confronted with major powers, such as China and Russia that do not share the political values promoted by the EU. Attempts at pursuing a normative policy towards these countries often come across as halfhearted. This article discusses EU normative policy towards China. It identifies loss of the moral high ground, conflicting positions of EU members and lack of leverage as the three main factors hampering it. It needs to be recognised that these problems are fundamental and stem from the very nature of the EU itself. The article argues that instead of a halfhearted offensive normative approach towards China or ubiquitous dialogues with partners, the EU may be better off with a more determined policy of defensive normativity. This would entail being more insistent in upholding European values within our own community rather than seeking to export them outside of the Union, and favouring demand-driven cooperation. The choice stands between altering the self-image of the EU to make it better correspond to reality, or making reality live up to the self-image.     

The evolution of the European Union’s failed approach to Afghanistan

ABSTRACT

This article provides a genealogical account of European actorness in Afghanistan. It argues that European agreement towards facilitating modernisation and development in Afghanistan was initiated with aid and trade, evolving into humanitarianism in the 1990s, and reconstruction and democratisation in the 2000s. The European Union has had a positive impact on Afghanistan, focusing on humanitarianism, but its multilateral and programme level approach to reconstruction and democratisation has failed to meet the EU’s stated objectives. By promoting the flawed “Bonn Model”, the EU is proportionally culpable for failed international attempts to reconstruct Afghanistan; even though the United States has been the primary international actor. Drawing a series of broader lessons, such as tensions between Atlantic solidarity and European integration, and the limitations of the European crisis management, the article demonstrates how European policy has been shaped by crises inside Afghanistan and the larger geopolitical crises these have generated. These have contemporary importance as history suggests that as the US withdraws its commitment to Afghanistan, the EU will have a very significant role in attempting to fill a humanitarian vacuum.     

European perspectives towards the rise of Asia: contextualising the debate

To what extent can we speak of a distinctively ‘European’ security approach towards the Asia-Pacific region? In order to address that timely question, this article examines how Britain, France, Germany and the European Union (EU) are framing their evolving security roles in the Asia-Pacific region, and how those individual perspectives intersect with each other. The article identifies a number of important common features in Europe’s approaches towards security in the Asia-Pacific, namely the tendency of most European actors to emphasize the economic and diplomatic nature of their contribution to regional security, their promotion of regional multilateral security fora, their rejection of the notion that China’s rise is inherently challenging for regional and global security, and their willingness to signal their differences towards Washington’s emphasis on military power and alliance-based approach. However, and despite the existence of common traits, individual European actors show different degrees of closeness vis-à-vis the US and China and feature different perspectives regarding which security relationships they should prioritize in the region (if any), or the appropriate balance between diplomacy and security and defence cooperation. Such divergences prevent Europeans from developing a coherent security profile in the region and preclude us from speaking of a distinctively European security approach towards the Asia-Pacific.     

Continuity in the Face of Upheaval—British Strategic Culture and the Impact of the Blair Government

This chapter will consider how the elements of continuity and change in British foreign policy that emerged under the current Labor government will be managed in the short to medium term and ask what their fuller implications for the UK and European security may be in the longer run. The article will examine how the change that transpired after 1997 which saw a new pro-European stance on security can be reconciled with the prevailing continuities in British strategic culture, namely Britain’s special relationship with the US, its global role, and, as demonstrated in the case of Iraq, the UK’s negation of Franco-German security initiatives. The article will also emphasise the central importance of the UK’s commitment to the EU’s security policy ambitions, given that the UK armed forces are the most capable in Europe and as confirmed in Iraq, an ESDP without a UK contribution would have no credibility. Despite Blair’s policy overtures towards developing greater European military capabilities, the continued reliance on the US has meant that British strategic culture has displayed remarkable continuity rather than fundamental transformation.