The "Essential Domino" of Military Operations: American Public Opinion and the Use of Force

It is a commonly held belief that the foreign policy issue to which the American public is most sensitive is the use of military force. Because American public opinion regarding the use of force is highly palpable, salient, and organized, and because decisions regarding the use of force are some of the most important decisions the nation ever has to consider, the analysis of public opinion regarding military involvement is academically significant and policy relevant. The indication from policymakers is that American military operations require public support. As a result, scholars and analysts have come to realize that public opinion is the "essential domino" of military operations. The relationship between mass American public opinion and the use of military force has become, therefore, the focus of numerous studies and surveys. There are currently several competing explanations—schools of thought—in the literature on why the mass public supports the use of force. This article is an attempt to identify the most prominent schools of thought on public opinion and the use of force, and the central factors associated with each school. Such a review is important to generating policy–relevant guidance pertaining to public opinion and the use of force—an objective made more pressing by the current war against terrorism.     

Israel's Deterrence Strategy Revisited

During the 2001–2009 period when American foreign policy was internationally unpopular and perceived as unilateral, many states strengthened their security cooperation with the United States and facilitated the reach of the us military. This behavior spans a range of actions along a spectrum from reaffirming traditional alliances to far more subtle forms of alignment. This pattern is in large part driven by the actions of regional powers such as Russia and China whose rising power pushes neighboring states to seek the assurance of the United States, and it has distinct implications for the endurance of American hegemony. As those regional powers seek to expand their influence, secondary states may increase their contributions to the maintenance of American hegemony, thus helping to extend it well into the future. They are less prone to do so, however, if the United States follows a strategy of restraint that calls into question its willingness to defend its hegemony. Therefore, a policy focused on maintaining American military preeminence and the demonstrated willingness to use it may be what sustains the cooperation from second-tier states that helps to maintain American hegemony.     

Whither Lafayette? French military policy and the American campaign in Afghanistan

During the American‐led military campaign against international terrorism, France has sought to preserve its special status and role as a global power. This effort continues longstanding French policies designed to maintain autonomy in security and foreign policy areas. Such policies create differences and discord with the United States over coalition warfare. This article examines the underpinnings of American and French preferences for coalition military missions in the context of national policy and past military operations. A case study of French participation in the operations in Afghanistan provides the framework for analysis.     

Why the U.S. Military Budget is ‘Foolish and Sustainable’

What defense budget the United States should have and what defense budget it can afford are separate questions. The debate raging in Washington about Pentagon spending ignores the distinction. Doves insist that we need a more modest military strategy because the current one is wasteful and economically unsustainable. Hawks say that the current approach is sensible and affordable. This article takes a third path, arguing that U.S. military policy is likely to remain extravagant because it is sustainable. We adopted our current strategy—which amounts to trying to run the world with the American military—because we could, not because it was wisest. Wealth and safety make the consequences of bad defense policy abstract for most U.S. taxpayers. So we buy defense like rich people shop, ignoring the balance of costs and benefits. We conflate ideological ambition with what is required for our safety. Unfortunately, the current political demand for austerity and fewer wars will only temporarily restrain our military spending and the ambitions it underwrites.     

Chinese Military Power: What Vexes the United States and Why?

The enhancement of Chinese military power over the past decade is generating ample debate over its meaning and consequences for American security interests. China's characterization in larger conceptions of U.S. national security strategy has experienced repeated shifts over the decades. China is now an arrived major power according to virtually all relevant power criteria, without U.S. policy makers conclusively resolving the implications of China's military modernization for American security interests. Comparable uncertainties bedevil Chinese thinking about American military power. The latent elements of strategic rivalry (if not outright confrontation) are beyond dispute, and could readily take deeper root in the bureaucratic processes of both countries. Without leaders in both systems fully imparting and communicating to one another their respective strategic equities in Asia and the Pacific, the emergence of a reconfigured regional security order fully accepted by both states remains very uncertain.     

Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations

Why do some states deploy troops to support UN missions while others do not? Although short from war, peacekeeping entails a military dimension of foreign policy in which uniformed personnel is deployed to accomplish diplomatic and political means. As such, decisions to commit troops to UN operations must have the implicit support of the armed forces in order to take place. Yet, military backing for peacekeeping participation is not universal; some military institutions are more willing to join such missions than others. This article accounts for variations in terms of peacekeeping commitments by focusing on security doctrines and the degree of integration between military and foreign policy roles. It hypothesizes that countries with externally oriented doctrines and integrated foreign and defense policies are more likely to commit troops to the UN than countries with national security doctrines and segregated military and foreign policy roles. Using evidence from the Latin American region, the paper suggests that the decision to engage in UN operations is the result of doctrinal policies and bureaucratic infighting.     

Italy and the new international economic order

In order to make it more effective as an actor on the international scene, the European Union is being urged to reverse its foreign policy priorities. EU enlargement policy has fallen out of grace and many want to see Europe acquire a “normal” foreign policy with a global rather than merely regional reach, significant military means and centralised governance. Management of various conflicts in Africa and Asia is also in vogue. Such a policy shift will define the nature of Europe's actorness. It is argued that, with all its defects, the EU performs quite well as a civilian regional power and efforts to transform it into a traditional military power with a global reach could make things worse rather than better.     

Anglo–American Relations 1950–51: Three Strikes for British Prestige

In 1949–1950, Britain rejected ideas of being a third force between the post-war Superpowers and adopted instead an approach that has been the keystone of British foreign policy from that point onwards: “hugging America close.” The aspiration was to establish a position closely related to the United States yet sufficiently independent, effectively to harness American power to British ends. This now familiar position has been much-debated recently in the context of post-9/11 military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan especially. However, this analysis examines three crises immediately following the British decision in 1949–1950 to give priority to the Anglo–American “special relationship” to demonstrate that, for Britain, this policy from the onset was both advantageous and potentially difficult. The outcomes of crises over NATO's Atlantic Command, Iranian oil, and ANZUS demonstrate how expansion of United States influence benefitted Britain but sometimes also required painful British adjustment and loss of prestige.     

The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

United States rapprochement with China should be re-examined by taking into consideration the American negotiating approach towards Beijing regarding the role of Japan, the United States' major Asian ally and China's long-term rival in East Asia. Whilst announcing the Nixon Doctrine, which increased pressure on Japan to strengthen its defense and regional responsibilities, Nixon and Kissinger used the so-called “Japan Card,” Japan's possible military resurgence and China's long-term fear of it, as a tacit negotiating tool to justify to Chinese leaders the continued United States military presence in East Asia. This article examines the impact of the United States rapprochement with China on the American negotiating process with Chinese leaders for the continuation of the United States–Japan Security Treaty and to what extent it changed China's policy toward American relations with Japan.     

Limiting America's Engagement: Roger Hilsman's Vietnam War, 1961–1963

This article examines the role of Roger Hilsman, an important State Department official in the Kennedy administration, in the formulation of American policy towards the Vietnam War between 1961 and 1963. Hilsman was one of the leading opponents of a conventional military escalation of the war in Vietnam, frequently clashing with the Pentagon and the American military establishment in order to limit United States' engagement. Hilsman was convinced that “victory” in Vietnam was possible if the United States adopted a counterinsurgency approach to the conflict. This perception was forged by his experiences as a guerrilla fighter in World War II. Perceived to be one of the main architects of the coup against President Diem in 1963, and vilified by elements in the United States military, he was removed from office by President Johnson early in 1964.     

The Perils of Politics: Why Staying Apolitical is Good for Both the U.S. Military & the Country

This article seeks to answer several vital questions about contemporary American civil- military relations. For example, why might the most professional military in United States history seem to be especially likely to engage in public dissent and advocacy? Why might political dissent and activity hold appeal for current and upcoming generations of military officers? And, how can present day officers be persuaded that retaining an apolitical ethos is fundamental to the American military, not just because of tradition but because public dissent can do real damage to the military institution and to the country it serves?     

Stagnation in U.S.-Africa Military Policy after U.S. Servicemembers’ Deaths in Niger

This article examines how events unfolded in the aftermath of the deaths of American servicemembers in Niger in 2017. It shows that there was remarkably little casualty aversion on the part of either the American public or the elites and examines why U.S. military policy towards Africa is so resistant to change, even when circumstances appear propitious.     

Competitive Engagement: Upgrading America's Influence

America's instruments of foreign policy are weak. As a result, Washington depends much more on its military power than it should. The militarization of foreign policy is neither good for American interests nor sustainable, since many political, economic, and ideological outcomes are not attainable through the use of military force. Yet ongoing discussions about America's non- military power miss one important factor: in virtually every theater of the world, local, regional, and strategic competitions affect America's ability to exert influence through its aid and diplomacy. From Pakistan to the Middle East to Africa, ideas about how to develop economies, shape educational systems, administer health care programs, and build political institutions, are contested. Until the competitive nature of aid and diplomacy is deliberately and explicitly considered, Washington's ability to achieve outcomes using its non-military power—often called “soft” or “smart power”—will remain fundamentally limited.     

The Two Halves of Sports-Diplomacy

ABSTRACT

What strategies does the United States pursue when it no longer perceives overt military intervention as politically viable or desirable but the problems or issues for which it was formerly undertaken remain? This analysis identifies three such periods in American foreign policy since the United States became a World Power and draws from the work of Peter Hall to develop a typology of strategies according to the magnitude of policy change. These range from adjustment in the settings of interventionism – persistence; the substitution of alternative instruments of foreign policy – ameliorism; and the principled rejection of interventionism in conjunction with a more systematic critique of prevailing foreign policy assumptions – transformationalism. Yet each approach is beset by certain structural limits and contradictions arising from the domestic politics and constitutional-institutional system of the United States that are important in understandiing and appreciating more fully the challenges – and opportunities – of the period ‘after interventionism’.     

Point of Departure: A Reassessment of Charles de Gaulle and the Paris Summit of May 1960

This article argues that the Franco–American antagonism of the 1960s, which culminated with France's partial withdrawal from NATO in 1966, stems from French president Charles de Gaulle's decision in the aftermath of the failed May 1960 Paris Summit to radically redirect French foreign policy away from its post-World War Two Atlantic orientation to a more European one. By linking the failed summit to de Gaulle's new perception of the Cold War, this article moves de Gaulle scholarship away from interpretations of his foreign policy as the product of anti-Americanism or an anachronistic vision of French power to an understanding rooted in his recognition that the changing dynamics of the Cold War required the Western Europeans to reduce their military dependence on the United States. Since American leaders would never willingly relinquish their dominant position in European security affairs, de Gaulle's new design almost ensured a rising Franco–American tension.     

Force Size for the Post-Westphalian World

The quality of the U.S. military has improved steadily since the end of the Cold War, but technological and managerial advancements cannot compensate for the inadequate size of the American armed forces. The post–Cold War years saw a shift from the Westphalian, state-ordered world to one where Western states are at war with transnational, substate terrorist groups. This requires adjustments in the American military establishment. Improvements in quality must be matched by an increase in quantity in order to meet U.S. security needs. As interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven, a minimalist force may be sufficient to win a war, but where nation-building is required, it will find it difficult to win the peace.     

The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War

Why did the Bush administration take the United States to war with Iraq in the aftermath of September 11, 2001? The constructivist approach used in this article to answer this question argues that the ideas of a handful of policy intellectuals affected political outcomes in remarkably consequential ways. These ideas shaped administration assessments of every major aspect of the Iraq war, beginning with its necessity and justification. Although the administration's ideational commitments were complex and evolving, four sets of ideas were central to its risk-filled gambit in the Middle East: a belief in the necessity and benevolence of American hegemony, a Manichaean conception of politics, a conviction that regime type is the principal determinant of foreign policy, and great confidence in the efficacy of military force. Taken together, these ideas defined the social purpose of American power, framed threats to the United States, and determined appropriate solutions to core problems. Ideas are not the sole factors setting the course of u.s. foreign policy, but they are essential to explaining an otherwise puzzling administration decision.     

Interdependent Preferences, Militarism, and Child Gender

Selection effects make it difficult to determine whether concern for other people genuinely affects individuals' policy preferences. Child gender provides a conveniently exogenous means of exploring the issue, especially in contexts such as military policy where girls and boys face different risks; in many countries male children are disproportionately likely to become soldiers and thus bear the costs of militarism. This creates divergent effects: those in households with girls generally prefer more hawkish foreign policies than do members of households with boys. Data from the 2004 American National Election Study confirm these intuitions, both in general statements of policy preference and in evaluating the net costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts.     

Why “Best Military Advice” is Bad for the Military—and Worse for Civilians

This article contends that “best military advice” is a problematic construct for both the military and civilians alike. Yet, the increasing resonance of this construct across the Joint Force cannot—and should not—be summarily dismissed. Instead, it merits reflection about why the term has grown in popularity, how its continued use is influencing the development of defense strategy, and perhaps above all, how it will affect American civil-military relations. As best military advice infuses the U.S. military, it will increasingly become normalized and held up as desirable, particularly among the younger generation. Short of serious near-term steps to neutralize this construct, its deleterious influence will only increase.     

The changing character of EUFOR Althea: power politics or learning?

States have different strategic cultures when it comes to legitimating the use of military force and its relation with other foreign policy instruments. However, increasingly, military operations are conducted in multilateral forums; EU military operations are one of the most notable examples of this development. While some claim that these operations reflect power relations between nations with different strategic cultures, others argue that these common missions involve states in a process of collective learning and convergence of interests. Drawing upon an advocacy coalition approach, this paper confronts the competing hypotheses in the case of European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), as the EU’s longest running military operation (since 2004). On the basis of policy documents and semi-structured interviews with policymakers and politicians, this paper concludes that the evolution of EUFOR Althea has been primarily the result of the power politics of different coalitions, but there have also been a few instances of learning.