Balance of Loyalties: Explaining Rebel Factional Struggles in the Nicaraguan Revolution

Abstract

What explains the causes and outcomes of rebel factional struggles? Existing explanations focus on exogenous and material factors that disrupt rebel organizations’ internal processes. Yet rebel groups succumb to infighting and organizational splinters even in the absence of external shocks. In this article I present an endogenous and social theory of rebel factional struggles, in which leadership disputes result from a shifting balance of loyalties within a rebel organization. In my model, rival rebel leaders cultivate the loyalty of two types of networks, recruitment networks and operational networks, which serve as power bases to initiate leadership struggles, launch coups, or split organizations. I build my theory through a case study of Nicaragua’s Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), which splintered into three factions in 1975–76. Drawing on an original network dataset of FSLN commanders, I trace how the organization’s network structure changed over time, spurring disputes over rank-and-file fighters’ loyalties that tore the FSLN apart.     

“Survival Mode”: Rebel Resilience and the Lord’s Resistance Army

ABSTRACT

To date, scholarly work on armed groups has seldom considered the notion of rebel resilience, or the factors that enable these groups to survive despite time, military pressure, and the myriad contingent events of civil war. In an effort to develop an explanatory framework for resilience as a distinct outcome of civil war and rebellion, this article examines the conditions under which the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has persisted for nearly three decades. Based on fieldwork and original research, the article explains the LRA’s resilience in light of the group’s organizational structure and resource self-sufficiency, which have been well suited for the borderlands of East and Central Africa. The LRA is a key case of rebel resilience. It is important because it sheds light on the organizational foundations of armed groups, the relationship between resources and rebellion, and the broader study of conflict duration and termination. Understanding the sources of the LRA’s resilience can inform efforts to end such insurgencies.     

Civil War Diffusion and the Emergence of Militant Groups, 1960–2001

In this research note, I argue that scholars of the international diffusion of civil conflict would benefit from directly measuring rebel mobilization prior to the onset of civil war. To better understand the way in which international processes facilitate dissidents overcoming the collective action problem inherent in rebellion, I focus on militant organizations and model the timing of their emergence. I use several data sets on militant groups and violent nonstate actors and rely on Buhaug and Gleditsch’s (2008) causal framework to examine how international conditions predict militant group emergence. While Buhaug and Gleditsch conclude that civil war diffusion is primarily a function of internal conflict in neighboring states, once militant group emergence is substituted in the dependent variable, I observe that global conditions affect rebel collective action. A final selection model links militant groups with civil conflict onset and demonstrates the variable performance of diffusion effects. The results indicate that many rebels mobilize in response to more global events and then escalate their behavior in response to local conditions.     

Battle Losses and Rebel Violence: Raising the Costs for Fighting

In many armed conflicts, rebel groups deliberately target civilians. This article examines whether such violence is related to the performance of the rebels on the battlefield. It is proposed that rebel groups who are losing battles target civilians in order to impose extra costs on the government. When rebels attack civilians, the government may incur both political and military costs. Violence against civilians is thus used as an alternative conflict strategy aimed at pressuring the government into concessions. The argument is evaluated by using monthly data for rebel groups involved in armed conflict from January 2002 to December 2004.     

From victorious rebels to strong authoritarian parties: prospects for post-war democratization

ABSTRACT

In a number of cases, rebel movements that won civil wars transformed into powerful authoritarian political parties that dominated post-war politics. Parties whose origins are as victorious insurgent groups have different legacies and hence different institutional structures and patterns of behaviour than those that originated in breakaway factions of ruling parties, labour unions, non-violent social movements, or identity groups. Unlike classic definitions of political parties, post-rebel parties are not created around the need to win elections but rather as military organizations focused on winning an armed struggle. Key attributes of victorious rebel movements, such as cohesive leadership, discipline, hierarchy, and patterns of military administration of liberated territory, shape post-insurgent political parties and help explain why post-insurgent parties are often strong and authoritarian. This article seeks to identify the mechanisms that link rebel victory in three East African countries (Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda) to post-war authoritarian rule. These processes suggest that how a civil war ends changes the potential for post-war democratization.     

武装组织治理制度与反叛成功

当前武装组织治理制度建设成为内战研究的重点。武装组织治理制度是武装组织对其控制区域和民众管理的相应制度与规则体系。以反叛成功为分析对象,通过系统评估武装组织治理制度建设对其内战中获得冲突优势的影响,可以看到,武装组织的反叛成功并不直接由武装组织治理制度决定,而是取决于武装组织治理制度在内部与外部产生的效果。在内部维度,武装组织治理制度需要取得良好的相对治理绩效;在外部维度,武装组织治理制度需要一个有利的国际战略环境并可对其进行塑造。而武装组织治理制度并不能确保相应效果的实现。通过混合研究的模式对以上观点进行检验:在定量研究方面,通过两个不同层次的数据库对于武装组织治理制度与反叛成功的关系进行检验,发现武装组织治理制度与反叛成功之间无直接的联系;在案例比较研究方面,通过两个具体武装组织的实践案例(阿富汗塔利班和"伊斯兰国"组织)进行分析,可以发现武装组织治理制度与反叛成功之间的关系并不确定,因此并不存在简单的正向促进关系。     

Fragile Proxies: Explaining Rebel Defection Against Their State Sponsors

Foreign governments frequently intervene in armed conflicts by sponsoring rebels against their adversaries. A sponsorship is less costly than a direct military intervention, but rebels often defy orders, desert fighting, or turn guns against their sponsors. Under what conditions do rebels defect against their sponsors? Drawing on organizational theory, I argue that as rebel organizations become less centralized and formalized, the rebels are likely to defect against their sponsors. This occurs because non-centralized organizations have weak central leadership and allow for dispersed decision-making, both of which narrow the manipulative capacity of sponsors. Due to these disadvantages, non-centralized rebel movements are less accountable to their sponsors, cannot credibly commit to rapidly change their policies in response to changes in the sponsor’s demands, and suffer from frequent and destructive quarrels between the top and lower echelons. Using multilevel logistic models for panel data, I test my argument on a novel dataset. My quantitative analysis shows that rebel structure is a robust predictor of defection.     

“Any press is good press?” Rebel political wings,media freedom,and terrorism in civil wars

As part of a recent effort to bridge the studies of terrorism and civil war, new research has begun to emerge on the use of terrorism by rebel groups as a strategy of war. Building on these findings, we examine the role of affiliated political wings in shaping the use of terrorism by rebel groups during civil wars. We contend that the presence of an affiliated political wing during the civil war should increase the use of terrorism by rebel groups only in countries where there are relatively few restrictions on the freedom of the press. As political wings are often designed to engage with the civilian population through the dissemination of information, these apparatuses are in a key position to frame the use of terrorism as part of the rebel’s broader war effort. To test this proposition, we examine the use of terrorism by all rebel groups from 1970 to 2011. The results from the analysis provide strong support for our argument that political wings increase the use of terrorism by rebel groups only when the press is allowed to independently cover terrorist attacks.     

Does political inclusion of rebel parties promote peace after civil conflict?

ABSTRACT

Does the inclusion of rebel parties into the post-conflict political process help contribute to peace after the end of conflict? In this article we examine whether the transformation of rebel groups into political parties actually leads to the development of a durable peace after a civil war. Examining the likelihood of recurrence of civil wars in a country and recurrence of conflict in government–rebel group dyads after a settlement, we find that the inclusion and participation of former rebel parties in national government has an important impact on the likelihood of a durable post-settlement peace. Most importantly, not excluding major rebel parties from access to governing institutions is the most important factor in promoting post-conflict peace.     

The Structure of Negotiation: Lessons from El Salvador for Contemporary Conflict Resolution

During more than a decade of violent conflict (1980–1992) involving the military, rebel forces, and paramilitary "death squads," El Salvador suffered some 75,000 casualties, mostly civilians. After three years of negotiations, the government and the largest rebel group signed a historic comprehensive peace accord that brought an end to the war and instituted wide-reaching political and social reforms. This agreement, and the peace process that produced it, has been widely hailed as a successful example of a negotiated end to civil war. In order to understand the conditions that led to the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords ending the war, this article tests ripeness theory in the context of the Salvadoran peace process.
This article affirms the validity of theories of ripeness and the mutually hurting stalemate as structural explanations for the initiation of dialogue and notes the role of "indicators of ripeness" in forcing the parties to recognize a hurting stalemate that may already exist. It also proposes several hypothesized explanations for the effectiveness of the Salvadoran negotiations themselves. These explanations include the presence of strong, empowered policy entrepreneurs on both sides with the political will and capability to make credible commitments; the combination of internal and external pressure for a negotiated solution that raised the cost of defection; and the active involvement, based on consent of both parties, of a neutral, empowered, and credible mediator who provided both technical assistance and vigilance to move the process forward. After analyzing the Salvadoran case through this theoretical lens, the article applies the same concepts to contemporary conflict cases such as Iraq and Colombia, discussing how the lessons learned in El Salvador do and do not provide instructive guidance for managing civil conflicts today.     

The Loyalty Trap: Regime Ethnic Exclusion,Commitment Problems,and Civil War Duration in Syria and Beyond

This article examines the impact of the ethnic exclusiveness of regimes on commitment problems and hence on civil conflict duration. It argues that members of privileged in-groups in highly exclusive regimes can be trapped into compliance with the regime. Ethnic exclusion helps to construct privileged-group members as regime loyalists. They therefore fear rebel reprisals even if they surrender or defect and consequently persist in fighting. The article finds in particular that, in ethnically exclusive regimes, privileged-group members mistrust even rebels who mobilize on a nonethnic agenda and regard rebel reassurances, including nonethnic aims, as suspect. Exclusion therefore induces privileged-group cohesion, an effect more resistant to rebel reassurances than previously recognized. A case study of the Syrian civil war shows this dynamic at a micro level, and a cross-national statistical analysis gives partial evidence that it lengthens civil conflicts on a larg`e scale.     

Explaining the number of rebel groups in civil wars

Why do multiple rebel groups form in some civil wars but not others? Since 1946, only half of all civil wars were fought by a single rebel group; the rest were fought by multiple groups. This article argues that this variation is determined by the incentives political entrepreneurs have to enter a war. The higher the demand for political change and the lower the costs of fighting, the more incentives entrepreneurs have to form their own group. Analyzing UCDP data for all civil wars between 1946 and 2015 I find that the two measures of demand – the number of identifiable ethnic or religious groups in a country and the size of the disgruntled population – have the most consistent effects, but that key measures of costs such as the size of the government military also matter. A detailed analysis of the Ethiopian case further reveals the influence of external intervention on the formation of rebel groups. These results suggest that rebel groups emerge in civil wars in rational, predictable ways related to the ease by which rebel elites can mobilize separate groups for fighting.     

Strategic rebels: a spatial econometric approach to rebel fighting durations in civil wars

ABSTRACT

Recent research on multi-actor civil wars highlights that rebel organizations condition their conflict behavior on that of other rebel organizations, with competition and free-riding constituting the core theoretical mechanisms. We provide a new actor-centric approach to explicitly model strategic interdependence in multi-actor civil wars. We argue that rebel organizations have incentives to remain mobilized until the end of a conflict to maintain their power to negotiate, power to spoil, power to enforce, and power to protect. This induces strategic complements that dominate duration dynamics in multi-actor conflicts. Based on a network game-theoretic model, we derive a spatial econometric framework that allows for a direct test of strategic interdependence. We find that the estimated duration interdependence is positive but partially offset in secessionist conflicts where the public goods nature of the incompatibility also induces strategic substitution effects.     

Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992

Policymakers often trumpet the potential for third parties to stop the killing associated with civil wars, yet third parties as strategic actors also have incentives to encourage longer civil wars. We argue that in order to assess the influence of third parties on civil war duration, it is necessary to consider the interdependent nature of third party interventions as they are distributed across the set of civil war combatants. We also argue that it is important to consider the geopolitical context in which civil wars occur, rather than focusing solely on characteristics internal to these conflicts. To test our hypotheses about the impact of third parties and geopolitical factors on civil war duration, we rely on event history analysis and a sample of 152 civil wars for the period 1820–1992. We find empirical support for the idea that extremely long civil wars correspond to the equitable distribution of third party interventions—stalemates prolong wars. The analysis also indicates that separatist civil wars and ongoing civil wars in states proximate to the civil war state result in civil wars of longer duration. Finally, we find that when third parties raise the stakes of the conflict by engaging in the use of militarized force against the civil war state, the duration of these conflicts is reduced. In general, our analysis underscores the importance of modeling the interdependent and dynamic aspects of third party intervention as well as the world politics of civil wars when forecasting their duration and formulating policy.     

Political party formation by former armed opposition groups after civil war

ABSTRACT

Under what conditions are rebel groups successfully incorporated into democratic politics when civil war ends? Using an original cross-national, longitudinal dataset, we examine political party formation by armed opposition groups over a 20-year period, from 1990 to 2009. We find that former armed opposition groups form parties in more than half of our observations. A rebel group’s pre-war political experience, characteristics of the war and how it ended outweigh factors such as the country’s political and economic traits and history. We advance a theoretical framework based on rebel leaders’ expectations of success in post-war politics, and we argue that high rates of party formation by former armed opposition groups are likely a reflection of democratic weakness rather than democratic robustness in countries emerging from conflict.     

Success or Failure in the Peace Processes of Aceh and Sri Lanka: A Comparative Study

Abstract

This study examines why some internal conflicts end in negotiated agreements, while negotiations fail in others. In order to address this question, I compare the cases of Aceh, where some 30 years of armed conflict ended in a 2005 peace agreement between Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, the Free Aceh Movement) and the government of Indonesia; and Sri Lanka, where 2002–2006 negotiations between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam broke down. This study adopts ideas from bargaining theories of war, focusing on the adversaries’ power perceptions in relation to actions that led to the civil war settlements. It identifies three variables as decisive: (1) information revealed by war, (2) control over spoilers, and (3) divisions in the ranks of the rebel organization.     

Selling to Both Sides: The Effects of Major Conventional Weapons Transfers on Civil War Severity and Duration

Civil wars are primarily fought with small and light arms, but the availability of major conventional weapons to states and rebels can alter the nature of the war being fought. This study explores the impact of major conventional weapons transfers on civil war severity and duration. By using a recipient based approach to arms transfers, I find rebel acquisition of major conventional weapons from international sources leads to conflict escalation and deadlier conflicts. State importation of major conventional weapons is associated with longer conflicts. These findings provide researchers a means to account for rebel capabilities in civil war research and policy makers insight to limit the destructiveness of civil wars.     

The Affect and Effect of Images of War on Individual Opinion and Emotions

We explore the conditions under which individuals are attentive to positive and negative battlefield information when forming beliefs about a conflict’s success or failure. We use three experiments to explore the impact of visual and textual battlefield cues on individuals’ emotional states and attitudes toward the war in Afghanistan. We find that both visual and textual information convey information about failure that influences public attitudes and emotions toward war. In keeping with rational expectations theory, but contrary to widespread beliefs within the journalistic and policymaking communities, textual cues and images of battlefield failure have similar effects on emotions and attitudes. The consistency of multiple war cues, however, greatly affects peoples’ reactions. Simply put, in war the content of information matters, not its delivery style.     

Individual-Level Data on the Victims of Nepal’s Civil War, 1996–2006: A New Data Set

This article introduces individual-level microdata on victims of violence in Nepal’s civil war (1996–2006). The data being presented in this study are unique in that they are a census—not a sample—of the known population of victims for which information could be collected. The unit of analysis is the individual victim, and the data provide information on: whether the victim was killed, injured, or disappeared; the districts and villages where they were targeted; their permanent home addresses; the circumstances of the attack (combat, extrajudicial, etc.); socioeconomic information; whether they had any affiliation to rebel groups or other political parties; identification of the perpetrator; and whether the victim was considered to be a government or Maoist informant. After describing the data, an application of the data is performed and some preliminary findings are discussed on the differences in targeting behavior between the government and the Maoist rebels.     

Relative Rebel Strength and Power Sharing in Intrastate Conflicts

According to bargaining theory, one would expect that governments in intrastate conflicts will only be willing to concede to power sharing agreements when they face relatively strong rebel groups. Previous empirical studies have not found support for this hypothesis because they have not operationalized the capability of civil war combatants in relative terms. I show that once one uses a relative measure of capability, one finds that power sharing is more likely as the strength of a rebel group increases. Additionally, the analysis indicates that the relationship between rebel strength and power sharing is stronger for political power sharing than for territorial or military power sharing.